JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. The appellant was the accused in a murder case; and the Sessions Judge of Kottayam convicted him under S.302 and sentenced him to imprisonment for life rejecting his plea of insanity under S.84 of the Penal Code. 2. Regarding the incident, there cannot be much controversy. The. appellant was living in a house in the same compound as the house of his brother pw. 6, where pw. 6, his wife pw. 2, and pw. 3 and pw. 1, the widow and daughter respectively of a pre-deceased brother, were living together with the mother of the appellant, Kunhupennu. The appellant left his house and went to Thikkoyil about six miles away and was working there as a tapper in a rubber estate belonging to Pw.7. On 24th December 1969, he left his work for no reason, and two days after, came to his brother's house and lived there. On 29tb December 1969, at about 9 a. m. while pw 4. and another were working on some vessels entrusted to them for repairs by Pw.6., the appellant joined them and had coffee with them. A little later, Pw2. saw him sharpening a chopper; and the mother of the appellant asked him why he was doing that. The appellant told her that he was going to pluck tapioca planted by Pw.6, when the mother told him that he should not do that as the tapioca was needed for domestic use. The appellant insisted that he would pluck and sell the tapioca, when the mother, in a rather loud tone, told him that he should not. The mother then went to the kitchen behind the house; and the appellant followed her and inflicted as many as seven cuts on her with the chopper. Thereafter, he threw the chopper there and ran away from the place. pw. 4, pw. 3 and pw. 2 came to the kitchen; and within a few minutes, the mother breathed her last. Pw. 1 went and gave the first information to the police in the afternoon; and the police came to the scene, conducted the inquest, recovered the material objects including M. O.1, the weapon used, sent the dead body for autopsy, questioned the relevant witnesses, etc. And the appellant was arrested at Thikkoyil the next day. 3. Pw. 1 went and gave the first information to the police in the afternoon; and the police came to the scene, conducted the inquest, recovered the material objects including M. O.1, the weapon used, sent the dead body for autopsy, questioned the relevant witnesses, etc. And the appellant was arrested at Thikkoyil the next day. 3. The police noted that the mental condition of the appellant was not alright; and they sent him to the Medical College Hospital at Kottayam, where he was kept under observation from 8th to 17th January 1969 by pw. 13. Then he was sent to the Mental Hospital at Trivandrum; and pw. 12 kept him there till 29th January 1970. He was of unsound mind when he was brought to the Mental Hospital; but on 29th January 1970, he was found fit to stand his trial, and Pw. 12 issued a certificate to that effect. Then came the trial. 4. As indicated already, there cannot be much dispute regarding the incident; nor does the counsel of the appellant dispute the incident and the complicity of the appellant in the crime. He has confined his arguments to the question whether the appellant was insane at the relevant time. 5. The Sessions Judge has considered this question and has referred to the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Dahyabhai Chahaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1964 SC 1563 ) and in Bhikari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1966 SC 1 ). Between the said two decisions, the question regarding insanity has been fairly settled; but we feel that the Sessions Judge has not properly understood the scope and content of these decisions. 6. In a case like this, there are two or three matters to be carefully understood and appreciated: One, that every individual is normally presumed to be sane until the contrary is established; two, that the onus of the prosecution is not merely to establish that the accused committed the criminal act, but also to establish that he had the necessary mens rea, which is also an ingredient of the offence; and three, that, under S.105 of the Indian Evidence Act, the onus of proving one of the General Exceptions like insanity is on the accused. Normally, every person is presumed to be sane, so that the prosecution need not initially establish that the accused was sane :the prosecution can rely on the normal presumption mentioned above - that the accused was sane. If the accused claims the benefit of S.84, he has to establish that he was non compos mentis - was not in a position to understand the nature of his act. But, to establish this, the degree of proof required is not the same as that required to establish the guilt of the accused - proof beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum of proof required is only that which is required in a civil case, a preponderance of probability in favour of the accused. Once the accused establishes this by such preponderance of probability, the normal presumption that every one is presumed to be sane is rebutted and the onus shifts to the prosecution, in other words, the onus of the prosecution to establish the mens rea is not discharged in such a case. The prosecution has then to establish that the accused had the requisite mental capacity to understand the nature of his act. (This the Sessions Judge has not understood.) Again, in establishing the mental capacity of the accused (his capacity to understand the nature of his act), what is required is (from the point of view of the prosecution or considering the question as part of the onus of the prosecution to establish the mens reas of the accused) that the prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the mental capacity to understand the nature of his act, or (from the point of view of the accused or treating the question as the onus of the accused to establish his claim to a General Exception) that the accused need create only a reasonable doubt in the judicial mind that he might have been insane, might not have been insane. The accused may do this from the prosecution evidence and circumstances and / or by defence evidence. The accused may do this from the prosecution evidence and circumstances and / or by defence evidence. In other words, if the ultimate result of the prosecution evidence and circumstances and / or the defence evidence is that the court is left in a reasonable doubt regarding the mental condition of the accused) that he might have been insane, might not have been insane), then the benefit of that reasonable doubt should go to the accused and he should be found insane. Of course, the relevant 'point of time at which the mental condition has to be assessed is the time when the offence was committed. 7. These propositions are laid down by the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court, in the former of which Subba Rao J. has mentioned these propositions seriatim, and in the second of which Mudholkar, J. has followed the principles pointed out by Subba Rao J. and also explained them, more particularly the last point mentioned by us, viz, the reasonable doubt regarding the mental capacity of the accused. We had also occasion to consider the question in two decisions, viz., Palakkal Mani v. State of Kerala (Criminal Appeal No. 364 of 1968) and In Re Venkita Rao (ILR 1970 (2) Ker. 507). 8. With these principles in mind, let us now examine the evidence in the case. The Sessions Judge and the prosecution did not think it necessary to examine either of the two doctors, the doctor at Kottayam who kept the appellant under observation for about a week a few days after the incident and the doctor at Trivandrum who kept him in the Mental Hospital for over a year. There is evidence in the case that the appellant had an attack of insanity about six years prior to the incident and was put in chains by his parents and relations. Immediately after the present incident, he was found to be insane by the doctor at Kottayam, which was confirmed by the doctor at Trivandrum. In these circumstances, the Sessions Judge and the prosecution should have called either or both of the doctors and examined them. When the case came up before us, we found this lacuna in the case and, therefore, called both the doctors and examined them here using our powers under S.428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They are pw. 13 (the Kottayam doctor) and Pw. When the case came up before us, we found this lacuna in the case and, therefore, called both the doctors and examined them here using our powers under S.428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They are pw. 13 (the Kottayam doctor) and Pw. 12 (the Trivandrum doctor). 9. The doctors have deposed that the appellant was suffering from schizophrenia; and both the doctors have also given some expert opinion about this ailment. Pw. 13 the Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, -Medical College, Kottayam, has stated that when the appellant was sent to him on 8th January, he was mentally unsound. That doctor has also stated that the appellant might have been suffering from this disease even prior to the date he saw him. Again, the doctor has opined that there are cases where schizophrenia comes without any kind of forebodings; the disease sets in all on a sudden. To the same effect is the evidence of pw. 12, the Superintendent and Chief Psychiatrist, Mental Hospital, Trivandrum and Professor and Head of the Department of Psychiatry, Medical College, Trivandrum. The appellant was working under pw. 7; and pw. 7 has said that the appellant left his job for no reason whatever. The relations of the appellant (witnesses like pw. 6, pw. 2 and pw. 3) have stated that when he returned home, he was quiet, withdrawn and preoccupied. Some mannerisms were also found in him. (The doctors have said that these are the symptoms of schizophrenia). And the further evidence of the relations is that the appellant was on very loving terms with his mother; and that he had an attack of insanity a few years previously, when he was put in chains. 10. Now, the Sessions Judge has attached undue importance to the fact that the appellant ran away from the place after the incident. He has also stated that, "Pw. 2 who heard this exchange did not hear any words which would indicate the onset of an attack of schizophrenia" Running away from the scene of occurrence is certainly a fact or circumstance to be considered, because, as it is said, if the assailant would not have committed the offence if a policeman were at the elbow, then, it cannot be said that he was mentally unsound. The reason is simple because if he would not have committed the offence in the presence of a policemen, it shows that he had the mental capacity to understand the nature of his act - that he was doing something wrong or contrary to law for which the policemen would take him to task. But, every case of running away from the scene cannot be said' to be for the reason that the assailant knew that what he did was wrong or illegal. Other reasons might have also prompted him to run away from the scene, so that too much importance should not be attached to this fact. This Court has indicated this in Palakkal Mani's case already referred to. It is to be noted that, though the appellant ran away from the place after the incident, he did not make any attempt to go into hiding. he was arrested by the police the very next day at Thikkoyil.' The other reason of the Sessions Judge that pw. 2 did not hear words which would indicate the onset of an attack of schizophrenia, we confess, we are not able to understand. The sudden onset of an attack of schizophrenia does not come with any particular "words which would indicate the onset", so that the absence of such words will not indicate that there was no attack of schizophrenia. 11. In the circumstances and the facts revealed in the case, the position ultimately boils down to this. Prior to the incident, the appellant was found to be quiet, withdrawn, moody and pre-occupied: he had some mannerisms too: the appellant left bis work under Pw. 7 for no reason: a few days after the incident when the doctor saw him, he was found to be of unsound mind: and his relationship with his mother was quite loving. The Kottayam doctor has said that the appellant might have had the attack even earlier than he saw him: and both the doctors have said that the onset of the disease might be quite sudden - without foreboding. In the face of these facts and the evidence, we have considerable doubt regarding the mental condition of the appellant at the time of the incident - whether he was in a position to understand the nature of his act. In the face of these facts and the evidence, we have considerable doubt regarding the mental condition of the appellant at the time of the incident - whether he was in a position to understand the nature of his act. In such a situation - when reasonable doubt is engendered in the judicial mind regarding the mental capacity of the appellant, the benefit of such reasonable doubt should be give to the appellant, with the result that he should be found to be of unsound mind. Mudholkar, J. has stated this in Para.6 of the judgment in Shikari's case already referred to. This Court has also indicated this in In Re Venkita Rao. Therefore, we give the benefit of our reasonable doubt regarding the mental capacity of the appellant to him and hold that he was insane at the relevant time. We hasten to reiterate that the condition of mind that is relevant is certainly the condition at the time the crime was committed. 12. The conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge on the appellant are, therefore, set aside and the appellant is acquitted. 13. Lastly comes the more anxious problem in the case. The appellant is one who is liable to have attacks of schizophrenia; and when the attack comes (and it might come all on a sudden), he is not capable of understanding the nature of his act. He might have homicidal or suicidal tendencies. (The doctors have said so.) Therefore, until he is perfectly and completely cured, he should not be let out; and, if he is released before he is fully cured, he will be a danger to society. Under S.471 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we have power to direct the appellant to be detained in safe custody and we do so. Under the proviso to the same section, the detention has to be in a lunatic asylum in accordance with the rules framed by the State Government under the Indian Lunacy Act. The appellant will, therefore, be detained in safe custody in a lunatic asylum in the State in accordance with the rules framed by the Government under the Lunacy Act; and we warn that the authorities should be careful to see that he is not released until he is fully and completely cured of the dicease.