Durga Charan Saha Roy, the respondent in the present revision petition, filed Money Suit No. 37 of 1965 against the Nishi Kumar Das, the petitioner herein for the recovery of Rs. 168.75 in the Court of Munsiff, Belonia. The suit was fixed for recording parties' evidence on 21-5-1966. Before that date only the evidence of the plaintiff Durga Charan had been recorded on commission. When the case was called on 21-5-1966, none put in appearance on behalf of the defendant and so the suit was decreed on the basis of plaintiff's evidence taken on commission. A short while after on the same date, Shri Jadunandan Datta, the Advocate of the defendant, moved an ap­plication on behalf of the defendant for set­ting aside the decree, which he described as ex parte, and deciding the suit afresh on hearing the arguments of the parties' counsel. That application was dismissed on 12-8-1968 on the finding that the decree dated 21-5-1966 was not ex parte, it having been made under Rule 3 of Order 17 of the Civil Pro­cedure Code, hereinafter called the Coda, and that as such an application under O. 9, Rule 13 of the Code was not the proper remedy for getting rid of the decree. Having felt aggrieved, Durga Charan Saha Roy went in appeal to the Court of Shri S. M. Ah, Additional Subordinate Judge, Agartala. Shri S. M. Ali differed from the trial Court on the point that the decree had been made under Order 17, Rule 3, of the Code. In his opinion, that provision of the law was not attracted because1 the suit had been adjourned to 21-5-1966 not on the prayer of the defen­dant but in normal routine by the Court it­self. He, therefore, held, speaking virtually, that the suit had been decreed ex parte. However, Shri S. M. Ali rejected the appeal on 21-2-1987 on the finding that the applica­tion for setting aside the ex parte decree had been made not by the defendant himself but by his counsel and that the counsel had no legal authority to do so. The instant revi­sion petition is directed against the orders made by the trial Court on 12-8-1966 and tide first appellate Court on 21-2-1967. 2. The instant revi­sion petition is directed against the orders made by the trial Court on 12-8-1966 and tide first appellate Court on 21-2-1967. 2. A reference to the order-sheet of the trial Court brings out that on 7-5-1966, the date preceding the one on which the suit was decreed, namely, 21-5-1966, the presid­ing officer of the Court was on leave. On that date it transpired that the Commissioner, appointed for recording the statement of the plaintiff, had submitted his report along with the relevant documents. Some official of the Court made an order adjourning the suit to 21-5-1966 for peremptory hearing. It does not take long to conclude that the Court official had no jurisdiction to fix the case for hearing, that being the exclusive privilege on the presiding officer. At the best, the Court official could have adjourned the case to some date for being put up before the pre­siding officer for proper orders. Therefore 21st of May, 1966, could not be a date for hearing of the case in the eye of law, and as a consequence the suit could not be taken up by the Court for hearing in the absence of the defendant. It was the legal obligation of the Court to issue notice to the defendant for appearance. The decree made on that date cannot stand. The defendant can legi­timately demand that that decree should be quashed and suit proceeded with 8. The order made on 21-5-1966 is a brief one and so I am tempted to reproduce it in full. It runs as under: "The plaintiffs side present. The defen­dant absent without taking any step. 1 P. W. has been examined and cross-exa­mined and the case of the plaintiff has been proved. Hence ordered that the suit be de­creed on contest for Rs. 168.75 with costs." Evidently, the proceedings in the Court on 7-5-1966 and 21-5-1966 do not establish that either the suit had been adjourned on the former date to the latter at the request of the defendant under Order 17, Rule 3, or that it was decreed on 21-5-1966 on contest. The defendant made no request to Court on 7-5-1966 to adjourn the case to 21-5-1966 and so that adjournment would fall under Order 17, Rule 2. The defendant made no request to Court on 7-5-1966 to adjourn the case to 21-5-1966 and so that adjournment would fall under Order 17, Rule 2. The defendant being absent on 21-5-1966, the question of contest on his behalf could not arise and as such the Munsiff who decreed the suit was not fair in Stating that the suit had been decreed on con­test. Hence, I agree with the first appellate Court that the trial Court was wrong -in holding that the suit had been decreed under Order 17, Rule 3, and that the proper course for the defendant to follow for challenging the decree made was to go in appeal rather than move an application under O. 9, Rule 13. I therefore feel satisfied that the defendant had the legal right to move an ap­plication under Order 9, Rule 13, because the suit must be considered in the eye of law to have been decreed ex parte despite the recital in the body of the order dated 21-5-1966 that it had been disposed of on contest. 4. This brings us to the consideration of the question whether Shri S. M. Ali was justi­fied in rejecting the appeal on the basis that it was the defendant and not his counsel who could have moved an application under Order 9, Rule 13. The rights and the obligations of the Pleaders are defined in Order III of the Code. The expression "Pleader" is defined in Section 2 (15) of the Code to mean any person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an advocate, a Vakil and an Attorney of a High Court. The rights and the obligations of the Pleaders are defined in Order III of the Code. The expression "Pleader" is defined in Section 2 (15) of the Code to mean any person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an advocate, a Vakil and an Attorney of a High Court. Rule 1 of Order III of the Code runs as under: "Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise express­ly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader (appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be), on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, C the Court so directs, be made by the party in parson." On plain reading of this Rule I see no escape from the conclusion that a Pleader duly appointed by a party can move an "ap­plication" on his behalf provided there is no provision to the contrary in law respecting that application just as an application made by a pauper - vide Order 33, Rule 4, of the Code. Surely the document dated 21-5-1966 which was presented to the Munsiffs Court by Shri Jadunandan Datta, the Advocate of the defendant, soon after the suit was decreed falls in the description of an "application", inasmuch as the prayer made in that docu­ment was for setting aside the ex parte de­cree and Rule 13 of Order 9, envisages an application for such a prayer. Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribing the period for moving the Court for setting aside an ex parte decree forms part of Third Divi­sion of the schedule to the Act and that Division bears the heading "Applica­tions". Part I of that Division, again, is headed "Applications in specified cases", and it is under that Part that Article 123 falls. Hence, there can be no manner of doubt that it was an "application" which Shri Jadunandan Datta had moved in the Munsiffs Court on 21-5-1966 praying for setting aside the ex parte decree. Part I of that Division, again, is headed "Applications in specified cases", and it is under that Part that Article 123 falls. Hence, there can be no manner of doubt that it was an "application" which Shri Jadunandan Datta had moved in the Munsiffs Court on 21-5-1966 praying for setting aside the ex parte decree. It would, therefore, follow that that Advocate had the necessary legal sanction to move the appli­cation on his own by virtue of the Vakalatnama which had been executed in his favour by the defendant. Consequently, Shri S. M. Ali was in error in holding that the Advocate could not have moved the application and that it was obligatory that the application should be signed and filed by the defendant! himself. 5. The conclusion reached by me gathers support from the authorities reported in AIR 1929 Lah 96, Abdul Aziz v. Punjab National Bank, and AIR 1944 All 238, Jwala Devi v. Bhrigunath. The Lahore High Court held that the authority of the counsel depends on the terms of the power-of-attorney, if any, granted by his client, and in the absence of such an authority, on the intention of the par­ties, express or implied, and that the general practice in such cases is a good indication of implied authority. It was held further that the provisions of Rule 4 (2) of Order 3 are wide enough to cover the case of an appli­cation for restoration of a suit dismissed in default, as all proceedings in the suit are not ended so far as regards the party, merely by its dismissal in default or by an ex parte decree, which part of the proceedings is lia­ble to be set aside on an application and the case restored to its original number. It might be appropriately mentioned here that when the suit of the respondent Bank in the re­ported case was dismissed in default, an ap­plication for its restoration was moved on the same date by the counsel on his own and without securing the signature thereon of any other authorised agent of the Bank. There­fore, the facts of this Lahore case are on all fours identical with those of the case in hand. 6. There­fore, the facts of this Lahore case are on all fours identical with those of the case in hand. 6. The Allahabad High Court held in the case of Jwala Devi, AIR 1944 All 238 (supra) that where the vakalatnama filed by the vakil for the defendant in a suit is in the usual terms giving the vakil the power to apply for execution of the decree, which would necessarily be a stage after the deci­sion of the suit, in the absence of any ex­pression indicating limitation on his powers it would be necessarily implied that the vakil has the authority to do everything that was essential for the proper conduct of the case, and if the case had been decided ex parte it must be held that there was an implied au­thority given to the vakil to have that order set aside and the case heard on merits. The application for setting aside the ex parte de­cree, it may be appositely stated, was signed by the vakil in whose favour the vakalat­nama had been issued by the defendant and not by the latter himself. The facts of the Allahabad case are also, therefore, identical with those of the present case. 7. Shri J. K. Roy, appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, was unable to cite any authority to the contrary. I would, therefore,' hold that Shri S. M. Ali was wrong in his conclusion that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree could not have been legally filed by the counsel of the defendant. 8. It was stated in the application filed by the counsel Shri Jadunandan Datta on 21-5-1966 that he had visited the Court early in the day and had learnt on enquiry that the plaintiff had not filed "any tadbir or hazira of the witnesses", that he was ready to argue the case, and that the case was called and decreed ex parte when he was busy in an­other Court. I see no adequate justification for not taking the counsel at his word, espe­cially when it was not denied on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent during the course of arguments in this Court that no witness had come to the Court on behalf of the plaintiff on 21-5-1966 and when it is obvious that the suit was decreed only on the basis of the statement of the plaintiff which had been re­corded on commission. 9. 9. It is germane to point out that ac­cording to Rule 8 of Order 26 of the Code, evidence taken on a commission cannot be read as evidence in the suit without the con­sent of the party against whom the same is offered, unless - (a) the person who gave the evidence is beyond the jurisdiction of Court, or dead or unable from sickness or infirmity to at­tend to be personally examined, or exempted from personal appearance in Court, or is a person in the service of the Government who cannot, in the opinion of the Court, attend without detriment to the public service, or (b) the Court in its discretion dispenses with the proof of any of the circumstances mentioned in clause (a), and authorises evidence of any person being read as evidence in the suit, notwithstanding proof that the cause for taking such evidence by commis­sion has ceased at the time of reading the same. It was therefore obligatory for the plaintiff to satisfy the Court, before his evidence re­corded on commission could be read as evi­dence in the suit, that his case fell within the ambit of clause (a) of Rule 8 or to secure a specific order from the Court under cl. (b) of that Rule. Nothing of the kind appears to have been done when the case was disposed of on 21-5-1966. Therefore, the Munsiff was clearly in error in decreeing the suit on the basis of plaintiffs evidence taken on com-, mission. That evidence was not admissible for the reasons just mentioned. 10. As a result, I accept the revision peti­tion, quash the MunsifFs order dated 12-8-1966 and that of the first appellate Court dated 21-2-1967, and on allowing the appli­cation dated 21-5-1966 set aside the ex parte decree. The case is remanded to the trial Court for disposal according to the provi­sions of law. The suit shall be re-entered at its old number. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, I leave the parties to bear their own costs in all the Courts regarding the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. Revision accepted.: