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1970 DIGILAW 25 (KAR)

SHIDAGOUDA BAPUSAHEB KHANAGOUDA DESAI v. BALASAHEB SHIDAGOUDA DESAI

1970-02-19

NARAYANA PAI

body1970
( 1 ) RESPONDENTS filed a suit against the appellants for partition and delivery to them of a half share in the suit properties. The appellants resisted the claim by contending that the property was a Desai Vathan go erned by the custom of impartibility and descent by primogeniture. The suit was, however, decreed as prayed. Against the decree the appellants preferred First Appeal 89 of 1955 to the High Court of Bombay. During the pendency of the said appeal, the appellants made an application for stay of execution of the decree and respondents an application for payment of maintenance to them. The stay application was rejected. The application for maintenance was ordered. ( 2 ) THE respondents in execution of the decree of the trial court, obtained possession of half share of the suit properties. Pursuant to the order of the Bombay High Court they also recoveied a sum of Rs. 1,129-6-0. ( 3 ) THE first appeal stood transferred to this Court in consequence of the Re-organisation of states and renumbered as R. A. B. 194 of 1956. The appeal was disposed ol on January 9,1962 by an order setting aside the decree of the trial court ana remanding tne suit for fresh trial witn liberty to parties to file additional pleadings and also to adduce lurtner evidence. ( 4 ) AFTER the disposal of the appeal, the appellants made an application for restitution under S. 144 or the Code of Civil Procedure seeking redelivery oi the properties taken possession of by the respondents in execution of the decree in suit and also for recovery of the sum of Rs. 1,129-6-0 recovered by the respondents pursuant to the interim order of the High Court of Bombay referred to above. The trial court granted both the prayers. Upon appeal, the District Judge while confirming the direction for redeiivery 01 properties, has set aside the order tor rerund Rs. 1,129-6-0. Hence this second appeal. 1,129-6-0 recovered by the respondents pursuant to the interim order of the High Court of Bombay referred to above. The trial court granted both the prayers. Upon appeal, the District Judge while confirming the direction for redeiivery 01 properties, has set aside the order tor rerund Rs. 1,129-6-0. Hence this second appeal. ( 5 ) THE ground on which the District Judge has held that S. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not entitle tne appellants to recover the above sum of money is that the reversal or setting aside of the trial court's decree for partition by this Court on appeal, does not by itself set aside or vary the interim order for maintenance reierred to above nor is it possible for the appellants to contend that the said order was to any extent dependent upon me trial court's decree set aside in appeal or its operation conditional upon the continuance of the said decree, He further observed that in the event of the suit being decreed, the amount paid may be adjusted against mesne profits to which the respondents wourd be entitled. ( 6 ) IT appears to me that the two observations made by the District judge are mutually contradictory. Once he says that the amount of Ks. 1,129-6-0 is an amount adjustable against the mesne profits which the respondents might be entitled, he necessarily holds that tne payment of the said sum is inevitably connected with the plaintiffs' claim succeeding or failing in the suit. That it is so intimately connected is also clear from the order of the Bombay High Court which is available in the papers of r. A. B. 194 of 1956. ( 7 ) THE prayer in the application was for payment of Rs. 8,000 by way of maintenance pending disposal of the first appeal. The judgment or order therein also observes, "the opponents (meaning the present appellants) admit that the income of the lands is Rs. 3,000 and inasmuch as the applicants appear to be prima facie entitled to a half share in the property in suit, there is no reason why they should not pay Rs. 1,500 per year to the applicants till the final partition is actually made. 3,000 and inasmuch as the applicants appear to be prima facie entitled to a half share in the property in suit, there is no reason why they should not pay Rs. 1,500 per year to the applicants till the final partition is actually made. It has got to be remembered that the decree against the opponents was not only for partition and separate possession, but for mesne profits prior to the suit and also for mesne profits pending the suit, and making an order for maintenance in this manner is likely to prove of assistance to the opponents also, because ultimately if the appeal is decided against them, they would not have to pay all at once all the mesne profits. " ( 8 ) THE reasoning contained in this paragraph of the Bombay High court's order leaves no room for doubt that the court while making an 'interim order proceeded on the footing that prima facie on the decree then pending in appeal, the respondents were entitled to receive the income the properties. That the amount payable under tne interim order of the High Court was also an amount liable to be adjusted against the mesae proms, is also stated as one of the reasons in support of the order. ( 9 ) IN view of these circumstances, it is impossible to accept the District Judge's view that the order for payment ox maintenance was wholly 'unconnected with tne decree or that its operation is not to any extent conditional upon the continuance of the decree. ( 10 ) FURTHER, as pointed out by this Court in the case reported in Anusuya Bai v. Ramaiah Raju 1961 Mys. L. J. 378. , the duty ol the court under S. 144 C. P. C. is not limited to the direct provisions of a decree or order setting aside or varying another decree or order, but extends to the making of such orders as are properly consequential on such variation or reversal. L. J. 378. , the duty ol the court under S. 144 C. P. C. is not limited to the direct provisions of a decree or order setting aside or varying another decree or order, but extends to the making of such orders as are properly consequential on such variation or reversal. Interim orders made pending an appeal, are perhaps the best examples ot orders which get so affected by the ultimate decision in the appeal as to make the consequence ot the said orders amenable to the jurisdiction of the court under S. 144 of the C. P. C. and which come within the scope of the jurisdiction indicated by the expression 'properly consequential on such variation or reversal' occurring at the end of sub-section (1) of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, ( 11 ) THE second appeal is, therefore, allowed; the order of the District judge is set aside and that of the trial court restored. The parties will bear their own costs here and in the lower appellate court. --- *** --- .