Judgment :- 1. In this Criminal Revision Petition by the husband, who was directed to pay a monthly maintenance at the rate of Rs. 20/- per mensem to his wife by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Chengannur, the learned counsel of the petitioner challenges the order on the ground that the court below did not comply with the provisions of sub-section (3) of S.488 Cr. P.C. The sub-section (3) with its first proviso may be read as follows: "If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that, if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing." 2. There is dispute whether the proviso under sub-section (3) referred to above is a proviso to sub-section (3) only or to sub-section (1) of S.488. There is equally strong opposite view that it is a proviso to sub-section (3) only and will come into play with an offer made after an order has been passed granting maintenance under sub-section (1). The order for maintenance can be made only under sub-section (1) of S.488 when two requirements had to be fulfilled, viz., that the husband in the case of a wife has sufficient means and yet neglects or refuses to maintain her. Once an order is passed under sub-section (1), subsection (3) deals with the case when the husband comes forward to offer maintenance to his wife. It was then that the trial court has to consider if there are any just grounds for the wife to refuse to live with the husband. If just grounds are made out, the Magistrate may issue an order under sub-section (3). It was then that the trial court has to consider if there are any just grounds for the wife to refuse to live with the husband. If just grounds are made out, the Magistrate may issue an order under sub-section (3). But, if such grounds are not made out for the wife to live separately from the husband, the Magistrate in spite of the order under sub-section (1) may pass an order disallowing the maintenance by execution of that order. Sub-section (4) of S.488 can successfully be pressed into service when the husband offers to maintain his wife on condition of living with him before an order is passed under sub-section (1). Sub-section (4) says that no wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section. So, it would be clear that subsection (4) governs the whole section including sub-section (1). Hence no maintenance can be granted to a wife under sub-section (1) if she is living in adultery or if without any sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or if she and her husband are living separately by mutual consent. In the light of this sub-section, it was unnecessary for the Legislature to apply the first proviso to sub-section (3) to sub-section (1) also. Probably, this proviso was inserted in the section in order to give the husband one more opportunity to offer to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him. Whether in the instant case the proviso to sub-section (3) goes with sub-section (1) or sub-section, (3), it is clear that before an order is passed for maintenance in favour of the wife, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider whether the offer made by the husband to the wife that she should live with him is bona fide or not. That appears to be the line of thought in, many rulings, one of which is reported in Bommareddi Venkattappa Reddy v. Bommareddi Laxmamma (1959 Madras Law Journal (Criminal) Vol. III page 549). That appears to be the line of thought in, many rulings, one of which is reported in Bommareddi Venkattappa Reddy v. Bommareddi Laxmamma (1959 Madras Law Journal (Criminal) Vol. III page 549). The relevant portion of that ruling is as follows: "The proviso to sub-section (3) of S.488, Criminal Procedure Code, enunciates a salutary principle of Courts having to consider the offers made by the husband to take back the wife and maintain her and if necessary uphold the wife's right to refuse such an offer only when the Court is satisfied that there is just ground for so refusing. The intendment of this provision is for affording as many opportunities as possible by the Court for composing the differences between the husband and the wife. When such is the purpose, the duty cast upon the Court to enquire into the matters arising out of such an offer or to state reasons for refusal of that offer should not be brushed aside merely on the ground that on earlier occasions or in original applications demanding maintenance such offer or offers have been considered." 3. It is, therefore, necessary in the circumstances of this case to find whether there has been any such offer bona fide made by the petitioner to the respondent-wife asking her to live with him. It is true that the court below did not consider the specific question as such, but the evidence has been adduced on either side keeping in mind the petitioner's offer to the respondent to live with him. Therefore, I do not find it necessary to send back the case for re-writing a judgment at the instance of the trial court. Form the evidence on record, I will consider whether the petitioner would have made any such bona fide offer to his wife as condition precedent for her maintenance. 4. The evidence in this ease is that of the petitioner as Pw.1 and her witnesses examined as Pws. 2 to 5. Pw. 2 is the husband of the respondent's mother's elder sister, while Pw. 4 is the husband of the respondent's mother's younger sister. Pws. 3 and 5 are independent witnesses. The evidence of these witnesses had established that the petitioner was not a willing party for the continuance of the marriage with the respondent. At the instance of Pw. Pw. 2 is the husband of the respondent's mother's elder sister, while Pw. 4 is the husband of the respondent's mother's younger sister. Pws. 3 and 5 are independent witnesses. The evidence of these witnesses had established that the petitioner was not a willing party for the continuance of the marriage with the respondent. At the instance of Pw. 2, two messengers had been sent to the petitioner asking him to take back the respondent to his house. They were Pws. 4 and 5. the fact that Pws. 4 and 5 visited the petitioner was more or less admitted by the petitioner himself. The petitioner when examined in the court as rw.1 had also stated that Pws. 4 and 5 were closely connected with the performance of the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent and they were also the neighbours of both parties. When they visited the petitioner, the petitioner was reported to have told them that he would not allow the respondent to visit his house and that he did not want to continue the marriage. The counter case of rw.1 that he sent word through Pws. 4 and 5 that he was prepared to take her back to his house was not put as a question to Pw. 4 or Pw. 5 in cross-examination. Apart from the statement of rw.1 of his word of mouth, there is no other evidence or circumstance to show that he made a bona fide offer to the respondent asking her to go back to his house. So, she had been living separately for more than 2 years at her own residence prior to the filing of the petition in the lower court. The alleged desertion by the respondent even according to the petitioner was some 2 years prior to the filing of the petition in the lower court. The alleged desertion of two years prior to the filing of the petition may not be a circumstance to disallow maintenance to a destitute wife. The respondent had, however, made out a case that the petitioner has sufficient means and yet he neglected or refused to maintain her. That is the pre-requisite which is required to be proved under sub-section (1) of S.488. Having proved that, it was not open to the petitioner to point out that the respondent's desertion was 2 years ago. The respondent had, however, made out a case that the petitioner has sufficient means and yet he neglected or refused to maintain her. That is the pre-requisite which is required to be proved under sub-section (1) of S.488. Having proved that, it was not open to the petitioner to point out that the respondent's desertion was 2 years ago. That cannot be put into service as a ground for disallowing maintenance. In this regard, the observation in Tejabai v. Shankarrao (AIR. 1966 Bombay 48) may be seen. It is as follows at page 52: "Desertion by the wife at some anterior date is not made a ground under the section for disallowing maintenance. It is her refusal to go back to her husband when a genuine offer is made which disentitled her to maintenance. For the purposes of that section, the Magistrate has to see whether the wife is destitute, and, the husband having means has refused or neglected to maintain her. If he finds that these requirements are fulfilled in praesenti, that is, at the date of the proceeding, it would be no answer to her claim that some five years previously, she bad voluntarily deserted her husband." 5. Even otherwise the evidence is conclusive in this case that the conduct of the petitioner was not to maintain his wife by bringing her back to his residence. Pw. 2 speaks of the ill-treatment which was meted out to the respondent at his residence while she was living there as husband and wife for a short period of one year after the marriage. It was the petitioner who, as a matter of fact, sent her back to her residence about a year after the date of marriage. She was left at the junction of the road directing her to go to her residence alone. Pw. 3 witnesses that incident. Again, the respondent invited him to go to her house. It was when he was seen in the neighbourhood of her house while he was witnessing a boat race. But, the petitioner refused to go with her. Pw.1 herself had given evidence as to how she was taken back to her residence and left there. She was living in her house for more than 2 years before the filing of the petition in the lower court. But, the petitioner refused to go with her. Pw.1 herself had given evidence as to how she was taken back to her residence and left there. She was living in her house for more than 2 years before the filing of the petition in the lower court. During the period of 2 years, no attempt had been made by the petitioner to take her back. The reconciliation sought to be brought about through Pws. 4 and 5 was not carried through because of the attitude of the petitioner, who did not want to continue the marriage. In the light of this evidence, I am of the opinion that the petitioner did not make a bona fide offer to the respondent either before or after the filing of the petition and as such the petitioner is not entitled to take advantage of either the proviso to sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) in the circumstances of this case. The order awarding maintenance to the respondent was, therefore, justified. I find no ground to interfere with that order. 6. In the result, the Revision Petition is dismissed. The order of maintenance passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate is confirmed.