Judgment :- 1. The tenant is the revision petitioner. Against him the landlord filed BRC.112/64 before the Rent Controller, Alleppey for eviction under S.11 (2), (3) and (4) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act-Act 2 of 1965 (shortly stated the Act), mainly on the ground that he wants the building for the occupation by his two sons who are dependent on him. The Rent Controller found that the requirement was not bonafide and dismissed the petition; but in appeal the learned appellate authority reversed it, finding that the building is required for the landlord bonafide for the occupation of two of the members of his family who are dependent on him. This order of the appellate authority has been confirmed in revision by the learned District Judge of Alleppey. 2. Two points urged on behalf of the revision petitioner were: (1) the allegation that the landlord requires the building bonafide for the occupation of bis sons is not bonafide; and (2) no notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act as is required of law was issued. 3. On the first point, the argument of the learned counsel is two-fold, viz., that the landlord has a number of other buildings in the town and any one of such buildings can easily be made available for the required purpose; and even conceding that the purpose stated is true, the two sons for whose occupation eviction is now demanded are not dependent on the petitioner. It is true that the landlord owns other buildings in the town; but all those buildings are with the tenants and not in his possession. The first proviso to S.11 (3) is to the effect that the rent control court shall not order eviction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city or town. This proviso cannot apply since the landlord has no other building in his possession in the town or city. The building now occupied by him has two rooms in the ground flour and one room in the upstair. The two sons are married and they stand badly in need of separate accommodation for their family. This proviso cannot apply since the landlord has no other building in his possession in the town or city. The building now occupied by him has two rooms in the ground flour and one room in the upstair. The two sons are married and they stand badly in need of separate accommodation for their family. It is not possible to give them separate accommodation in the present building itself and when the father feels that in the interest of the family and for maintaining healthy relationship between him and his sons it is necessary that they should be provided accommodation elsewhere, he can with justification demand eviction of the present tenant who is running an oil mill in item No. 2 shed. The argument that the sons are not dependent on the father as they have their own sources of income and are financially in a sound position to maintain their family. I do not think, is open to the revision petitioner. Dependency contemplated in sub-section (3) of S.11;has to be viewed from a broader and humane angle. What is contemplated in the sub-section is not mere financial dependency, as was held by the Punjab High Court in Davar v. Kapur (ILR.1962-2 Punjab 484). The learned Chief Justice, observed: "The word'dependant' cannot be construed as meaning nothing but wholly dependant in the sense of not earning anything at all and being entirely dependant on the father for board, lodging and food. The term must be construed as meaning somebody not wholly independent or self-supporting and in a position to set up a separate residence. Dependence may not in all circumstances be entirely a matter of finance." 3. In the present case there cannot be any doubt that for residence, the two sons are depending entirely on the father. It is because they cannot afford to find separate buildings for their residence that they are dependent on the father for the purpose. The matter has to be looked at from the father's standpoint also. What every father under such circumstances would desire is peace in the family house and the avoidance of misunderstanding and unpleasantness between one member and another. That the family is growing is also a factor to be taken into consideration and if the father feels that to avoid further congestion other accommodation is to be found he cannot be blamed for that. That the family is growing is also a factor to be taken into consideration and if the father feels that to avoid further congestion other accommodation is to be found he cannot be blamed for that. I do not see any reason to disturb the concurrent findings of the revisional and appellate authority in this regard. 4. There is also the other aspect that the revision petitioner is owning another land, 38 cents in extent, in the market ward where he has got a row of rooms which he has let out to various tenants; but there is an open space there where he can conveniently shift his mill. Even though the rent control petition was filed as early as in 1964 no attempt was made by him so far in this regard. 5. In the matter of notice under S.106 of the Tarnsfer of Property Act also I do not think there is any case for the revision petitioner. In the first place, this ground was never taken by him in any of the courts below. Notice was, in fact, sent on 26-6-64. That was received by the tenant on 29-6-64, but no contention was ever made by him about the insufficiency of the notice. In rejecting a similar contention Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J., observed in Sarada v. Kumaran (1969 KLT.133 at P. 142) as follows:-. "There is no denial of the receipt of the notices by the revision petitioners. Exs-A2 and A3 are the copies of the notices issued to the revision petitioners. Their counsel contend that the notices do not satisfy the requirements of S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The revision petitioner never contested the adequacy of the notices issued. The District Judge is therefore right in refusing to entertain the plea raised before him for the first time. I therefore, over-rule the third ground also." The situation is the same here also. I would, therefore, overrule the contention of the revision petitioner regarding the adequacy of the notice. 6. The case has been remanded by the courts below for an enquiry under S.106 of Act 1/64 as amended by Act 35/69 and for passing the necessary orders by the Rent Controller. I see nothing wrong in the order of remand. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed. Dismissed.