ORDER S.N. Singh, J. - The facts giving rise to the two writ petitions are as follows: The plots in dispute are situate in village Dagarpur and Tigri of Meerut district. These plots were owned by one Har Prasad the father of the parties Ghasi and Risal. Har Prasad who was the owner of these plots transferred his proprietary right along with sir and Khudkasht in favour of his wife Smt. Kanho through a gift deed, Thus Smt. Kanho became the owner of the plots in dispute. After the execution of the gift deed Smt. Kanho in her turn executed a will in respect of the plots in dispute in favour of Ghasi and Risal. Ghasi was the real son of Smt. Kanho and Risal was a step son. Both Ghasi and Risal were the sons of Har Prasad. After the abolition of Zamindari Smt. Kanho became the bhumidhar of the plots in dispute. 2. It appears that after the start of consolidation proceedings in the village in suit Smt. Kanho died on 19-11-1961. Risal the Petitioner who has been substituted by his widow Smt. Mathuri during the pendency of the writ petition, filed an application to the effect that the Petitioner and his brother Ghasi be recorded in place of Smt. Kanho. In support of this prayer the Petitioner filed a copy of a registered will executed in the year 1935. This prayer of Risal was objected to by Ghasi on the ground that on the death of Smt. Kanho he alone inherited the property. He denied the execution of the will. 3. Parties led evidence before the Consolidation Officer who accepted the Petitioner's case and directed the entry of Risal and Ghasi over the plots in dispute in place of Smt. Kanho. The certified copy which had been produced before the consolidation officer was proved by Risal, No objection was taken by Ghasi at the original stage about the admissibility of document though execution of the same was denied. 4. Against the order of the Consolidation Officer an appeal was preferred before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) confirmed the decision of the Consolidation Officer. In the grounds of appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) there is a vague ground challenging the admissibility of the certified copy of the will, but the same, does not appear to have been pressed before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 5. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) confirmed the decision of the Consolidation Officer. In the grounds of appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) there is a vague ground challenging the admissibility of the certified copy of the will, but the same, does not appear to have been pressed before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 5. A revision was preferred against-the two concurrent orders by Ghasi wherein it was urged that the certified copy of the will was inadmissible in evidence in absence of the loss of the original will and that Ghasi opposite party was the only heir of Smt. Kanho and thus he alone was entitled to be recorded as the heir of Smt. Kanho. This technical objection of Ghasi prevailed with the Deputy Director who allowed the revision and directed the name of Ghasi alone to be recorded over the plots in dispute of the two cases. 6. Against the order of the Deputy Director the present writ petition has been filed. Sri Bhupeshwar Dayal learned Counsel holding the brief of Sri K.C. Agarwal submitted that the Dy. Director of Consolidation appears to have overlooked Section 90 Sub-clause (2) of the Evidence Act as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Act. His contention is that the presumption which is to be raised in respect of original document by virtue of Sub-clause (1) of Section 90 should have also been raised in respect of certified copy in view of Section 90 Sub-clause (2) as amended by the UP Act. 7. As against this submission of Sri Bhupeshwar Dayal Sri A. Banerji submitted that Section 90 Sub-clause (2) of the Evidence Act aforesaid is circumscribed by Section 90-A Sub-clause (2) of the Evidence Act. It was submitted that this sub Clause 90A(2) supported the judgment of the Dy. Director and since in the instant case the will was relied as the basis of the claim no presumption could be raised in respect of certified copy. 8. After having looked into the relevant sections referred to above I am of opinion that the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner should be accepted. Director and since in the instant case the will was relied as the basis of the claim no presumption could be raised in respect of certified copy. 8. After having looked into the relevant sections referred to above I am of opinion that the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner should be accepted. On a plain reading of Section 90 Sub-clause (2) as amended by the UP Legislature it is clear that the presumption which can be raised in respect of the original can also be raised in respect of a certified copy the only condition which should be fulfilled is that the certified copy should be that of a document which is more than 20 years old. This sub section is not controlled by Section 90A Sub-clause (2) of the Evidence Act. 9. It is next contended by Sri Bhupeshwar Dayal that even if the first contention was not acceptable to this Court the Dy. Director should not have allowed the objection about the proof of the document to be raised at the re-visional stage. Learned Counsel relied on a Privy Council case in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji 1943 AWR 14 PC. In this case it was held by the Judicial Committee as follows: Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. 10. In the present case no objection about the mode of proof was submitted before the first authority, though there was a vague reference in the grounds of appeal, this question was not convassed before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). It appears to have been pressed before the revisional authority which accepted it. In view of the Privy Council authority cited above I am of opinion that the contention of the learned Counsel has force and should be accepted. Since the opposite party Ghasi did not object to the mode of proof before the first; authority he should not have been allowed to raise this point either by appellate court or by the revisional court. Since the opposite party Ghasi did not object to the mode of proof before the first; authority he should not have been allowed to raise this point either by appellate court or by the revisional court. I am further of opinion that to the facts of the present case Section 65(a) of the Evidence Act is also attracted. The will had been executed in favour of Ghasi and Risal. Ghasi was the own son of Smt. Kanho in all probabilities the document must be held to be with Ghasi. Since the document was in possession and power of Ghasi by virtue of Section 65 Sub-clause (a) the Petitioner could prove this document by producing secondary evidence which he had done in this case by producing the certified copy. This is also another reason why the document should have been held to be proved in accordance with law. 11. It has been held by this Court that Consolidation authorities are not hedged in by the strict principles of the CPC and the Evidence Act and in order to do justice between the parties consolidation authorities would do well in not relying on technicalities and should decide the rights of the parties on merits. The Dy. Director of Consolidation in my opinion has acted illegally in exercise of his jurisdiction and has committed a patent error of law in rejecting the will executed in favour of Ghasi and Risal. The first two authorities were right in relying on the will produced by Risal. 12. Before concluding this judgment this has to be mentioned that Sri A. Banerji at the initial stage raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the substitution moved by Smt. Mathuri the widow of Risal was beyond time and since there is no final decision by this Court on the substitution application the substitution application should be held to be time barred. It was pointed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the learned single Judge who decided the substitution application finally disposed of the substitution application and accepted the Petitioner's case that it was within time. But since there was certain criminal case pending against Ghasi who it was suggested was being prosecuted for forgery the learned Single Judge thought it proper not to express final opinion as to the date of the death of Risal. But since there was certain criminal case pending against Ghasi who it was suggested was being prosecuted for forgery the learned Single Judge thought it proper not to express final opinion as to the date of the death of Risal. The order dated 5-5-1970 passed by an Hon'ble Judge of this Court clearly allowed the substitution as prayed. In my opinion the order passed was a final order so for as the substitution application is concerned. This preliminary objection which was raised by the learned Counsel Sri A. Banerji was overruled by me before the merits of the case was heard. 13. In the result these petitions are allowed and the order of the Dy. Director dated 21-2-1964 is hereby quashed. The Petitioner is entitled to the cost of these petitions.