JUDGMENT Broome, J. - This writ petition, filed in March 1965 by Sharat Chandra Misra, who formerly held the post of Secretary of the erstwhile District Board of Hamirpur, is directed against a resolution passed by the Zila Parishad of Hamirpur on 9-11-1963, terminating his services under Rule 3-A (iv) of the Rules Regarding Officers and Servants of the District Boards on payment of three months' salary in lieu of notice, as well as the subsequent order of the State Government passed on 2-11-1964, rejecting the petitioner's appeal against that resolution. 2. Mr. S. N. Kacker, who appears for the petitioner, has advanced the following four arguments in support of the petition : (1) that rule 3-A (iv) , under which the petitioner's services have been terminated, confers arbitrary powers and is discriminatory and must therefore be struck down for contravening Article 14 of the Constitution; (2) even assuming that Rule 3-A (iv) is valid and enforceable, its requirements have not been fulfilled in the case of the petitioner, because he was not paid the three months' salary to which he was entitled in lieu of notice either at the time when the impugned resolution was passed or when a copy of that resolution was served on him; (3) the resolution passed at the meeting of the Zila Parishad on 9-11-1963 was invalid because the termination of the petitioner's services was not a matter included in the agenda for that meeting; and (4) the termination of the petitioner's services is a disguised order of dismissal, vitiated by mala fides. 3. Rule 3-A (iv) -printed at page 189 of the District Board Manual-runs as follows : "3-A. The period of office of a permanent servant of the Board other than a Government servant in its employ shall not determine until (iv) he has been given by the authority competent to appoint his successor not less than three months' notice or a sum equal to three months' pay in lieu of notice where his pay exceeds Rs. 15, and in other cases, not less than one month's notice or a sum equal to one month's pay in lieu of notice." The argument advanced by Mr. 15, and in other cases, not less than one month's notice or a sum equal to one month's pay in lieu of notice." The argument advanced by Mr. Backer regarding the wires of this rule is that it is discriminatory and contravenes Article 14, firstly because it introduces an unfair distinction between, permanent servants ' of District Boards and permanent servants of other similar bodies and secondly because it confers an arbitrary and uncontrolled power on the District Board, permitting it to discriminate between two District Board servants similarly placed by taking action under this rule against one and not taking it against the other. In this connection Mr. Kacker has placed reliance on various observations of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600 which dealt with a similar provision for termination of services under Rule 148 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code. In that case Gajendragadkar, J. observed : "We appreciate the argument that the nature of services rendered by employees in different sectors of public service may differ and the terms and conditions governing employment in all public sectors may not necessarily be the same or uniform; but in regard to the question of terminating the services of a civil servant after serving him with a notice for specified period, we are unable to see how the Railways can be regarded as constituting a separate and distinct class by reference to which the impugned Rule can be justified in the light of Art. H. If there is any rational connection between the making of such a Rule and the object intended to be achieved by it, that connection would clearly be in existence in several other sectors of public service. What has happened is that a provision like Rule 148 (3)or. Rule 149 (3) was first made by the Railway Companies when employment with the Railways was a purely commercial matter governed by the ordinary rules of contract. After the Railways were taken over by the State, that position has essentially altered, and so, the validity of the Rule is now exposed to the challenge under Art. 14. Therefore, we are satisfied that the challenge to the validity of the impugned Rules on the ground that they contravene Art. 14 must also. succeed." This passage is cited by A4r. Therefore, we are satisfied that the challenge to the validity of the impugned Rules on the ground that they contravene Art. 14 must also. succeed." This passage is cited by A4r. Kacker in support of his first contention, while with regard to the second contention he relies on the following remarks made by Das Gupta, J. in the same case : "I find on scrutiny of the Rule that it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the authority who will terminate the service in the matter of selection or classification. Arbitrary and uncontrolled power is left in the authority to select at its will any person against whom action will be taken. The Rule thus enables the authority concerned to discriminate between two railway servants to both of whom Rule 148 (3) equally applied by taking action in one case and not taking it in the other. In the absence of any guiding principle in the exercise of discretion by the authority the Rule has therefore to be struck down as contravening the requirements of Art. 14 of the Constitution." 4. The suggestion that Rule 3-A (iv) unfairly discriminates between District Board servants and other classes of servants has in my opinion little force. It is important to bear in mind that the equality before the law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution can only apply to persons similarly placed. Moti Ram Deka's case' related to discrimination between various classes who were all similarly placed, because all came within the category of Government servants. District Board servants, however, cannot be equated with Government servants; and merely because Government servants have a guaranteed security of tenure and cannot be discharged on being given three months' notice or three month's pay in lieu of notice, it cannot be said that District Board servants are necessarily entitled to the same protection and security of tenure. Mr. District Board servants, however, cannot be equated with Government servants; and merely because Government servants have a guaranteed security of tenure and cannot be discharged on being given three months' notice or three month's pay in lieu of notice, it cannot be said that District Board servants are necessarily entitled to the same protection and security of tenure. Mr. Kacker has tried to argue, however, that at least District Board servants should be put on a par with the servants of other local bodies and has drawn my attention to the fact that in the corresponding rules regarding termination of service in the U. P. Municipal Boards' Servants (Inquiry, Punishmentt and Termination of Services) Rules and in the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Sewa Adhiniyamawali termination is ordinarily to be permitted only under a scheme of retrenchment. But as pointed out in State of U. P.Ram Bharose Singh Chauhan, 1966 A.L.J. 290. District Board employees form a completely separate class from the employees of the Nagar Mahapalikas, Municipalities, Notified Areas and Town Areas and it cannot be said that District Board employees and employees serving under other local bodies stand in the same situation. I see no reason therefore to hold that there is discrimination violative of Article 14 merely because the rules applicable to District Boards' servants in respect of termination of services are not identical with the rules applicable to the servants of other local bodies. 5. Regarding the second contention of Mr. Kacker in respect of Article 14, viz., that Rule 3-A (iv) should be struck down because it confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power ion the District Board, I may point out that he has been unable to cite any cogent authority in support thereof, apart from the passage from the judgment of Das Gupta, J. in Moti Ram Deka's' case, quoted above: and that expression of opinion by a single judge, though undoubtedly entitled to respect, cannot be treated as a binding pronouncement of the Supreme Court, since the majority judgment pronounced in that case by Gajendragadkar, J. on behalf of himself and three other Judges deliberately refrains from expressing any opinion on this aspect of the case. My attention has been drawn to Kripa Ram Gupta v. R. K. Talwar, 1969 A.L.J. 962, in which a Full Bench of this Court held that a rule empowering the State Government to order the compulsory retirement of it Government servant on his attaining the age of 55 violated Article 14; but that decision can have little relevance to the present case, which concerns a District Board employee, not it Government servant with a guaranteed security of tenure. It cannot be said that there is any hard and fast rule that wherever an unguided and uncanalised power to terminate the services of employees has been vested in an employer, it must necessarily be considered to be violative of Article 14. For example, in Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1970 M.P.W.R. 83 the Supreme Court held that although the power granted to the State Government by Rule 12 of the M. P. Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent Service) Rules 1960 to terminate the services of temporary Government servants was untrammelled by any restrictions and unguided by any indication of the circumstances in which the discretion ought to be exercised, there was nevertheless no infringement of Article 14. 'When judging such cases, much will obviously depend on the status of the authority invested with the power to terminate the employee's services. In the present case that power has been exercised by the entire corporate body of the District Board, passing a resolution at a properly convened meeting; and the fact that such a resolution requires the concurrence of the majority of members before it can be passed is in itself a safeguard against arbitrary action. In the circumstances I 'see no justification for holding that Rule 3-A (iv) of the Rules Regarding Officers and servants of the District Boards contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. I now turn to Mr. Kacker's second main argument, viz., that the petitioner's services have not been validly terminated because there has been no proper compliance with the requirements off Rule 3-A(iv) as regards the pay went of three months' salary in lieu of notice. 6. I now turn to Mr. Kacker's second main argument, viz., that the petitioner's services have not been validly terminated because there has been no proper compliance with the requirements off Rule 3-A(iv) as regards the pay went of three months' salary in lieu of notice. The contention is that when salary is paid in lieu of notice, it is essential to pay the salary at the very time when the order for termination of services is passed; whereas in the present case the petitioner was not paid his three months' salary until December, 1964, more than a year after tile resolution of 9-1l-1963 which terminated his services. In this connexion reliance is placed on certain pronouncements of the Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which deals, inter alia, with the payment to retrenched workmen of wages in lieu of notice. The specific provisions about such payment are contained in clause (a) of the section, but in order to appreciate the cases referred to, it is necessary to consider the whole of this section, which runs as follows "25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen - No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the work- man has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice : Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies the date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen clays' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months, and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 610 it was held that the payment of compensation at the time of retrenchment, prescribed by clause (b) of Section 25F., was a condition precedent for the retrenchment of a workman, non-compliance with which would render the retrenchment invalid; but there was no discussion of clauses (a) and (c) , which were merely referred to as prescribing 'similar conditions'. In Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1617, however, it was clarified that clause (c) could not be treated as a condition precedent, because the notice prescribed thereby had necessarily to be given after the retrenchent, if this was effected by payment of wages in lieu of notice. But in National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1206, it was held that the payment prescribed under clause (a) in lieu of notice must be made at the time when the workman was asked to go and the workman could not be directed to collect his dues after the date when the retrenchment was meant to take effect." 7. Stress is laid on the similarity between the wording of Rule 3-A(iv) of the Rules Regarding Officers and Servants of the District Boards and Section 25-F (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Both of these provisions lay down that the services of the employee concerned shall not come to an end until he has been given notice for a certain period or has been paid in lieu of notice the salary or wages 'due for the period of the notice. It is argued, therefore, that since it has been held by the Supreme Court in the last of the three cases referred to above that payment in lieu of notice under Section 25-F (a) must be made at the time when the workman is asked to go, the same interpretation should be placed on Rule 3-A (iv) and it should be held that the services of a District Board servant cannot be terminated by payment of salary in lieu of notice unless that payment is made at the very time when the notice is given. I am not prepared to hold, however, that the analogy between the two provisions is as close as learned counsel would like to suggest. I am not prepared to hold, however, that the analogy between the two provisions is as close as learned counsel would like to suggest. In the first place we cannot lose sight of the fact that the ruling referred to deals with a question arising out of the law governing industrial relations between an employer and his workmen; and it is well-known that when deciding such cases the courts are expected to take broad and liberal views so as to avoid all chance of encouraging exploitation of the workers by the employer. Considerations of this nature can scarcely be relevant to a dispute between the District Boards and its servants. Moreover, there are distinct differences in the wording of Section 25-F and Rule 3-A, for Section 25-F categorically states that its.provisions relate to the "conditions precedent" to the retrenchment of workmen; and clause (b) of that section specifically provides that the payment of compensation on retrenchment must be made at the time of retrenchment. In the case of Rule 3-A on the other hand there is no mention of any "condition precedent" and no specific injunction regarding payment at the time of the termination of Services. It is no doubt true that the rule says that services shall not be terminated until notice is given or payment of salary is made in lieu of notice; but the use of the word 'until' is clearly not conclusive, for the same word has been used in Section 25-F with reference to all the three clauses of that section and yet clause (c) has been held not to be a condition precedent that must be complied with before retrenchment can take place. In the circumstances I do not see any justification for holding that Rule 3-A must be interpreted in precisely the same watt- as Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was interpreted in the National Irons and Steel Co.7 case referred to above. 8. It seems to me that it would be unreasonable to construe Section 3-A (iv) as making it obligatory on the District Board to offer payment of wages in lieu of notice to an employee at the very time when his services are being terminated by means of a resolution of the Board. Serious practical difficulties would arise if such a condition were to be insisted upon. Serious practical difficulties would arise if such a condition were to be insisted upon. The sponsors of a proposal to terminate the services of an employee can never know whether their proposal will be accepted or not, until the Board actually meets' and passes its resolution; and even after the resolution was passed, more time must inevitably elapse before payment can be made, in view of the formalities that have to be observed when making disbursements out of District Board funds. I am satisfied in the circumstances that Rule 3-A (iv) was never intended to lay down that payment of salary in lieu of notice must be made at the very time when the services of a servant of the Board are terminated. My interpretation of this rule is that it implies that the three month's pay in lieu of notice shall be offered to the employee concerned within a reasonable time after the passing of the resolution directing his services to be terminated. 9. The question now arises whether in the present case it can be said that payment has been made within a reasonable period. The resolution terminating the petitioner's services was passed on 9-11-1963; and a copy of this resolution was sent to the petitioner along with an office letter dated 19-11-1963. But, as pointed out in paragraph 42 of the counter-.affidavit, on receipt of that copy the petitioner did not turn up to receive his three months' pay. Instead, he filed an appeal to the State Government on 19-12-1963, which remained pending until 2-11-1964, when it was dismissed. It is further to be noted that on 15-5-1961 orders were issued by the Commissioner of Jhansi prohibiting the execution of the resolution of 9-11-1963, and that prohibition remained in force until the appeal was disposed of. The petitioner still did not turn up to receive payment of his three months' salary even after his appeal had been dismissed and consequently a letter was issued to him to come and take the payment, which he eventually did (under protest) on 28-12-1964. The petitioner still did not turn up to receive payment of his three months' salary even after his appeal had been dismissed and consequently a letter was issued to him to come and take the payment, which he eventually did (under protest) on 28-12-1964. It is clear from the pleadings that the delay in making the payment of three months' salary to the petitioner was due more to his failure to turn up-at the District Board office to receive payment than to any negligence or oversight on the part of the Board; and in the circumstances I am inclined to hold that the payment made on 28-12-1964 was made Within a reasonable time after the passing of the resolution for termination of the petitioner's services and that the requirements of Rule 3-A (iv) in this respect have been substantially complied with. 10. The third main argument advanced oil behalf of the petitioner is that the resolution of 9-11-1963 is invalid because the termination of the petitioner's services was not one of the matters included in the agenda for the meeting held on that date. This argument is based on Rule 7 (1) of the U. P. Zila Parishads (Conduct of Proceedings) Rules, 1962, which runs : "7 (1) Except as provided otherwise in the Act or any rule made thereunder, no business shall be transacted at any meeting of the Parishad which has not been included in the list of business under sub-rule (2)." A perusal of Annexure 11 to the writ petition, which sets forth the agenda and die resolution side by side, shows, however, that no substantial irregularity was committed in this respect either. Time proposed special resolution included at item No. 16 of the agenda was a proposal that the petitioner Sharat Chand Misra be relieved of his employment (Seivaon se mukt) ; and this clearly gave notice to all members of the Board that the question of the termination of the petitioner's services was to be considered at the meeting of 9-11-1963. Time proposed special resolution included at item No. 16 of the agenda was a proposal that the petitioner Sharat Chand Misra be relieved of his employment (Seivaon se mukt) ; and this clearly gave notice to all members of the Board that the question of the termination of the petitioner's services was to be considered at the meeting of 9-11-1963. It is true that the reason suggested in the agenda for termination was different, namely that there were some defects in the petitioner's age and qualifications at the time of his appointment as Secretary, whereas the resolution passed on this item refers to no such defect but is based purely on the power of termination granted by Rule 3-A (iv) ; but the basic subject referred to both in the agenda and in the resolution is one and the same, namely the termination of the petitioner's employment. In the circumstances I am not prepared to hold that there has been any material violation of Rule 7 (1) referred to above. 11. The last submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned termination order is vitiated by mala fides. I can find nothing in the petition, however, to show how mala fides can be imputed to the entire Zila Parishad which passed the impugned resolution. Certain allegations have been incorporated in the petition with a view to showing that the Adhyaksh of the Zila Parishad, Ram Gopal Gupta, bore ill will against the petitioner on account of political rivalry; but even if it were true that Ram Gopal Gupta was biased against the petitioner, that would not mean that the impugned resolution was tainted with mala fides. 12. The petition thus fails on all the points raised and is dismissed with costs.