This is an application by Abi­nash Chandra Gautam under Article 133 of the Constitution read with Rule 2 of O. 45 of the Civil Procedure Code, praying for a certificate that it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. 2. To appreciate the point involved, the relevant facts have to be briefly summarised. Abinash Chandra, the applicant, was em­ployed temporarily as junior Sub-Inspector of Police in July, 1949, by the Union Territory of Tripura, he was made permanent junior Sub-Inspector with effect from 2-1-1951, and was then promoted as Sub-Inspector on 9-9-1951. With effect from 1-10-1951 he was reverted to his substantive rank of junior Sub-Inspector and subsequently he was dis­charged from service on 8-7-1952. Having felt aggrieved, Abinash Chandra filed a suit on 2-12-1952 challenging the validity of the orders dated 1-10-1951 and 8-7-1952. The principal relief claimed was one of de­claration that he was still a member of the Tripura Police Service in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police. In addition, he asked for such other reliefs which the Court might deem he was entitled to. That suit was filed under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and so a court-fee of Rs. 10 was paid. The trial Court disposed of the suit on 21-3-1955 decreeing the reliefs that the plaintiff continued to be a member of the Tripura Police Service in the rank of Sub-Inspector and that he was entitled to arrears of salary for the period for which it had not been paid to him. The defendants, who are the State of Tripura and the Superintendent of Police of Tripura, challenged the validity of the decree of the trial Court in an appeal filed in the Court of the District Judge. The District Judge allowed the appeal on 4th of January, 1958, when he quashed the decree of the trial court and remanded the case to it with the directions that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to amend the plaint claiming such further reliefs as may be open to him and that after retrial the trial Court will "decree the suit in part by giving a declara­tion in favour of the plaintiff that he still remained a member of the Tripura Police Force in the rank of Junior Sub-Inspector of Police at the date of the institution of the suit". The plaintiff amended the plaint, after remand, respecting his claim to arrears of salary. By judgment dated 30th of Septem­ber, 1959, the trial Court gave a declaration to the plaintiff in the manner directed by the District Judge and awarded him, in addition, a decree in the sum of Rs. 10,564 by way of salary and allowances for the period 1-5-1952 to 30th of September, 1959. 3. The defendants this time challenged the decree of the trial Court by filing an appeal in this Court because the valuation of the suit after remand had gone beyond Rs. 5,000. When the appeal came up for hearing before this Court, the learned Gov­ernment Advocate accepted as correct the declaratory part of the decree made by the trial Court. He therefore, confined his chal­lenge to the money part of the decree only. Shri Jagannadhacharyulu, the then Judicial Commissioner, held in his judgment dated 20th of September, 1967 that the plaintiff was not entitled to any arrears of salary etc. for the double reason that since 1-1-1955 he (the plaintiff) had admittedly entered private service and so he was not entitled to claim any emoluments from the Government as he had violated the provisions of R. 12 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, and that the entire claim for arrears was barred by time. 4. In the application filed by the plain­tiff under Article 133 of the Constitution, he pleaded that this Court had erred in its con­clusions that he (the plaintiff) was not entitled to salary for the two reasons just reproduced and that as such it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. After closely examin­ing the arguments addressed and the autho­rities cited at the bar, I have reached the conclusion that it is so. 5. Rule 12 (1) of the Conduct Rules pro­vides that no Government servant shall, ex­cept with the previous sanction of the Gov­ernment, engage directly or indirectly in any trade or business or undertake any employ­ment. Shri Jagannadhacharyulu held in para 13 of his judgment that since admitted­ly the plaintiff had been employed in a school since 1-1-1955 and that since he had not taken the sanction of the Government for entering that service, he must be said to have ceased to be a member of the Tripura Police Force. Shri Jagannadhacharyulu held in para 13 of his judgment that since admitted­ly the plaintiff had been employed in a school since 1-1-1955 and that since he had not taken the sanction of the Government for entering that service, he must be said to have ceased to be a member of the Tripura Police Force. Obviously, there is a contradic­tion between these observations of Shri Jagan­nadhacharyulu and the declaratory decree. which has by now assumed finality, that Abinash Chandra continues to be a member of the Tripura Police Force. Moreover, it is too apparent that any violation of Rule 12 (1) of the Conduct Rules would visit the official concerned with some disciplinary penalty, which may be as severe as his re­moval or dismissal from service, but that violation would not ipso facto bring about termination of his services. 6. Shri Jagannadhacharyulu held the claim for recovery of arrears of salary etc. as barred by time on the sole ground that it had been made more than 3 years pres­cribed by Article 102 of Limitation Act, 1908. He was of the opinion that the application for amendment of the plaint claiming the relief of arrears of salary etc. having been allowed by the trial Court on 11-9-1958, it is that date and not the date 2-12-1952, when the suit was filed, which is material for determining whether that relief had been claimed within the period of limitation. How­ever, there is consensus of judicial opinion amongst the various High Courts in India that when an amendment is allowed under Rule 17 it relates back to the date of the suit as originally filed. I invite attention in that respect to the authorities cited, by the celebrated author Chitaley at page 2258 of his Commentary on the Code of Civil Proce­dure, 7th Edition. The learned Government Advocate, Shri J. K. Roy, was unable to in­vite my attention to any authority to the contrary. Hence, there is an obvious con­flict between the judgment of this Court and the view taken by other High Courts in India in regard to the point of time from which the amendment allowed under Rule 17 takes effect. The learned Government Advocate, Shri J. K. Roy, was unable to in­vite my attention to any authority to the contrary. Hence, there is an obvious con­flict between the judgment of this Court and the view taken by other High Courts in India in regard to the point of time from which the amendment allowed under Rule 17 takes effect. The Subordinate Courts in the Territory of Tripura shall be bound to follow the view expressed by this Court in the im­pugned judgment if it were allowed to stand especially when there does not appear to be any direct authority of the Supreme Court on the point. However, the view expressed by the Supreme Court recently in the case of A. K. Gupta v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 , lends support to the pro­position that the amendment relates back to the date of the institution of the suit. In that case, as here the suit for declara­tion had been instituted under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and it was at a late stage that the plaintiff A. K. Gupta sought the permission of the High Court to amend the plaint to claim the consequential relief for recovery of Rs. 6500. The High Court having rejected the prayer, A. K Gupta went in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and permitted the plaintiff to amend the plaint though the Supreme Court pertinently observed that "it is not in dispute that at the date of the application for amendment, a suit for a money claim under the contract was barred". After making this observation the Supreme Court proceeded to discuss the principles bearing on the amendment of the pleadings and said: "The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a differ­ent or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limita­tion". But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a differ­ent or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limita­tion". "The principal reasons", the Supreme Court added "that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes, and, secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended". These observations of the Supreme Court, as stated earlier, lend decisive weight to the submission made by Shri Dev Barma on behalf of the plaintiff. Abinash Chandra that the amendment of the plaint relates back to the date of the institu­tion of the suit and not to the date on which the amendment is allowed as held by Shri Jagannadhacharyulu. Nevertheless, I feel, an authoritative direct pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the point in issue is clearly indicated. In my opinion, though normally an amendment which deprives the opposite party of a right acquired by limitation may not be allowed but that is a matter which must be taken into consideration by the Court at the time of passing the order on the application for amendment, and if the amend­ment is allowed, the date of the suit for computing the period of limitation would be the date on which the suit was originally filed. I cannot resist observing that no suit is filed on the date the amendment of the plaint is allowed and that the period of time which is material for determining whether a given suit is within time or barred by time is that which has elapsed between the dates of ac­crual of the cause of action and the institution of the suit. The date on which amendment of the plaint is allowed has no relevancy to that question, nor that date finds mention anywhere in the Limitation Act. The date on which amendment of the plaint is allowed has no relevancy to that question, nor that date finds mention anywhere in the Limitation Act. It would be too artificial for a litigant to contend or for the Court to hold that a suit is filed on the date the amendment of plaint is allowed. Suit is filed, it will be noted, by presenta­tion of a plaint to the Court, and certainly no plaint is presented on the date its amend­ment is allowed by the Court at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, there is no room for doubt that the view taken by Shri Jagannadhacharyulu requires examination at the hands of the Supreme Court. 7. This takes me to the question whe­ther the present is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court in terms of Clause (c) of Section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code. That clause corresponds to Clause (c) of Arti­cle 133 (1) of the Constitution. It is well settled on authority that the tests to deter­mine whether a case is a fit one to be certi­fied under Clause (c) of the two provisions is to find out whether the point involved is of great public or private importance, or is of such a nature that a decision thereon might result in a precedent governing a large num­ber of cases, or whether there are any other exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of certificate. It is equally well established that mere existence of a substantial question of law is not sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of either of the two statutory provi­sions, and that the question will be one of public importance if it affects not merely the parties to the case but also a large body of other persons, vide AIR 1953 Raj 42 (FB), Gulab Bai v. Manphool Bai, Judged in that context, I feel clear that the point in issue in the present case is a point of great public importance inasmuch as not quite unoften amendments of the plaints are allowed much after the period of limitation for the relief claimed has run out and so an authoritative! pronouncement by the Supreme Court is in-1 deed necessary. 8. pronouncement by the Supreme Court is in-1 deed necessary. 8. Shri J. K. Roy placed reliance on the decision in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Pun} & Har 441 (FB), in support of the contention that a claim for salary in arrears can be made only within a period of 3 years under Article 102 of the Limitation Act. It was held by the High Court in this case that a public servant, after his dismissal or removal has been declared to be unlaw­ful, can claim wages or salary only upto a period of 3 years and 2 months in lieu of the notice period under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code from the date when the cause of action accrued. I have no fight with this proposition of law. However, that proposition has nothing to do with the ques­tion that has arisen in the present application for leave to appeal. That question is whether after an amendment of the plaint has been allowed the period of limitation for the newly added relief shall be determined on the basis of the date on which the suit was originally filed or the date on which the amendment was allowed. The decision in the case of Jagdish Mitter, AIR 1969 Punj & Har 44] (FB) (supra) affords no help in determining that question. 9. As a result, I allow the application and direct that a certificate do issue that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court in terms of Clause (c) of Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Application allowed.