JUDGMENT Anwar Ahmad J.:- This appeal by the decree-holder arises out of an execution proceeding. 2. The appellant filed a suit for specific performance of contract on the 3rd March, 1964. On the 17th May, 1965, a joint compromise petition was filed on behalf of the parties to the suit. The court below considered this compromise on the 3rd June 1965 and decreed the suit in terms thereof. It further directed that the compromise petition would form a part of the decree. The preparation of the decree was notified on the 10th June 1965 and, as no objection was raised on behalf of the parties to the suit, the decree was scaled and signed on the 16th June 1965. 3. By the compromise, it was agreed between the parties that a sum of Rs. 7,000 would be paid by the respondents to the appellant towards the costs of the suit and this amount would be set off towards the consideration of the sale deed, that defendant-respondents 1 to 4 would execute a kebala in favour of the appellant or his nominee or nominees in respect of the suit property and would get the same registered by the 30th November 1965 and, on such execution and registration, the appellant would pay to respondent no. 1 Rs. 1,19,999 on account of the balance of the consideration money and that the sale deed was to be executed for a sum of Rs. 1,25,000, out of which Rs. 5,001 had already been paid by the appellant to respondent no. 1 as earnest money. It was also agreed that, in case the respondents failed to execute and register the kebala by the 30th November, 1965, the appellant would be entitled to have it executed and registered by the Court in his own favour or in favour of his nominee or nominees. If, on the other hand, the appellant failed to have it executed and registered and to pay the balance of the consideration money as mentioned above, he would forfeit his right to recover the said earnest money amounting to Rs. 5,001 from the respondents and would have no right to get the said kebala executed, and the decree would be rendered infructuous. 4. It appears that stamps worth Rs. 1,606 were purchased from the Bhagalpur Treasury on the 26th November, 1965 (vide Exhibit A). Stamps worth Rs. 5,001 from the respondents and would have no right to get the said kebala executed, and the decree would be rendered infructuous. 4. It appears that stamps worth Rs. 1,606 were purchased from the Bhagalpur Treasury on the 26th November, 1965 (vide Exhibit A). Stamps worth Rs. 1,694 were also purchased from the same treasury on the same date (vide Exhibit A/1). Further stamps worth Rs. 2,200 were purchased from the same treasury on the 30th November 1965 (vide Exhibit A/2). 5. The case of the appellant is that a draft of the sale deeds to be executed by the respondents were handed over to respondent no. 1 by Nandlal Sah (opposite party-appellant's witness no. 4) on behalf of the appellant in the evening of the 20th November, 1965. The fact that drafts of the sale deeds were actually handed over to Mohammad Ismail (applicant-respondents' witness no. 1)-who holds power of attorney on behalf of respondent no. 4 for execution of the sale deeds and had signed the compromise petition filed in Court on the 17th May 1965 on behalf of respondent no.4-is not denied; but the case of the respondents is that the drafts were handed over to Mohammad Ismail on the 29th November, 1965. The further case of the respondents is that, as the drafts were handed over to Mohammad Ismail in the evening of the 29th November, 1965 the same could not be verified by their lawyer and it was absolutely impossible for them to have them examined and scrutinised by their lawyer. Thus, on the case of the respondents, as the drafts were given very late, the default was on the part of the appellant, who did not give the drafts earlier, although the decree was passed more than five months back, and, as such, the appellant forfeited his right to get the decree executed. According to them, the time was the essence of the contract and, the default being on the part of the appellant in giving the drafts very late, namely, in the evening of the 29th November 1965, the decree has become inexecutable. 6. According to them, the time was the essence of the contract and, the default being on the part of the appellant in giving the drafts very late, namely, in the evening of the 29th November 1965, the decree has become inexecutable. 6. So far as a suit for specific performance of a contract is concerned, it is settled that a party is not entitled to the specific performance of the contract by the other party unless he shows that he was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In such a suit, there must be continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff from the date of the contract--vide (1) Srimati Sabitri Thakurain vs. Mrs. F. A. Savi and others (A.I.R. 1933 Patna 306); (2) Bhagwat Narain Singh and another vs. Srinivas (A.I.R. 1937 Patna 113-Full Bench); (3) Kedarnath Khetan vs. Jainarain Ram Lundia and others (A.I.R. 1954 Patna 497). As the present appeal arises out of a decree passed in a suit for specific performance of a contract, the test would be slightly different, when such a decree is sought to be enforced, the party seeking to execute it must fulfil the obligations imposed upon him by the decree. Unless he does so, he cannot ask the other side to abide by the decree. Sections 51 and 52 of the Indian Contract Act run as follows:- "51. When a contract consists of reciprocal promises to be simultaneously performed, no promisor need perform his promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his reciprocal promise. 52. Where the order in which reciprocal promises to be performed is expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be performed in that order; and, where the order is not expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be performed in that order which the nature of the transaction requires." In the present case, no sale deed could have been executed unless the drafts submitted by the appellant had been approved by respondent no. 1. As already stated, on the case of the respondents, drafts were handed over to Mohammad Ismail (applicant-respondents' witness no, 1), at least, in the evening of the 29th November 1965. On the 30th November, 1965, the appellant filed a petition in court informing it that he handed over the drafts of the sale deeds to respondent no. 1. As already stated, on the case of the respondents, drafts were handed over to Mohammad Ismail (applicant-respondents' witness no, 1), at least, in the evening of the 29th November 1965. On the 30th November, 1965, the appellant filed a petition in court informing it that he handed over the drafts of the sale deeds to respondent no. 1 and Mohammad Ismail (on behalf of respondent no. 4) for approval and that he deposited money in the local treasury for purchase of the stamps and obtained the same within the knowledge of the respondents. It was also stated therein that the appellant had come to know on enquiry from respondent no. 1 and Md. Ismail that they were not in a position to execute the sale deeds by the 30th November, 1965 as the drafts of the sale deeds could not be verified by their lawyer. In Paragraph 4 of that petition, it was stated that the appellant was prepared to pay the consideration money as stipulated in the compromise petition but due to the evasive reply of respondent no. 1, it was apprehended that respondent no. 1 and Mohammad Ismail were avoiding to execute the sale deeds on some pretext or the other for wrongful gain. In that petition, it was also stated that there was a subsequent agreement between the parties to the effect that a joint petition would be filed in court praying for an extension of time till the 20th December 1965 but, later on, in the morning of the 30th November 1965, respondent no. 1 refused to file such a petition; but for the purposes of this appeal, it will not be necessary to refer to this part of the appellant's case. Suffice it to say that, on the 30th November, 1965, the appellant filed his petition showing his readiness to pay the entire balance of the consideration money as well as drawing the attention of the court to the fact that the drafts of the sale deeds could not be verified due to shortness of time. A rejoinder to this petition was filed on behalf of the respondents on the 1st December 1965. It was admitted in Paragraph 5 of that petition that, although the drafts were handed over to respondent no. 1 on the 29th November 1965, the same could not be examined by their lawyer, as the time was very short. A rejoinder to this petition was filed on behalf of the respondents on the 1st December 1965. It was admitted in Paragraph 5 of that petition that, although the drafts were handed over to respondent no. 1 on the 29th November 1965, the same could not be examined by their lawyer, as the time was very short. They also stated that the default was entirely on the side of the appellant and, as such, the decree itself had become inexecutable. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that, even if the case of the respondents was accepted that the draft kebalas were handed over to respondent no. 1 in the evening of the 29th November 1965, there was sufficient time for them to consult their lawyer and it is difficult to accept their case that they were unable to scrutinise the drafts because the time was very short. It has been admitted by Mohammad Ismail (applicant-respondents' witness no. 1) that the draft was returned to Ram Chandra Ghose, the appellant's karpardaz, in court at 1 P.M. It is apparent from what has been stated above that the default, if any, was that on the part of the respondents. It also appears from the evidence of Mohammad Ismail that the appellant was never told that the draft kebalas were not in consonance with the agreement. This witness has, no doubt, stated that his lawyer told him that the draft kebalas were against the terms of the compromise; but he has not stated that this fact was conveyed to the appellant. 8. In this Court, Mr. Asghar Hussain, learned counsel for the respondents, has urged that, according to the terms of the compromise, the respondents had to execute "a kebala" in favour of the decree-holder, or his nominee or nominees, but the drafts supplied to his clients were ten in number and, as such, default, if any, was committed by the appellant. The exact words of the compromise so far as this point is concerned, are the following:- "That the defendants no. The exact words of the compromise so far as this point is concerned, are the following:- "That the defendants no. 1 to 4 hereby agree and undertake to execute a kebala in favour of the plaintiff or his nominee or nominees in respect of the suit properties and to get the same registered duly by 30th November, 1965, and the plaintiff hereby agrees and undertakes that on such execution and registration the plaintiff will pay to the defendant no. 1 Rs. 1,19,999 (Rupees One Lac Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninetynine) on account of the balance of consideration out of Rs. 1,25,000 (Rupees One Lac Twentyfive Thousand) after deducting Rs. 5,001 (Rupees Five Thousand One) on account of earnest money already paid by the plaintiff to defendant no. 1 and if the defendants fail to execute and register the kebala as aforesaid by 30th November, 1965, the plaintiff will have a right to have the said kebala executed and registered by the court in his own favour or in favour of his nominee or nominees in respect of the properties in suit and (if the plaintiff will fail to have the kebala executed and registered and to pay the balance of the consideration as mentioned above, he will forfeit his right to recover the said earnest money of Rs. 5,001 from the defendants and the plaintiff will have no right to get the said kebala executed and the decree shall be rendered infructuous)". This submission of learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted in view of the respondents' own petition filed on the 1st December, 1965. The relevant lines of that petition run as follows:- "That the plaintiff has filed a petition dated 30-11-65 in the above noted suit praying the court to be pleased to execute kebalas on deposit of the consideration amount by the plaintiff. * * * That it is correct that according to the terms of the compromise decree, the plaintiff should have got kebala executed by 30th of November, 1965, otherwise the earnest money etc. should stand forfeited." In this petition, it is definitely stated that the appellant was entitled to have "kebalas"--not "a kebala"--executed by the 30th November, 1965. The fact that more than one kebala had to be executed has also been repeated in Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the petition. should stand forfeited." In this petition, it is definitely stated that the appellant was entitled to have "kebalas"--not "a kebala"--executed by the 30th November, 1965. The fact that more than one kebala had to be executed has also been repeated in Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the petition. It is therefore, clear that the case of the respondents that there was default on the part of the appellant because he submitted drafts of ten kebalas instead of a draft of one kebala cannot be accepted. 9. Mr. J. C. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, has, on the other hand, submitted that the default, if any, was on the part of the respondents. In support of his submission, he has relied on the recitals in the petition of the respondents dated the 1st December, 1965, which have already been quoted as well as on the evidence of Mohammad Ismail, to which also reference has already been made. In (4) Jones vs. Barkley [(1781)2 Doug 684-8 East 437], it was held that when something was to be performed by each of the parties at the same time, he who was ready and offered to perform his part but was discharged by the other may maintain an action against the other for not performing his part. Lord Mansfield said that the party must show that he was ready, but if the other stopped him on the ground of an intention not to perform his part, it was not necessary for the first party to go further and do a nugatory act Parker, J., in the case reported in (5) (1909) 1 Ch 648 (In re Bayley Worthington and Cohen's Contract), observed as follows:- "Default, must I think, involves either not doing what you ought or doing what you ought not, having regard to your relations with the other parties concerned in the transaction, in other words it involves the breach of some duty you owe to another or others. It refers to personal conduct and is not the same thing as breach of contract. It refers to personal conduct and is not the same thing as breach of contract. If A contracts that B shall do something by a certain day, and B does not do it by the day named, commits a breach of contract; but if the question arises whether the delay be due to A's default, A's personal conduct has to be considered, and the question will be whether he has committed some breach of his duty towards B." So far as the present case is concerned, it has already been held that the appellant was entitled to have a number of kebalas executed in his favour or in favour of his nominee or nominees. He actually submitted the drafts, at least, in the evening of the 29th November, 1965. The respondents never told him that the contract was for the execution of a single kebala and not a number of kebalas for which drafts had been submitted. On the contrary, the conduct of the respondents is amply manifested by the petition they filed on the 1st December 1965 to which reference has already been made and which is to the effect that a number of kebalas had to be executed by the respondents in favour of the appellant or his nominee or nominees. In this view of the matter, the default was entirely on the part of the respondents. 10. It is next contended by Mr. Asghar Hussain that the appellant was not ready with the money. There are two answers to this question. Firstly, on the compromise petition, the relevant portion of which has already been quoted, the payment of the balance of the consideration money by the appellant was made dependent on the execution and registration of the kebalas. The drafts submitted by the appellant not having been approved by the respondents, no occasion arose for the appellant to pay the balance of the consideration money. In the words of Parker; J., in (5) in re Bayley Worthington & Cohen's Contract, the repudiation of the contract by the respondents relieved the appellant during such time as the respondents insisted on repudiation from proceeding with their part of the bargain. Secondly, on the 30th November, 1965, the appellant had shown his readiness to pay the entire balance of the consideration money on the execution and registration of the sale deeds. Secondly, on the 30th November, 1965, the appellant had shown his readiness to pay the entire balance of the consideration money on the execution and registration of the sale deeds. As put by Lord Mansfield in Jones's case, the respondents having stopped the appellant from performing his part of the contract, that is to say, by not handing over to him the draft kebalas after their approval in time, it was not necessary for the appellant to go further and do a nugatory act, that is to say, to go with the money in his pocket and offer it to the respondents. 11. Mr. Asghar Hussain has, thereafter, contended that, as the agreement between the parties had been reduced to writing, no other evidence was admissible to contradict the recitals in the agreement. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Indian Evidence Act and the Bench decision of this Court in (6) Md. Murtaza Hussain and another vs. Abdul Rahman and another (A.I.R. 1949 Patna 364); but, in the present case, the words in the petition filed by the respondents do not contradict the terms contained in the compromise decree. They have been referred to by me to show the real intention of the parties. In (7) Brent's case [(1583). 2 Leon. 14, at P. 17], it was laid down as follows:- "In conveyances we are to respect two things, the form and the effect of it; and in all cases where the form and effect cannot stand together, the form shall be rejected and the effect shall stand." In the present case, on the case of both the parties, a number of kebalas had to be executed the drafts of which had to be given to respondent no. 1 by the appellant which he did; but the said drafts with the approval of the respondents were not returned by them to the appellant in time, and, as such, the question whether the appellant was ready with the money does not arise at all. 12. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs and the order of the court below is set aside. 12. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs and the order of the court below is set aside. The learned Subordinate Judge is directed that on receipt of the records of the case from this Court, he will issue notice to the parties concerned to submit the drafts of the sale deeds within two weeks from the date of the service of the notice on them. The Court will approve the same within a week thereafter and the appellant wm prepare fair copies of the same on stamped paper within two weeks from the date of the approval of the drafts. Thereafter, the court below will direct the appellant to deposit within two weeks of its order the balance of the consideration money namely, Rs. 1,19,999 less Rs. 7,000 being the costs of the suit, that is to say in all Rs. 1,12,999. When this has been done, the court below will direct the execution and registration of the documents in accordance with the provisions of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court will also see that the appellant is put in possession of the vended property within three months from the date of the execution of the sale deeds. BAHADUR, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.