Order.- An important point of law has been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, viz., whether under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, subject to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, it is enough to give consent to the Public Prosecutor for withdrawing the case or that it should record its reasons for doing so. There are conflicting decisions on this point of various High Courts. Therefore, it will be proper that an authoritative opinion should be given by a Bench. The learned Counsel for the respondents has also brought to my notice that the petitioner has no locus standi, but this point also can be considered along with the question that I am referring for consideration and decision to a Bench. 2. The papers may therefore, be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Bench. 3. Pursuant upon the said order the case came on for hearing before the Bench (Kondaiah and A.D.V. Reddy, JJ.). P. Chennakesava Reddi, for Petitioner. S. Dasaratha Rami Reddi, for Respondent No. 1. C. Padmanabha Reddi and Y. Rama Reddi, for Respondents Nos. 2 to 14. Public Prosecutor on behalf of State, the 15th Respondent. The Judgment of the Bench was delivered by Kondaiah, J.-This Criminal Revision Case gives rise to an important question of law relating to the procedure to be followed under section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the scope and effect thereof. 5. The material facts which lie in a short compass and which are not in dispute may briefly be stated. The petitioner and the respondents 1 to 14 herein are the residents of Leburu Village in the Nellore District, situate within the jurisdictional limits of Indukurpet Police Station. There is a long standing faction between the petitioner and one Y. Bhaskar Reddi and their supporters on one side and Tikkavarapu Ramanujulu Reddi and the other respondents on the other, as a result of which security proceedings against both the groups in M.C. Nos.29 and 30 of 1969 under section 107, Criminal Procedure Code, have been launched. There exists a donka poramboke bearing S. Nos. 257, 258/A etc., towards the east of the donka to which side the wet lands of the petitioner and some other ryots are situate. To the west of the donka, there are Yenadi Huts. There exists a donka poramboke bearing S. Nos. 257, 258/A etc., towards the east of the donka to which side the wet lands of the petitioner and some other ryots are situate. To the west of the donka, there are Yenadi Huts. The aforesaid donka poramboke is being used as a threshing field for agricultural purposes by the petitioner and the other ryots, since several years. 6. On the application filed by the petitioner and some others on and December, 1909, the Tahsildar, Nellore ordered eviction of the Yenadis and other poor persons who had put up huts in the donka poramboke. In pursuance of the order of eviction, the Revenue Inspector of Indukurpet accompanied by vetties and Police Constables went to the donka to remove the huts which were considered to be encroachments. The Yenadis, the occupants of the poramboke land, requested the Revenue Inspector and the Police not to evict them, as they are not occupying any private land of the petitioner or anyone else. They did not use any violence, or attack the Revenue Inspector and the Police with any weapons. On a report sent by the Revenue Inspector, a case, Grime No. 123 of 1969 against respondents 1 to 14 was registered by the Station House Officer, Indukurpet. The Police after investigation had filed a charge sheet against respondents 1 to 14 for offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 186 and 341 read with 149, Indian Penal Code, and the case was numbered as C.C. No. 64 of 1970 on the file of the IInd Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore, who framed the charges on 21st August, 1970 for the offences referred to earlier. 7. In the meanwhile, the request made on 29th July, 1970, by the respondents 1 to 14 to the District Magistrate and Collector of Nellore for withdrawal of C.C. No. 64 of 1970 was rejected. Thereafter, the State Government on the representations made by the respondents by its G.O.Ms. No. 3356, dated 28th August, 1970, ordered the withdrawal of the complaint filed by the Revenue Inspector. A Memo. dated 30th October, 1970, by the accused was filed before the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore, with a prayer to drop the proceedings on the ground that the Government has passed the aforesaid Government Order to withdraw the case. On 31st October, 1970, A.P.P. Gr. A Memo. dated 30th October, 1970, by the accused was filed before the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore, with a prayer to drop the proceedings on the ground that the Government has passed the aforesaid Government Order to withdraw the case. On 31st October, 1970, A.P.P. Gr. I, Nellore, who was in charge of the prosecution case, had filed an application under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, praying for permission to withdraw the case from prosecuting the above accused in that case. On that application, the learned Magistrate granted permission. Aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, permitting the A.P.P. to withdraw the case against respondents 1 to 14 herein, the present Crl. R.G. has been preferred, which came up before a learned Single Judge Mirza, J., on 26th February, 1971. As it was represented to the learned Judge that there are conflicting decisions on the points whether any reasons have to be given while granting permission to withdraw the case under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, and whether the petitioner has any locus standi to perfer this Crl. R.G., which were considered to be important, the learned Judge has referred the matter to a Division Bench. That is how, this Crl. R.C. has come up before us. 8. It Was contended by Sri P. Chennakesava Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the impugned order passed by the Magistrate permitting A.P.P. Gr. I. under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, to withdraw from the prosecution of the respondents 1 to 14 herein, is illegal, improper and unjust. It was urged that no reasons had been given by the A.P.P. in his application to withdraw from the prosecution of the respondents; nor by the Magistrate in granting permission for such withdrawal. This claim of the petitioner was strenuously resisted by Sri Y. Rami Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondents 1 to 14 and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, contending inter alia that the petitioner has no locus standi even to prefer this Crl.R.C. as he is neither the complainant nor the owner of the land in question. That apart, it was argued that the Crl.R.C. must be rejected even on merits, as the Court below has rightly exercised its statutory discretion under section 494 in granting permission to the A.P.P. to withdraw the cafe. 9. That apart, it was argued that the Crl.R.C. must be rejected even on merits, as the Court below has rightly exercised its statutory discretion under section 494 in granting permission to the A.P.P. to withdraw the cafe. 9. Upon the allegations and the counter-allegations and the respective contentions of the parties, the following two questions arise for decision: (1) Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the petitioner has or has not the locus standi to prefer the present Criminal Revision Case, questioning the validity of the impugned order? (2) Whether the action of the lower Court, in granting permission to the A.P.P. to withdraw from the prosecution of the respondents 1 to 14 for the offences charged against them is illegal, improper or unjust and is liable to be set aside? 10. We shall first advert to the question relating to locus standi of the petitioner to file this Criminal Revision Case. Admittedly the land bearing S. Nos. 257, 258-A, dry, situate in Leburu village in the District of Nellore, is a donka poramboke belonging to the State. The petitioner is not the owner of that land. He has no legal vested right over the land in question. He along with a number of ryots, owning lands adjoining the donka poramboke was using a portion of the land for thrashing and other agricultural purposes during harvest season. Such sporadic use of the land by the petitioner and others would not in any way create any kind of legal vested rights in them. Nor is there any evidence to establish that the user of such land by the petitioner and others Was continuous, open and for more than the statutory period, so as to create a right of ownership by adverse possession. In these circumstances, it does not lie in the month of the petitioner to claim any legal rights over the donka poramboke which is occupied by a number of needy Yenadis by raising sheds, and huts to live in. The occupation of a portion of donka poramboke by those poor Yenadis by putting up small sheds and huts to live in, cannot be complained of by the petitioner and any other ryot, as none of their rights has been infringed by such occupation of the land by the Yenadis. The occupation of a portion of donka poramboke by those poor Yenadis by putting up small sheds and huts to live in, cannot be complained of by the petitioner and any other ryot, as none of their rights has been infringed by such occupation of the land by the Yenadis. True, the State Government is the owner of the land and it can, if it so chooses, evict those poor Yenadis on the ground that they have unauthorisedly encroached upon the land. That apart, the petitioner is not the person who gave the complaint on the basis of which the charge-sheet was filed by the Police of Indukurpet resulting in framing charges against respondents 1 to 14 herein for the offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 186, 341 read with 149, Indian Penal Code op 21st August, 1970. According to the prosecution case, the alleged forcible resistance by respondents to 14 to the Revenue Inspector who was accompanied by Police and vetties, from implementing the orders of eviction was caused on 9th December, 1969. The complaint by the Revenue Inspector against respondents 1 to 14 was preferred on 16th December, 1969. After completing the investigation, the police field a charge-sheet against the accused an 1 thereafter the charges were framed on 21st August, 1970, by the Magistrate. The aforesaid facts would clearly disclose that the case was not filed by the petitioner herein and it was filed by the State represented by the Police on the complaint made by the Revenue Inspector. 11. That apart, it is the State that is the prosecutor and custodian of the public peace, charged with the duty of maintaining law and order. Where the State through its authorised representative, the Public Prosecutor or A.P.P., as the case may be, decided to withdraw the offence and allows the offender to let go, it is not open to the private citizen or complainant, even if aggrieved by such withdrawal, to raise an objection to Wreak his private grudge or vengeance against the alleged offenders. Where the State through its authorised representative, the Public Prosecutor or A.P.P., as the case may be, decided to withdraw the offence and allows the offender to let go, it is not open to the private citizen or complainant, even if aggrieved by such withdrawal, to raise an objection to Wreak his private grudge or vengeance against the alleged offenders. It is pertinent to notice that such a private citizen may at the most bring it to the notice of the concerned authorities of the State and pursuade their to prosecute the accused on the ground that it was not a fit and proper one for withdrawal, on such withdrawal is not in the interests of public peace or advancement of welfare of the State. However, he should not be permitted to take the role of a prosecutor which, in our considered opinion, is neither warranted in law nor based on any just or valid grounds. We may also add that it is not every person that is competent to prefer a revision under section 435 read with section 439, Criminal Procedure Code or a Criminal Appeal except, the person or persons aggrieved by the impugned order or orders, as the case may be. The material on record reveals that there existed a faction between the first respondent and his supporters on the one hand and the petitioner and his followers on the other. True, as stated by Sri Chennakesava Reddy, that it Was at the instance of the petitioner that the order of eviction of the Yenadis, the occupants of the donka poramboke, was passed by the Tahsildar and the present alleged offence had occurred when the Revenue Inspector accompanied by the Police and vetties sought to execute the order of eviction. In view of the facts and circumstances referred to earlier, it cannot be stated that the petitioner is an aggrieved party, as he is neither the owner of the land nor the complainant in the present case. In such circumstances, the petitioner should not be allowed to wreak his vengeance against the first respondent and his supporters and particularly when respondents 2 to 14 who are poor and helpless Yenadis occupied the Government poramboke by raising small sheds and huts for their living. In such circumstances, the petitioner should not be allowed to wreak his vengeance against the first respondent and his supporters and particularly when respondents 2 to 14 who are poor and helpless Yenadis occupied the Government poramboke by raising small sheds and huts for their living. Simply because, respondents 2 to 14 happened to be the followers or supporters of the first respondent against whom the petitioner has an axe to grind, he should not be permitted to take the role of a prosecutor and proceed against the respondents in this Crl.R.C. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that the petitioner has no locus standi to prefer the present Criminal Revision Case. 12. It Was next argued by Sri P.C. Reddy that it is just and proper for this Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 and dispose of the case on merits as the matter has now been brought to our notice, even though his client is found to have no locus standi to prefer the Criminal Revision Case. True, this Court has undoubtedly the power and jurisdiction under section 435 read with section 439, Criminal Procedure Code to call for the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court, either suo motu or if the proceeding otherwise comes to its knowledge examine the same and exercise its powers of revision. This Court is competent to revise the impugned orders if it is satisfied that they are incorrect, illegal and improper. 13. We may point out that there is another hurdle for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 435, read with section 439. It is now well settled that ordinarily the practice of this Court is not to entertain a revision directly unless the aggrieved party had approached the lower Court in the first instance. However, we may add that this normal salutary rule of practice can be deviated only on special, exceptional or extraordinary grounds. What is a special, exceptional or extraordinary ground for entitling the aggrieved party to approach this Court directly for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction in criminal cases, is a question of fact, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There can be no rule of thumb to determine the same. What is a special, exceptional or extraordinary ground for entitling the aggrieved party to approach this Court directly for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction in criminal cases, is a question of fact, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There can be no rule of thumb to determine the same. It is, therefore, just and proper for the aggrieved party to first approach the Sessions Court, having concurrent jurisdiction in exercise of its revisional powers, before approaching this Court for the same relief, vide Ramayya v. Venkata1, and A. Srirama Murthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh2. Hence, even on this ground, we must held that this Criminal Revision Case is not maintainable, as no special, exceptional or extraordinary grounds justifying the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court directly without the petitioner approaching the Sessions Court in the instant case, Was brought to our notice. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that this plea of the petitioner merits rejection. 14. We shall now turn to the second question. The answer to this question depends upon the scope and interpretation of the provisions of section 494 and their application to the facts of the present case. Section 494 empowers any Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried. This power vested in the Public Prosecutor is not absolute. It can be exercised only with the consent of the Court before whom the case, in respect of which the prosecution of any person is sought to be withdrawn, is pending. Section 494 has no application if the cases are not put up for trial before the Court. Further, it will come into play only before the return of the Verdict in cases tried by Jury and in other cases before the judgment is pronounced. The Public Prosecutor is not competent to withdraw the prosecution of any person either after the return of the verdict in cases tried by Jury or after the pronouncement of the judgment in other cases. The Public Prosecutor is, therefore, competent to exercise the power Vested in him under section 494 only when the case before the Court is still pending, but not when it is completed. The Public Prosecutor is, therefore, competent to exercise the power Vested in him under section 494 only when the case before the Court is still pending, but not when it is completed. The use of the word “may” would manifest, that the power vested in the Public Prosecutor is only discretionary, but not mandatory. However, the discretion vested in the Public Prosecutor must be exercised judiciously, i.e., objectively, fairly and reasonably, but not arbitrarily, maliciously or according to his whims and fancies. As observed by the Privy Council in Faqir Singh v. Emperor1, the Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court. He has the bounden duty to assist the Court in arriving at the truth and dispensing justice according to law. It is, therefore, the duty of the Public Prosecutor under section 494 to give Valid, proper and just reasons for the withdrawal from the prosecution of any person. He must act independently and satisfy himself on the facts and circumstances that a given case is a fit and proper one for withdrawal. It is only when the Public Prosecutor satisfies himself, on applying his mind to all the relevant facts and circumstances, that it is only in furtherance of justice, that he should exercise his discretion under section 494 to withdraw the prosecution, but not otherwise. Where the Public Prosecutor is not satisfied that the withdrawal from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more offences for which he is tried, is not in public interest, or for the furtherance of justice, he should not prefer an application before the Court for permission to withdraw the same. However, we may add that he should not act simply on the advice of the State or any outside agency or person and withdraw from the prosecution of any person. Such exercise of discretionary power must be held to be unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, and improper and not warranted by the provisions of section 494. However, we may add that he should not act simply on the advice of the State or any outside agency or person and withdraw from the prosecution of any person. Such exercise of discretionary power must be held to be unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, and improper and not warranted by the provisions of section 494. At the same time, it should not be understood that the Public Prosecutor is not competent or justified in taking into consideration the opinion expressed or orders passed by the State Government in a given case about the desirability of withdrawal of a particular case or the representations made by any citizen, complainant or persons aggrieved, in arriving at a correct conclusion as to whether that case is a fit and proper one to exercise his discretion under section 494. In our judgment, the Public Prosecutor who is a responsible officer of the Court and an authorised representative of the State must be considered to have been invested under section 494 with a specific discretionary power to be exercised only in appropriate, just and reasonable cases. The Court, while giving its consent has also a duty to consider the entire material and the facts and circumstances in withholding or granting consent for the request of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of any person. It is the Court that has seisin of the matter, as the case is pending before it. Hence, the Court has a duty to exercise its powers judiciously, but not unreasonably and arbitrarily. The consent, contemplated under section 494, should not be given as a matter of course, simply because it was requested for by the Public Prosecutor. In our considered opinion, the Public Prosecutor as well as the Court while making a decision, have been invested with a statutory discretion to be exercised judiciously, honestly, objectively and reasonably, keeping in mind the furtherance of justice as a prime guide or factor and none else. It is pertinent to notice that section 494 doe; not specifically state that reasons must be given either by the Public Prosecutor in his request for withdrawal of the case from the prosecution of any person or by the Court in, with holding or granting consent for the same. It is pertinent to notice that section 494 doe; not specifically state that reasons must be given either by the Public Prosecutor in his request for withdrawal of the case from the prosecution of any person or by the Court in, with holding or granting consent for the same. However, the power exercisable under section 494 being of judicious nature, it is always desirable, though not mandatory, that reasons for prompting the Public Prosecutor to request the Court to grant consent for the withdrawal from the prosecution of any person must be given, and the Court while passing its order should give valid, just and proper reasons in support of its conclusion. There may be cases where the application made by a Public Prosecutor under section 494 may not disclose the reasons for the withdrawal of the case and the Court also may grant permission without a well-reasoned order. However, the revisional Court should not interfere with such order on that sole ground, if, on the facts and circumstances, the action of the Public Prosecutor in applying for the permission and the order passed by the lower Court are just, proper and Valid. The revisional power of the High Court, as is well settled, is discretionary and the High Court will interfere only when the impugned order is illegal, improper or unjust. Where the withdrawal of a case by the Public Prosecutor with the consent of the Court is really just and proper, this Court will not interfere with such an order, as the discretion vested in the Public Prosecutor is an executive discretion, whereas the discretion that has to be exercised by the Court is a judicious one. 15. This view of ours that it is the Public Prosecutor that is invested with the executive discretionary power under section 494 to withdraw but not the State, is amply borne out by the very language of that section. The framers of the Code thought in their wisdom fit and proper to invest such power to withdraw the prosecution of any person for any cognizable offence in the Public Prosecutor, an independent officer of the Court though appointed by and acting for and on behalf of the State. The framers of the Code thought in their wisdom fit and proper to invest such power to withdraw the prosecution of any person for any cognizable offence in the Public Prosecutor, an independent officer of the Court though appointed by and acting for and on behalf of the State. The very intendment and purpose of section 494 appears to be that the power Vested thereunder has to be exercised by the Public Prosecutor after applying his mind judiciously and independently to all the relevant and material facts, inclusive of the view taken or orders passed by the State Government. The procedure contemplated under section 494 would certainly be a kind of check on the executive to withdraw any case due to political or other reasons, not warranted by law. Where the evidence adduced or material available on record in a case is, in the opinion of the concerned prosecutor, insufficient or inadequate to sustain a conviction, it is not open for him (Public Prosecutor) to prejudge the issue at that stage and exercise his discretion under section 494, as it is the Court that is invested with that power to utlimately decide on an appraisal of the entire material on record, whether it was a case for conviction or acquittal. There is no rule of thumb, having universal application in exercising the powers vested in the Public Prosecutor and the Court under section 494. However, the Public Prosecutor and the Court have to exercise their discretion judiciously taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case without being influenced by any outside agency or extraneous or irrelevant consideration. 16. We may now turn to the decided cases on the subject. The earliest case on the point is that of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sadayan, In re1, wherein it was held that the Public Prosecutor in his application under section 494 or the Court in granting permission thereunder need not record reasons for the withdrawal of the prosecution. This view has been reiterated by the learned Judge, Govinda Menon, in Kasi Viswanadham v. Madan Singh2. The same view has been taken by the Patna High Court in Guili Bhagat v. Narain Singh3, the Bombay High Court in Ratan Shah Kavasji v. Keki Behramsha4. We may add that contrary view has been taken by the Calcutta, Rangoon, Sindh and Kerala High Courts. The same view has been taken by the Patna High Court in Guili Bhagat v. Narain Singh3, the Bombay High Court in Ratan Shah Kavasji v. Keki Behramsha4. We may add that contrary view has been taken by the Calcutta, Rangoon, Sindh and Kerala High Courts. In Umesha Chandra v. Satish Chandra5 , it was held that either in withholding or granting consent to the withdrawal of the prosecution under section 494, the Court must record its reasons therefor as it acts in a judicial manner. See Rajani Kantha Shah v. Idris Thakur6, Jagat Chandra Roy v. Kali Mudi Sardar1, Raman v. Emperor2, Emperor v. Milanmal3 Ouseph Yakob v. Jose4, and Deputy Acctt.-General v. State5. True, as observed by the learned Judges of the Madras, Patna and Bombay High Courts in the cases referred to earlier, section 494 does not specifically require the reasons to be given by the Public Prosecutor in his application to withdraw the prosecution of any person, or the Court in withholding or granting the consent thereon. As the power vested in the Public Prosecutor and the Court is a statutory discretion we are unable to endorse with great respect to the learned Judges the view that no reasons need be given by the Public Prosecutor in his application and the Court in granting permission for the withdrawal of prosecution under section 494. Nor are we in entire agreement with the contrary view expressed by the Calcutta, Kerala and Sind High Courts that it is mandatory to give reasons and any failure to give reasons either by the Public Prosecutor in his application or the Court in granting or withholding consent would vitiate the very order passed by the Court under section 494. In our considered opinion, the Public Prosecutor and the Court are invested under section 494 with executive and judicious discretions respectively and the power so vested being a statutory one affecting the rights of the citizens, it is not only desirable, just and proper for the Public Prosecutor to indicate at least broadly the reasons that prompted him for preferring the application for withdrawal under section 494 and the Court to pass a speaking order disclosing the reasons for its conclusion. The propriety apart from its desirability and justness for the Court to pass a speaking order on the application by the Public Prosecutor giving reasons therefor, may be judged from another angle which we shall presently refer to. The resultant order, where the consent under section 494 is granted by the Court, being one of discharge or acquittal of the accused, as the case may be, is undoubtedly an order subject to correction by the High Court under sections 435, 436 and 439 or section 470, Criminal Procedure Code. Where a revisional or appellate Court has to exercise its powers in disposing of the revision or appeal against an order of discharge or acquittal passed by the Court in pursuance of granting of consent under section 494, a judicious order disclosing the reasons in support of its conclusion would certainly be of immense use and assistance for the appellate or revisional Court to arrive at a correct conclusion and find out whether the Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction or not. 17. This view of ours gains support from the very language of section 494 when read with the scheme, intendment and purpose of the Code and also the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh6. In that case, it was ruled that the function of the Court in granting its consent is a judicial one and it must, therefore, be exercised judiciously with reference to the material gathered by a judicial method. It is the Public Prosecutor that should initiate in the matter and what the Court has to do is to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. 18. We may usefully notice, in this context, the provisions of section 333, Criminal Procedure Code, whereunder the Advocate-General is empowered, at any stage of any trial before a High Court before the return of the verdict, to inform the Court that he will not further prosecute the defendant upon any charge. When once the Advocate-General exercises his power under section 333 on behalf of the Government, all further proceedings on such charge against the defendant shall be stayed and he shall be discharged of and from the same. When once the Advocate-General exercises his power under section 333 on behalf of the Government, all further proceedings on such charge against the defendant shall be stayed and he shall be discharged of and from the same. The only embargo placed on the Advocate-General in exercise of his power under section 333 is that should think fit to do so. 19. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we shall examine the validity of the action of the A.P.P., Grade I. and the Court in the instant case. True, as argued by Sri P. Chennakesava Reddy, no reasons specifically had been given in the application filed by the Public Prosecutor. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances, we are unable to agree with him that the Public Prosecutor has not exercised his executive discretion at all in preferring the application under section 494. It is also not correct to state that the impugned orders have been passed by the Court solely on the ground that the State Government has decided to withdraw prosecution. This view is amply established by the fact that the Court has on the prior date dismissed the application filed on behalf of the accused for withdrawal on the ground that the State Government has decided or directed withdrawal of prosecution against them. The facts and circumstances which have been established in the present case are these. The land in question is a donka poramboke belonging to the State Government. The petitioner herein has absolutely no legal or valid right over the land. He is neither the owner nor has acquired any legal vested rights in it. A sporadic use of that land along with some other ryots for thrashing and agricultural purposes during the harvest seasons, will not create any legal right in him over the land. He is admittedly not even the complainant in the instant case. The persons who are in occupation of the land are poor Yenadis who have no houses of their own to live in. The State Government has certainly a duty to assist and help the poor citizens and weaker sections of the public by providing suitable accommodation for their living. The Yenadis have raised small sheds and huts for their personal living. The State Government has certainly a duty to assist and help the poor citizens and weaker sections of the public by providing suitable accommodation for their living. The Yenadis have raised small sheds and huts for their personal living. The evidence on record did not also show that they resisted forcibly the Revenue Inspector and the Police who accompanied him when they went there to execute the orders of eviction passed by the Tahsildar. The poor Yenadis have only represented to the Revenue Inspector about their difficulties if they are thrown out of their huts and sheds raised by them at considerable cost and they will be put to irreparable loss and injury. On those representations, the Revenue Inspector and the Police have returned from the donka poramboke. It is not the case of anyone that the Revenue Inspector and the Police have been forcibly attacked by the Yenadis or anyone, else on their behalf or that any force or violence has been used against them. It is well settled that every citizen has an ample right to make proper representations to the concerned authorities even in the course of execution proceedings peacefully and without resort to any violence and force. In fact, the respondents herein have approached the District Collector for the withdrawal of the prosecution and thereafter the State Government thought fit and proper not to prosecute the respondents herein. 20. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the Public Prosecutor has rightly exercised his executive discretion Vested in him under section 494 and applied for permission to withdraw the case and we are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the A.P.P. Gr. 1 has applied for permission under section 494 only on the directions or instructions of the State Government and without applying his mind independently to the facts and circumstances of the case. We are also satisfied that the Court has rightly exercised its discretion in a judicial manner having taken into consideration the entire facts and circumstances and there is absolutely no illegality, irregularity or impropriety justifying our interference in this Criminal Revision cafe. We have already held that the petitioner has no locus standi even to maintain the application. 21. We are also satisfied that the Court has rightly exercised its discretion in a judicial manner having taken into consideration the entire facts and circumstances and there is absolutely no illegality, irregularity or impropriety justifying our interference in this Criminal Revision cafe. We have already held that the petitioner has no locus standi even to maintain the application. 21. For all the reasons stated supra, our answer to both the questions is in the negative i.e., against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents. The Revision case, therefore, must fail and is hereby dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Revision dismissed.