Judgment :- 1. The defendant is the appellant and the only point that arises is as to whether Ext. P2 mortgage is barred by limitation, the suit itself being one for recovery of the mortgage money due under to mortgages, Exts. P1 and P2, executed in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant over the same property. Ext. P1 is in terms a usufructuary mortgage and since there has been perception of profits, S.19 Explanation A operates because the receipt of rent has to be deemed to be a payment, and on this basis it is agreed that the claim under Ext. P1 is not barred. However, the main dispute is as to whether Ext. P2, which is described as a ]pdhbv]m[mcw executed on 161949 is barred since the date of the institution of the suit viz., 30 11964, is beyond 12 years. Art.62 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of 12 years to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage, the terminus a quo being "when the money sued for becomes due". In the present case, the] document recites thus: The argument of the counsel for the appellant is simple. Ext. PI virtually provides for payment of the mortgage money on demand and, therefore, the technical expression'on demand', which means at once without any demand, should be given that construction, and limitation must be deemed to commence from the date of Ext. P1. On this argument, there is no doubt that the time prescribed in Art.62 has elapsed. The courts below, however, did not accept this plea because of the provision for consolidation admittedly contained in Ext. P2. Relying on a ruling reported in 1961 KLT. 52 the learned Subordinate judge held that a consolidation of the two mortgages under Exts. P1 and P2 had to be made as provided for in S.67A of the T. P. Act and that so long as the earlier mortgage under Ext. P1 had not become a stale claim the later mortgage also remains alive. In this court, counsel for the respondent has challenged what has found favour with the lower courts. 2. Both sides agree that since Ext. P2 is a puravaipa and since there is an express provision for consolidation, the mortgagor is bound to pay the mortgage money under both the transactions together. In this court, counsel for the respondent has challenged what has found favour with the lower courts. 2. Both sides agree that since Ext. P2 is a puravaipa and since there is an express provision for consolidation, the mortgagor is bound to pay the mortgage money under both the transactions together. Thus, we cannot read these two transactions as independent of each other and the ruling reported in AIR 1927 Madras 417 cannot come to the rescue of the defendant. In 1961 KLT. 52 Mr. Justice Raman Nayar, as he then was, took the view that since the terms of the document contained an express recital that on demand the mortgagor would pay the amounts due under both the documents together and obtain a release of the property it amounted to a contract to the contrary, excluding the operation of S.61 of the Transfer of Property Act and giving the mortgagee the right of consolidation. The mortgage money has, therefore, to be regarded as the consolidated amount. According to the learned judge "the effect of the transaction is to increase the principal of the original mortgage by the amount subsequently advanced". If the mortgage, money under Ext. P1 is augmented by adding the amount due under Ext P2, so long as Ext. P1 mortgage is not barred, the whole claim remains alive. For this reason, I am inclined to uphold the decision of, the lower appellate court. 3. There was considerable argument on another aspect of the case bearing on limitation. What is the exact import of the expression 'on demand' when occurring in a mortgage like Ext. P2, in relation to the starting point of limitation under Art.62 of the Limitation Act?. 33 Cochin Law Reports 531, AIR. 1944 Allahabad 197 and AIR. 1955 Calcutta 194 lay down the law and that is common place enough that the money payable on demand is payable forthwith when it occurs in bills and promissory notes and the same meaning has been attached to those words when occurring in mortgages. However, the ruling reported in AIR. 1933 Rangoon 188 makes a refinement, shall 1 say. In that case, money was due under a promissory note and a security was furnished by way of mortgage which contained the words 'on demand' with reference to the time of payment. However, the ruling reported in AIR. 1933 Rangoon 188 makes a refinement, shall 1 say. In that case, money was due under a promissory note and a security was furnished by way of mortgage which contained the words 'on demand' with reference to the time of payment. A Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court held that although prima facie a sum payable on demand is repayable forthwith and the words 'on demand' are superfluous, in each case the question whether or not the parties intended that the words 'on demand' should be treated as an integral and operative part of the agreement depends upon the true construction of the agreement into which the parties entered. After adverting to one or two cases where money was lent repayable on demand and the cause of action arose on the date of the loan itself, the Bench observed: "If it was intended in those cases to lay down that in every case in which it was agreed that a sum of money should be payable on demand the money was payable forthwith, I am of opinion that in those cases the law was laid down too broadly. In my opinion, although primafacie a sum payable 'on demand' is repayable forthwith and the words 'on demand' are superfluous, in each case the question whether or not the parties intended that the words 'on demand should be treated as ad integral and operative part of the agreement depends upon the true construction of the agreement into which the parties entered. In N. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation ( (1921) 3 KB. 110) at p. 129, Atkin, LJ., observed that: 'The question appears to me to be in every case, did the parties in fact intend to make the demand a term of the contract? If they did, effect will be given to their contract, whether it be a direct promise to pay or a collateral promise, though in seeking to ascertain their intention the nature of the contract may be material.' In so holding the learned Lord Justice was stating what, in my opinion, has always been the common law upon this subject. In Norton v. Ellam ((1838) 2M. & W 461) at p. 464' Parke, B., observed: 'It is the same as the case of money lent payable upon request, with interest, where no' demand is necessary before bringing the action. In Norton v. Ellam ((1838) 2M. & W 461) at p. 464' Parke, B., observed: 'It is the same as the case of money lent payable upon request, with interest, where no' demand is necessary before bringing the action. There is noobligation in law to give any notice at all; if you choose to make it part of the contract that notice shall be given, you may do so.' And in Walton v. Maccall ( (1844) 13M & W 452) at p. 458, Parke, B-, laid down that: 'It is clear that a request for the payment of a debt is quite immaterial, unless the parties to the contract have stipulated that it shall be made; if they have not, the law requires no notice or request; but the debtor is bound to find out the creditor and pay him the debt when due: see also Hanmantram Sadhuram v. Arthur Bowles ~ (1884) 8 Bom. 561), Nattakaruppa Goundan v. Kumarasami Goundan( (1899) 22 Mad. 20) and Secy. of State v. Radhika Prasad Bapuli (AIR. 1923 Mad. 667).' the last case, Schwabe, C.J., held that: 'The question to be considered is whether the words 'on demand' are mere words, or whether, looking at the whole document, it is really intended that the demand should be made before the liability to pay arises.' In my opinion it is manifest, having regard to the language in, which the deed of mortgage of the 28th July 1916. is couched, that the parties to the deed of mortgage intended that the sum of Rs. 25,000 should not be due and payable unless and until a demand in that behalf had been made upon the mortgagors by the mortgagee." In AIR. 1934 Rangoon 51, a,similar view was expressed, and the observations of Schwabe Chief Justice in AIR. 1923 Madras 667 as to whether the words 'on demand' reading the document as a whole, really convey the meaning that a demand should be made before the liability to pay arose was referred to. In short, where mortgage money, is 'payable on demand, ordinarily, time would run from the date of the document unless the circumstances clearly point to the condition of the demand being treated as an integral term of the contract of mortgage. 4. In the present case, Ext. P2 is a puravaipa. The debtor not only could not pay Ext. In short, where mortgage money, is 'payable on demand, ordinarily, time would run from the date of the document unless the circumstances clearly point to the condition of the demand being treated as an integral term of the contract of mortgage. 4. In the present case, Ext. P2 is a puravaipa. The debtor not only could not pay Ext. P1 mortgage amount, but wanted an additional loan to be 'secured on the same property and with an agreement to consolidate. The parties could not have intended that, on the additional loan being granted, both the loans would be immediately payable. It is perfectly possible to read into the circumstances attending upon the execution of Ext. P2 the meaning that a formal demand was intended by the parties as an integral part of the contract. In this view also, there is no bar of limitation for any part of the suit claim. 5. I dismiss the appeal, but in the circumstances, parties will bear their costs. 6. Counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the provisions of S.11 (8) of Act 11 of 1970 and has claimed benefits thereunder, particularly because, in the present case there is a possessory mortgage and a varakachit in favour of mortgagor. While not deciding the point now, I direct that when raised, the court of first instance will consider this question and grant such relief as the defendant may be eligible for. Dismissed.