JUDGMENT V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. 1. This appeal is a tragic illustration of the inaction of the legislature in clarifying a statutory ambiguity where High Courts have spoken in conflicting voices for about half a century. The continuance of the uncertainty of law leads to speculation in litigation and militates against the rule of law. In the present case, a moot point under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code has divided the High Courts of India and the Supreme Court has not yet pronounced on it, apparently because no case has reached that, level. 2. The facts are few so far as they are relevant to the appeal. The decree-holder purchased in court auction the property of the judgment-debtor in execution of his money decree. Thereafter, instead of resorting to proceedings under Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, for executing the sale certificate and taking possession, (he had made one effort on the executive side but it proved futile) he filed the present suit for recovery of possession from the judgment-debtor who set up the bar of section 47 which was not accepted by the trial court, but in appeal proved successful. The disappointed decree-holder has come up in second appeal to complain that he is the owner of the property having purchased it in court auction and that he is entitled to recover possession from the judgment-debtor notwithstanding section 47, Civil Procedure Code. According to him, any question arising while enforcing a sale certificate under Order 21, C.P.C., even by a decree-holder cannot be held to relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Counsel on both sides argued at great length and the material for the length is furnished by the numerous precedents on the point supporting both sides. Quite a few courts have taken the view that a decree-holder who buys property in execution of his decree sheds his capacity as party to the suit and assumes the character of auction-purchaser thereafter and that the further stages in proceedings for recovering possession from the judgment-debtor by such auction-purchaser do not relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. This view has been highlighted in a Full Bench ruling of the Patna High Court reported in A.I.R. 1931 Patna 241. This view has been highlighted in a Full Bench ruling of the Patna High Court reported in A.I.R. 1931 Patna 241. Other High Courts also have endorsed this view, among them are the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Lahore, Rangoon, the Chief Court of Oudh as also the Judicial Commissioner's Court (as well as the High Court) of Himachal Pradesh. The opposite view point has been espoused by an equally imposing array of High Courts including those of Madras, Calcutta, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, Travancore, Travancore-Cochin, Punjab and the courts of the Judicial Commissioners of Sind and Peshawar. Counting the number of courts may not always be the correct way to decide a question of law although counsel were tempted into that exercise. The view which found favour with Madras, Travancore and Travancore-Cochin has been referred to with a hint of approval by Kerala in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Lakshmi Ammal Meenakshi Ammal 1957 K.L.T. 1094, although counsel for the appellant is right in pointing out that the question was not directly decided there. 3. The point itself is not too complicated, but opposing approaches to what is meant by satisfaction of a decree has led to the conflict of judicial thought. Really two points arise in a case like this. Is the decree-holder-auction-purchaser a party to the suit when he is enforcing the sale certificate and seeking to dispossess the judgment-debtor in proceedings under Order 21, C.P.C.? He is, according to Madras, but he is not, according to Patna. The first takes the view that there is transformation of the status of the decree-holder once he purchases the property and seeks to take possession pursuant to such purchase. The second holds that a decree-holder remains a party notwithstanding his becoming a purchaser. This conflict, however, as to whether there is a distinction between a decree-holder-purchaser and a stranger auction-purchaser no longer arises, since the amendment of the Code in 1956 has made it clear that every purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree is a party to the suit. 4. This conflict, however, as to whether there is a distinction between a decree-holder-purchaser and a stranger auction-purchaser no longer arises, since the amendment of the Code in 1956 has made it clear that every purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree is a party to the suit. 4. The second question which has led to considerable controversy, and which could also have been easily settled by an amendment of section 47, is as to whether a decree-holder-purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree is raising a question relating to the execution, discharges or satisfaction of the decree when actually he is trying to get delivery of the property under Order 21, rule 95 on the strength of the sale certificate obtained under Order 21, rule 94. Those courts which have held that section 47 is a bar to a suit brought by the decree-holder-auction-purchaser argue that the full fruits of the decree are obtained by the decree-holder only when he secures possession of the property and until then he is seeking satisfaction and questions which crop up during that stage are questions which relate to the satisfaction of the decree. The rival view point is based on the express provisions of Order 21, rule 72, C.P.C., which lays down that the holder of a decree shall bid for or purchase property sold in execution of that decree only with the express permission of the court and then comes the crucial provision and ''Where a decree-holder purchases with such permission, the purchase-money and the amount due on the decree may, be set off against one another, and the Court executing the decree shall enter up satisfaction of the decree. " Order 21, rule 72(2) in terms stipulates that satisfaction of the decree shall be entered up, on a purchase of the judgment-debtor's properties by the decree-holder. How can there be any question relating to satisfaction of a decree if, on the purchase, satisfaction of the decree is entered up by virtue of Order 21, rule 72 (2)? There are other approaches to the question based upon article 138 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 Krishna as the Patna decision points out; but I am not elaborating them now. There are other approaches to the question based upon article 138 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 Krishna as the Patna decision points out; but I am not elaborating them now. I may candidly state that, presented in the simple form in which I have set it out, there is much to commend the view that in enforcement of the sale certificate under Order 21, C.P.C., what the decree-holder does is not to execute, the decree or seek satisfaction of the decree but to put through the sale certificate and, with the assistance of the summary procedure under Order 21, C.P.C., to get the fruits of his purchase. If this view is sound, section 47 will not come in the way of a suit by such decree-holder-auction-purchaser when he seeks recovery of possession from his judgment-debtor. In such procedural matters law is amoral like the rule of the road and there is no issue of right or wrong. 5. I may also mention that an auction- purchaser may not bother to avail himself of the summary procedure under Order 21, but may, by other means, secure possession. In the light of section 51, C.P.C., it is not obligatory for him to apply under Order 21, C.P.C. to recover possession from the judgment-debtor. If authority were necessary for this proposition I may cite the ruling reported in A.I.R. 1954 Madras 760. 6. Jwala Prasad, J. in A.I.R. 1931 Patna 241 most exhaustively examined the question and, speaking for the majority, took the view that section 47 did not bar a decree-holder- auction-purchaser bringing a suit for possession. The learned Judge held that section 47 strictly speaking barred only the determination, by a separate suit, of questions raised or arising between the decree-holder and the judgment debtor which relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. He further argued that a suit for possession of property purchased Krishna at an execution sale really did not raise any question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. He further argued that a suit for possession of property purchased Krishna at an execution sale really did not raise any question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The import of Order 21, rule 72 (2), as explained by me a little while ago, was also relied upon by the learned Judge who derived support from article 138 of the Limitation Act which gave to every purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, a period of twelve years, from the date when the sale become absolute, for a suit for possession of immovable property irrespective of the fact that the purchaser was a stranger or a decree-holder. 7. The rival school of thought has found favour with Madras. A Full Bench of that High Court, in A.I.R, 1939 Madras 369, took the opposite line. Leach, C.J., speaking for the court, was of the opinion that "proceedings by a decree-holder who has become the auction-purchaser for delivery of possession must be deemed to relate to the execution or discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of section 47, Civil P.C. ". A later decision by a Bench of five Judges in A.I.R. 1941 Madras 161 followed the eariler Full Bench in A.I.R. 1939 Madras 369. Indeed, the Madras High Court had from ancient times taken this view; for, in one of the earliest cases (I.L.R. 13 Madras 504 ) Muttusami Ayyar, J. had observed : "I am unable to uphold the contentian that the court, sale operated to satisfy the decree" In fact Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri, as he then was, in Thondman Annamalar Mudali v. Tiruthani Ramaswami Mudali and others ,A.I.R. 1941 Madras 161 expressed himself thus, "On a careful consideration of these cases, however I am clearly of opinion that grounds on which they are based cannot reasonably be held to apply to the case of a stranger auction-purchaser whose position seems, for this purpose, to be essentially different from that of decree-holder-auction-purchaser. These decisions proceed on the ground that where a decree-holder himself purchases the property in court-auction, he cannot be regarded as having secured the full, fruits of his decree until he obtains delivery of possession of the property purchased and the decree cannot be deemed to be completely satisfied until such delivery is obtained. These decisions proceed on the ground that where a decree-holder himself purchases the property in court-auction, he cannot be regarded as having secured the full, fruits of his decree until he obtains delivery of possession of the property purchased and the decree cannot be deemed to be completely satisfied until such delivery is obtained. Any steps, therefore, that he might take for obtaining such delivery must be deemed to be steps in furtherance of the execution of his decree." It is proper to remember that even in Madras, from the earliest times, doubts and dissents have found expression, for in I.L.R. 26 Madras 740 Benson and Bhashyam Ayyangar, JJ. doubted whether proceedings taken by a decree-holder, who had purchased property, to obtain possession did relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree; but in view of the earlier decisions of that court they felt constrained to follow them. In I.L.R. 28 Madras 87 Arnold White, Chief Justice, observed that if the matter were res Integra, he would be disposed to hold that the right to sue for possession was not a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, where the plaintiff represented a decree-holder who had purchased land in execution of his decree. Leach, C.J. referred the practice of the Madras High Court for over 50 years to treat section 47 as having application to proceedings for recovery of possession by decree-holder-auction-purchasers. Indeed, His Lordship silenced the opposition by the observation "In my opinion, it is now far too late in the day to reopen the question". Even Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri, in A.I.R. 1941 Madras 161, took refuge in the long course of decisions in that court and did not want to upset " what has been regarded in his Presidency as a settled cursus curise for over 50 years''. 8. Many of the decisions toeing the Madras line, if I may say so, have referred to the observations of the Judicial Committee in I.L.R. 19 Calcutta 683, where Their Lordships stated: "It is of the utmost importance that all objections to execution sales should be disposed of as cheaply and as speedily as possible. 8. Many of the decisions toeing the Madras line, if I may say so, have referred to the observations of the Judicial Committee in I.L.R. 19 Calcutta 683, where Their Lordships stated: "It is of the utmost importance that all objections to execution sales should be disposed of as cheaply and as speedily as possible. Their Lordships are glad to find that the courts in India have not placed any narrow construction on the language of section 244, and that, when a question has arisen as to the execution, discharge (now section 47)" On the strength of these observations a wider interpretation is given to section 47 by some courts which proceed to argue that the decree-holder-auction-purchaser who purchases with the permission of the court under Order 21, rule 72 cannot be said to have obtained the benefit of his money due under the decree until he gets possession of the property of the judgment-debtor purchased by him. With great respect, there is a difference between taking a liberal view of a statute and taking liberties with the language of a statute. Section 47 speaks of the satisfaction of a decree which cannot be equated with the satisfaction of a purchase. What I mean is that the decree gets satisfied when its holder becomes the owner of the property purchased. Thereafter, the sale intervenes and he seeks to secure the rights flowing from his purchase by recovering possession from the judgment-debtor. The other theory that the decree-holder gets his money's worth only when he gets khas possession of the property stems from a confusion between legal satisfaction, which he derives, under Order 21, rule 72,by virtue of his purchase and economic satisfaction which comes to him when he starts enjoying the land purchased. We are concerned, in a court of law, with legal and not economic satisfaction. Thus, there is much to be said in favour of the view that a decree-holder who becomes the auction-purchaser is not trammelled by section 47 when he brings a suit for recovery of possession from the judgment-debtor. 9. However, we have the important circumstance that the Kerala High Court has, though not pronounced specifically on this question, has glanced at it, if I may say so, in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Lakshmi Ammal Meenakshi Ammal A.I.R. 1958 Kerala 309. Speaking for the Bench, Mr. 9. However, we have the important circumstance that the Kerala High Court has, though not pronounced specifically on this question, has glanced at it, if I may say so, in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Lakshmi Ammal Meenakshi Ammal A.I.R. 1958 Kerala 309. Speaking for the Bench, Mr. Justice Iyengar summarised the Travancore High Court's view on certain questions arising under section 47, C.P.C., "following some of the High Courts in India", and stated that "questions relating to the deliver of possession between decree-holder-auction-purchaser and the judgment-debtor or his representative will also fall under the above section (section 47); but if such questions arise between third parties and the decree-holder-auction-purchaser section 47 will not apply". The learned Judge's inclination appears to be towards the Travancore view. There is no doubt that the consistent view in Travancore has been in keeping with Madras. In Rasavu Mahammathu Rowther Muhammathu Ussan Sahib v. Meera Pillai Shekadhavu XI T.L.T. 776 a Bench of five Judges considered the identical question raised here and came to the concluion that decree-holder who becomes purchaser of the property sold in execution of his decree continues to be a party to the suit and the question relating to the delivery of possession of the property is one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. An exhaustive survey of the case law on the point is disclosed in the judgment. The Travancore-Cochin High Court concurred in this view as is seen from a Division Bench decision of that court reported in Neelakanta Iyer Subramonia Iyer v. Neelakanta Pillai Vasudeva Pillai, 1949 T.C.L.R. 90. To wind up this part of the dicussion, a survey of the ruling of the High Courts formerly having jurisdiction in the Kerala State of today, reveals the long and consistent acceptance of the '"Madras view" of this issue. In matters of procedure it is safe and sensible to follow the settled law, right or wrong, when differences of opinion are possible. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Gafnan and others v. Seth Brindaban 1970 (2) Supreme Court Cases 360 observed: "There is also another aspect which may legitimately be kept in view. In matters of procedure it is safe and sensible to follow the settled law, right or wrong, when differences of opinion are possible. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Gafnan and others v. Seth Brindaban 1970 (2) Supreme Court Cases 360 observed: "There is also another aspect which may legitimately be kept in view. People in arranging their affairs are entitled to rely on a decision of the highest court which appears to have prevailed for considerable length of time and it would require some exceptional reason to justify its reversal when such reversal is likely to create serious embarrassment for those who had acted on the faith of what seemed to be the settled law. Where the meaning of a statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretations than one, and one view accepted by the highest court has stood for a long period during which many transactions such as dealings in property and making of contracts have taken place on the faith of that interpretation the court would ordinarily be reluctant to put upon it a different interpretation which would materially affect those transactions." Justice Dua continued thus: "Now, assuming that two views on the statutory scheme of the Act are possible and assuming the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the appellant to be preferable to that accepted in the impugned judgment we are unable to say that the construction adopted in the judgment under appeal is so clearly and patently erroneous that it should, in the larger interests of justice, be upset notwithstanding the fact that it is likely to disturb rights to property and under contracts founded upon this construction." I have earlier referred to the reluctance of the Madras High Court to depart from a settled course of decisions. I am persuaded notwithstanding my hesitancy to adopt as correct the reasoning which has appealed to the Judges in Madras and Travancore, to uphold the view of the law adopted by Madras, Travancore and Travancore-Cochin High Courts. The ride of stare decisis makes me accept as sound what I would not otherwise do, even if I could, in the absence of a Kerala ruling. The ride of stare decisis makes me accept as sound what I would not otherwise do, even if I could, in the absence of a Kerala ruling. In procedural matters, the hint we derive from section 54 of the States Re-organisation Act read in the light of the ruling in Mammed Haji v. Kunhamina 1962 K.L.T, 130 reinforces the preference I have indicated for the Madras and Travancore view. 10. I hold that the suit is not maintainable and the unfortunate plaintiff, who purchased the property of the judgment-debtor, has become a martyr for the uncertainty of the law. 11. At this stage counsel for the appellant prays that this suit may be converted into an application under section 47 and that he will be in time if that course were adopted. Certainly, if the interests of justice require and procedural pitfalls should not deprive a party of his rights, ordinarilythe court may treat the suit as a proceeding under section 47, subject to limitation and jurisdiction. The appellant will move separately, setting out how he will be free from the bar of limitation, within three days after serving a copy on the opposite side. His motion for conversion of the suit into a proceeding under section 47 will then be considered.