Judgment 1. THIS Rule is at the instance of the accused-petitioner, Kumar P. N. Tagore, against an order dated the 9th June, 1969, passed by Sri S. N. Chakraborty, magistrate 1st Class, Barrackpore, rejecting the petitioner's prayer that the complaint is time-barred and for quashing the proceedings, being case no. C/1766 of 1968, pending against him under section 240 (1) (b) read with section 500 of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932. 2. THE point involved is one of limitation and the facts leading on to the same can be put in a short compass. The complainant, who is the Law assistant of the Barrackpore Municipality filed on 19. 6. 68 a complaint dated the 15th June, 1968, before the learned sub-divisional Magistrate, Barrackpore under Section 240 (1) (b)/500 of the bengal Municipal Act, 1932, against the accused, Kumar P. N. Tagore, of Tagore villa, Baranagar alleging inter alia that the accused had erected and set up an obstruction and encroachment over the main municipal drain (Dantia Khal) without the permission of the administrator of the Municipality that the accused was accordingly served with a notice under section 240 (1) (b)of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 on the 7th December, 1967, to remove the obstruction and encroachment within 15 days from the receipt of the notice but he did not comply with the same and thereby committed the above-mentioned offence; and that the cause of action had arisen on the 22nd December, 1967. The learned Sub-Divisional magistrate, Barrackpore, thereupon took cognizance and summoned the accused under section 240 (1) (b)/500 of the bengal Municipal Act, 1932 and fixed 8. 8. 1968 as the next date. An application was filed on behalf of the accused on 8. 8. 1968 for adjournment and for dispensing with his personal appearance. On an inter-mediate date viz., on 19. 9. 1968, an application was filed by the accused for personal exemption due to his illness, and the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate allowed the prayer for personal exemption for the day. The case was sent to the file of Sri S. N. Chakraborty, magistrate, 1st Class, Barrackpore for disposal. The next date fixed was 9. 10. 1968. 9. 1968, an application was filed by the accused for personal exemption due to his illness, and the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate allowed the prayer for personal exemption for the day. The case was sent to the file of Sri S. N. Chakraborty, magistrate, 1st Class, Barrackpore for disposal. The next date fixed was 9. 10. 1968. On the 24th September, 1968 an application under section 561a of the code of Criminal Procedure was filled on behalf of the accused before the transferee magistrate praying that the complaint filed was misconceived and without any cause of action and therefore should be dismissed. It was inter alia stated in the said petition that the proceedings are barred by limitation having been initiated after the stipulated period provided for under section 533 of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932 and that the same is also not maintainable on merits. The application was set down for hearing on the next date and it was further directed on the next date by an order dated the 27th September, 1968 that the accused would also be examined under section 242 Cr. P. C. The case was adjourned and the next date fixed was on 9. 11. 68. A prayer for adjournment was also filed on that date and the learned trying magistrate being on leave, the case was fixed on 14. 12. 68 for orders. On 6. 1. 69 the learned Magistrate heard both the parties on the maintainability of the present proceedings and fixed 11. 1. 69 for further hearing. On 11. 1. 69 the learned trying magistrate heard both the parties at length and held that the notice having been served on the accused on 7. 12. 67. the complaint was filed within the statutory period of six months; that the prosecution being sanctioned by the administrator of the Municipality and filed by Law Assistant under orders of the Administrator, was maintainable in law; and that the case shall accordingly proceed in accordance with law. After several dates, three witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and on 24. 5. 69, P. W. 3 Becharam samanta was examined. In his evidence, p. W. 3 stated that he served the notice (Ext. 2) on the accused, Kumar P. N. Tagore, who received the notice after signing the acceptance (Ext. 2/5) and the same was later on submitted by him to the Municipality (Ext. 2/4. 5. 69, P. W. 3 Becharam samanta was examined. In his evidence, p. W. 3 stated that he served the notice (Ext. 2) on the accused, Kumar P. N. Tagore, who received the notice after signing the acceptance (Ext. 2/5) and the same was later on submitted by him to the Municipality (Ext. 2/4. The learned defence lawyer pointed out to the learned trying Magistrate at that stage that in view of the said disclosure, the petition of complaint which was filed on the 19th June, 1968, was barred by limitation. A reference was also made to some case-law and the learned magistrate fixed 31. 5. 69 for further hearing when both the parties were heard against and ultimately on 9. 6. 69 the learned trying Magistrate rejected the petitioner's prayer that the complaint was barred by limitation and directed that the case shall continue. This order has been impugned and forms the subject-matter of the present Rule. Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, advocate (with Mr. Arun Kumar mukherjee, Advocate), appearing in support of the Rule on behalf of the accused-petitioner, made a short submission which is one of law and relates to limitation. Mr. Banerjee contended that the date of service of the notice (Ext. 2) being 5. 12. 67 as borne out by the evidence of P. W. 3, the process-server and exhibit 2/5, the learned trying magistrate had clearly erred in holding that the complaint was not time-barred on the purported ground that the starting point of limitation is 7. 12. 67, the date of service of the registered notice on the accused as borne out by the postal acknowledgment receipt (ext. 2/4. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the petition of complaint being thus time-barred on the date when it was presented viz., the 19th June, 1968, the learned Sub-divisional magistrate, Barrackpore was not legally competent to take cognizance thereof and the resultant proceedings based thereupon are not maintainable in law. In support of his contention Mr. Banerjee referred to several cases which will be considered in their proper context. Mr. Pranab Kumar Chatterjee, advocate (with Mr. In support of his contention Mr. Banerjee referred to several cases which will be considered in their proper context. Mr. Pranab Kumar Chatterjee, advocate (with Mr. Mohanlal Dey and miss Lovely Sinha Roy, Advocates), appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party joined issue and contended that the learned Magistrate's finding that there has been no limitation is quite a proper one because in law the date of limitation shall run from the 7th December, 1967, which is the date of service of the registered notice. Mr. Balai Chandra Roy, Advocate and mr. Amitava Dutt, Advocate, who were permitted to appear on behalf of the de facto complainant, the diamond Products Ltd., submitted that the objection raised by Mr. Banerjee on the ground of limitation to the maintainability of the proceedings in the court below is unwarranted and untenable because under section 3 (35)of the General Clauses Act, 1897, 'month' shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar. Mr. Roy further contended that accordingly a month does not constitute a period of 30 days only and the period of limitation of 6 months as provided for under section 533 of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932 is not a period of 180 days. Mr. Chatterjee and Mr. Roy both referred to some cases which will be considered in their proper context. 3. HAVING heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties and on going through the evidence on record. I hold that there is much force behind the contention of Mr. Banerjee that the proceedings are barred by limitation having been instituted beyond the statutory period of six months as enjoined under section 533 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 and that the petition of complaint being time-barred, the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate has erred in law in taking cognizance on the basis of the same. Banerjee that the proceedings are barred by limitation having been instituted beyond the statutory period of six months as enjoined under section 533 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 and that the petition of complaint being time-barred, the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate has erred in law in taking cognizance on the basis of the same. A reference may be made to the provisions of section 533 of the Bengal municipal Act, 1932 (Bengal Act XV of 1932) which is as follows : "no prosecution for an offence under this Act or any rule or bye-law made in pursuance thereof shall be instituted without the order or consent of the Commissioners, and no such prosecution shall be instituted except within six months next after the commission of such offence, unless the offence is continuous in its nature, in which case a prosecution may be instituted within six months of the date on which the commission or existence of the offence was first brought to the notice of the Chairman : provided that the failure to take out any license under this Act shall be deemed to be a continuing offence until the expiration of the period for which such license is required to be taken out". It is abundantly clear therefore that the period provided for thereunder is six months and it is pertinent now to refer to the records to ascertain the correct position. In paragraph 2 of the petition of complaint it has been clearly averred that the accused was served with the notice under section 240 (1) (b) of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932 on 7. 12. 67 and he having failed to comply with the same the offence was committed. In paragraph 3 of the said petition it was further stated that the cause of action arose on 22. 12. 67. P. W. 1, Tamal Lahiri, the law Assistant of the Baranagar Municipality proves the petition of complaint (ext. 1. P. W. 2, Rabindranath Chatterjee, an Overseer of the Baranagar municipality refers to the date of service of the notice by registered post and proves the postal acknowledgment receipt (Ext. 2/4), bearing the date 7. 12. 67. In his cross-examination the witness admitted that there was a service of the notice by the peon of the baranagar Municipality on 5. 12. 67. The said peon was examined as P. W. 3 and he proves the service return (Ext. 2/4), bearing the date 7. 12. 67. In his cross-examination the witness admitted that there was a service of the notice by the peon of the baranagar Municipality on 5. 12. 67. The said peon was examined as P. W. 3 and he proves the service return (Ext. 2/4) bearing the date 5. 12. 67, and also the signature of the accused (Ext. 2/5)in receipt of the said notice on 5. 12. 67. The evidence therefore is quite clear and establishes that the notice was served earlier on the accused on 5.12.67, and the service of a copy of the said notice by registered post on a later date cannot be taken to be the starting point for limitation. This changes the basis of the prosecution case which is based on a service on 7. 12. 67, overlooking the material fact that the service had taken place earlier or 5. 12. 67. The period of limitation being six months, the complaint should have been filed by the Municipality before the 19th June, 1968 on which date it was barred by limitation. If the date be 7.12.67, the complaint is undoubtedly in time but the starting point for limitation must be reckoned from 5. 12. 67 and not 7. 12. 67 because it cannot be overlooked that it was the same notice that was being served in a different manner on the later date and the same cannot extend the period of limitation on the purported footing that the starting point for limitation must be from the later date. Unless and until a statute specifically provides for it, it has never been the intention of the legislature that the period of limitation should be so enlarged by reckoning the date for the purpose of limitation, from the later date of service of the same notice in a different manner. 4. I will now turn to the cases and authorities cited in this connection. A reference was made to the observations made in halsbury's Laws of England (2nd Edition), Vol. 32, page 122 that where the word 'month' occurs in any document which is part of any legal procedure, the time is to be computed by calendar months unless otherwise expressed. A reference was also made to the case of (1) Marakanda sahu, petitioner v. Lal Sadananda singh, opposite party reported in A. I. R. 1952 Orissa page 279. 32, page 122 that where the word 'month' occurs in any document which is part of any legal procedure, the time is to be computed by calendar months unless otherwise expressed. A reference was also made to the case of (1) Marakanda sahu, petitioner v. Lal Sadananda singh, opposite party reported in A. I. R. 1952 Orissa page 279. The said decision however is not directly on the point and refers to the equitable principles of section 9 of the General Clauses Act for being applied for the construction of decrees and orders of the courts and holds that the date of the order which is 25th October, 1948 in that case should be excluded in computing the period of one month. A reference was also made to the case of (2) Provas Chandra poddar, appellant v. Visyaraju Kasi viswanatham Raju and another, Respondents reported in A. I. R. 1962 Orissa, page 149. But the said case also lays down as to how the period of a month's notice is to be computed and in that context it refers to section 3 (35) of the General Clauses Act. In the case of (3) sm. Aloka Ghosh, Accused petitioner v. The Corporation of Calcutta, opposite party reported in A. I. R. 1964 Calcutta page 43, Mr. Justice Amaresh Roy observed as to how the period of limitation enjoined under section 582 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 should commence viz., from the date of expiry of the period of 30 days given in the notice for compliance. A recent decision of the Andhra Pradesh High court reported in A. I. R. 1970 Andhra Pradesh page 234 was also cited and therein it was stated by their Lordships that the period is "within three" months of the date" in the Factories Act, 1948 means "within the three calendar months after the commission of offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector". The pith and substance of the argument put forward by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the opposite parties is that a month means a calendar month and not 30 days and therefore there is no limitation. Mr. Banerjee referred to two cases of this court. He referred in the first instance to the case of (4) The Municipal Commissioner of Raniganj, Complainant-petitioner v. Kedar Kalwar, Accused opposite party, reported in 57 C. W. N. page 704 wherein Mr. Mr. Banerjee referred to two cases of this court. He referred in the first instance to the case of (4) The Municipal Commissioner of Raniganj, Complainant-petitioner v. Kedar Kalwar, Accused opposite party, reported in 57 C. W. N. page 704 wherein Mr. Justice Sen delivering the judgment of the Division bench observed at page 706 that "therefore the starting point of the offence on the Municipality's case would be the 27th June, 1950, and therefore under section 533 the complaint could be legally filed on the 23rd December, 1950, which would be within six months from the date of the commission of the offence". Mr. Banerjee submitted on the basis of the said observations that the period of six months has been taken by their Lordships to be 180 days. Mr. Banerjee further referred to the case of (5) A. C. Saha and Co., petitioner v. The State and anr. opposite parties reported in 61 C. W. N. page 107. In that case under the Calcutta Municipal act, 1951, Mr. Justice Debabrata mookerjee had to consider the period of limitation as provided for under section 582 of the Calcutta Municipal act. In that context the learned Judge held that "the rule of limitation prescribed in section 582 has, in my view, to be strictly followed and the prosecution in the present case must be held to be barred by time". Mr. Banerjee submitted that the period of three months in that case was considered on the footing of 30 days to a month and in any event it was held that the rule of limitation has to be strictly followed and when the prosecution is barred by limitation it is not an irregularity but an illegality which cannot be cured. The learned trying Magistrate has found that the limitation of six months means in effect 180 days. I also agree respectfully with the principles laid down in the case reported in (4) 57 C.W.N. page 704 and hold that the complaint in this case having been filed on the 19th June, 1968, is beyond the period of six months as enjoined under section 533 of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932. I also agree respectfully with the principles laid down in the case reported in (4) 57 C.W.N. page 704 and hold that the complaint in this case having been filed on the 19th June, 1968, is beyond the period of six months as enjoined under section 533 of the Bengal Municipal act, 1932. The objection taken on behalf of the Municipality as also on behalf of the de facto complainant-opposite party that by a month is meant a calendar month and not 30 days, is not of any avail in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the relevant point for consideration is as to from which date the period of limitation is to run. In view of the evidence of P. W. 3 and also in view of ext. 2/5, the signature of the accused on the notice served, it is abundantly clear that the date of service of notice is on the 5th December, 1967 and not 7. 12. 67 which is the later date of service by registered post. If 5.12.67 be the starting point, the complaint is barred by time even if six calendar months be taken into consideration and not 180 days. The contention raised by Mr. Banerjee relating to limitation therefore succeeds and I hold that the complaint filed on the 19th June, 1968, having been filed beyond the statutory period of limitation, is bad in law and the learned trying Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance of the offence on the basis thereof. In the result, the Rule is made absolute; the order dated the 9th June, 1969, passed by Sri S. N. Chakraborty, magistrate, 1st Class, Barrackpore in case No. C/1766 Act of 1968 under section 249 (1) (b) read with section 500 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, is set aside and the proceedings pending before the learned trying Magistrate are hereby quashed. Affidavits filed in court may be kept on the record.