JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - These connected appeals have arisen out of an application for restitution made under Section 144, C.P.C. Plaintiff Kedar Nath and others filed suit No. 91 of 1946 for possession over share of Khewats described in Schedule A given at the foot of the application under Section 144, C.P.C. The suit was decreed by the 1st appellate court on 26-7-1949 and in pursuance of that decree the plaintiffs had obtained possession over the said property including sir, khudkasht and grove plots detailed in Schedule B which appertained to that share on 9-9-1949. In the meantime the defendants of that suit namely Sheo Murat Pande and others filed a second appeal in the High Court which was decided in their favour on 9-8-1957 and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed. Pursuant to that decree the defendant-respondents applied for restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. (Misc. Case No. 208/57) which was allowed. By that time Zamindari was abolished, so the Khewat share ceased to exist with result that possession was alleged to have been taken back over the plots given in Schedule B on 12-10-1958. Thereafter the present application under Section 144 C.P.C. was made on 9-8-1960 by the defendant-respondents for recovery of mesne profits for the period 9-9-1949 to 12-10-1958. In the meantime some of the original defendants had died and the present applicants were substituted and they claimed to be entitled to realise the entire mesne profits which were claimed at the rate of Rs. 150/- per acre per year amounting to Rs. 19,548/- plus a sum of Rs. 850/- as the price of certain Khunti Bans and fruits said to have been appropriated by the plaintiffs during the period in question. Thus, a total amount of Rs. 20,398/- was claimed. 2. The appellants (opposite parties) contested this application for mesne profits pleading that they had simply taken dakhal of the share in the Khewat and had not claimed actual possession over any plot. They denied their liability to pay mesne profits. 3. The trial court held that the plaintiff-opposite parties had been in actual possession of certain plots measuring 12.48 acres and as such liable to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 50/- per acre per year. It also held that the applicants were entitled to recover Rs. 112-50 only as price of the fruits etc. Thus, the claim of the applicants for Rs. 50/- per acre per year. It also held that the applicants were entitled to recover Rs. 112-50 only as price of the fruits etc. Thus, the claim of the applicants for Rs. 5,730.75 as mesne profits was decreed against the opposite parties. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal and the defendants filed a cross appeal and prayed that they should have been awarded the full amount claimed. The lower appellate court dealt with the matter and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were liable to pay mesne profits in respect of the sir and khudkasht plots over which they had come into actual possession at the time of dakhaldihani. The claim for mesne profits was dismissed with regard to those plots over which the lower appellate court held that some other persons were in possession and the plaintiffs had not secured actual possession. The view of the court below was that the sir and khudkasht plots over which the defendants remained in actual possession must be taken into consideration for awarding mesne profits to the applicants and they could not be absolved from that liability. The result was that the appeal filed by the opposite parties was partly allowed and the appeal filed by the applicants was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the court below the plaintiff-opposite parties have preferred second appeal No. 608 of 1963 whereas the defendant-applicants have filed second appeal No. 369 of 1963. 4. The main point which has been argued before me on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants and which does not seem to have been canvassed before the courts below is that on account of the abolition of Zamindari all the land of intermediaries vested in the State and the respondents were not entitled to claim any mesne profits in respect of the property in suit. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is as to the effect of the coming into force of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 on the respondents claim for mesne profits. It was emphasised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the original suit No. 91 of 1946 was for possession over fractional shares of Zamindari in three villages. In other words, it was purely a suit for possession over Khewat shares and the sir and khudkasht plots were alleged to be merely appertaining to that Khewat share. It was emphasised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the original suit No. 91 of 1946 was for possession over fractional shares of Zamindari in three villages. In other words, it was purely a suit for possession over Khewat shares and the sir and khudkasht plots were alleged to be merely appertaining to that Khewat share. There is no dispute in the fact that so far as the Khewat share was concerned, the rights of the intermediaries were extinguished and it vested in the State as a result of the notification under Section 4 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. So far as the sir and Khudkasht plots are concerned they were merely entered in Schedule B of the application under Section 144, C.P.C. and the prayer for mesne profits was in respect of the property described in Schedule A and B. The other averments in the application were also to the effect that the applicants had secured possession on 12-10-1958 over the property described in Schedules A and B and consequently the reliefs claimed in the application with regard to mesne profits must be deemed to relate to the same property. It is abundantly clear from a perusal of that application that no reference was made to sir and Khudkasht rights of the intermediaries or any other rights such as the bhumidhari rights which might have arisen in the wake of the Zamindari abolition. It was an application simpliciter in which the relief relating to the property entered in Schedules A and B was claimed. In these circumstances it was strongly contended on behalf of the appellants that the property forming the subject-matter of the application under Section 144, C. P. C, having come to an end in so far as the proprietary rights of the applicants are concerned, no liability for mesne profits could be fastened on them. 5. The appellants took their stand on the consequences of vesting mentioned in Section 6 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, the relevant part of which runs as under :- "6. Consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State. 5. The appellants took their stand on the consequences of vesting mentioned in Section 6 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, the relevant part of which runs as under :- "6. Consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State. When the notification under Section 4 has been published in the Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequence as hereinafter set forth shall, from the beginning of the date of vesting, ensure in the area to which the notification relates, namely :- (a) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediatries- (i) in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren) grove land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other that trees in village abadi, holding or grove) ; fisheries, tanks, ponds, water channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites hats, bazars and melas (other than hats bazars and melas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section "(1) of Section 18 apply), (ii) in all sub-soil in such estates including rights; if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances ..............." The word "Estate" has been defined in Section 3 (8) of the Act. The gist of the definition is that the "Estate" shall be deemed to have always meant the area included under one entry in any of the registers described in clause (e) of Section 32 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The sir and khudkasht land is also described in the register maintained under Section 32 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. It is, therefore, comprised within the term "Estate" as used in the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. The language of Section 6 (a) (i) and (ii) is wide and comprehensive and suggests that all rights; title and interest of all the intermediaries shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh from all encumbrances as a consequence of vesting. The language of Section 6 (a) (i) and (ii) is wide and comprehensive and suggests that all rights; title and interest of all the intermediaries shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh from all encumbrances as a consequence of vesting. An attempt was made on behalf of the respondents to suggest that the extinction of rights which were strictly proprietary rights of the intermediaries and so far as the cultivatory rights in regard to sir and khudkasht land were concerned they did not extinguish. I was referred to a number of provisions in he Act such as Secs. 10, 14, 16, 17 and 44 of the Act which seem to suggest that the sir and khudkasht rights were protected by the Act and were not meant to be extinguished. The learned counsel particularly adverted to the provisions of Section 44 clause (d) of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and contended that if the sir and khudkasht rights were also intended by the legislature to be extinguished and not retained after the Zamindari abolition, then some compensation ought to have been provided for taking away those rights, but since no such compensation was provided, it became apparent that the intention was not to extinguish those rights, I, however, find it difficult to accede to this submission because as I have already pointed out the language of Section 6 (a) of the Act is wide and categorical and does not seem to make any reservation with regard to the extinction of rights of the intermediaries and their vesting in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances. 6. It was next contended on behalf of the respondents that since the sir and khudkasht plots admittedly remained in possession of the present appellants since 27-7-1949 until the decree passed in second appeal by the High Court in the year 1957 and the respondents had suffered a loss and were deprived of the enjoyment of that property during that period, they were entitled to claim mesne profits irrespective of the capacity in which the intermediaries may now be in possession of those plots. A reference was made to the provisions of Section 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. A reference was made to the provisions of Section 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It was submitted that though the effect of the provisions of that section, was to confer bhumidhari rights on the intermediaries in respect of sir or khudkasht land which was in their possession or deemed to be held by them, nevertheless it was obvious that those plots were permitted by the Legislature to remain to the occupation of the intermediaries, hence so far as their cultivatory rights were concerned, they remained unimpaired. This interpretation of Section 18, however, cannot be accepted now because the law has been laid down in this regard by the Supreme Court. In the first place, Sec. 6 of the Act provides for extinction of the rights of the intermediaries without reservation. Consequently by virtue of Section 18 altogether new rights known as bhumidhari rights have been conferred upon intermediaries in respect of khudkasht and sir land and whatever old rights vested in them in respect of such land ceases as a result of the vesting. The question as to the nature of bhumidhari rights and how far they could be regarded as mere substitute for the rights which erstwhile vested in the intermediaries with regard to sir and khudkasht land has been the subject of judicial interpretation. In Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank, A.I.R. 1959 Allahabad 179 : 1959 A.L.J. 229. It was held by this Court that where sir, khudkasht and grove land formed part of the mortgaged property, the mortgage having been created before the commencement of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, the bhumidhari rights in such land would be by way of substituted security and the mortgagee would be entitled to get such right put to sale in execution of the decree on the basis of the mortgage deed. This view was, however, not approved by the Supreme Court and in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790 : 1961 A.L.J. 716. It was pointed out that the way in which Section 18 was worded showed that three kinds of property namely sir, khudkasht land and intermediary's grove, vested in the State under Section 6 (a) (i) and were then resettled with the intermediary on a new tenure and not in the same right which he had in them before the vesting. It was pointed out that the way in which Section 18 was worded showed that three kinds of property namely sir, khudkasht land and intermediary's grove, vested in the State under Section 6 (a) (i) and were then resettled with the intermediary on a new tenure and not in the same right which he had in them before the vesting. In other words, these properties could not be available to the mortgagee by way of substituted security, the property being new property which could not have been mortgaged before the date of vesting. In my opinion the decision of the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh's, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790 : 1961 A.L.J. 716 case puts the matter beyond controversy. 7. The whole object of Section 144, C.P.C. is to restore status quo ante. If a person was wrongfully deprived of a property, on account of a decision of a court which was later reversed, he is entitled to claim restoration of possession of that very property and also the payment of such compensation, mesne profits etc. as are payable consequent on such variation or reversal of the decree. In other words the applicants for mesne profits must be entitled to the benefit of that very property and that property should continue to exist. This presupposes that the applicants have a subsisting right in that very property. In case however, the property itself has ceased to exist, a claim for mesne profits on it would not be competent. Since as a result of vesting under Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 all rights of the intermediaries including those in respect of sir and khudkasht land cease as a consequence of the notification under Section 4 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, they cannot be deemed to have still a subsisting interest as sir and khudkasht in that property. The question that the intermediary acquires some new rights namely bhumidhari rights in respect of sir and khudkasht land is, however, not relevant for the purpose of determining as to whether his rights as sir and khudkasht holder in that very property still exist. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh's, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790 : 1961 A.L.J. 716 case (page 1792, para. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh's, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790 : 1961 A.L.J. 716 case (page 1792, para. 6) as under :- "All lands therefore whether cultivable or barren or grove lands vested in the State on the notification under Section 4 having been made save as otherwise provided in this Act. Therefore, proprietary rights in sir and khudkasht land would vest in the State on the coming into force of the notification under Section 4 unless there was some provision otherwise in the Act. The contention of the respondent therefore that sir and khudkasht land and grove land continued to be the property of the appellant and could therefore remain liable to be sold in execution proceedings would fail in view of the notification under Section 4 unless of course there is a provision otherwise in the Act." Thus, the Supreme Court very clearly laid down that the sir and khudkasht land cease to be the property of the intermediary if the notification under Section 4 was issued. This lends support to the appellant's contention that the property was no longer the same as formed the subject-matter of the suit and the decree that entirely new kind of rights might have accrued under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act but they could not be availed of by the applicants for the purposes of enforcing a claim under Section 144, C.P.C. The Supreme Court drew a distinction between Secs. 9 and 18 in this regard and came to the conclusion that whereas Section 9 used the words "shall continue to belong on be held by such intermediary" Sec. 18 was differently worded. It merely said that the three kinds of property vested in the State and were then resettled with the intermediary on a new tenure and not in the same right which he had it them before the vesting. It observed as follows (page 1793, para. 7) :- "The legislature was therefore creating a new right under Section 18 and the old proprietary right in sir and khudkasht land and any intermediary's grove land had already vested under Section 6 in the State. It observed as follows (page 1793, para. 7) :- "The legislature was therefore creating a new right under Section 18 and the old proprietary right in sir and khudkasht land and any intermediary's grove land had already vested under Section 6 in the State. Therefore, it cannot be said that Section 18 is an exception to the consequences provided in Section 6 and therefore sir and khudkasht land and grove land continue to be the property of the judgment-debtor in this case in the same manner as they were his property at the time of the mortgage and would therefore be available in execution of the decree as the proprietary rights mortgaged. We are of the opinion that the proprietary rights in sir and khudkasht land and in grove land have vested in the State and what is conferred on the intermediary by Section 18 is a new right altogether which he never had and which could not therefore have been mortgaged in 1914." In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court it is not possible to split the concept of rights into proprietary rights and those derived from cultivatory possession. They constitute a single, integral right which vested in the intermediary prior to the date of vesting and which came to an end by the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The rights which were subsequently conferred by Section 18 of the Act were altogether new rights and therefore the intermediary could not be said to be in enjoyment of the same rights or in possession of the very Property. The decision of the Supreme Court also contains an answer to the argument of the respondent based on the provisions of Section 44 (d) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The fact that no compensation is provided in respect of sir and Khudkasht right does not militate against the effect of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. In my opinion the direct and immediate impact of the notification under Section 4 of the Act was to extinguish all the rights of the intermediaries (including those in relation to sir and khudkasht land) and vest them in the State and thereafter confer entirely view rights. In my opinion the direct and immediate impact of the notification under Section 4 of the Act was to extinguish all the rights of the intermediaries (including those in relation to sir and khudkasht land) and vest them in the State and thereafter confer entirely view rights. It was observed by Wanchoo, J. in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh's, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790 : 1961 A.L.J. 716 case (page 1794) as follows :- "It is true that under Section 44 of the Act when calculating net assets, the income from sir and khudkasht land and grove land has been excluded on the ground that bhumidhari rights have been conferred therein under Section 18 of the Act. That is, however, for the purposes of calculating what should be paid to the intermediary as compensation and in that connection it was necessary to take into account the fact that the Legislature was creating a new right in the inter mediary with respect to certain lands and therefore it was not necessary to give money as compensation. That would not, however, make any difference in our view as to the legal effect of the notification under Section 4 and under the notification sir and khudkasht land and grove land would vest in the State and would not be an exception to the consequences of vesting in Section 6 and therefore the proprietary right in sir and khudkasht land and grove land which were mortgated would be extinguished and the bhumidhari right which is created by Section 18 would be a new right altogether and would not therefore be considered to be included under the mortgage in this case." That seems to have been the trend of decisions from the very beginning with regard to the scope and implication to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. In the case of Suryapal, Singh v. U.P. Government, A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 674 (F.B.) : 1951 A.L.J. 365 it was laid down that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not merely extinguish the rights of the intermediaries but transfers them to the State. In Shitladin v. Board of Revenue, 1963 A.L.J. 389 (F.B.) Desai, C. J. observed (para. In Shitladin v. Board of Revenue, 1963 A.L.J. 389 (F.B.) Desai, C. J. observed (para. 4, page 391) as under :- "When during the pendency of the suit the U.P. Tenancy Act was repealed and the Zaminclari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force all rights of the lumberdar and the co-sharers were extinguished and the land of the mehal vested free from all encumbrances in the State. All tenancy rights were also extinguished, because all land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Rights were conferred by the Zaminclari Abolition and Land Reforms Act upon persons holding tenancy right under the U.P. Tenancy Act, but they were new rights and the rights acquired under the U.P. Tenancy Act were extinguished. This was the effect since 1-7-1952." 8. So far as the present case is concerned, it is significant that, as, has been pointed out in the earlier part of my judgment, the suit related specifically to possession over fragmented shares of the khewat and the application for mesne profits made under Section 144, C.P.C. was in similar terms. The respondents never came with the allegation with regard to any new rights which might have emerged as a consequence of the abolition of the Zamindari and how far they could have bearing on the question of recovery of mesne profits. The application was based entirely on the footing that the property described in schedule A and the property described in schedule B which is appurtenant to it were the subject-matter of restitution, and mesne profits were claimed in respect of the property entered in the schedules. 9. The result of the above discussion is that the property in which mesne profits were claimed had ceased to exist, the applicants had no longer any subsisting interest in that property, irrespective of whatever new rights they might have become entitled to. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in any view of the matter the applicants were entitled to mesne profits for the period prior to the issue of the notification under Section 4 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in any view of the matter the applicants were entitled to mesne profits for the period prior to the issue of the notification under Section 4 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. In reply the learned counsel for the appellants referred to the provisions of Section 7 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and contended that the only exceptions to the proceedings under Section 6 of the Act were incorporated in Section 7 and no other exception could be engrafted. It was argued that clause (b) of Section 7 which used the words "arrear of rent, cesses, sayar, or other dues which accrued before the date of "vesting would not include mesne profits. The language of that sub-section indicated that the dues must be specified or ascertained ones and not in the nature of mesne profits which have to be specifically asserted and determined. Moreover, the rights safeguarded by Section 7 are also proprietary rights and in case those rights themselves have disappeared, the right to recover rent and other clues etc. also comes to an end. Therefore, the effect of vesting of the property under Section 4 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 was that the property of the applicants in respect of the sir and khudkasht land ceased to exist and mesne profits in respect of the same could not be claimed. Thus, no liability could be fastened upon the appellants in respect of mesne profits. 11. For these reasons I allow second appeal No. 608 of 1963 preferred by Kedar Nath and others and dismiss second appeal No. 369 of 1963 preferred by Sheo Murat Pandey and others. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.