JUDGMENT M. H. Beg, J. - This application under Sections 314 of the Contempt of Courts Act has been made by a plaintiff landlord who had filed a suit No. 817 of 1964 for the ejectment of the opposite party No. 1 his tenant, and his sub-tenant, opposite party No. 2, and for recovery of arrears of rent and for pendentilite and future mesne profits. The suit was decreed with costs on 21st November, 1964, for ejectment and arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 961- for damages to the extent of Rs. 36i- and for payment of Urban Area Property Tax of Rs. 631- by the court of Additional Munsif, Kanpur. On 18-10-1965, the 1st Civil Judge of Kanpur partly allowed the appeal of the tenant inasmuch as the suit for ejectment was dismissed on the finding that the subtenancy was not without the landlord's con- sent. But, it was decreed for Rs. 173/-, the arrears of rent and taxes. A second appeal No. 383 of 1966 was then filed in this Court and admitted on 16-2-1966. An application was made by the plaintiff on 17-12-1968 during the pendency of the second appeal. The provisions of law under which this application was made was not cited. In paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit of opposite party No. 1, filed in reply to the affidavit supporting the application, the tenant said ; "The deponent undertakes to deposit the decretal amount as also the rent upto the date of suit and further rent also. The deponent prays that some reasonable time (six months) be allowed for depositing these amounts." On 9-5-1969, when this application came up for orders, my learned brother R. B. Misra, passed the following order : "This is an application by the plaintiff-appellant with a prayer that the respondents be directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,600/- and Rs. 60/- per month during the pendency of the appeal. A Counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents. In paragraph 12 of the same, the respondents undertake to deposit the decretal amount as also the rent upto the date of the suit and further rent also. 2,600/- and Rs. 60/- per month during the pendency of the appeal. A Counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents. In paragraph 12 of the same, the respondents undertake to deposit the decretal amount as also the rent upto the date of the suit and further rent also. In terms of the undertaking given by the respondents, the respondents are directed to deposit the entire decretal amount and the arrears of rent upto 30th of April, 1969, within a period of six months from today and further continue to deposit the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month by the 15th of the succeeding month. If any amount has already been deposited, due credit shall be given to that amount." 2. The plaintiff landlord has now filed the application for proceedings fot contempt of Court against the opposite parties for having failed to carry out the terms of the undertaking. The counter affidavit, containing the offer of an undertaking, was on behalf of the tenant only, but, it was assumed that the sub- tenant was also a party to it, and, there was no objection by the sub-tenant to the order passed. In the counter-affidavit filed in reply to the landlord's affidavit in support of the contempt application, the tenant, opposite party No. 1, stated that he has been very anxious to make the payments, but, due to losses in business and inability to collect money in spite of his best efforts, he has not been able to carry out the undertaking given in the bona fide hope of being able to comply with it. The tenant also took up the plea that this Court had not directed him to do any particular act so that the failure to carry out a promise to the appellant landlord does not amount to contempt. He points out that the remedy of attachment before judgment is open to the landlord in exercise of his rights under the Code of Civil Procedure. In the alternative, the tenant has tendered as unqualified apology and prays for forgiveness in case this Court comes to the conclusion that he has committed a contempt of Court although there was, according to him, no intention on his part to disobey any order or direction of this Court. In the alternative, the tenant has tendered as unqualified apology and prays for forgiveness in case this Court comes to the conclusion that he has committed a contempt of Court although there was, according to him, no intention on his part to disobey any order or direction of this Court. In reply, the applicant landlord merely asserts that the stand taken up by the tenant is incorrect and that "the respondent No. I has malicious intentions of not paying the just dues of the deponent and has deliberately avoided to deposit the same." No facts are stated to show that the tenant's business was flourishing or that his resources were sufficient when he offered the undertaking or are now sufficient to make the payments so that the undertaking was either ab initio dishonest or its violation is wilful and deliberate. Apparently, the landlord has no grievance against the sub-tenant who has also been impleaded as an opposite party in the contempt proceedings. The land- lord seems concerned only with the payment of dues to him somehow. In other words, the landlord has apparently invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court only in order to get the order containing an agreement between the parties executed. 3. The question arises whether, in the circumstances set out above, the tenant should be punished by this Court for having committed an offence of contempt of Court. Learned counsel for the applicant has strongly relied on B. G. Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd., A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 326 where the defendant had undertaken to execute a lease. Upon the failure of the defendant to carry out the undertaking, an order of the Court was made directing the Prothonotary of the Court to execute the lease. The plaintiff then called upon the defendant to get a third party to join in the lease as this was necessary for its due execution. The defendant having failed to comply with the requirements for execution of the lease, proceedings were taken for contempt of court on the ground that the defendant's disobedience of the order was wilful. The plaintiff then called upon the defendant to get a third party to join in the lease as this was necessary for its due execution. The defendant having failed to comply with the requirements for execution of the lease, proceedings were taken for contempt of court on the ground that the defendant's disobedience of the order was wilful. The defence, that the undertaking was only it promise to the plaintiff, was rejected on the ground that once the Court had passed a decree, putting its imprimaturs on the terms of a compromise, the terms of the consent decree amounted to an undertaking to the Court and its breach was a contempt of court. It was found, on the facts of that particular case, that there was a wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court on the part of the plaintiff. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has relied on a number of decisions, the latest of which is a Single Judge decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ram Juwan v. D. N. Gupta, A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 280 where the view taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Khemka's case was expressly dissented from. It was held here "that a compromise between parties on the basis of which it decree has been made, is not at all an undertaking to the Court, and, on breach of terms of compromise embodied in the decree, no committal proceedings can be initiated." The learned judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court also differed from the view taken by it Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Suretennessa Bibi v. Chintaharan Das, AIR 1955 Calcutta 182 where it was laid down "It is settled law that breach of an undertaking given to a Court by a person in a pending proceeding on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt." 5. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has also relied on N. K. Roy Chowdhury v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR 1948 Calcutta 294 where it was held that the effect of a compromise "was nothing more than a solemn promise by the defendants to the plaintiff and the nature of that promise or undertaking could never be changed by reason of the compromise being accepted by the Court and a decree passed in its terms." 6. In B. B. Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 231 a Division Bench of the Patna High Court, interpreting it particular consent order, held that it was an undertaking by one party to another and that there was no contempt of Court as there was no undertaking given to the Court. 7. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the opposite parties on Badri Dass v. Labhu Mal, A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 322 where a compromise decree was passed upon an undertaking given by one party to another in the course of an agreement outside the court. It was.held : "It was no more than a solemn promise by the -defendant to the, plaintiff and- the nature of that promise or undertaking.. could never, be changed by reason - of the- compromise being accepted by the Court and a decree, passed in its, terms."' 8. No authority of this Court was cited before me. But, a perusal of the authorities indicated above shows that the question whether a breach of an undertaking incorporated in an order of the Court amounts to contempt of Court or not depends on the determination of two questions: (1) whether there was an undertaking given to the Court quite apart from a mere agreement bet- ween the parties which was accepted by the Court; and, (2) whether there was any wilful disobedience of an order of the Court. The answers to these questions will necessarily differ with the facts of each case. Hence, the particular order of the Court incorporating the undertaking has to be interpreted, and the whole conduct of the party giving the undertaking in relation to it has to be examined in each case. 9. As no definition of a Contempt of Court is given in our Contempt of Courts Act of 1952, the question whether there is a contempt of court or not has to be answered by a reference to the basic principles. I find, in Halsbury's laws of England, 3rd Edition Vol. 9. As no definition of a Contempt of Court is given in our Contempt of Courts Act of 1952, the question whether there is a contempt of court or not has to be answered by a reference to the basic principles. I find, in Halsbury's laws of England, 3rd Edition Vol. 8, at page 3 the following classification of contempts "Contempt of Court is either (I) criminal contempt, consisting of words or acts obstructing, or tending to obstruct, the administration of justice, or (2) con- tempt in procedure, consisting of disobedience to the judgments, orders, or other process of the court, and involving a private injury." It is then said (at page 20) "Contempt in procedure unaccompanied by circumstances of misconduct, that is, mere unintentional disobedience to a judgment, order, or process, not falling within the exceptions specified in the Debtors Act, 1869, is a contempt in theory only, and is not punishable by imprisonment, but the respondent may be ordered to pay the costs of the application. In circumstances involving misconduct, contempt in procedure bears a two fold character, implying as between the parties to the proceedings merely a right to exercise and a liability to submit to a form of civil execution, but as between the party in default and the State, a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the Court in the public interest. Misconduct of this kind consists in disobedience to such orders for the payment of money as are excepted from the general provisions of the Debtors, Act, 1869, abolishing imprisonment for debt, or in wilful disobedience to any order or process, or in the breach of an undertaking given to the Court." We find with regard to breach of undertaking (at page 29) : "The breach of an undertaking given to the court by a person or corporation, in pending proceedings, on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action or inaction, is misconduct amounting to contempt." 10. We find in Oswald's "Contempt of Court," (3rd Edna) (1910), that disobedience to orders and breaches of undertakings other than those. payment of money are' dealt with one footing (see Chapter 4, page- 101)',.whereas those for defaults in payment of 'a sum of money are dealt with. subject to the statutory provisions contained in the Debtors Act, 1869 (see Chapter 5., page 1.11) . payment of money are' dealt with one footing (see Chapter 4, page- 101)',.whereas those for defaults in payment of 'a sum of money are dealt with. subject to the statutory provisions contained in the Debtors Act, 1869 (see Chapter 5., page 1.11) . ,,The reason for this difference is that the Debtors Act, 1869, abolished imprisonment for non-payment of a debt in England. Other processes are available for enforcement of mere liabilities to pay. But, where the liability has been incurred by solemnly giving an undertaking to the Court to pay some amount or amounts so as to avert some more adverse or drastic consequences which would have ensued from some other order contemplated by the Court, its wilful disobedience is punishable as a defiance of the authority of the Court. Even obtaining an order on an undertaking given, without any possible means of carrying it out may, when not carried out, constitute a contempt on the ground that this was punishable misconduct and trifling with the Court. 11. In the instant case, I find that an order was certainly passed by this Court directing payment of money by the opposite parties to the applicant. But, it appears from a perusal of the affidavits and the order that the order followed almost automatically from the offer of the tenant accepted by the land- lord because that is exactly what the landlord sought. It is not clear what this Court, left to itself, would have ordered if the applicant had not accepted the offer made in the form of an undertaking given by the tenant. It is possible that this court may have dismissed the landlord's application altogether on the ground that the applicant could only apply for attachment of the property of the tenant-respondent before judgment on adequate grounds shown. If proved facts had shown that the undertaking offered and accepted did not contain practically what the landlord tenant himself sought but was an alternative agreed upon to avert some other consequence or more adverse order the Court had contemplated, its infringement could be a contempt. Facts stated above do not disclose such a position here. 12. Proceedings for contempt should not, in my opinion, become more substitutes for either proceedings for execution of decrees or orders for payments for money or for other proceedings, such as attachment before judgment, which may be available to the complainant. Facts stated above do not disclose such a position here. 12. Proceedings for contempt should not, in my opinion, become more substitutes for either proceedings for execution of decrees or orders for payments for money or for other proceedings, such as attachment before judgment, which may be available to the complainant. "Where must be something more than that. There must be such misconduct on the part of the alleged contemner as to indicate an intention to mislead or trifle with the Court. I am not prepared to lay down, as a general proposition, that an undertaking offered by a party and accepted by another but incorporated in an interim or interlocutory order of the Court, pending a final decision, can never stand on a higher footing than a mere record of an agreement between the parties. In order to stand on the higher footing of an undertaking to the Court, the circumstances in which an order was passed must clearly emerge so as to indicate its meaning and the footing on which it stood. Again, as already observed, a wilful disobedience or flouting of the order passed must be proved. A frustration of a bona fide intention to abide by the undertaking given, resulting from subsequently supervening causes beyond the control of the party giving the undertaking, will not do. Where it is clear that a party giving the undertaking could not, in any event, have carried it out at all, the undertaking could not be a bona fide one, and, in such a case a breach of the undertaking to the Court could be punished as a contempt. 13. In the case before me, I am not satisfied, upon all the facts and circumstances of the case, that the offence of contempt, as explained above, has been proved against the opposite parties. Atleast, it is not established beyond a reasonable doubt. This application is, therefore, dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.