Ahmed Ali Khan, J.-The accused who is the respondent in this appeal has been prosecuted for the offence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Cade, before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bagewadi in Criminal Case No. 175 of 1968 on the file of his Court. 2. On the material in record the trying magistrate found that the off:nce charged has not been brought home to the accused and he acquitted him by his order dated 37th September, 1969. The State has preferred this appeal against the order of acquittal made by the Magistrate. 3. Briefly stated, the prosecution case was that the accused who is the respondent in this appeal before us, was the Revenue Thalathi of Bommanahalli Saja in Bagewadi Taluka and was a public servant at the relevant time. In his capacity as public servant, he collected a sum of Rs. 85 from Kallappa who has been examined as P.W. 3 in the case on 24th July, 1961 towards the Takavi loan due to Government from the said Kallappa. But the accused credited the same to the treasury on 25th May, 1962, i.e., ten months after he had collected the amount from P.W. 3. The prosecution alleged that the accused was legally bound to credit the amount to the treasury immediately after its collection, but he failed to do so, and therefore, he has committed an offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. It is now well settled that in an appeal against an order of acquittal the power of this Court to review the evidence afresh is as extensive as its power in appeal against conviction. If two reconcilable views on the evidence adduced are possible, the view that had commended itself to the trial Court should be accepted. But, if the trial Court has misdirected itself on a question of law or in appreciation of evidence before it, and has arrived at conclusions which are wholly unreasonable or unsupportable, then it is the duty of this Court to interfere in the verdict of acquittal. 5. Mr. But, if the trial Court has misdirected itself on a question of law or in appreciation of evidence before it, and has arrived at conclusions which are wholly unreasonable or unsupportable, then it is the duty of this Court to interfere in the verdict of acquittal. 5. Mr. Havanur, the learned Public Prosecutor argued on behalf of the State that it is established and not disputed in this case that the accused respondent was a public servant at the relevant point of time and that the lower Court has found on facts that entrustment of a sum of Rs. 85 to the accused has been established by the evidence as alleged by the prosecution. The trial Court has also found that the accused respondent remitted the amount to the treasury only on 25th May, 1962. But he was of the view that conviction cannot be based against the accused for the offence charged on the material on record. For arriving at that conclusion he has stated two grounds: (1) that mere retention of money is not such a circumstance as to impute criminal intention to the accused, particularly when the amount had been credited by him, and (2) that the prosecution has failed to prove the manner is which the accused has misappropriated the amount. 6. We think Mr. Havanur is right in his contention that the learned Magistrate did not bear in mind the correct principle applicable to the case. 7. The lower Court has found on facts that entrustment of a sum of Rs. 85 to the accused had been established by the evidence. It also found that the accused respondent remitted the said amount to the treasury on 25th May, 1962. It further held that the explanation offered by the accused cannot be accepted. The lower Court was however of the opinion that conviction cannot be based against the accused for the offence of criminal breach of trust on the material on record. The reason given for the same is found in paragraph 16 of his judgment. It states: "In the instant case, it is only after the EAK P.W. 2 inspected the Dafter of the accused, he came to know that the accused had collected a sum of Rs. 85 from Kallappa P.W. 3 on 24th July, 1961 and had credited the same on 25th May, 1962. It states: "In the instant case, it is only after the EAK P.W. 2 inspected the Dafter of the accused, he came to know that the accused had collected a sum of Rs. 85 from Kallappa P.W. 3 on 24th July, 1961 and had credited the same on 25th May, 1962. So before the EAK inspected the Daftar the amount had been credited. So there appears to be no criminal intention on the part of the accused. There is no proof of such criminal misappropriation for the accused having used the said amount for any personal use. So in view of the same I am inclined to hold that the accused has not committed any offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code." Mr. V.S. Kulkarni, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, in support of the judgment of the Court below, contended that dishonest misappropriation which is the necessary ingredient to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust under section 409, Indian Penal Code, has not been proved by the prosecution. He submitted that the burden to prove the case lies upon the prosecution. According to him on the material on record it cannot be said that criminal intention can be imputed to the accused-respondent. It is undoubtedly true that the prosecution has to establish every ingredient of the offence alleged but in so doing it can rely on legal presumptions, as well as on inferences from proved and admitted facts. It cannot always be possible for the prosecution to prove the intention of the alleged culprit. It may not be possible to adduce concrete evidence in all cases to show that the intention of the alleged culprit was either dishonest or fraudulent. In such cases, the Judges have to ask themselves as to what is the reasonable inference to be drawn from the proved facts. In doing so, they have to take into consideration the explanation offered by the accused; but if the explanation offered is prima facie false or unreliable, then that circumstance must also be taken into consideration. Quite often, the allegation of misappropriation may not be capable of being proved by evidence aliunde; but it may be a necessary inference from the proved facts. Once that stage is reached, the burden shifts on the accused to prove that be did not misappropriate the amount or the goods entrusted to him. Quite often, the allegation of misappropriation may not be capable of being proved by evidence aliunde; but it may be a necessary inference from the proved facts. Once that stage is reached, the burden shifts on the accused to prove that be did not misappropriate the amount or the goods entrusted to him. The law on this point was considered by the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India1, In that case, their Lordships observed: "It is not necessary or possible in every case to prove in what precise manner the accused person has dealt with or appropriated the goods of his master. The question is one of intention and not a matter of direct proof but giving a false account of what he has done with the goods received by him may be, treated a strong circumstance against the accused person. In the case of a servant, charged with misappropriating the goods of his master the elements of criminal offence of misappropriation will be established if the prosecution proves that the servant received, the goods that he was under a duty to account to his master and had not done so. If the failure to account was due to an accidental loss, then the facts being within the servant’s knowledge, it is for him. to explain the loss. It is not the law of this country that the prosecution has to eliminate all possible defences of circumstances which may exonerate him. If these facts are within the knowledge of the accused, then he has to prove them. Of course, the prosecution has to establish a prima facie case in the first instance. It is enough to establish facts which give rise to a suspicion and then by reason of section 106 of the Evidence Act to threw the onus on him to prove his innocence." 8. It was further observed at page 1394 in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment: "...If under the law it is not necessary or possible for the prosecution to prove the manner in which the goods have been misappropriated then the failure of the prosecution to prove facts it set out to prove would be of little relevance. It was further observed at page 1394 in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment: "...If under the law it is not necessary or possible for the prosecution to prove the manner in which the goods have been misappropriated then the failure of the prosecution to prove facts it set out to prove would be of little relevance. The question would only be one of intention of he appellant and the circumstances which have been above set out to show that the appellant in what he has done or has omitted to do was moved by a guilty mind." The same principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court in J.M. Desai v. State of Bombay1. In the instant case, it is proved that the amount in question was obtained by the accused. The Court below declined to accept his explanation offered in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, it thought that the explanation offered by the accused Was prima facie false. Hence it can be reasonably inferred that the accused has dishonestly misappropriated the amount entrusted to him. 9. In any view of the case, we are of the opinion that the lower Court was wrong in acquitting the accused. It is unfortunate that the trial Court did not analyse the relevant circumstances and see whether the proved as well as the admitted facts and circumstances by themselves established the charge against the accused. The lower Court accepted every one (of the) circumstances enumerated above but failed to grasp their effect. It did not bear in mind the true principle of law applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore the acquittal of the accused cannot be sustained. We, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the Court below and convict the accused for the offence punishable under section 409, Indian Penal Code. 10. Next question for consideration is that of sentence. Mr. Kulkarni argued that the respondent is young man of 32 years and requested this Court to take a lenient view of the matter while prescribing sentence to him. The sentence prescribed for the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, is imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and also liable to fine. Admittedly the accused respondent is a public servant. The sentence prescribed for the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, is imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and also liable to fine. Admittedly the accused respondent is a public servant. The offence committed by him in a serious one. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, we are of the opinion that it would meet the ends of justice to sentence the accused with rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year. He should also pay a fine of Rs. 200 (two hundred) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month more. This appeal is thus allowed and the order of acquittal passed by the lower Court is set aside, and the accused is convicted and sentenced accordingly. S.V.S. ----- Appeal allowed; Convicted and sentence passed.