In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Mahendra Chandra Deb, the validity and the legality of the notification dated 18-9-1967, issued by the Administrator, Union Territory of Tripura, under Section 3 (1) read with Sec­tion 5 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, hereinafter called the Act, is challenged. 2. By a notification dated 29th of April, 1967, the Administrator constituted a Committee consisting of eight members with Shri Monoranjan Choudhury, a senior prac­tising Advocate of Agartala, as Chairman "to enquire into the conditions prevailing in em­ployment in Public Motor Transport in Tri­pura and to advise the Administrator in res­pect of fixation of minimum rates of wages in the said employment." Three of the members of the committee were repre­sentatives of the employers, and another three represented the employees, while two including the Chairman were inde­pendent members. The committee sub­mitted its report on 8-9-1967, and after considering that report the Adiminstra-tor issued notification dated 16th of September, 1967, by which he fixed the minimum rates of wages of different classes of employees in respect of em­ployment in Public Motor Transport in Tripura. The rates were specified in a schedule annexed to the notification. He directed further that the minimum rates of wages "shall be deemed to have come into force on the first day of January, 1967." Since the decision on the ques­tions debated in this Court will turn on what is primarily mentioned in the schedule, I consider it necessary to re­produce the same in this judgment. It is in the following terms:- Classes or categories of employees, Minimum rates of wages 1. Driver: (a) Heavy vehicles Rs. 160.00 p.m., plus Trip Allowance of Bs. 5.00 per diem subject to the mini­mum of Rs. 100.00 p. m. (b) Medium vehicle Rs. 115.00 p.m. plus Trip Allowance of Es. 4.00 per diem subject to the mini­mum of Rs. 60.00 p.m (c) Light vehicles Rs. 105.00 p.m. plus Trip Allowance of Rs. 4.00 per diem subject to the mini­mum of Rs 60.00 p.m 2. Head Clerk/Accountant Rs. 110.00 p.m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 55.00 p.m. ... 3- Inspector/Ticket Checker Rs. 100.00 p. m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 50.00 p. m. 4. Booking Clerk/Clerk (Office) Rs. 95.00 p. m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 50.00 p.m. 5. Mail Runnec Rs. 85.00 p. m. plus Trip Allowance of Rs. 3.75 per diem. 6. Time-Keeper Rs. 110.00 p.m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 55.00 p.m. ... 3- Inspector/Ticket Checker Rs. 100.00 p. m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 50.00 p. m. 4. Booking Clerk/Clerk (Office) Rs. 95.00 p. m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 50.00 p.m. 5. Mail Runnec Rs. 85.00 p. m. plus Trip Allowance of Rs. 3.75 per diem. 6. Time-Keeper Rs. 75.00 p.m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 45.00 p.m. 7. Bus Conductor: Rs. 65.00 p.m. plus Trip Allowance of Rs. 4.00 per diem subject to the mini­mum of Rs. 80.00 p. m. 8. Peon & other Class-IV staff Rs. 60.00 p. m. plus Special Allowance of Rs. 43.00 p.m. 9. Assistant (Handyman): (a) Heavy Vehicles Rs. 60.00 p.m. plus Trip Allowance of Rs. 4.00 per diem subject to the mini­mum of Rs. 80-00 p. m. (b) Medium Light Vehicles Rs. 50.00 p. m. plus Trip Allowance of Rs. 3.50 per diem subject to the mini­mum of Rs. 52.50 p. m. (II) The number of hours of work for a normal working day for the aforesaid classes of employees shall be 9 hours. (Ill) Weekly day of rest, overtime etc. will be as laid down in the Mini­mum Wages Act, 1948 and the Tripura Minimum Wages Rules, 1952 made thereunder. Notes:- (i) The terms "Heavy Vehicles", "Medium Vehicles" and "Light Vehicles" shall have the same meaning in which these terms are used in the relevant sections in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. (ii) "Trip Allowance per diem" means the allowance payable to the em­ployees for the day or days during which the vehicles will remain out of the owner's garage on duty at a stretch. Provided that if a vehicle remains idle and does not ply for more than two months at a stretch, then the employees will get no 'Trip Allowance' for the period in ex­cess of two months, during which period the employees shall get the minimum 'Trip Allowance' men­tioned above. 3. Provided that if a vehicle remains idle and does not ply for more than two months at a stretch, then the employees will get no 'Trip Allowance' for the period in ex­cess of two months, during which period the employees shall get the minimum 'Trip Allowance' men­tioned above. 3. Broadly stated, the challenge to the legality of the notification was made in the writ petition on the follow­ing grounds:- (1) That the notification could not be legally given a retrospective effect; (2) That the Trip Allowance granted to certain employees is not cover­ed by the definition of "wages" and as such the Administrator had no legal sanction to make it as a component of minimum wages; and (3) That the number of hours of work fixed for the employees at 9 offends the provisions of Section 13 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1961. which came into force in the Territory of Tripura on 15-2-1962. and as such that fixation is ultra vires the Ad­ministrator. 4. The respondent in the writ petition, the Government of India (Union Territory of Tripura), vehemently denied the allegation that the notification dated 16th of September, 1967, suffers from any vice, legal or other. It was main­tained that the Trip Allowance could validly form a component of the "mini­mum wages", that in terms of S. 5 (2) of the Act it was open to the Adminis­trator to make the notification fixing the minimum wages to take effect retrospec­tively, and that the Act of 1961 applies only to motor transport undertakings em­ploying five or more workers and as such the question of fixation of work­ing hours as per provisions of that Act does not arise while the Government fixed minimum rates of wages, hours of work etc. under the Minimum Wages Act and Rules. 5. I propose discussing seriatim the three points pleaded in the writ peti­tion in support of the contention that the notification fixing the minimum wages is illegal and invalid. Shri S. K. Kar, representing the writ petitioner, urged while criticising the retrospective nature of the notification that the rele­vant part of Section 5 (2) of the Act is in terms prospective and that, alterna­tively, the Court must hold it only having prospective effect. Shri S. K. Kar, representing the writ petitioner, urged while criticising the retrospective nature of the notification that the rele­vant part of Section 5 (2) of the Act is in terms prospective and that, alterna­tively, the Court must hold it only having prospective effect. That part of Section 5 (2) provides that the appro­priate Government shall, by notification in the official Gazette, fix, or, as the case may be, revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of each schedule employment. and unless such notification otherwise provides, it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue- Shri Kar submitted that it is established principle of interpretation of statutes that retros­pective operation cannot be given to statutes other than those which are con­cerned with matters of procedure and that since Section 5 (2) of the Act re­lates to a substantive matter, namely, fixation of minimum wages which over­ride the contractual obligations mutual­ly settled, it should be presumed to be prospective in nature. Shri H. C. Nath, the learned Government Advocate, how­ever, contended that the phrase "and unless such notification otherwise pro­vides" occurring in Section 5 (2) of the Act clearly indicates that the Parlia­ment gave the authority to the appro­priate Government to make the notifica­tion retrospective in effect. Shri Kar cited the authorities reported in G. P, Stewart v. Broiendra Kishore, AIR 1939 Cal 628, The Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1953 Aimer 65 and Narot-tamdas v. P. B. Gowarikar, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 182, in support of his submis­sion, while Shri H. C. Nath relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Hydro (Engineers) Pvt. Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR 1969 SC 182 , to shore up his contention. 6. Maxwell states at page 204, et. seq., of his celebrated treatise on In­terpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edi­tion, that upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is un­just rests the leaning against giving cer­tain statutes a retrospective operation and that such statutes are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English law, the author men­tions, that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. He states further on the authority of the case In re Athlumney, (1898) 2 QB 547 (552), that perhaps no rule of construc­tion is more firmly established than that "a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, un­less that effect cannot be avoided with­out doing violence to the language of the enactment", and that "If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only." On page 206 the author expresses the view that it is chiefly where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality of past transac­tions, or impair contracts, that the rule against the retrospective operation of the statutes prevails. He concludes by stat­ing that every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obliga­tion, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transac­tions or considerations already past, must be presumed, out of respect to the legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation, and that where vested rights are affected, prima facie it is not a question of procedure. Look­ed at in the light of these principles bearing on the interpretation of statutes, the expression "and unless such notifica­tion otherwise provides" in Section 5 (2) of the Act can at the best be said to be "fairly capable of either interpreta­tion", to use the phraseology of Max­well, and so it has to be construed as prospective in nature because the noti­fication issued in terms of Section 5 (2) "would prejudicially affect vested rights, the legality of past transactions, and impair contracts". Obviously, if the notification is given retrospective effect it will supersede the term of the con­tract relating to wages and in con­sequence would reopen the question of adequacy of wages already paid and settled. Hence, on the authority of prin­ciples governing interpretation of statu­tes, the notification could not have been made to operate retrospectively. 7. Obviously, if the notification is given retrospective effect it will supersede the term of the con­tract relating to wages and in con­sequence would reopen the question of adequacy of wages already paid and settled. Hence, on the authority of prin­ciples governing interpretation of statu­tes, the notification could not have been made to operate retrospectively. 7. The conclusion reached above gathers corroboration from the three authorities relied upon by Shri Kar. It was held by the Calcutta High Court in the case of G. P. Stewart, AIR 1939 Cal 628 that unless the parent Act it­self clearly authorises the issue of a notification with retrospective effect, it must be presumed that such a notifica­tion is forbidden. On the authority of this Calcutta decision, the Judicial Com­missioner of Ajmer held in the case of Edward Mills Co., AIR 1953 Ajmer 65 that legislature never contemplated giv­ing retrospective effect to a notification issued under the Act fixing minimum rates of wages. Shri C. K. Daphtary, the Solicitor General, who represented the Government in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, did not contest seriously the submission made on behalf of Edward Mills Co. that a retrospective notification could not have been issued by the Chief Commissioner. The emi­nence of Shri C. K. Daphtary in the legal profession is guarantee of the fact that he could not have taken such a stand unless he believed It to be sound in law. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner in that case was challenged by the Edward Mills Co. in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court took note of the finding of the Judicial Commissioner that the Chief Commissioner had exceeded his legal authority in giving retrospective effect to the impugned notification, vide para 8 of the report AIR 1955 SC 25 , A perusal of the Supreme Court judg­ment would bring out that the validity of the finding of the Judicial Commis­sioner was not assailed by either party. Therefore, obviously both parties had accepted that finding as correct even though I may not go to the extent of stating that that finding had received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. 8. The exact implication of the relevant part of Section 5 (2) of the Act came up for consideration before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Narottamdas, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 182. 8. The exact implication of the relevant part of Section 5 (2) of the Act came up for consideration before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Narottamdas, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 182. That Court also held that the notification fixing the rates of wages cannot be given retrospective operation. The High Court observed that it is the settled rule that a_ statute has always a prospective operation unless the inten­tion of the legislature that it should have a retrospective effect is expressed in plain and unambiguous language, and that the same rule applies to a notifica­tion issued under the parent Act. The High Court observed further that the expression "unless such notification other­wise provides" in Section 5 (2) of the Act must take its colour from the pro­visions following it and so must be con­strued as meaning "unless such notifica­tion specifies a point of time after the issue of the notification", and that un­less the Act itself clearly authorises the issue of a notification with retrospective effect, it must be held that such a noti­fication is prohibited. The High Court stated further that the provision in Sec­tion 5 (2) of the Act that in the absence of any specific date about the coming into force of the notification it shall be­come effective on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue un­mistakably shows that the legislature in­tended that some time should be given to the employers concerned before the minimum wages fixed by the notifica­tion come into operation. 9. The general principle enun­ciated In the case of G. P. Stewart, AIR 1939 Cal 628 (supra) and the specific findings given by the Judicial Commis­sioner of Ajmer and the Madhya Pradesh High Court respecting a notification issu­ed under the Act fixing the rates of minimum wages constitute a formidable dicta in support of the proposition can­vassed by Shri Kar. As against that respectable body of direct authority, Shri H. C. Nath placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Raj Kumar V. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180 , to support the contrary view. As against that respectable body of direct authority, Shri H. C. Nath placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Raj Kumar V. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180 , to support the contrary view. There it was held that it is a matter of discretion for the Tribunal to decide from the cir­cumstances of each case from which date its award should come into operation, and that no general rule can be laid down as to the date from which a Tri­bunal should bring its award in force, That was apparently a decision relating to an award given by a Tribunal ap­pointed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Sub-section (1) of S. 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that an award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17, and sub-section (4) of that section enacts that subject to the provisions of sub­section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into opera­tion on the date when the award be­comes enforceable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) as the case may be. These provisions of the Industrial Dis­putes Act, in my opinion, are clearly capable of the interpretation that an award can be given retrospective effect. Those provisions, therefore, fall under the rule, mentioned by Maxwell, that if the language of the statute is plainly re­trospective or such a construction arises by necessary and distinct implication from the terms thereof, it must be so interpreted. On page 333 of the law of Industrial Disputes by Malhotra, 1968 Edition, the author has collected a large number of authorities including some of the Supreme Court which lay down that there is a clear indication in sub-sec. (4) that it is within the competence of an industrial tribunal to make an award with retrospective effect from a speci­fied date. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court bearing on the interpre­tation of Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot solve the problem that arises for determination in the pre­sent writ petition. That problem has to be tackled on the basis of the wording of S. 3 (2) (S. 5 (2)?) of the Act. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court bearing on the interpre­tation of Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot solve the problem that arises for determination in the pre­sent writ petition. That problem has to be tackled on the basis of the wording of S. 3 (2) (S. 5 (2)?) of the Act. I res­pectfully agree with the interpretation placed by the Judicial Commissioner of Aimer and a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on that provision of law. Therefore accepting the contention of Shri Kar, I hold that the notification could not have been made retrospective in operation. 10. The practical effect of the finding just recorded would be that the notification would take effect on the ex­piry of three months from the date on which it was issued, viz., 16-9-1967. This is exactly what was done by the Judi­cial Commissioner of Ajmer and the High Court of Madhya Pradeh, who held on the authority of Calcutta decision in the case of G. P. Stewart, AIR 1939 Cal 628 that where a statutory order is made on a certain date, not authorised by law, the Court "can sever it and give effect to it from a subsequent date ..............." I would, therefore, hold that if the notification as a whole or any part of it can be declared as valid, then it shall take effect on the expiry of three months from 16-9-1967. 11. This takes me to the second challenge made to the validity of the notification, namely, that Trip Allowance allowed to various employees could not have been included in the minimum rates of wages fixed. The expression "wages" is defined in Cl. 11. This takes me to the second challenge made to the validity of the notification, namely, that Trip Allowance allowed to various employees could not have been included in the minimum rates of wages fixed. The expression "wages" is defined in Cl. (h) of Section 2 of the Act as under: " 'wages' means all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or im­plied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his em­ployment or of work done in such em­ployment (and includes house rent allowance) but does not include- (i) the value of- (a) any house-accommodation, sup­ply of light, water, medical attendance, or (b) any other amenity or any ser­vice excluded by general or special order of the appropriate Government; (ii) any contribution paid by the employer to any Pension Fund or Pro­vident Fund or under any scheme of social insurance; (iii) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; (iv) any sum paid to the person em­ployed to defray special expenses en­tailed on him by the nature of his em­ployment; or (v) any gratuity payable on dis­charge." The term "minimum rate of wages" or "minimum wages" is not defined in the Act because the minimum rate of wages has to be fixed by the appropriate Gov­ernment as enjoined by Sec. 3 of the Act. The definition of "wages" given in Cl. (h) of Section 2 has to be read, to comprehend its exact scope, with Sec­tion 4 (l) of the Act. The definition of "wages" given in Cl. (h) of Section 2 has to be read, to comprehend its exact scope, with Sec­tion 4 (l) of the Act. That section pro­vides that any minimum rate of wages fixed or revised by the appropriate Gov­ernment in respect of scheduled employ­ments under S. 3 may consist of- (i) a basic rate of wages and a special allowance at a rate to be adjust­ed, at such intervals and in such manner as the appropriate Government may direct, to accord as nearly as practicable with variation in the cost of living index number applicable to such workers (hereinafter referred to as the "cost of living allowance"); or_ (ii) a basic rate of wages with or without the cost of living allowance and the cash value of the concessions in res­pect of supplies of essential commodities at concession rates where so authorised; or (iii) an all-inclusive rate allowing for the basic rate the cost of living al­lowance and the cash value of the con­cessions, if any. Shri H. C. Na'th contended for the State that the phrase "a special allowance" used in clause (i) of Section 4(1) is wide enough to take within its ambit the Trip Allowance finding mention in the notification. Shri Kar, on the other hand, urged that Trip Allowance is nothing but travelling allowance per­mitted to certain employees and that since travelling allowance is specifically excluded from the definition of "wages" by sub-clause (iii) of clause (h) of Section 2, it (Trip Allowance) cannot form part of the wages. I think there is weight in the submission made by Shri Kar. The special allowance men­tioned in Section 4(1) of the Act, it will be noticed, is a variable amount forming part of the wages, being linked with the cost of living index number. Actually, this allowance is specifically referred to in Section 4(1) as "cost of living al­lowance". Therefore very obviously "Trip Allowance" and "cost of living allowance" fall in different categories for the former has not much to do with the prevailing cost of living index number. It was candidly admitted by Shri H. C. Nath, as is evident from the notification itself, that Trip Allowance is meant to compensate the extra cost which an employee is likely to incur when he moves out of his headquarter in connection with his employment. It was candidly admitted by Shri H. C. Nath, as is evident from the notification itself, that Trip Allowance is meant to compensate the extra cost which an employee is likely to incur when he moves out of his headquarter in connection with his employment. If so, it clearly partakes of the character of travelling allowance, and since travelling allowance, according to the definition of expression "wages", cannot form a component of the wages, the Administrator could not have prescribed it as a part of wages. 12. In the case of Punchiri Boat Service v. State of Travoncore-Cochin, AIR 1955 Trav-Co 97, a Division Bench of the High Court held that the "batta" payable per day in case of road trans­port to cover a portion of out-of-station expenses by drivers, cleaners etc. would come under Section 2 (h) (iv) of the Act and as such cannot form the part of wages. The High Court consequently held that the inclusion of "batta" by the State in the notification issued under Section 5 of the Act was ultra vires their powers and consequently void. When this authority was brought to the notice of Shri H. C. Nath, he represent­ed that the exact attributes of the ex­pression "batta" were not clear to him and so he could not accept the conten­tion of Shri Kar that "batta" and the "Trip Allowance" are expressions having identical connotation. The expression "batta", it will be noticed, has been ad­opted by the English language and its meaning given in Dictionaries. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word is given the meaning: "subsistence money; extra pay during a campaign and specially an extra allowance which be­came a constant addition to the pay of officers serving in India." In the Chambers's Dictionary, the meaning given to it is: "an allowance in addition to ordinary pay; subsistence money." That Dictionary also states that the etymology of the word appears to be Kanarese "bhatta", meaning rice. In the New English Dictionary by Murray the word Batta is given the following meaning: "Batta- Anglo-Ind. a. Indo Por­tuguese bata prob. ad. Canarese Bhatta rice in the husk (also called by Euro­peans batty), which became, first with the Portuguese, a term for 'maintenance' 'allowance for maintenance'. (Col. Yule) orig. Subsistence money (given to sol­diers in the field, witnesses, prisoners, etc.). a. Indo Por­tuguese bata prob. ad. Canarese Bhatta rice in the husk (also called by Euro­peans batty), which became, first with the Portuguese, a term for 'maintenance' 'allowance for maintenance'. (Col. Yule) orig. Subsistence money (given to sol­diers in the field, witnesses, prisoners, etc.). Hence extra pay given to East Indian regiments when on a campaign, and spec., an extra allowance which grew in the time to be a constant addition to the pay of officers serving in India." Bhatta is thus an extra payment over and above the pay proper. Though that extra payment may be a common feature in certain employments, nevertheless it does not form part of the pay and is clearly outside and above the pay. There­fore, the true nature of Bhatta is almost analogous to the characteristics of Trip Allowance, even if the two expressions cannot be said to be conterminous. How­ever, the only extra amounts that can form the component of "wages", besides the basic rate of wages, are those re­presenting the cost of living allowance and the cash value of concessions men­tioned in Cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) of Sec­tion 4 (1) of the Act, and so the Trip Allowance cannot form in law a part of the "wages". I feel safe in going a step further and stating that the "Trip Allowance", precisely speaking, is an­other name of "travelling allowance" and since travelling allowance cannot, ac­cording to the definition of "wages" given in Section 2 (h) of the Act, form part of "wages", that part of the noti­fication issued by the Administrator which relates to the payment of Trip Allowance to the various workers suffers from the vice of invalidity. Whereas travelling allowance is specifically intradicted from being included in the "wages" by Section 2 (h) of the Act, its inclusion is not authorised by Sec­tion 4 (1) of the Act either. Hence, there is no escape from the conclusion just listed. 13. The proviso to the definition of "Trip Allowance per diem" given in note (ii) to the notification states that if a vehicle remains idle and does not ply for more than two months at a stretch, then the employees will get no "Trip Allowance" for the period in ex­cess of two months, during which period the employees shall get the minimum "Trip Allowance" mentioned in the noti­fication. Shri Kar was rather critical about the legal validity of this proviso. Shri Kar was rather critical about the legal validity of this proviso. He contended that apart from the fact that it was highly unjust to the em­ployers, it could not legitimately form part of a notification fixing the minimum rate of wages for it tantamounts to changing the contract, express or impli­ed, between the employer and the em­ployee respecting matters for which the appropriate Government has not been given authority by any provision of the Act. He cited the decision in Bidi Leaves v. Bombay State, AIR 1962 SC 486 , in support of that submission. In the relevant notification, the Supreme Court had to deal with in that case, the appropriate Government had inserted certain clauses laying down the manner in which the employer should make pay­ment for "chaat" or the discarded "bidis". The Supreme Court declared those clauses ultra vires the power given to the Government by Section 5 of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that when Government purports to issue a notification under the Act, it cannot claim the wide powers possessed by the Industrial Tribunal under the Indus­trial Disputes Act, that the powers and authority vouched to the Government for issuing a notification would neces­sarily be conditioned by the relevant provisions under which it purports to act, and that as such the validity of the impugned notification will be adjudged not by general considerations of social justice or even considerations for in­troduction of industrial peace. Those powers, it was stated further, must be judged solely and exclusively by the test prescribed by the provisions of the statute itself and that the relevant pro­visions of the Act do not authorise the appropriate Government to make rules for the decision of any dispute between the employer and the employee and for the payment of minimum rate of wages on the basis of such decision. The Supreme Court went on to observe fur­ther that the impugned clauses of the notification purport to modify the terms of the contract other than remuneration in material particulars and that would be plainly outside the jurisdiction of the authority of the appropriate Govern­ment. The Supreme Court went on to observe fur­ther that the impugned clauses of the notification purport to modify the terms of the contract other than remuneration in material particulars and that would be plainly outside the jurisdiction of the authority of the appropriate Govern­ment. It was pointed out that the dis­pute relating to payment for the discard­ed bidis may well form the subject-matter of reference for industrial ad­judication but it cannot form the sub­ject-matter of a notification prescribing minimum rate of wages in terms of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act, or even by invoking the doctrine of implied power. The definition of the terms "wages", the Supreme Court held, postu­lates the binding character of the other terms of the contract and brings within the purview of the Act only one term and that term relates to wages and to no other subject. That being so the Supreme Court added, it is difficult to' hold that by implication the very basic concept of the term "wages" can be ignored and the other terms of the con­tract can be dealt with by the notifica­tion issued under the Act. In conclu­sion, the Supreme Court pointed out that Sections 20 and 21 of the Act have made a specific provision for the enforcement and implementation of the minimum rates of wages prescribed by notifica­tions, and if any dispute arises respect-tog the payment of the said wages that must be left for adjudication by the authority prescribed by Section 20. 14. I think the above observa­tions of the Supreme Court apply with equal force to the proviso appended to note (ii) of the impugned notification. Practically speaking, that proviso appears to create more difficulties between the employer and the employee than solve the question of appropriate wages pay­able to the latter. It is not clear from that proviso whether the employee shall be entitled to Trip Allowance or not if the vehicle remains idle on account of any laches, criminal act, or deliberate mischief on his part after it had left the owners' garage on duty. One can mul­tiply other instances where dispute may crop up between the employer and the employee respecting the payment of Trip Allowance. I feel clear that the Ad­ministrator could not have prescribed any solution in the notification fixing minimum rates of wages for settlement of such disputes. One can mul­tiply other instances where dispute may crop up between the employer and the employee respecting the payment of Trip Allowance. I feel clear that the Ad­ministrator could not have prescribed any solution in the notification fixing minimum rates of wages for settlement of such disputes. Therefore, the pro­viso is clearly ultra vires the powers given to the Administrator by the Act. 15. The Trip Allowance is pre­scribed in the notification only in res­pect of drivers, mail runners, bus con­ductors and assistants (Handymen). Since the wages of these employees were fixed under distinct heads, the illegality there­of does not affect the wages of the other employees mentioned at Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of CL 1 of the schedule. Like­wise, note (ii) appended to the schedule also has no bearing on the wages fixed for the last mentioned set of employees. Hence, the wages prescribed for two sets of employees are clearly severable and so only the offending part of the noti­fication, and not the whole of it, need be declared void. This is exactly what was done by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of Punchiri Boat Service, AIR 1955 Trav-Co 97 (supra) and by the Supreme Court in the case of Bidi, Bidi Leaves, AIR 1962 SC 486 (cited above). It is correct that in the Travancore-Cochin case, only the "Batta" was declared invalid and rest of the wage structure, comprising of Basic Pay and Dearness Allowance, was held bind­ing on the parties, and on that analogy here too only Trip Allowance could have been declared ultra vires, retaining the rest of the wages. However, the last course would not be equitable to the concerned employees for qua them no special allowance was prescribed as had been done respecting the employees en­tered at Nos. 2 to 4, 6 and 8 of Cl. I of the schedule. Therefore, in respect of employees mentioned at Nos. 1, 5, 7 and 9 of that clause the entire notifica­tion has to be declared as violative of the Act. 16. The third submission made by Sri Kar was that the fixation per Cl. II of the impugned notification the hours of work per day for the employees at 9 being in conflict with the provision of Section 13 of the Act of 1961, it is invalid and not binding either on the employer or on the employee. 16. The third submission made by Sri Kar was that the fixation per Cl. II of the impugned notification the hours of work per day for the employees at 9 being in conflict with the provision of Section 13 of the Act of 1961, it is invalid and not binding either on the employer or on the employee. Shri H. C. Nath's only defence was that since the Act of 1961 applies only to motor transport undertakings employing five or more motor transport workers, Sec­tion 13 thereof does not come into pic­ture while fixing the minimum rates of wages under the Act. This defence, if I may say so, is altogether untenable. The impugned notification covers the employees engaged in Public Motor Transport. It is, therefore, not incon­ceivable that there may be Public Motor Transport Companies who employ more than five workers, or there may be pri­vate persons engaging in the business of Public Motor Transport and they have five or more than five workers in their service. Qua such Public Motor Trans­port concerns, the provisions of Sec. 13 of the Act of 1961 will be applicable and the fixation of daily hours of work at 9 in the impugned notification would involve contravention of Section 13 of the Act of 1961, which fixed a maximum of 8 hours in any day and 48 hours in any week for an adult motor transport worker. I may mention that Shri H. C. Nath did not contest the proposition that the Act of 1961 being a special legisla­tion and of a subsequent date, where it is in conflict with the provisions of the Act it shall prevail against the latter. Hence, Cl. II of the notification cannot stand in its present form. It has to be amended by addition of the proviso "but subject to the provisions of Section 13 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (No. 27 of 1961)", to give it a legal shape. It would be noticed that Sec­tion 31 of the Act of 1961 makes the contravention of provisions thereof as an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. Therefore, Shri Kar was justified in the assertion that although the fixation of the working hours at 9 by Cl. Therefore, Shri Kar was justified in the assertion that although the fixation of the working hours at 9 by Cl. II of the impugned notification is advantageous to the employers, but employers can take benefit of that provision only at the risk of being involved in a criminal case. 17. The last point urged by Shri S. K. Kar, though not very zealously, was that since the Act of 1961 classifies the workers as "adolescent", "adult" and "child", and Section 21 thereof prohibits the engagement of any "child" in any capacity in a motor transport undertak­ing, it was obligatory for the Adminis­trator to fix separately the wages of "adolescents" and "adults" and also to prescribe that no "child" shall be en­gaged. The argument has not carried weight with me. If a child cannot be engaged in terms of a valid legislation, there was no necessity to pinpoint that fact in the notification issued under S. 5 (2) of the Act. Nor does the latter Act enjoin upon the appropriate Government to fix separately the wages of "adoles­cents" and "adults". At the best, it can be stated that it would have been more rational for the Administrator to fix the wages of "adolescents" and "adults" at appropriate separate rates but since that does not appear to be legally obligatory, I cannot find any fault with the notifica­tion actually issued by the Administra­tor. 18. No other point was urged by Shri Kar in support of the writ petition. 19. 18. No other point was urged by Shri Kar in support of the writ petition. 19. To sum up, my conclusions are:- (1) The notification could not be made to take retrospective effect and as such it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue; (2) The Trip Allowance sanctioned for certain categories of employees can­not form a component of wages and so the part of the notification concerning employees who have been given Trip Allowance is void and altogether in­operative; and (3) Clause II of the notification in its present form being yiolative of Sec. 13 of the Act of 1961 in the manner and to the extent indicated above it cannot stand in its present form and so to give it a legal shape these words shall be deemed to form part of it: "but sub­ject to the provisions of Section 13 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (No. 27 of 1961)", after removal of full stop following the word "hours". What survives out of the notification is that Clause 1 will stand respecting the em­ployees entered at Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8, Cl. II will stand amended in the manner just stated, while Clause III and Note (i) will hold good in their entirety. In addition, the valid parts of the notifica­tion shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. 20. In the result, I allow the writ petition to the extent indicated but in view of the partial success of the par­ties I leave them to bear their own costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. Petition allowed.