ORDER :- Opposite party No. 1 obtained an ex parte decree against the petitioners and their brother (opposite party No. 2) for Rs. 890/- in the Court of the 6th Munsif, Alipore, Calcutta, on 25-4-67. The decree was transferred for execution to the Court of the Munsif of Balasore. Execution Case No. 9 of 1968 was levied by the decree-holder in the Court of the Munsif, Balasore. The petitioners and opposite party No. 2 filed O. S. No. 121 of 1968 in the court of the Munsif, Balasore, to set aside the ex parte decree on various grounds including fraud, nonservice of notice etc. In the execution case the petitioners filed an application under Order 21, Rule 29 and Section 151, C.P.C. before the Munsif, Balasore, for staying that very execution case. The learned Munsif rejected the application and refused to grant stay, on 27-11-68. It is against this order the Civil Revision has been filed. 2. Mr. Pal for the petitioners urges that the learned Munsif exercised his jurisdiction illegally in refusing stay, which the petitioners were entitled to get not only under Order 21, Rule 29, but also under Section 151, C.P.C. Order 21, Rule 29, runs thus :- "Where a suit is pending in any Court, against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided." There is no dispute that a suit is pending in the Court of the Munsif, Balasore, for setting aside the ex parte decree in favour of opposite party No. 1 passed by the Sixth Munsif, Alipore. Order 21, Rule 29, however, insists that the decree-holder must have a decree in his favour of the very court in which the subsequent suit is pending. As the decree is of the Alipore Court and the suit is pending in Balasore Court, Order 21, Rule 29, in terms, does not apply. 3. To get over this difficulty, reliance is placed on Section 37(b), C.P.C. to say that the transferee execution court must be deemed to have passed the decree which was, in fact, passed by the transferor court, Section 37(b) is as follows :- "37. 3. To get over this difficulty, reliance is placed on Section 37(b), C.P.C. to say that the transferee execution court must be deemed to have passed the decree which was, in fact, passed by the transferor court, Section 37(b) is as follows :- "37. The expression "the Court which passed a decree" or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decree, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include - * * * (b) Where the court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such a suit." 4. A bare scrutiny of the sub-section would show that it is hedged in with certain limitations. In this case, the court of first instance, i.e., the Alipore Court, has not ceased to exist. Neither it has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute the decree. So, either of the two conditions does not apply. Consequently, the Munsif's Court, Balasore, in which the application was filed for execution of the decree, cannot be taken to be a court which passed the decree within the meaning of Section 37(b). 5. There was some conflict of authority as to whether the transferor court ceases to have jurisdiction to execute the decree, after the decree is transferred. The concensus of judicial opinion, however, is that the transferor court does not cease to have such jurisdiction. The transferor court can withdraw the execution by recalling the decree. It may pass an order for simultaneous execution or may make the order for ratable distribution. It would also have jurisdiction to decide an objection to limitation. In case of assignment of the decree after transfer the assignee is to apply for execution to the original court. If the judgment-debtor dies after the decree has been transferred for execution, an application for proceeding against the legal representatives of the deceased is to be made to the transferor court and not to the transferee court under Section 50, C.P.C. These various illustrations establish that the transferor court is not divested of its power to execute the decree after transfer. Thus the Alipore Munsif's Court has not either "ceased to exist" or "ceased to have jurisdiction to execute the decree". In the circumstances, the Munsif's Court, Balasore, cannot be a court passing the decree in relation to execution of decrees within the meaning of Section 37(b), C.P.C. 6. Reliance was also placed on Section 42, C.P.C. which, so far as relevant, runs thus :- "The court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself," The question for consideration is whether in granting stay of execution, the transferee court would be taken as exercising powers in execution of a decree. The expression "powers in executing such decree" means powers in carrying out the purpose of executing such decrees. Though an order staying execution may be passed in the course of execution of a decree it would be difficult to hold that the power to order stay is a power to carry out the execution of a decree. Section 42, therefore, does not authorise the transferee execution court to stay execution of a decree. 7. This conclusion is reinforced by a reference to Order 21, Rule 26(1). "R. 26(1). The court to which a decree has been sent for execution shall, upon sufficient cause being shown, stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the Court by which the decree was passed or to any court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decree or the execution thereof, for an order to stay execution, or for any other order relating to the decree or execution which might have been made by such court of first instance or appellate court if execution had been issued thereby, or if application for execution had been made thereto." This rule makes a distinction between the court to which the decree is sent for execution, and the court by which the decree was passed, i.e., between the transferor and the transferee (executing) court. The transferee court has no jurisdiction to grant an absolute order of stay. It can stay the execution of the decree only for a reasonable time as denoted by the underlined expression. The fact that the powers of the transferee court have been limited to grant of stay for a reasonable time is decisive of the matter. The transferee court has no jurisdiction to grant an absolute order of stay. It can stay the execution of the decree only for a reasonable time as denoted by the underlined expression. The fact that the powers of the transferee court have been limited to grant of stay for a reasonable time is decisive of the matter. It cannot grant stay until the decision of the court in sesin of the suit for setting aside the ex parte decree. Further such reasonable time is to be granted only to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the transferor court or the appellate court having jurisdiction to grant necessary orders of stay of execution. 8. Order 21, Rule 28 also supports the aforesaid view. It says that- "Any order of the Court by which the decree was passed, or of such Court of appeal as aforesaid, in relation to the execution of such decree, shall be binding upon the Court to which the decree was sent for execution." Thus, when the Court of first instance passing the decree passes certain orders in course of execution of such decree, those orders would be binding on the transferee execution court. That means that the transferor court is not divested of its powers in the matter of execution of the decree which it had passed and necessarily if it exercises the power to grant stay, the transferee court is bound to honour the same. 8-A. All the aforesaid provisions would lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the power to grant stay of execution vests absolutely in the transferor court and only to a limited extent in the transferee court as indicated in Order 21, Rule 26(1). 9. On this point there is conflict of authority. AIR 1934 Cal 4, Sarada Kripa Lala v. Comilla Union Bank Ltd. is in support of the view that the transferee court has got the power to grant stay of execution without any limitation. On the contrary, AIR 1930 All 121, Inayet Beg v. Umrao Beg; AIR 1936 Rang 184, Chettiyar Firm v. Vanappa Chettiyar; AIR 1958 Madh Pra 131. Khemchand Raimal v. Ram Babu; AIR 1962 Mys 89, Raghavender Rao v. Laxminarasayya; AIR 1963 Raj 4 , Sohanlal v. Rajmal take the contrary view. On the analysis indicated above, I am of opinion that the majority view is in consonance with the different provisions as discussed above. Khemchand Raimal v. Ram Babu; AIR 1962 Mys 89, Raghavender Rao v. Laxminarasayya; AIR 1963 Raj 4 , Sohanlal v. Rajmal take the contrary view. On the analysis indicated above, I am of opinion that the majority view is in consonance with the different provisions as discussed above. If I may say so with respect, AIR 1934 Cal 4 does not lay down the correct law. 10. The next question for consideration is whether the transferee execution court can grant stay under Section 151, C. P. C. That section lays down that- "nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of court." In AIR 1934 Pat 637, Baza'at Ahmad v. Ali Hussain, a learned single Judge held that though a case may not come within the purview of Order 21, Rule 29, stay can be granted under Section 151. With respect I must say that this decision has not laid down the law correctly. In (1965) 31 Cut LT 769 : (AIR 1966 Orissa 24), Kunjabehari Das v. Chanchala Das, this Court pointed out that the inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are supplementary to those powers and, therefore, it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151, C.P.C. when the exercise of these powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intention of the Legislature. The inherent powers are to be exercised by the Court in very exceptional circumstances, for which the Code lays down no procedure. Reliance was placed on AIR 1962 SC 527 . Manoharilal v. Seth Hiralal and AIR 1964 SC 993 . Arjun Singh v. Mahendra Kumar in support of this view. 11. As has been analysed already, Order 21, Rule 26(1) specifically provides that the transferee court can grant stay only for a reasonable time for particular purposes. There is thus a provision in the Code expressly providing for limited exercise of powers in the matter of stay by the transferee execution court. 11. As has been analysed already, Order 21, Rule 26(1) specifically provides that the transferee court can grant stay only for a reasonable time for particular purposes. There is thus a provision in the Code expressly providing for limited exercise of powers in the matter of stay by the transferee execution court. Section 151 cannot therefore be invoked to say that the transferee court has got absolute power of stay. Such a view would be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code and against the intention of the Legislature. Section 151 cannot therefore be resorted to by the transferee execution court for granting absolute stay of the execution pending before it. 12. The learned Munsif took the correct view. The revision is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.