JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The petitioner was an Inspector of Police. He has been removed from service by an order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 7th January, 1968. Against this order, the petitioner filed a revision before the Inspector General of Police. But, the Inspector General dismissed the revision on 22nd April, 1969. The petitioner challenges the order of removal from service, on the ground that it was without jurisdiction and, alternatively, that the finding that the charges were proved was without any evidence. 2. The Superintendent of Police received a complaint that the petitioner had extorted a sum of Rs. 600- from one Sunder Lal. He directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police to make an enquiry. During the pendency of the enquiry, the petitioner was placed under suspension on February 5, 1966. During the course of the enquiry, the Deputy Superintendent of Police came to know that the petitioner had won over some of the witnesses who had later on filed affidavits denying their earlier statements. The Deputy Superintendent of Police reported that there was strong suspicion of the complaints being true. The Superintendent of Police after considering the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 21st June, 1967. The first charge was that the petitioner had succeeded in extorting a sum of Rs. 600/- from Sunder Lal. The second charge was that he had won over certain prosecution witnesses. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, who conducted the oral enquiry, found that the first charge was not proved though there wag a strong suspicion thereof. He held that the second charge was proved. He recommended that the petitioner be reduced to the lowest stage in the pay-scale for three years and that his integrity certificate for the year 1966 be withheld. The superintendent of Police, by the show cause notice dated 21st June, 1967, asked the petitioner to explain the proposed penalty. After considering the petitioner's explanation, the Superintendent of Police passed an order on 8th July, 1967, accepted the finding of the enquiry officer. He directed that the petitioner be reduced to the lowest stage in the pay-scale for one year and that his integrity certificate for 1966 be withheld. 3. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police against the order of punishment. He directed that the petitioner be reduced to the lowest stage in the pay-scale for one year and that his integrity certificate for 1966 be withheld. 3. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police against the order of punishment. On 12th December, 1967, the Deputy Inspector General of Police issued a notice, requiring the petitioner to show cause why his punishment should not be enhanced and he be not dismissed from service. The notice stated that he was satisfied that the first charge also stood proved against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted an elaborate explanation to this show cause notice. On 7th January, 1968, the Deputy Inspector General of Police ordered the removal of the petitioner from service. He found that both the charges had been established. The petitioner then filed a revision, which was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police. He confirmed the findings. 4. Mr. Khare, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the Deputy Inspector General of Police had no jurisdiction to impose a punishment on the petitioner in relation to a charge on which the petitioner was acquitted by the punishing authority. Paragraphs 511, 512 and 513 of the Police Regulations deal with Revision. They state : "511. The power of revision may in the case of all orders against which an appeal would lie under paragraph 508-1 be exercised suo motu by the authority to whom the appeal would lie or by any authority superior to that authority. The power of revision may be exercised in non-appealable cases also as well as in cases of acquittal but by the Inspector General of Police, alone. 512. An officer whose appeal has been rejected by any authority subordinate to the Local Government is entitled to submit an application for revision to the authority next in rank above that by which appeal has been rejected. On such an application the power of revision may be exercised only when, in consequence of some flagrant irregularity, there appears to have been material injustice or miscarriage of justice. The procedure prescribed for appeals applies also to applications for revision. An application for revision of an order rejecting an appeal must be accompanied by a copy of the original as well as of the appellate order. "513. The procedure prescribed for appeals applies also to applications for revision. An application for revision of an order rejecting an appeal must be accompanied by a copy of the original as well as of the appellate order. "513. A punishment may be enhanced by- (a) an appellate authority on appeal or in exercise of revisionary powers; or (b) any authority superior to the authority to whom an appeal would lie in exercise of revisionary powers; Provided, in either case, that before enhancing a punishment the competent authority must call upon the officer punished to show cause why his punishment should not be enhanced and that an order by an appellate authority enhancing a punishment will count as an original order for the purpose of appeal." It will be seen that under paragraph 511, the appellate authority can suo motu exercise the revisional power. But in non-appealable and in cases of acquittal, the power of revision can be exercised only by the Inspector General of Police. The learned Counsel urged that the present was a case of acquittal on the first charge, and so, the power of revision could have been exercised only by the Inspector General of Police. The order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police is without jurisdiction. 5. The Inspector General of Police has confirmed the order of the Deputy Inspector General. He has confirmed the findings as well as the punishment of removal. Even if it be assumed that the Deputy Inspector General, had no power, his order having merged in the order of the Inspector General, the lack of jurisdiction vanished. In Janardhan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1851 S.C. 217, it was held that it is well-settled that if a court acts without jurisdiction, its decision can be challenged in the same way it would have been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction. Where the conviction and sentence had been upheld on appeal by a court of competent jurisdiction, the mere fact that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction would not justify interference, treating the appellate order also as a nullity. These observations cover the present case. 6. In the next place, the power of revision can be exercised by the Inspector General in non-appealable cases and in cases of acquittal. The word 'case' would refer to the order of the punishing authority. These observations cover the present case. 6. In the next place, the power of revision can be exercised by the Inspector General in non-appealable cases and in cases of acquittal. The word 'case' would refer to the order of the punishing authority. Under paragraph 508-II of the Police Regulations, no appeal lies against an order inflicting petty punishments enumerated in paragraph 478 (c) , (d) , (e) and (f) or against an order discharging an officer appointed under Section 2 of the Police Act. When an order of this nature is passed, the case is non-appealable. But, where an order reducing the pay of an officer is passed, such an order is admittedly appealable under paragraph 508-I of the Regulations. The same case cannot be appealable as well as non-appealable. A case where the finding is that one of the charges ha i not been proved but another charge has been proved and where a punishment is imposed on the basis of the charge which has been found proved, would be appealable or non-appealable depending on the punishment that has been inflicted. It will not be a non-appealable case, simply because there is a finding that one of the charges has not been proved. A case where one of the charges has been found to be proved and a punishment has been imposed thereon is not a case of acquittal. A case of acquittal would be where all the charges have been found not proved, resulting in the lack of imposition of any punishment. A case of acquittal cannot be a equated with a finding of acquittal on a particular charge. In the present case, the petitioner was found guilty of one charge and punished. The case was not one of acquittal. It would be an appealable case. The power of revision in such a case could validly be exercised by the appellate authority. 7. In the alternative, the learned counsel urged that under paragraph 51S, a punishment can only be enhanced; a fresh punishment cannot be imposed. In other words, the revisional authority can change the punishment inflicted on a particular charge. It cannot impose a fresh punishment on a charge, which was not proved before the punishing authority. I am unable to accept this contention, because it will wholly nullify the power of revision. In other words, the revisional authority can change the punishment inflicted on a particular charge. It cannot impose a fresh punishment on a charge, which was not proved before the punishing authority. I am unable to accept this contention, because it will wholly nullify the power of revision. The power of revision, undoubtedly, extends to that part of the findings under which a particular charge was not found proved. The revisional authority has been given power to look into the entire case, and come to its own conclusion; if it finds that a particular charge is proved by the evidence on the record, it is empowered to give that finding and to impose the requisite punishment thereon. If by doing so, the total punishment is increased, it will be a case of enhancement, to which paragraph 513 would apply. Such enhancement could be inflicted after the officer punished has been given a show cause notice as to why his punishment should not be enhanced. This view is supported by the last clause of paragraph 513, where it is provided that an order passed by the appellate authority enhancing a punishment will count as an original order for the purpose of appeal. This would show that the appellate authority in exercise of the revisional power may pass an original order of punishment. He is not confined to the charges which have been found to be proved by the original authority. In my opinion, it cannot be said that the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police was without jurisdiction. 8. The Deputy Inspector General of Police found that the first charge was proved by the evidence of several witnesses. The prosecution case was that the petitioner had taken search of the shop of Sunder Lal. He found some charas in it. He arrested Sunder Lal, and demanded a sum of Rs. 700- for his release. Sunder Lal gave him Rs. 600/- and promised to pay the sum of Rs. 100- later on. Thereupon, he was released from custody. P. W. 1, Girish Chand was a servant at Sunder Lal's shop. He in his statement deposed that at the instance of Sunder Lal, he brought a sum of Rs. 300- from Daley Ram and Rs. 140/- from Raja Ram, and this money was given to a Constable accompanying the petitioner. 100- later on. Thereupon, he was released from custody. P. W. 1, Girish Chand was a servant at Sunder Lal's shop. He in his statement deposed that at the instance of Sunder Lal, he brought a sum of Rs. 300- from Daley Ram and Rs. 140/- from Raja Ram, and this money was given to a Constable accompanying the petitioner. This statement of Girish Chand was corroborated by Raja Ram and Daley Ram. P. W. 8, Shiv Dayal Singh deposed that he was told by Sunder Lal that he (Sunder Lal) had given Rs. 600- as bribe to the petitioner. The learned counsel urged that the statement of Shiv Dayal was inadmissible in evidence. Paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations deals with the admissibility of evidence at departmental trials. It provides that "the evidence may be either oral or documentary. If oral- (a) It must be direct, i.e., if it is a fact which can be seen or otherwise perceived, it must be the evidence of the person who said he saw or otherwise perceived it". Shiv Dayal deposed that he heard from Sunder Lal. This was direct evidence, that is, by a person who himself heard what he was deposing. It cannot be said that this evidence was not direct and hence inadmissible. The Indian Evidence Act does not apply to such departmental proceedings. The evidence of Shiv Dayal cannot be excluded under paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations. The learned counsel relied on Raj Singh v. State of U. P., 1969 A.L.J. (Summary of Cases) 84. The decision in full has not been reported. One of the head notes in this report states : "It is clear from sub-para. (2) (a) of paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations that oral evidence which would be indirect is not permitted. Circumstantial evidence is an indirect form of evidence and is not direct evidence. Therefore, a fact at the departmental enquiry under Section 7 of the Police Act, cannot be proved on the basis of circumstantial evidence." This does not lay down that evidence which is a direct evidence as defined by sub-paragraph 2 (a) of paragraph 490, would also be inadmissible. As seen above, Shiv Dayal's statement was direct evidence. It was not inadmissible. 9. It was then urged that Girish Chand did not say that Sunder Lal had given any bribe to the petitioner. As seen above, Shiv Dayal's statement was direct evidence. It was not inadmissible. 9. It was then urged that Girish Chand did not say that Sunder Lal had given any bribe to the petitioner. The Deputy Inspector General of Police in his order has not held that Girish Chand said so. He has correctly recounted what Girish Chand stated. Girish'Chand brought the money, which was given to the Constable accompanying the petitioner. Thereupon, the petitioner released Sunder Lal and went away. This was relevant evidence in relation to the charge. 10. It is well-settled that a writ petition under. Article 226 of the Constitution is not an appeal on facts see Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1168. It cannot be said that there was no evidence in support of the finding. As held by the Supreme Court in this case, errors if any in the course of appreciation of evidence cannot be gone into a writ petition. 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon Darbari Ram Sharma v. State of U. P., 1956 A.L.J. 447 and the State of U. P. v. Ajodhya Prasad, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 773. I have looked into these cases. They have no relevance. 12. The petition fails, and is accordingly dismissed with costs.