Sughar Singh v. State of U. P — 1970 DIGILAW 284 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Pathak, J. - It is with great regret that I find myself unable to agree with my brother Mukerjee. 2. From the material on the record it seems to me that the appellant was appointed a temporary Sub-Inspector in an officiating capacity. There is no- thing to show that he held the post thereafter in a substantive capacity. As an officiating temporary Sub-Inspector he enjoyed no right to hold the post and consequently no question arises of the contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution, I am also unable to hold that the order of reversion was passed by way of punishment. It is difficult for me to conclude that from the record before us. As regards the question whether Article 16 (1) of the Constitution has been contravened, it seems to me that the protection of that provision could have been availed of by the appellant only if he had a right to hold the post from which he had been reverted. Article 16 (1) is concerned with cases where a person has been deprived of his rights by reason of discrimination. 3. In my opinion the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 4. Mukherjee, J. -This special appeal is directed against the order dated May 12, 1969 passed by a learned Snigle judge of this Court in Civil Miscellaneous writ No. 2243 of 1968 dismissing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the appellant. The facts are as stated : Sughar Singh, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, was appointed as constable, initially in the Special Armed Constabulary Force, in the month of December, 1941. On account of an unblemished carrier and excellent work he was promoted and became a permanent Head Constable in 1960. The averments in the appellant's affidavit in point have been admitted on behalf of the respondents in the counter affidavit. From 1950 to the year 1960 the appellant worked in that capacity. In 1960 the appellant was selected for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector, Armed Police. After such selection the appellant was required to undergo training at the Armed Police Training Centre at Sitapur. The appellant underwent the training as a cadet Sub-Inspector for the requisite period and he was placed 11th in rank in the list of the Successful candidates. In 1960 the appellant was selected for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector, Armed Police. After such selection the appellant was required to undergo training at the Armed Police Training Centre at Sitapur. The appellant underwent the training as a cadet Sub-Inspector for the requisite period and he was placed 11th in rank in the list of the Successful candidates. Thereupon the appellant was posted to Agra as a Platoon Commander in the 15th Provincial Armed Constabulary Batallion at Agra. The post of Platoon Commander is equivalent to that of Sub-Inspector of Police. The respondents version is that the appellant was appointed to "Officiate" in that post and it was not a substantive appointment. 5. The appellant continued to work as Platoon Commander for a number of years. On the 22nd July, 1966, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur, where the appellant was then posted, served on the latter a notice to show cause why an adverse entry should not be made in his character roll for having allegedly got entries relating to his date of birth and educational qualifications altered on the authority of a fictitious certificate. The notice (Annexure A) states that when the appellant was enlisted in the police force his date of birth was recorded as 1921 and educational qualification as literate (knowing Hindi and Roman). But, subsequently, the date of birth was altered to 8-9-1920 and educational qualification as Hindi Middle", on the basis of a school leaving certificate No. 42 of 1938, which was pasted on the character roll. It was further alleged that these entries were made in red ink without the attestation of any G.O. Having set out these facts the notice stated as follows "It seems that you got the date of birth and educational qualifications altered in your character roll on the authority of a fictitious certificate. Please show cause within ten days of the receipt of this notice as to why the following adverse entry should not be awarded in your character roll : 1966 : Is suspected to have got entries of date of birth and educational qualifications altered on the authority of a fictitious certificate. Severely warned." The appellant submitted in his explanation dated 30-7-1968 that he had given his date of birth 1921 roughly on the basis of what he knew and what he had stated about his educational qualifications was also correct. Severely warned." The appellant submitted in his explanation dated 30-7-1968 that he had given his date of birth 1921 roughly on the basis of what he knew and what he had stated about his educational qualifications was also correct. He qualified in Hindi and Roman test and secured 86 per cent marks in the examination for N. C. course as noted in the character roll. The appellant had no knowledge about the school leaving certificate nor who had submitted the same. He stated that his uncle who was a Havildar in the District Police, Agra at that time or some of his enemies might have done the mischief. He completely denied the charge that he had made the alterations as alleged. 6. The explanation of the appellant was, not, however, considered satis- factory and an adverse entry, as noted above was made in his character roll by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kanpur, Range, however, made an order on August 12, 1968 reverting the appellant from the post of Sub-Inspector to the post of Head Constable. A transliterations of the order of reversion dated August 12, 1968, in Roman script, is given below : ADESH Asthai Sub-Inspector, Armed Police, Sri Sughar Singh, Sub-Inspector pad se Avannit (revert) karke apne asli pad Head Constable par wapas kiya jate hain. Sd. N. K. Verma. Dy. Inspector General of Police, Kanpur Range". After the revision the appellant was transferred to Banda as a Head Constable. 7. The appellant stated that he was senior to about 200 Sub-Inspectors who were, initially, Head Constables and had received similar training at Sitapur after him. He further stated that he held the substantive post of Sub-Inspector right from the period of training in 1960 up to 1968 when the order of reversion was made. He submitted that there was a false statement in the order of reversion that lie held the post as a temporary Sub-Inspector and that his substantive post is that of a Head Constable. He contended that the order of reversion has visited the appellant with penal consequences without allowing him an opportunity to show cause against it. He also stated that as a result of this order his emoluments were reduced from Rs. 3271- per mensem to Rs. 200/- per mensem. He contended that the order of reversion has visited the appellant with penal consequences without allowing him an opportunity to show cause against it. He also stated that as a result of this order his emoluments were reduced from Rs. 3271- per mensem to Rs. 200/- per mensem. Moreover, the appellant pointed out that for the alleged fault of alterations in the character roll be had been punished thrice. First, the Superintendent of Police, Kanpur made an adverse entry in his character roll. Secondly, his annual increment of Rs. 101- per mensem to which the appellant was entitled was withheld. The third punishment was a reduction in rank ordered by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. 8. On the above facts the appellant contended that he was, evidently, reverted as it penal measure and, therefore, the necessary requirements of Article 311 should have been complied with. As, however, there has been no compliance with the constitutional provisions the order of reversion is untenable. Alternatively, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that if the reversion was not inflicted on him as a measure of punishment, even in that case, the 200 Head Constables who had subsequently taken training as Sub-Inspectors, Armed Police at Sitapur after him, should have been reverted first in order of juniority. The appellant having been reverted before the Sub-Inspectors junior to him, has been discriminated against and, therefore, the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution have been infringed. On these grounds it was prayed that a writ of certiorari may be issued quashing the order of reversion dated August 12, 1968 and a writ of mandamous directing the respondents to treat the appellant as Sub-Inspector Armed Police. 9. The learned Single judge, as already stated, dismissed the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the appellant. The learned Single judge held in his order dated May 12, 1969 that ". . . the petitioner was appointed to officiate on temporary basis in the rank of Sub-Inspector, "He observed that as the petitioner was never declared permanent it could not be contended that he had a right to hold the post of a Sub-Inspector, Armed Police, merely because the appointment was,made by selection. As he had no right to hold the post of Sub-Inspector, the reversion from that post would not Per se amount to reduction in rank under Article 311. As he had no right to hold the post of Sub-Inspector, the reversion from that post would not Per se amount to reduction in rank under Article 311. He was also of the view that mere reduction in emoluments would not necessarily involve penal consequences and, therefore, the provisions of Article 311 were not attracted in this case. As to the discriminatory treatment complained of by the appellant, the learned Single judge observed that there was no specific allegation that the 200 Head Constables who were junior to him were still continuing as Sub-Inspectors. There was also no evidence, according to the learned Single judge to show that the junior Sub- Inspectors had also the same service records and were considered to be as inefficient as the petitioner. The petitioner could not, therefore, be regarded as belonging to the same class to which the junior Sub-Inspectors belonged and he could not, therefore, invoke the provisions of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution. 10. It appears to me that the learned Single judge, with great respect, was wrong in holding that the petitioner was officiating in a temporary post in the rank of Sub-Inspector. The order of appointment (Annexure A) which has been quoted above, dated March 21, 1961 states as follows : "On completion of the practical training on March 16, 1961, the following S.I., A.P. cadets allotted to P.A.C. for posting as offs Platoon Commanders :- Name District of lien Unit Residence. .......... ........ ........ 8. Sughar Singh Agra Etawah. .......... ........ ........ 11. The order was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Head Quarters, U. P. The order no doubt refers to the appointment of the appellant as an officiating Platoon Commander on March 16, 1961 when he was posted at Agra. Subsequently, however, it appears that the appellant ceased to officiate in that post. The cadre of Sub Inspector Armed Police consists of 2 permanent posts and 147 temporary posts. When the order of reversion was passed, the appellant, it appears, had already been absorbed in the temporary cadre of Sub Inspector, Armed Police. The order of reversion (Annexure C) dated August 12, 1968 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kanpur Range, refers to appellant Sughar Singh as an "Asthai" Sub Inspector, which means "temporary" Sub Inspector. When the order of reversion was passed, the appellant, it appears, had already been absorbed in the temporary cadre of Sub Inspector, Armed Police. The order of reversion (Annexure C) dated August 12, 1968 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kanpur Range, refers to appellant Sughar Singh as an "Asthai" Sub Inspector, which means "temporary" Sub Inspector. It is clear, therefore, that when the order of reversion was passed the appellant had ceased to be an "officiating" Sub Inspector and had become a temporary Sub Inspector, Armed Police. The incidents attaching to that post are governed by the provisions of the Police Regulations. Regulation 447 lays down : "Promotion to the rank of Sub Inspector, Armed Police, will be made in the following manner : (a) Approximately 80 per cent of the posts will be filled by a selection of men from the ranks." (b) The remaining 20 per cent of the posts will be filled by direct recruitment till the quota of 50 directly recruited posts out of 270 is filled up." Regulation 448 says that candidates nominated or selected under paragraph 447 will undergo a course of training of seven months duration at the Armed Training Centre, Sitapur including one month's practical training in the Provincial. Armed Constabulary Units. Before taking training at Sitapur, the selected candidates arc required to undergo a successful preliminary training for a period of two months at the Armed Training Centre, Sitapur. Art. 448-A says that relative seniority will be governed by the date of passing the Sub-Inspector, Armed Police Course and by the position obtained by the candidates in the final examination of such course. There is no specific provision in the Police Regulations for confirmation of Sub Inspectors, Armed Police, who have been appointed in the temporary cadre. It seems that a Sub Inspector Armed Police is entitled to be confirmed, on satisfactory service, when there is a vacancy in the permanent cadre and he cannot be passed over except for inefficiency or gross -dereliction of duty., It follows, therefore, that the appellant as a temporary -Sub-Inspector held the post in a substantive capacity in the temporary cadre and not as a probationer or on officiating basis.' In fact, there is no provision for probation of Sub-Inspector, Armed Police, in the- police Regulations.- The appellant had, therefore, a right to hold the post of a temporary Sub-Inspector; Armed Police. 12. In the case of the Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway, Mysore v. S. Raghavendrachar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 159 the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "Since Article 311 makes no distinction between permanent and temporary posts, its protection must be held to extend to all Government servants holding permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any of them, but that protection is limited to the imposition of three major penalties contemplated by the Service Rules, namely, dismissal or removal or reduction in rank." The Supreme Court also remarked that even an officiating Government servant may be reverted to his original rank by way of punishment and observed : "One test for determining whether the termination of service was by way of punishment or otherwise is to ascertain whether under the Service Rules, but for such termination, the servant has the right to hold the post." The above observation of the Supreme Court implies that even when a person is officiating in a post and is reverted, not on the ground of unsatisfactory work, such reversion would amount to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. As I have already found, the appellant was holding a post in the temporary cadre of Sub-Inspectors Armed Police and he had a right to hold the post. He could not, therefore, be reverted to the inferior position, which he had previously occupied, without compliance with the pro- cedure prescribed in Article 311 of the Constitution. 13. Learned Counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the decision of a Bench of this Court in the case of Shambhoo Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1964 A.L.J. 331 for his contention that in a case in which a Government servant was appointed to a higher post as a result of selection and was drawing a salary higher than that of his permanent post and the nature of duties in the posts was different, his reversion from the higher post to his permanent post amounts to a reduction in rank by way of punishment. In that case the appellant was holding the permanent post of a clerk in the Collectorate. Then a selection took place for appointment to the post of Panchayat Inspector and the appellant was selected for that post and was appointed to it in June, 1949. In that case the appellant was holding the permanent post of a clerk in the Collectorate. Then a selection took place for appointment to the post of Panchayat Inspector and the appellant was selected for that post and was appointed to it in June, 1949. In December, 1953 the respondent served a charge sheet on the appellant asking him to explain why he should not be properly punished for drawing travelling allowances on false grounds. The appellant denied the charges, but his explanation was not accept- ed and he was, eventually, reverted to his original post which was that of a clerk in the Collectorate. V. Bhargava, J. who delivered the judgment in the case, set aside the order of reversion on the ground that there had been no compliance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. In delivering the judgment the learned judge observed : "... And it has already been held by the Supreme Court that even if a temporary appointment is terminated by way of punishment, the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution are tracked and the authority passing the order of termination of the appointment has to comply with the requirements of that Article by giving an opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment." The learned Single judge has distinguished the Bench decision in Shambhoo Ji's case on facts. I do not, however, see any line of distinction between the two cases. The broad facts are that, in both the cases the appellant was promoted by selection from a lower post to a higher post and they were reverted as a measure of punishment, to their original post when they were working in a temporary capacity in the higher post. In both the cases, the procedure prescribed in Article 311 of the Constitution was not followed. In my opinion, therefore, the facts of the present case are on pan materia with those of Shambhoo Ji's2 case. I do not see any reason to depart from the very salutary dictum laid down by Bhargava, J. in that case. There can be no doubt that in the present case the order of reversion was passed against the appellant as a penal measure by the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was not satisfied with the punishment of severe warning and the stoppage of increment given by the Senior Superintendent of Police. There can be no doubt that in the present case the order of reversion was passed against the appellant as a penal measure by the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was not satisfied with the punishment of severe warning and the stoppage of increment given by the Senior Superintendent of Police. The punishment inflicted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police entailed not only loss of emoluments but also loss of rank which the appellant previously enjoyed. This was preeminently a case in which it was mandatory on the part of the superior authorities to have proceeded in accordance with the provisions of Article 311. 14. The learned Single judge has observed that there has been no discrimination against the appellant as there is no specific allegation that the 200 Head Constables who were selected for promotion and were promoted as Sub-Inspectors, Armed Police after the appointment of the appellant as such, are still continuing to hold the same post. It appears that the appellant did not make any specific allegation in that regard and relied on the presumption of continuity of events. It is not possible to think that the 200 constables appointed after the appellant had all retired before the date the order of reversion was passed against the appellant. Then again, the learned Single judge observed that there is no allegation that "such junior Head Constables were considered to be as inefficient as the petitioner". The learned Single Judge apparently, laboured under a mis- conception. The appellant, indisputably, had a brilliant record of service all along and, as pointed out above, his statement in the affidavit at paragraph 5 was not controverted in the counter affidavit. He stood 11th in order of merit in the final examination held at Sitapur Training Centre and there is no allegation on behalf of the respondents that the appellant was reverted on account of inefficiency. The order of reversion is also silent on the point. It must follow, therefore, that if the reversion of the appellant was not ordered as a penal measure, but on account of exigencies of service the appellant has been discriminated against vis a vis his juniors and, therefore, Article 16 (1) of the Constitution has been violated. 15. The order of reversion is also silent on the point. It must follow, therefore, that if the reversion of the appellant was not ordered as a penal measure, but on account of exigencies of service the appellant has been discriminated against vis a vis his juniors and, therefore, Article 16 (1) of the Constitution has been violated. 15. It has, however, been found that the appellant was reverted by way of punishment and, therefore, the order of reversion is had for non-compliance with the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 16. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of the learned Single judge-is -set aside. The order of reversion dated August 12, 1968- passed by respondent No. 3, the Deputy Inspector General-of Police, Kanpur- Range, Kanpur is quashed. The appellant will be entitled to the costs of, these; proceedings. front. the Respondents in this special-appeal as well as in the writ petition.' 17. By The Court - As we have differed, we refer the case to a third Hon'ble Judge for decision. 18. The papers of this case shall be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. On a difference of opinion between R. S. Puthuk and T. P. Mukerjee, JJ. 19. Verma, J.-This special appeal has been listed before me because of a difference of opinion between R. S. Pathak, J. and T. P. Mukerjee, J. 2. The appellant, Sughar Singh, was appointed a constable in the Special Armed Constabulary Force in December, 1941. Apparently his work was found to be good and he was promoted to the post of permanent Head Constable in 1950. He worked in that capacity from 1950 to 1960. In 1960 he was selected for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector, Armed Police. After his selection, in accordance with the provisions contained in the Police Regulations, he underwent training as a Cadet Sub-Inspector. At the end of the period of training his position was eleventh in the List of successful candidates. He was thereafter posted to Agra as a Platoon Commander in the 15th Provincial Armed Constabulary Batallion, Agra. It is common ground that the rank of Platoon Commander is that of Sub-Inspector of Police. He continued to work in that capacity for a number of years. He was thereafter posted to Agra as a Platoon Commander in the 15th Provincial Armed Constabulary Batallion, Agra. It is common ground that the rank of Platoon Commander is that of Sub-Inspector of Police. He continued to work in that capacity for a number of years. On 22nd July, 1966, the Senior Superintendent of Police Kanpur where the appellant was posted at the time, served a notice on him requiring him to show cause why an adverse entry should not be made in his character roll because of alterations alleged to have been made by him in his character roll relating to his date of birth and educational qualifications. It was alleged that at the time of his enlistment in the police force the year of his birth was recorded is 1921 and his educational qualification was described as 'Literate' (knowing Hindi and Roman). Subsequently the year of his birth was altered to 1920 and his educational qualification was described as 'Hindi Middle' on the basis of a school leaving certificate No. 42 of 1938, which was pasted on his character roll. 21. I am not concerned with the question whether the appellant made the alterations in his character roll but, nevertheless, the thought that crosses my mind is this : would he alter the year of his birth in such a way that he would be one year older and he would retire one year earlier ? 22. The appellant submitted his explanation in which he stated that he was not responsible for the alternations, but the same had been made by some of his enemies. His explanation, however, was not accepted. An adverse entry was made in his character roll and he was severely warned by the Senior Superintendent of police, Kanpur. In April, 1968 the appellant's increment of Rs. 10/- was stopped and on 12th August, 1968, by an order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kanpur Range, he was reverted to the post of Head Constable. The order reads as follows : "Asthai Sub-Inspector, Armed Police Sri Sughar Singh, Sub-Inspector pad se avannit (revert) Karke apne asli pad Head Constable par wapas kiye jate hain." After this order the appellant was transferred to Banda as a Head Constable. 23. The order reads as follows : "Asthai Sub-Inspector, Armed Police Sri Sughar Singh, Sub-Inspector pad se avannit (revert) Karke apne asli pad Head Constable par wapas kiye jate hain." After this order the appellant was transferred to Banda as a Head Constable. 23. The appellant filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed by Satish Chandra, J. The appellant thereupon filed this Special- Appeal which was heard by the R. S. Pathak, J. and T. P. Mukerjee, J. The former was of the view that the Special Appeal should be dismissed and the latter was of the view that the Special Appeal should be allowed and the order reverting the appellant should be quashed. 24. The order of reversion was impugned on three grounds : firstly that the appellant had acquired a right to the post of a Sub-Inspector of Police by Virtue of his selection and appointment to that post; secondly, that the order of his reversion amounted to reduction in rank and he was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; and thirdly, that as 200 officers, who were junior to him, were allowed to continue, his reversion was discriminatory within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution of India. 25. Before I proceed any further I consider it necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Police Regulations under which the appellant's selection was made. "406 (b) Armed Police-Permanent promotions to the rank of sub-inspector in the armed police are made by Deputy Inspectors General from the list of those who have qualified at the course prescribed under paragraph 448. Superintendents may promote in officiating or temporary vacancies. 447. Recruitment to the rank of Sub-Inspector Armed Police Platoon Commander will be made in the following manner : (a) 80 per cent of the posts both temporary and permanent in the combined cadre of Sub-Inspector Armed Police Platoon Commander will be filled in by selection of men from the ranks. (b) The remaining 20 per cent of the posts both temporary and permanent in the combined cadre of Sub-Inspector Armed Police Platoon Commander will be filled in by direct recruitment. (b) The remaining 20 per cent of the posts both temporary and permanent in the combined cadre of Sub-Inspector Armed Police Platoon Commander will be filled in by direct recruitment. For category (a) the Range Deputy Inspectors General of Police, Deputy Inspector General, Provincial Armed Constabulary and the Deputy Inspector General of Police Head-quarters in the case of the Railway Police, will nominate from time to time as required by the Inspector General such number of head constables of the Armed Police as may be specified. For Category (b) selection of the required number of candidates will be made by a committee consisting of the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General, Provincial Armed Constabulary and one more Deputy Inspector General nominated by Inspector General. 448(i). Candidates nominated or selected under paragraph 447, will undergo a course of training of 7 months duration at the armed training centre, Sitapur, including one months practical training in the Provincial Armed Constabulary Units. I (ii) Before taking training under the above sub-para. candidates selected under para. 447 (b) shall undergo a successful preliminary training for a period of two months at the Armed Training Centre, Sitapur. 448-A. Relative seniority will be governed by the date of passing the Sub Inspector Armed Police Course and for men passing the same course both iii position obtained in the final examination of Sub-Inspector Armed Police Course between two men obtaining equal marks in the same final examination (i) promoted man will take seniority over directly recruited candidate (ii) if both men are directly recruited the age will be the determining factor and in the case of the ranker cadets it will be the length of service. 26. The appellant fulfilled all the requirements that the police Regulations required. He was, however, appointed only as officiating Platoon Commander. I am not prepared to go to the length of holding that the appellant acquired a right to the post by virtue of his selection. Indeed, it is not necessary for me to go into this question. The question, however, that arises is whether, even on the assumption that he was appointed only as an officiating Platoon Commander, he was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India or not. Indeed, it is not necessary for me to go into this question. The question, however, that arises is whether, even on the assumption that he was appointed only as an officiating Platoon Commander, he was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India or not. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 : 1958 A.L.J. 372 it was pointed out that Article 311 made no distinction between permanent and temporary posts and extended its protection equally to all Government Servants holding permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any of them. But that protection was available only where dismissal, removal or reduction in rank was sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. 27. In Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1711 one Sukhbans Singh was appointed Tahsildar in 1936. His work was found to be good and he was appointed as an Extra Assistant Commissioner on probation in the year 1945. His appointment amounted to promotion to the Provincial Civil Service (Executive Branch) and this selection was made through the Punjab Public Services Commission. Subsequently, however, he had to face an enquiry on seven charges. The enquiry was conducted by Mr. S. B. Kanpur, Commissioner, under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. He was, however, exonerated. His increment was stopped for one year on the ground that he had allotted some evacuee property to his father in law who was an evacuee from West Pakistan. He was then transferred to Jullunder as a Revenue Assistant in September 1950. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Kashyap, however, was annoyed with Sukhbans Singh and he wrote to the Government protesting against the transfer. The transfer was, however effected and eventually Sukhbans Singh was reverted to his post of Tahsildar on May 20, 1952. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out that a probationer had no right to a permanent post at the end of his period of probation. Their Lordships, however, said thus : "Even though that is so, a probationer cannot be as pointed out in Dhingara's3 case punished for misconduct without complying with the requirements of Art. 311 (2). The question then is whether it can be said that the appellant was so punished. Their Lordships, however, said thus : "Even though that is so, a probationer cannot be as pointed out in Dhingara's3 case punished for misconduct without complying with the requirements of Art. 311 (2). The question then is whether it can be said that the appellant was so punished. The sequence of events which led up to a departmental inquiry against him, his exoneration, his transfer to Jullunder, the unsuccessful attempt of Mr. Kashyap, the Deputy Commissioner to have the transfer cancelled followed by his being asked to stop collecting funds for a Government College and then by his reversion on May 20, 1952, would go to show that the reversion was not in the ordinary course." Sukhbans Singh's appeal was allowed and the order of reversion was quashed. 28. In Debesh Chandra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 77 the appellant, Debesh Chandra, was a member of the Indian Civil Service. He was Chief Secretary of Assam. He was appointed as Secretary under the Government of India, a tenure post, the tenure of which was to expire in July, 1969. On 20th September, 1966, he received the following letter from the Cabinet Secretary : "My dear Debesh For sometime, the Government has been examining the question of building up a higher level of administrative efficiency. This is much more important in the context of the recent developments in the country. The future is also likely to be fill of problems. In this connection, the Government examined the names of those who are at present occupying top level administrative posts with a view to ascertaining whether they were fully capable of meeting the new challenges or whether they should make room for younger people. As a result of this examination, it has been decided that you should be asked either to revert to your parent State or to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement or to accept some post lower than that of Secretary of Government. As a result of this examination, it has been decided that you should be asked either to revert to your parent State or to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement or to accept some post lower than that of Secretary of Government. I would be glad if you would please let me know immediately as to what you propose to do so that further action in the matter may be taken." Debesh asked for an interview with the Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister and represented his case, but he got no redress and on 7th September, 1966, he received a second latter from the Cabinet Secretary which stated, inter alias, as follows : "I am now directed to inform you that after considering your oral and written representations in the matter Government has decided that your services may be placed at the disposal of your parent State, namely, Assam. In case, how- ever, you like to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement, will you please let me know? ............ Debesh treated these orders as reduction in rank and filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court. On these facts their Lordships made the following observations : "In this appeal also, it is contended that the reversion of the appellant to the Assam Service amounts to a reduction in rank. This is on the ground that he held a higher post in the Government of India and there is no post equal to it under the Assam Government. The post of the Chief Secretary in the Assam Government is equal to the post of a joint Secretary in the Government of India and his reversion would therefore indirectly mean a reduction in his rank and also in his emoluments because the highest post in Assam does not carry a salary equal to that of a Secretary in the Government of India. He also contends that under Article 311 (2) an enquiry had to be made and he had to be given a chance of explaining his case if the reduction in rank amounted to a penalty. He contends that the letters of the Cabinet Secretary spell for themselves and clearly show that he was being offered a lower post even in the Government of India if he was to continue here denoting thereby a desire to reduce him in rank. He contends that the letters of the Cabinet Secretary spell for themselves and clearly show that he was being offered a lower post even in the Government of India if he was to continue here denoting thereby a desire to reduce him in rank. The letters also spell of his unsatisfactory work and, therefore, cast a stigma on him and therefore his reversion must be treated as a penalty and if the procedure laid down under Article 311 (2) is not followed, the order of the Government of India could not be sustained. This, in short, is the case which he had put up before the High Court and has now put up before us. 29. The Government of India contends that he was on deputation and the deputation could be terminated at any time; that his orders of appointment clearly show that the appointments were "untill further orders" and that he had no right to continue in the Government of India if his services were not required and that his reversion to his parent State did not amount either to any reduction in rank or a penalty, and, therefore, the order was quite legal. ............................................................. The position that emerges is that the cadres for the Indian Administrative Services are to be found in the States only. There is no cadre in the Government of India. A few of these persons are, however, intended to serve at the Centre. When they do so they enjoy better employments and status. They rank higher in the service. and even in the Warrant of precedence of the President. In the States they cannot get the same salary in any post as Secretaries are entitled to in the Centre. The appointments to the Centre are not in any sense a deputation. They mean promotion to a higher post. The only safeguard is that many of the posts at the Centre are tenure posts. Those of Secretaries and equivalent posts are for five years and for lower posts the duration of tenure is four years. .............................................................. Therefore, we are satisfied that Das was being reduced in rank with a stigma upon his work without following the procedure laid down in Article 311 (2). Those of Secretaries and equivalent posts are for five years and for lower posts the duration of tenure is four years. .............................................................. Therefore, we are satisfied that Das was being reduced in rank with a stigma upon his work without following the procedure laid down in Article 311 (2). We say nothing about a genuine case of accident of service in which a person drafted from a State has to go back for any reason not connected with his work or conduct. Cases must obviously arise when a person taken from the State may have to go back for reasons unconnected with his work or conduct. These cases are different and we are not expressing any opinion about them. But this case is clearly one of reduction in rank with a distinct stigma upon the man. This requires action in accordance with Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and since none was taken, the order of reversion cannot be sustained. We quash it and order the retention of Das in it post comparable to the post of a Secretary in emoluments till such time as his present tenure lasts or there is an inquiry against him as contemplated by the Constitution." 30. In Shambhoo Ji Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh the facts were similar to the facts of the present case. Shambhoo Ji Srivastava was a clerk in the Collectorate. He was selected for appointment to the post of Panchayat Inspector. He wanted to improve his educational qualifications and, with this end in view, lie joined B.A. classes in a College. He was subsequently alleged to have drawn travelling allowances on dates when he was marked present in the College. Srivastava denied these allegations. He was, however, removed from the post of Panchayat Inspector. He filed an appeal to the State Government and the State Government converted the order of removal from service into one of reversion to his post as a clerk in the Collectorate, to which he held a lien. He filed a writ petition which was dismissed by a learned single judge on this Court. On special appeal the Division Bench observed as follows : "In this case, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are unable to agree with the view of the learned Single judge that the provisions of Art. 311 were not attracted at all to the case of the appellant. On special appeal the Division Bench observed as follows : "In this case, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are unable to agree with the view of the learned Single judge that the provisions of Art. 311 were not attracted at all to the case of the appellant. The appellant was no doubt holding a permanent post of a clerk in the Collectorate and was reverted to that post as a result of the final order which was impugned by him in the writ petition. This order did not affect his permanent status in the Government service; the question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant was reduced in rank and, if so, whether this was done by way of punishment. The 'facts admitted by the parties show that the appellant was appointed to the post ,of Panchayat Inspector as a result of selection. The use of the word 'selection' itself implies that he was being appointed to a post which was better than that held by him at the time when he was selected for the other post. There is the further fact that in this case the appellant in his affidavit stated that he was drawing a higher salary in the post of Panchayat Inspector while his salary in his permanent post was lower. There is also the circumstance that the nature of duties in the two posts was different, in the post of Panchayat Inspector the appellant's duties were in the nature of an officer of the executive while in his permanent post he was only entrusted with clerical and ministerial work. In all these circumstances, we think that the reversion of the appellant from the post of Panchayat Inspector to that of a clerk in the Collectorate did amount to reduction in rank. The result of his reversion was that he subsequently got lower pay, the nature of his duties was altered to duties which are carried on normally by Government servants of a lower status and he was deprived of the benefits which it must be deemed impelled him to apply for selection in order to get the appointment as Panchayat Inspector even though he was earlier holding the permanent post of a clerk. It is also to be noticed that the order of reversion was clearly made by way of punishment. It is also to be noticed that the order of reversion was clearly made by way of punishment. Initially the respondent No. 2 imposed the punishment of removal from the post of Panchayat Inspector and all that the respondent No. 1 purported to do in appeal was to modify that order and convert the final order of punishment from removal to reversion. The order of respondent No. 1 clearly mentions that the order passed by respondent No. 2 was being modified to the extent of substituting reversion for removal. Consequently, it was not a case where the appellant was sent back to his permanent post in the ordinary course for some reason or the other the appropriate authorities considered it advisable to send him back to his original post: but he was in fact reverted by way of punishment. The State Government, in mentioning that the order under appeal was modified and restricting the modification merely to the punishment awarded, clearly adopted the findings recorded by respondent No. 2 that the appellant was guilty of the charges levelled against him and that he deserved to be punished for them. It was by way of punishment that he was reverted. The very fact that the reversion was by way of punishment implies that the appellant was placed in a more disadvantageous position than that originally held by him and that dis- advantage clearly was that he was sent from a better and superior post to a worse and inferior post." (The italicis is mine) . 31. P. C. Wadhwa v. The Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 423 is an authority for the proposition that the order of reversion may be expressed in innocuous terms but if from the totality of circumstances, the inference is irresistible that the order of reversion was passed by way of punishment, the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution would be attracted. 32. In the case in hand, the appellant was selected for appointment to a post which was higher in rank than that of a Head Constable. His emoluments, while he held the post of Sub-Inspector of Police for eight years, were higher. His reversion cannot be said to be unconnected with the events preceding it, viz., the adverse entry given to him, the severe warning administered to him and the stoppage of his increment. 33. His emoluments, while he held the post of Sub-Inspector of Police for eight years, were higher. His reversion cannot be said to be unconnected with the events preceding it, viz., the adverse entry given to him, the severe warning administered to him and the stoppage of his increment. 33. The sequence of events in the present case leaves no room for doubt that the appellant's reversion can be described as nothing else but punishment by reduction in rank. He was first accused of making alterations in the entries in his character roll. He was thereafter warned. His increment was stopped in April, 1968 and in August he was reverted. I asked the learned counsel appearing for the State whether he could give any other reason for the appellant's reversion. He stated that the order of reversion was the result of the adverse entry given to the appellant in his character roll. He could give no other reason why the appellant, whose record had been excellent throughout and who worked as a Sub-Inspector of Police for eight years, should he reverted to the post of Head Constable. I am, therefore, of the view that the appellant was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and that the order sought to be impugned must be quashed. 34. As regards the question whether Article 16 (1) of the Constitution of India was violated or not, the appellant never laid the foundation for that argument by making necessary allegations. He never alleged that other persons, who were junior to him, even after his reversion, were still continuing to work as Sub- Inspectors of Police. I cannot proceed on the assumption that they are still continuing to work as Sub-Inspectors of Police. 35. For the reasons given above, I am of the view that this appeal should be allowed and that the order dated 12th August, 1968, reverting the appellant, should be quashed. I am also of the view that the appellant should get his costs from the respondents. 36. Let the papers of this case along with this opinion be laid before the Bench concerned.