Judgment.- A-1, A-3, to A-6, A-8 and and A-9 the petitioners herein, have been convicted for the offences punishable under sections 147, 226, 232 and 333: of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for various periods up to three years. 2. The case for the prosecution was that all? the accused except A-6 are the residents of Dachavaram and A-6 belongs to Kontalapalli of Nandigama taluk A-1 and some of the accused were wanted in certain crimes where their complicity-was suspected by the police. At die-instance of P.W.12, the Circle Inspector of Police, Nandigama, an investigation detective party (hereinafter called the I.D. Party) consisting of P.W.1 Head Constable and P.Ws. 3, 4 and 7 Police Constables belonging to different police-stations went on 25th June, 1968 to Keesara Village where from they proceeded to Dachavaram on information and arrested A-1 at 4 p.m. at his house. When A-1 was being taken by the police constables to Nandigama through the ‘donka’ leading from Dachavaram to Vollanki by about 5-00 p.m. all the accused and some others, twenty in number, came from behind armed with sticks and attacked the I.D. Party as a result of which P.Ws.1, 3, 4 and 7 sustained bleeding injuries and fell down. A-1 also extricated himself from the police and took part in the attack. He along with the other accused ran away after the incident. The injured police constables thereafter got up and reached the choultry in the outskirts of Vellanki village where P.W.8, the village officer, arranged a double bullock cart driven by P.W. 9 and one Shaik Galib Sabeb to Keesara Village. The police party went to Nandigama Police Station in a rickshaw driven by P.W.10 in the early hours of 26th June, 1968. Exhibit P-1, a complaint, was given by P.W.1 to P.W.11, the S.I. of Police, Nandigama who registered the case as Grime No. 42/68 and sent the four injured constables to the Government Hospital, Nandigama for treatment. The case was investigated by P.W.12 who arrested some of the accused. Others except A-2 and A-7 surrendered before the Court. 3. Exhibit P-1, a complaint, was given by P.W.1 to P.W.11, the S.I. of Police, Nandigama who registered the case as Grime No. 42/68 and sent the four injured constables to the Government Hospital, Nandigama for treatment. The case was investigated by P.W.12 who arrested some of the accused. Others except A-2 and A-7 surrendered before the Court. 3. As the accused 2 and 7 were absconding, the case was separated and all the accused except A-2 and A-7 have been tried by the Second Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Vijayawada in S.C. No. 7/69, who convicted and sentenced the petitioners and acquitted others of various charges levelled against them. The appeals preferred by the petitioners to the Additional Sessions Judge, Krishna against the convictions and sentences awarded by the trial Court have been dismissed. Hence, this revision petition. 4. In the meanwhile, the absconding accused 2 and 7 have been arrested and tried in S.C. Nos. 15 and 64 of 1969 by the 1st Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Vijayawada who on an appraisal of the evidence, oral and documentary adduced before him, acquitted both the accused for the reasons stated in his judgment, dated 22nd January, 1970, i.e., subsequent to the filing of this revision petition. 5. Sri P.S.T. Sayee, for the petitioners, raised the following contentions in support of his claim that the petitioners are entitled for an acquittal: (1) that the judgment in S.C.Nos.15 and 64 of 1969 on the file of the Court of the 1st Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Vijayawada is admissible as evidence under sections 11 and 13 read with 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, in this revision petition. (2) that there is no valid arrest of A-1 under section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence, the offence under section 225 of the Penal Code, must be held to have not been made out; (3) that there is no finding of common object to justify the conviction of the petitioners under section 147 of the Penal Code; (4) that the prosecution evidence is discrepant and contradictory in material particulars apart from its being partisan and interested; (5) that the best evidence of independent witnesses available, has not been placed before the Court, and (6) that in any event, the petitioners are entitled to benefit of doubt. (6) The Public Prosecutor opposed the claim of the petitioners contending inter alia that the convictions and sentences are valid and amply justified. 7. Upon the facts and the respective contentions raised by the parties, the following points arise for decision; (1) whether the judgment of a criminal Court acquitting some of the accused separately tried by it for certain offences relating to the same transaction, is or is not admissible in evidence in a revision or appeal preferred against the conviction of the other accused by another Court for similar offence!; in respect of same transaction? (2) Whether the convictions and sentences of all or any of the petitioners are illegal or improper justifying the interference of this revision under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 8. In order to appreciate the respective stands taken on point No. 1 by the parties it is relevant and necessary to examine the provisions of sections 11, 13 and 43 of the Indian Evidence Act and the scheme and intendment thereof. The principle intendment of the Evidence Act is to consolidate, define and amend the law of evidence. Under section 11, facts which are not otherwise relevant would become relevant if they are inconsistant with any fact in issue or relevant fact, or if they make the existence or otherwise of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable, when they are considered either independently or in in connection with other facts. Section 13 relates to the relevancy of facts when the existence of any right or custom is in question. Sections 11 and 13 by mem-selves are not attracted in the instant case. Section 43, on which much reliance has been placed, reads, thus: “Judgments, Orders or decrees other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or relevant under some other provision of this Act.” 9. Sections 40 and 42 of the Act embody the fundamental principles governing the admissibility of judgments, orders or decrees. Section 40 refers to the existence of any previous judgment, order or decree as relevant to bar a second suit or trial on the same question and set of facts. Sections 40 and 42 of the Act embody the fundamental principles governing the admissibility of judgments, orders or decrees. Section 40 refers to the existence of any previous judgment, order or decree as relevant to bar a second suit or trial on the same question and set of facts. Section 41 deals with relevancy of certain judgments in probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction; whereas section 42 speaks to the relevancy and effect of the judgments, orders or decrees other than those specified in section 41. Under section 43, all other judgments, orders or decree not specified in sections 40 to 42 are irrelevant unless the existence or otherwise of such a judgment, order or decree is relevant or is a fact in issue. The judgments and decrees of civil Courts declaring rights of the parties to the identical property in dispute in a criminal case are admissible under section 43 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of deciding the points at issue. 10. The pertinent question now posed before me is not, whether or not a judgment of the criminal Court acquitting the accused 2 and 7 is in existence. There is no such issue for decision in the present case; nor is it considered to be relevant for the purpose of this revision by virtue of any of the provisions of the Evidence Act. The provisions of sections 11 and 13 read with section 43 do not, in my judgment, come in aid of the peti-tioners to establish their plea that the judgment of the 1st Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Vijayawada acquitting accused 2 and 7 for offences relating to the same transaction under which the petitioners have been convicted, is admissible in evidence in this revision petition. 11. I shall now turn to the plea of Sri Sayee that in order to have a free and fair trial, the principle that admission of evidence in criminal cases is a rule but exception is the other way is applicable to the present case. 11. I shall now turn to the plea of Sri Sayee that in order to have a free and fair trial, the principle that admission of evidence in criminal cases is a rule but exception is the other way is applicable to the present case. The following well-known principles relating to trial of cases by a criminal Court may usefully be referred to at this stage: (i) There should be free and fair trial of the charges levelled against an accused, (ii) Conflict of decisions may be avoided as far as possible, (iii) Burden of proof is always on the prosecution to establish the charge and guilt of the accused, (iv) The benefit of doubt, whether it relates to law or fact or finding in a criminal Court, should invariably go to the accused but not to the prosecution. (v) Admission of evidence is a rule but exception is the other way. The principle that admission of evidence is a rule but exception is the other way will be attracted only in cases where the evidence sought for admission is admissible as per the provisions of the Evidence Act and relates to a relevant and material fact or circumstance necessary for decision on the point at issue. It does not contemplate that evidence which is inadmissible under the Evidence Act, irrelevant, unconnected or unnecessary for the point or question at issue has to be admitted as a rule. This guiding principle indicates the manner of approach by criminal Courts in respect of admission of evidence. The question relating to the manner and method of admission of evidence would arise only when such evidence is admissible but not otherwise. The admission of oral or documentary evidence by a criminal Court in the course of a trial of the accused for any charge levelled against him or by an appellate or revisional Court is circumscribed and regulated by the Evidence Act. Where the evidence sought for is not admissible as per the provisions of Evidence Act, this rule now pressed upon me by Sri Sayee has no application. Hence, I do not find any substance in this plea of the petitioners. 12. Where the evidence sought for is not admissible as per the provisions of Evidence Act, this rule now pressed upon me by Sri Sayee has no application. Hence, I do not find any substance in this plea of the petitioners. 12. The further submission of Sri Sayee that the refusal to admit the judgment of the criminal Court acquitting A-2 and A-7 as evidence in this revision would amount to denial of fair and free trial of the charges levelled against his clients, cannot be given effect to. The trial Judge, in the instant case, has, in my view, not committed any illegality or irregularity in trying the charges of the accused other than A-2 and A-7 whose presence could not be secured. Where the Magistrate is satisfied that the presence of the accused cannot be secured within a reasonable time or he is found to be of unsound mind and detained in safe custody, the Sessions Judge may order to remove the case from the register of cases. Rules 17 to 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Criminal Rules of Practice prescribe the procedure relating to criminal cases where the accused has absconded. Rule 18 specifically empowers the Magistrate to separate the case of the absconding accused and proceed with the case as against others according to law, if he is satisfied that the presence of the other accused cannot be secured within a reasonable time where the absent accused are subsequently produced or appear before the Magistrate, the case against them shall, under rule 20, be registered under a new number. Rule 21 prescribes the procedure for cases where an accused absconded after appearance. Hence, the trial in the present case, of the petitioners and others by the trial Court is valid and according to law. 13. I shall now proceed to examine the basis or criterion for the decision of a case by a criminal Court in respect of the charges levelled against the accused and whether the Judgment of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Vijayawada acquitting accused 2 and 7 is a relevant and material piece of evidence required for the decision of the guilt or otherwise of the petitioners in this revision case. It is the duty of the criminal Court to determine on an appraisal of the entire evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the prosecution as well as the defence in support of their respective pleas, whether or not the guilt of the accused under all or any of the charges levelled against him has been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The criterion or basis for the criminal Court to arrive at a conclusion relating to the guilt or otherwise of the accused in respect of all or any of the charges levelled against him, is exclusively the admissible and relevant evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties according to the provisions of the Evidence Act before it. The Court has no jurisdiction to travel for the purpose of finding the guilt or otherwise of the accused beyond the material on record before it. The guilt or otherwise of any accused depends entirely on a consideration of the evidence adduced before the Court in his presence according to law but not otherwise. No material which is not relevant or admissible in that case can be permitted by the Court. Indisputably, no provision of Evidence Act has been brought to my notice to make the judgment of the criminal Court acquitting the accused 2 and 7 admissible in this revision. The acquittal of the accused 2 and 7 depended on an appraisal of the evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties in that case. The petitioners in the present case are not parties to the judgment of acquittal now sought to be admitted into evidence. The Judgment of acquittal of A-2 and A-7 is an opinion of that Court arrived at on the evidence before it and hence, that opinion, cannot be imported into the present case, wherein the Courts below have taken a different view on the evidence adduced before the trial Court. 14. I am unable to agree with the Counsel for the petitioners that the decisions in Dharam Singh v. State of U.P.1. In re, Narsiah and others2, and In re, Repana Naganna Alia2 Nagula3, support his contention relating to the admissibility of the judgment in question. The aforesaid cases have no relevancy to the point at issue. 14. I am unable to agree with the Counsel for the petitioners that the decisions in Dharam Singh v. State of U.P.1. In re, Narsiah and others2, and In re, Repana Naganna Alia2 Nagula3, support his contention relating to the admissibility of the judgment in question. The aforesaid cases have no relevancy to the point at issue. They had arisen under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for specific procedure to be followed in disposing of an appeal by a third Judge, where Judges of the appellate Court arc equally divided. Under section 429, the Judge, to whom the case is referred is empowered to hear the entire appeal and deliver his opinion regarding the guilt or otherwise of all the accused in respect of the charges levelled against them, on independent consideration of the entire material on record. The referee-Judge is free to decide the entire case independently on an appraisal of the material on record as the whole case has to be dealt with by him. He is also not bound to take only either of the views expressed by the referring Judges. He is competent to take an altogether different view of the matter and decide the entire appeal on merits, not being fettered by any opinion or view expressed by any of the referring-Judges. When a reference is made under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must be taken for granted that the entire appeal was before the referee-Judge who is competent to give his own decision on merits, as if the appeal in its entirely was before him for decision and the judgment and order in the appeal will follow the opinion of the third Judge. See Babu and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, and Hethubha and others v. The State of Gujarat2, For all these reasons, I have no hesitations to hold that the Judgment of the Assistant Sessions Judge acquitting the accused 2 and 7 is neither relevant nor admissible in evidence in this revision case. See Babu and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, and Hethubha and others v. The State of Gujarat2, For all these reasons, I have no hesitations to hold that the Judgment of the Assistant Sessions Judge acquitting the accused 2 and 7 is neither relevant nor admissible in evidence in this revision case. This view of mine finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in Koran Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh3, wherein the acquittal of Ramhans was held to be not in any proceeding to which the appellant therein was a party, Sarkar, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Court, ruled thus: “........the decision in each case has to turn on the evidence led in it; Ramhan’s case depended on the evidence led there while the appellant’s case had to be decided only on the evidence led in it. The evidence led in Ramhan’s case and the decision there arrived at on that evidence would be wholly irrelevant in considering the merits of the appellant’s case.” For these reasons, question No.1 is answered in the negative and against the petitioners. 15. I shall now turn to examine on the application of the principles governing the criminal trial, the points raised by Mr. Sai in support of his plea that the convictions and sentences are illegal and unwarranted. The convictions of the petitioners must be either sustained or set aside on the direct evidence of the injured witnesses, P.Ws.1, 3, 4 and 7. The prosecution story that these witnesses received injuries on 25th June, 1968 is amply established. The next question that really falls for decision is, whether it is the petitioners that are responsible for the injuries caused to the direct witnesses and the convictions are lawful. 16. Though the occurrence is alleged to have taken place at 5 p.m. on 25th June, 1968, the First Information Report Exhibit P-1 was purported to have been given by P.W.1 on the next morning. The defence version is that Exhibit P-1 was given only at 12 noon the next day, but not in the early morning as sought to be established by the prosecution. The delay is sought to be explained by the prosecution by showing that they have to walk upto Vallanki which is three miles from the scene of occurrence and go to Nandigama and report to the Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.11). The delay is sought to be explained by the prosecution by showing that they have to walk upto Vallanki which is three miles from the scene of occurrence and go to Nandigama and report to the Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.11). Though they were purported to have been examined by die doctor at about 8 a.m. the registers maintained by the hospital authorities disclose that there was tampering of these registers as well as the wound certificates Exhibits P-10 to P-13 and the time of 12 noon appears to have been changed to 8 a.m. with a view to show that Exhibit P-1 was not belated. The first informant is no other than P.W.1. The Head Constable and he must have known the importance of a First Information Report. 17. That apart, the report could have been given at Veerullapalem Police Station which is only two miles from the seene of occurrence, but no explanation worth mentioning is forthcoming from the prosecution as to why the injured police constables did not choose to to Veerullapalem Police Station to which admittedly one of them belongs. The delay assumes much importance when it is judged from the admitted fact that P.W.1 did not give the names of any of the assailants to P.W. 8, though it is disclosed from the evidence that he knew the names of all the accused even by the time of the occurrence. This delay in First Information Report is really a serious infirmity which cannot be ignored. 18. The plea of Mr. Sai that the arrest of A-1 is not lawful, appears to be of considerable force. P.W.12 the Circle Inspector of Police, says that P.Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 7 have been deputed by him to arrest A-1 if necessary, whereas P.W.1 speaks that they had no information about A-1 but they were informed by two individuals in Keesara about A-1 and proceeded to his house. The diary maintained in due course of business by the I.D. Party has not been produced, nor is there any order in writing by P.W.12 directing them to arrest A-1. The prosecution story is that P.W.12 gave oral instructions. In fact, the constables did not go to Dachavaram straight, but they are alleged to have gone to Dachavaram only on the information given by two individuals at Keesara that A-1 was in his house. The prosecution story is that P.W.12 gave oral instructions. In fact, the constables did not go to Dachavaram straight, but they are alleged to have gone to Dachavaram only on the information given by two individuals at Keesara that A-1 was in his house. These two persons who are examined in the committal Court, did not support the prosecution version. They are not even examined at the trial. In the circumstances, it is not safe to hold that the alleged arrest of A-1 is lawful and the offence under section 225 of the Penal Code has been made out beyond reasonable doubt. 19. On a perusal of the judgments of both the courts below, I am unable to find a finding on the common object for the petitioners and others to sustain the conviction under section 147 of the Penal Code. The learned Additional Sessions Judge erred in thinking that the evidence of the medical witnesses corroborated the evidence of the P.Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 7 whose evidence has not been very much relied upon. P.W.1 mentions only the name of A-1 and A-9 although his evidence reveals that he knew the names of all the accused. 20. The failure on the part of the prosecution to examine any independent witnesses available, to unfold the prosecution story, is a material infirmity as the best evidence has not been placed before the Court. See V. Thevar v. State of Madras1, Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of A.P.2 and B. Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat3. In the present case, the evidence discloses the presence of some independent witnesses at the scene of occurrence, but they have not been examined. No valid explanation has been forthcoming in this regard. Except the evidence of the interested police constables who are injured, there is no other material worth mentioning in this case. On a careful consideration of the entire material, I am satisfied that the Courts below have not approached the points at issue according to law and failed to come to grips with the material facts and circumstances to arrive at a correct conclusion on the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In view of the infirmities pointed out earlier, I am of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the convictions and sentences are liable to be set aside. 21. In view of the infirmities pointed out earlier, I am of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the convictions and sentences are liable to be set aside. 21. In the result, the revision petition is allowed setting aside the convictions and sentences awarded to the petitioners for the various offences levelled against them. The petitioners are acquitted and their bail bonds are cancelled. A.B.K. ----- Revision allowed. Accused acquitted.