JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The two Appellants have been convicted u/s 304, Part II read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code and each of them has been sentenced to R.I. for 5 years by the learned Sessions Judge of Koraput. 2. The prosecution case was that on 4-9-1966 these two Appellants intentionally caused the death of one Bayang Saura by striking him with a Tangia Bayang was a resident of village Kutiting with the Puttasing Police Station in the district of Koraput. P.w. 1 Ati happens to be his son. About a year before the incident one day he was informed by p.w. 2 to take food for his father to the place in the forest where the latter occasionally lived. P.w. 1 with his wife took food for his father to the said place where the father had raised a hut to watch the crops grown by him on reaching the hut p.w. 1 saw the dead body of his father lying there with injuries. p.w. 1 returned to the village and informed his uncles. Then he along with the village watchman went and lodged F.I.R. at the Police Station. According to the prosecution case the deceased had married the sister of Appellant No. 1 Patio Appellant No. 2 is the nephew of Patio It is stated that the day previous to the occurrence the deceased dragged away to the forest another sister of Appellant No. 1, namely, Lasa Saurani (p.w. 7) and kept her in his hut on the hill. Therefore, both the Appellants went there and killed the deceased. The defence was a denial of the entire occurrence. 3. In support of the prosecution case 13 witnesses were examined including the son of the deceased, p.w. 7 the younger sister of the deceased's wife, the Doctor and the I.O. The learned Sessions Judge came to hold that the accused persons had exceeded their right of private defence, and that Appellant No. 2 had no justification whatsoever to aim the third Tangia blow at the deceased, and his action made him guilty of man-slaughter. He was of the view that both the Appellants with the common intention of rescuing the girl by force came armed with Tangias and in that process without justification dealt the blows on the deceased. He was of the view that both the Appellants with the common intention of rescuing the girl by force came armed with Tangias and in that process without justification dealt the blows on the deceased. He, therefore, held that they were guilty of man-slaughter and as they had not the intention of killing the deceased they were guilty not u/s 302, but u/s 304-Part II read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. He found them guilty of that offence and sentenced them to R.I. for 5 years as already indicated. 4. It is not disputed that apart from the confessional statements of the two Appellants recorded u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure there is no direct evidence to implicate the Appellants in the present case on 8-9-1966, these two Appellants appeared before the learned S.D. M., Gunupur and their statements u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure were recorded. Appellant No. 1 stated that the deceased forcibly took his grown-up sister to a neighbouring hillock. Appellant No. 2 saw this and told Appellant No. 1 in the evening of that Saturday about the same. The two Appellants went to the hillock on Sunday morning and found that both of them were sitting together. There upon Appellant No. 1 called upon his sister to come along with him and return to their house. The deceased immediately rushed with a Tangia at them and threw down Appellant No. 2 and aimed the Tangia at him, to give a blow. When Appellant No. 1 saw that the deceased was about to kill Appellant No. 2 he took away the Tangia from him and gave two blows to the deceased near the ear. As a result the deceased fell down. Thereafter' Appellant No. 2 got up and gave a blow on the stomach. Almost to the same effect is also the statement of Appellant No. 2. 5. Mr. Panda, learned Counsel for the Appellants, contends that the confessional statements cannot be relied upon on account of the fact that the necessary requisites have not been satisfied; the learned Magistrate who recorded the said statements did not disclose his identity and does not appear to have been satisfied that the Appellants who made those statements had understood their import and having known the matter were making those confessions. He further contended that the confessions as recorded were really no confessions in law. He further contended that the confessions as recorded were really no confessions in law. They were more or less indicating their own defence and the statements (sic) were exculpatory in nature. In the circumstances they could not be received as confessions in the legal sense. He also contended that the confessions having been retracted corroboration was necessary and in the absence of any material corroboration it would be risky to base the conviction merely upon such retracted confessions. The second aspect of his contention was that even accepting the confessions to be valid and legal and as such available for use against the Appellants, it must be held in the facts of the present case that the Appellants were entitled to the protection u/s 100, Indian Penal Code as their act was in self defence. The view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that Appellant No. 1 had exceeded his right of private defence and Appellant No. 2 had no such right cannot be accepted in law to be correct. 6. Since it is admitted in the present case by the learned Counsel for either side that if the confessions are ruled out there is no other evidence, I would first examine the contention of Mr. Panda in relation to the confessions, and if the confessions are liable to be ruled out in law and would not provide the basis for the conviction there may not be any need for examining the second aspect of Mr. Panda's contention. 7. Mr. Panda started his submission by referring to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sarwan Singh Vs. The State of Punjab. Their Lordships indicated in the said decision: Incidentally, we may invite the attention of the High Court of Punjab to the fact that the circulars issued by the High Court of Punjab in the matter of the procedure to be followed, and questions to be put to the accused by Magistrates recording confessions u/s 164 may be revised and suitable amendments and additions made in the said circulars in the light of similar circulars issued by the High Courts of Uttar Pradesh, Bombay and Madras. The whole object of putting questions to an accused person who offers to confess is to obtain an assurance of the fact that the confession is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person as men Honed in Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. There can be no doubt that, when an accused person is produced before the Magistrate by the investigating officer, it is of (sic) importance that the mind of the accused person should be completely freed from any possible influence of the police and the effective way of securing such freedom from fear to the accused person is to send him to jail custody and give him adequate time to consider whether he should make a confession at all. It would naturally be difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the time which should be allowed to an accused person in any given case. However, speaking generally, it would, we think, be reasonable to insist upon giving an accused person at least 24 hours to decide whether or not he should make a confession. Where there may be reason to suspect that the accused has been persuaded or coerced to make a confession, even longer period may have to be given to him before his statement is recorded. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case it is impossible to accept the view that enough time was given to the accused to think over the matter. Indeed, any Magistrate with enough criminal experience would have immediately decided to give longer time to Sarwan Singh in the present case for the obvious reason that Sarwan Singh appeared to the learned Magistrate to be keen on making a confession straightaway. The learned Magistrate himself has fairly stated that he would have given him longer time but for his insistence to make a confession without delay. In the present case there is material to show that the Appellants were arrested at about 3 P. M. on 6-9-1966. on 7-9-1966 in the afternoon they were brought by the police to the Gunupur Sub-jail and by the noon of the next day, that is, 8.9.1966 they were produced before the learned Magistrate. Admittedly, the Appellants are hill tribe people and judicial notice can be taken of their low attainment of life. on 7-9-1966 in the afternoon they were brought by the police to the Gunupur Sub-jail and by the noon of the next day, that is, 8.9.1966 they were produced before the learned Magistrate. Admittedly, the Appellants are hill tribe people and judicial notice can be taken of their low attainment of life. It can also be accepted that persons of the Appellants type would be Blow to understand matters. The confessional statements as recorded do not indicate that the learned Magistrate had taken the necessary precaution of satisfying himself of the fact that the Appellants were making statements being free from fear and not being under coercion. The learned Magistrate has been examined in this case as p.w. 13. He has candidly stated: I was concerned only whether the confession was voluntary and I was satisfied that it was so. The general questions put by me to ascertain if the confession was voluntary have been noted in the confessional statement. No other questions were put No further time was allowed that day for cool reflection. After the production of the accused persons in my Court-hall either on 7th or on 8th I did not leave the Court-room for any other purpose. As the circumstances and the background stand in this case, it is indeed difficult to hold that enough time has been given to the Appellants to brood over and decide as to whether they would actually confess their guilt. They were admittedly in police custody after being brought from the jail until they were produced before the learned Magistrate on the self same day. The learned Magistrate does not appear to have made any attempts to be satisfied by putting questions as to whether the statements were being made after the Appellants were sure of their own freedom from fear or coercion. 8. I would now proceed to examine the other submission of Mr. Panda in relation to the legality of the confessions. Mr. Panda relied upon a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Palvinder Kaur Vs. The State of Punjab (Rup Singh-Caveator), in respect of this aspect of his submission. 8. I would now proceed to examine the other submission of Mr. Panda in relation to the legality of the confessions. Mr. Panda relied upon a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Palvinder Kaur Vs. The State of Punjab (Rup Singh-Caveator), in respect of this aspect of his submission. Mahajan, J., as he then was, stated: It was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperors 6 C.L.T. 25 (P.C.), that the word 'confession' as used in the Evidence Act cannot be construed as meaning a statement by an accused suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. A confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a confession. A statement that contains self-culpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact, which if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Mr. Panda contends that if this is the true standard for the purpose of finding out whether a particular confession is really a confession in the present case, it must be held that the two statements of the Appellants recorded on 8-9-1966 cannot amount to confession in law. It is clearly stated in both these statements that the deceased came rushing with a Tangia aiming it at one of the Appellants 'with a view to killing him and in order to protect themselves in self defence the Tangia was snatched away and assault was given. He, therefore, contends that the confessions contained exculpatory statements which, if accepted, would not make them guilty of any offence. According to Mr. Panda, the defence available to them by bringing their action under an exception provided under the Indian Penal Code is also exculpatory in character and, therefore, the two confessions, applying the rule which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have indicated in the reported decision, must be held not to amount to confessions in law and conviction on the sole basis of these confessions cannot be justified. 9. I have already indicated the nature of the confessional statements and in my view the submission made by Mr. Panda can be accepted in the present case to be applicable. 9. I have already indicated the nature of the confessional statements and in my view the submission made by Mr. Panda can be accepted in the present case to be applicable. These two statements of the Appellants were really exculpatory in character. Both of them in the same manner indicated that the deceased was rushing at them having raised the Tangia for assault and both of them wanted to save that at that point of time the Tangia was taken away from him by force and the assaults were inflicted in the manner already indicated. I am prepared to accept the contention of Mr. Panda that these two confessional statements cannot form the basis of sustaining the conviction. In view of the fact that the confessionals are not admissible, in my opinion, to sustain a conviction it is not necessary to examine the second aspect of Mr. Panda's contention as already referred to above. 10. On this analysis, I would hold that the prosecution has failed to establish its case by leading any evidence excepting placing the confessional statements to the effect that the Appellants had caused the death of the deceased by inflicting Tangia blows. It may be noted that though the Tangia in question was sent for expert examination the Serologist has reported that there was no blood mark on it. No other circumstances have' been shown from which it can be clearly pointed out that the Appellants are implicated in the incident. I would, therefore, hold that the Appellants are entitled to acquittal in this case and the conviction is not justified. The Criminal Appeal is allowed and the Appellants are acquitted. Their bail bonds are cancelled. Final Result : Allowed