Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 7 of 1958 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Attingal, is the appellant. The suit was filed by him in forma pauperis for cancellation of a sale deed on deposit of the mortgage amount charged on the plaint items. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. But in appeal the learned District Judge of Trivandrum reversed the decision and passed a preliminary decree for redemption. In second appeal, a learned single judge of this Court allowed the appeal reversing the decision of the District Judge and restoring that of the Munsiff. On leave granted by him, this appeal has been filed by,the plaintiff. 2. The plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 are members of a Malayala Brahmin Illom. The 3rd defendant is the mother of the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant is the son of the plaintiff's father by another wife. The 1st defendant is alleged to be the mortgagee from whom redemption is sought. There was a partition in the illom in 1115 evidenced by Ext. P-5 in which the suit properties were allotted to the plaintiff's branch. The 3rd defendant, mother of the plaintiff, acting for herself and as the guardian of her minor children including the plaintiff executed a sale deed Ext. Dl on 26 111123 in respect of the plaint properties. Subsequently, there was a suit by some of the members of the Illom including the plaintiff represented by a next-friend to set aside the partition of 1115 and for cancellation of various alienations including Ext. Dl transaction, which came into existence after partition. That suit was compromised under the original of Ext. D-15, compromise petition. Ext. D-19 is the copy of the judgment in that suit. The present suit was thereafter filed by the plaintiff to set aside Ext. D-1 and for redemption of the mortgage. 3. The main contention raised in the suit was that it was barred by res judicata on account of the compromise decree in O. S. No. 125 of 1124 of Attingal Munsiff's Court. This plea was rejected by the Munsiff as in his opinion the principle of res judicata would not apply to a compromise decree. The Munsiff, however, dismissed the suit on his finding that Ext. D-1 was supported by consideration and necessity. This plea was rejected by the Munsiff as in his opinion the principle of res judicata would not apply to a compromise decree. The Munsiff, however, dismissed the suit on his finding that Ext. D-1 was supported by consideration and necessity. The decision on the question 6f res judicata was upheld by the lower appellate Court, but the learned District Judge reversed the decree holding that the document was not supported by consideration and necessity. In second appeal, a learned single judge of this Court held following the decision in Shankar Sitaram Sontakke v. Balakrishna Sitaram Sontakke AIR. 1954 SC. 352 that the principles of res judicata were applicable to compromise decrees also. It is the correctness of this decision that is now canvassed. 4. On behalf of the appellant, the learned counsel has brought to our notice the decision in Sunderabai v. Devaji AIR. 1954 SC. 82 as also the decision in Subba Rao v. Jagannadha Rao AIR. 1967 SC. 591. In the first of these decisions, the Supreme Court has observed that the bar of res judicata may not be applicable in the case of a compromise decree as the matter in issue has not been heard and finally decided as required under S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the Supreme Court has in the same decision observed that the party would be estopped from raising the same contention in a subsequent suit. 5. The observations of the Supreme Court in Sailendra Narayan v. State of Orissa AIR. 1956 SC. 346 make the position clear. It has been explained in that decision that the compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment and a judgment by consent is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the Court exercises its mind on a contested case. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Hershell in In re South American and Mexican Co. Ex. Parte Bank of England, (1895) 1 Ch. 37 which runs as follows: "The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. Ex. Parte Bank of England, (1895) 1 Ch. 37 which runs as follows: "The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. "And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action." The Judicial Committee in Kinch v. Walcott 1929 AC. 482 at p. 493 has also taken the same view. 6. In Secretary of State v. Ateendranath Das (1936) 36 Calcutta 550 the Calcutta High Court observed: "On this authority it becomes absolutely clear that the consent order is as effective as an order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusions arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded." 7. It is clear that the earlier compromise decree, to which the present plaintiff is a party, acts as an estoppel by judgment against the plaintiff-appellant from questioning the validity of the sale deed Ext. D-1. The decision of the learned single judge is correct. The appeal is dismissed with the costs of the contesting respondents. Dismissed.