ORDER H.N. Seth, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal. Plaintiff brought a suit for the ejectment of the Defendant from a shop No. 6542/2 situated at M.G. Marg, Agra. 2. The suit was filed on the allegation that there were two adjoining shops Nos. 6542/2 and 6542/3, situated at Paoli, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Agra and the Defendant Appellant was a monthly tenant of both the shops. The shop in dispute namely 6542/2 was let out to the Defendant about 40 years ago on a rent of Rs. 5/- per month. The other shop namely 6542/3 was let out to the Defendant in the year 1947. Plaintiff had filed a suit for ejectment of the Defendant from shop No. 6542/3 which had been decreed by the court below. According to the plaint allegation there was a partition wall between the two shops Nos. 6542/2 and 6542/3, which the Defendant demolished and appropriated the bricks thereof. This act of demolition of the wall caused substantial damage to the accommodation in question and also amounted to a material alteration therein. Defendant therefore rendered himself liable to ejectment. He also fell in arrears of rent from 10th May, 1959 and a notice of demand coupled with a notice terminating his tenancy was given to him on 23rd June 1960 by registered post. This notice was returned unserved with the remark that the addressee had left the place without leaving any address. Thereupon another notice was sent to him on 21st July 1960 asking him to clear the arrears of rent within a month and to vacate the premises on the expiry of 30 days of the receipt of notice. Inspite of service of this notice the Defendant neither cleared the arrears of rent nor vacated the premises. In the circumstances the Plaintiff has been compelled to file the present suit. 3. The Defendant resisted the claim of the Plaintiff on the ground that he had deposited rent of the accommodation in dispute in the court of Munsif Agra under the provisions of Section 7C of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act as the Plaintiff refused to accept the same. He denied that he made any default in payment of arrears of rent and asserted that the notice to quit was invalid. He denied that he made any default in payment of arrears of rent and asserted that the notice to quit was invalid. According to him there was a partition wall made of Bamboo Tatti to the extent of half of the length in the room dividing the two shops and that he did not demolish it. He therefore urged that he neither damaged nor materially altered the building and therefore the suit for his ejectment was barred by the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 4. Trial Court held that there was a partition wall in between the two shops namely 6542/2 and 6542/3 and that the Defendant had demolished the same. This action of the Defendant resulted in causing substantial damage to the accommodation and it also amounted to material alteration within the meaning of Section 3 of UP Act III of 1947. It also held that the Defendant had deposited the rent in respect of the accommodation in dispute under the provisions of Section 7C of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act and therefore he could not be said to be in default. So far as notice to quit was concerned he did not find any defect in that notice. In view of the finding that the Defendant had made material alteration in the accommodation in dispute he decreed the suit for ejectment. He also decreed the Plaintiff's suit for damages suffered by him on account of demolition of the wall which amounted to Rs. 100/-. 5. In appeal it was urged that the view taken by the trial court that the Defendant had demolished a part of the partition wall was erroneous and that it was also wrong in holding that the Defendant Appellant caused substantial damage to the accommodation and made material alterations therein. The lower appellate court agreeing with the trial court found that the Defendant had in fact demolished the partition wall between the shops-viz. 6542/2 and 6542/3. It also held that the action of the Defendant amounted to causing substantial damage to the property of the Plaintiff and also in making of material alteration in the accommodation. In this view of the matter the decree passed by the trial court was upheld and the appeal filed by the Defendant was dismissed. 6. Defendant has now come up in second appeal before this Court. 7. In this view of the matter the decree passed by the trial court was upheld and the appeal filed by the Defendant was dismissed. 6. Defendant has now come up in second appeal before this Court. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant argued that by demolishing the partition wall between the two shops 6542/2 and 6542/3 he did not made any material alteration in the accommodation within the meaning of Section 3 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act and the view of the courts below that the suit was not barred by the provisions of UP Act III of 1947 is therefore erroneous. He relied upon the case of Jai Dhawan v. Padamsen 1964 AWR 612. In this case Dhavan, J. held that "in determining whether any particular alteration is material as contemplated u/s 3, if the Court comps to the conclusion that it was necessary for a proper enjoyment of the accommodation and has not changed the structure and nature of the accommodation or caused any damage to it and can be removed without much expense or causing damage to the building, it may find that it is not material." Learned Counsel urged that the demolition of the partition wall was for the convenient and proper enjoyment of the accommodation inasmuch as the Defendant was carrying on the manufacture of sweetmeats in both these accommodations and therefore according to the principle laid down by Dhavan J. the alteration made by him could not be said to be material. Learned Counsel has however omitted the further observation made by Dhavan J. wherein he held that the alteration should not be such which has the effect of changing the structure and nature of the accommodation. Reliance was also placed on the case of Dr. Jaigopal v. Budh Mal 1969 AWR 237 , wherein it was observed that the expression material alteration in its ordinary meaning would imply important alteration such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises. According to the learned Counsel the changes made in this case could not be said to be important alterations which materially or substantially changed the front or the structure of the premises. I am unable to agree with this contention. According to the learned Counsel the changes made in this case could not be said to be important alterations which materially or substantially changed the front or the structure of the premises. I am unable to agree with this contention. Even though, by pulling down the partition wall between the two shops, front of the structure might not have been changed still the structure of the accommodation involved in the case has undergone an important change. By demolishing the partition wall the Defendant altered two different accommodations and converted them into one accommodation. In my opinion any change made in an accommodation which makes that accommodation lose its original identity and converts it into a different accommodation would amount to a material alteration within the meaning of Section 3 of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In this case this is precisely what has happened. By removing the partition wall the identity of both accommodations numbered as 6542/2 and 6542/3 has disappeared and it has merged into a new accommodation standing over the area over which shops Nos. 6542/2 and 6542/3 originally stood. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant then argued that the bar created by Section 3 of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act against the landlord's right to file a suit for ejectment is not removed merely because the tenant has made material alteration in the accommodation. Relevant provision of Section 3(1) reads thus: Subject to any order passed Under Sub-section (3) no suit shall without the permission of the Distt. Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on the one or more of the following grounds: (a)..... (b)..... (c) That the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value. (b)..... (c) That the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value. The argument is that u/s 3(c), two conditions must co-exist before the bar created on the right of the landlord to file a suit for ejectment is removed--(1) That the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction and (2) That the construction is such which in the opinion of the court materially alters the accommodation or of substantially diminishes its value. He contends that by demolishing the wall, the Defendant did not make any construction and as such the provisions of Section 3(c) would not be attracted in this case. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent however contended that "making of construction" as contemplated by Section 3(c) should be understood also in the sense of "demolition of construction." He argues that just as wherever in an enactment the word 'act' is used it also implies an "omission" in the same manner an act of making of construction should also imply an act of demolition of construction. The point raised needs consideration, but as in my opinion this case can be decided without going into this question, I refrain from expressing any opinion on this point. 9. Learned Counsel for the Respondent urged that the bar created by UP Act III of 1947 is also removed u/s 3(d), if a tenant creates a nuisance or does any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. He argues that there cannot be any doubt that by demolishing the partition wall the Defendant did an 'act'. This 'act' was certainly inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to tenancy. The accommodation was let out to the Defendant to be used as such and not for being included in any other accommodation. Demolition of the partition wall, therefore, amounted to an act which was inconsistent with the purpose for which the accommodation had been let out to him. The accommodation was let out to the Defendant to be used as such and not for being included in any other accommodation. Demolition of the partition wall, therefore, amounted to an act which was inconsistent with the purpose for which the accommodation had been let out to him. Furthermore the act of demolition of the wall was likely to adversely and substantially affect the landlord's interest in the property as well. It has been pointed out by the learned Munsif that Plaintiff's suit for ejectment from shop No. 6542/3 already stood decreed and demolition of partition wall may create difficulty in execution of that decree as it may be difficult to identify the precise property over which possession is to be delivered in execution of the decree. Defendant has therefore done an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. In the circumstances, I think that, the provisions of the UP Act III of 1947 do not bar the institution of the present suit. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant then argued that admittedly the Defendants were carrying on the business of manufacturing sweetmeats in the shop in dispute. He urged that preparation of sweetmeats amounts to carrying on a manufacturing process and therefore the lease was for manufacturing purpose and therefore one month's notice given to him for vacating the accommodation was invalid in law. The point was not raised in either of the two courts below. It has also not been raised in the grounds of appeal. I am not inclined to permit the learned Counsel to raise this point for the first time in second appeal. Moreover the learned Counsel was not able to point out any material on the record which went to show that the tenancy was created with a clear understanding that it was for the purpose of manufacture. Merely because the Defendant carried on the process of manufacture in the accommodation which had been let out to him it does not mean that the letting out was for the purpose of manufacture. 11. I therefore find no force in any of the contentions raised by counsel for the Appellant. In the circumstances the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.