JUDGMENT -This is an application in revision by the original defendant No.1 from a decree passed by the Small Causes Court Judge, Akola. The plaintiff had filed a suit on the basis of a promissory note executed by Shri Harihar Ramchandra Sansthan, through Vahiwatdar Radhakisan Narayandas Agarwal, who is defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 contested the suit by stating that he was not personally liable for the claim. On the other hand, he had incurred the loan as a Vahiwatdar of the Sansthan and that he had also utilised the money for the liabilities of the Sansthan. The learned Judge found after hearing the suit that the loan in question was incurred for the necessity of the sans than but also found that the defendant No.1 was personally liable for the suit claim. Accordingly, therefore, he decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was ordered to recover from Radhakisan Narayandas Agarwal, defendant No. 1, Rs. 475 with costs and future interest. The suit against Shri Harihar Ramchandra Sans than and the receiver, who was defendant No.2, was dismissed. This decree is challenged here by the defendant No.1. The point, therefore, that arises here for consideration is to see whether the decree of the trial Court is legal and proper. 2. The learned advocate for the applicant contends here that the learned Small Causes Court Judge relied only on the rulings in P. Balavenkatarama Chettiar v. Maruthamuthu Chettiar1 as well as on the rulings in The Chikkottil Rama Variar v. Ananthanarayana Pattar2|, and decreed the claim of the plaintiff. According to him, this decree by the trial Court on the basis of these two Madras cases is erroneous. On the other hand, the learned advocates for the two opponents here contend that the principles laid down in those two Madras Cases are now settled and, therefore, the learned Small Causes Court Judge was right in following the principles laid down there. Let us see whether the contention of the learned advocate for the applicant is correct. 3. Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri in P. Balavenkatarama Chettiar v. Maruthamuthu Chettiar (Supra), was considering section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He was considering the promissory notes executed by the trustees or managers of a temple who had borrowed money. Let us see whether the contention of the learned advocate for the applicant is correct. 3. Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri in P. Balavenkatarama Chettiar v. Maruthamuthu Chettiar (Supra), was considering section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He was considering the promissory notes executed by the trustees or managers of a temple who had borrowed money. It was contended before that Court that though section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act did not in terms cover promissory notes executed by trustees, the principle underlying the provision applied to such cases. Section 28 provides that an agent who signs his name to a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque without indicating thereon that he signs as agent or that he does not intend thereby to incur personal responsibility, he is liable personally on the instrument, to those, who induced him to sign upon the plea that the principal only would be held liable. The learned Judge, in that case, has observed, while dealing with this contention, as follows:- It is plain that section 28 deals only with the liability of agents executing promissory notes and does not in terms refer to trustees signing such instruments, but it is urged that the section is based upon a principle of wider application, namely, that a person can, by indicating on the instrument that he is signing only in a representative character, exclude his personal responsibility, and that if a trustee accordingly uses appropriate language in a promissory note to indicate that he is executing it only as trustee he will not be personally liable on the note. I find it difficult to accept this contention. It has to be remembered that a promissory note is an unconditional undertaking to pay a certain sum of money and when such an instrument is given it necessarily involves a promise to pay by or on behalf of some person who is capable of binding himself by such promise. When a duly authori6ed agent executes the note in the name of the principal, the principal is of course the person bound by the unconditional undertaking to pay and section 28 provides that it is open for tile person signing as agent to exclude his personal responsibility by appropriate words indicating that he does not intend thereby to incur such liability. But in the case of a trustee or manager of a charity borrowing money on a promissory note, the undertaking to pay which such execution necessarily imports can be imputed only to the executants, as there is no principal who can be bound by such undertaking, and it is difficult to see how such a person can borrow on a promissory note without incurring thereby personal liability. To attribute to the parties in such cases an intention to exclude the personal liability of the executant would in effect be to nullify the unconditional undertaking contained in the instrument. Hence, it is, I apprehend, that Courts have always inclined to the view that trustees or managers borrowing money on promissory notes incur personal liability, and, in fact, Mr. Rajah Ayyar was unable to bring to my notice any case where a trustee executing a promissory note was held not liable personally". With respect, these observations appear to be according to the well settled law that a promissory note is an unconditional promise to pay a sum and when such promissory note is executed, it necessarily involves a promise to pay, by or on behalf of a person, who is binding himself by such promise. The promissory note being an unconditional undertaking to pay, a temple which is an inanimate object cannot undertake to pay the sum as promised. It would be a different case if an authorised agent executes the note in the name of the principal. If, therefore, the trustee does not exclude his personal responsibility On the face of the promissory note, then the execution necessarily imports that he is the person who has undertaken to pay the money under the promissory note. 4. Similar view was taken by the same High Court (Mr. Justice Viswanatha Sastri), after considering quite a number of cases, in Rama Variar v. Ananthanarayana (supra). That Court at that time was considering a similar promissory note as we have in the instant case. In Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya3, although that Court was concerned with a case of de-facto guardian and a minor, they were comparing the case of a guardian, who had executed the promissory note on behalf of the minor, with that of a trustee of a temple. During the course of a long judgment in this case, the Federal Court has observed in para 29 as follows :- "29. During the course of a long judgment in this case, the Federal Court has observed in para 29 as follows :- "29. It has been held in a series of cases that an executor or a trustee cannot be borrowing money from a person make him creditor of the estate in his hands even though the money was applied for the purpose of the estate. In Farhall v. Farhall (4),- Mellish L.J. took it to be settled law that upon a contract of borrowing made by an executor after the death of the testator the executor is only liable personally and cannot be sued as executor so as to get execution against the assets of the testator. The principle enunciated in this case has been applied to the case of an executor or a trustee in a number of cases in this country also. (See Shailendranath Palit v. Hade Kaza Mane (5). where some of these cases are collected.) The general rule however is subject to certain exceptions and. in a proper case, the executor or trustee may be entitled to be indemnified out of the estate in his charge." It appears, therefore, that a trustee cannot by borrowing money from a creditor bind the trust even though the money was applied for the purpose of estate unless be excludes his liability on the face of the promissory note. 5. The learned advocate for the applicant relies on Niladri Sahu v. Mahant Ghaturbhuj6, and says that a personal decree was passed against a Mahant; it was because he signed personally although, it was for the expenditure of the Math. But this was a case in which the Mahant of a math had mortgaged certain endowed property in order to discharge loans which were an accumulating burden upon the endowment. He covenanted personally to pay. This was therefore a case of a mortgage in which he covenanted personally to pay. I do not think this case in any way will help the learned advocate. He relies also on Sadasukh v. Sir Kishan Prasad. This was a case of a hundi and a question regarding the liability of a principal and an agent was involved. This was therefore a case of a mortgage in which he covenanted personally to pay. I do not think this case in any way will help the learned advocate. He relies also on Sadasukh v. Sir Kishan Prasad. This was a case of a hundi and a question regarding the liability of a principal and an agent was involved. It was observed by the Judicial Committee that the name of the person or firm to be charged upon a negotiable instrument must be clearly stated on the face or on the back of the document, so that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognised as the document passes from hand to hand, and further, that the principals name must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable. The learned advocate argues that the promissory note with which we are concerned is executed in the name of "Shri Harihar Ramcbandra Sansthan by Vahiwatdar Radhakisan Narayandas Agarwal". According to him, this description clearly shows that defendant No.1 Radhakisan Narayandas Agarwal was not binding himself under the promissory note but was executing the promissory note hi a way that the trust was executing the promissory note. He says that the trust name was disclosed in such a way that the instrument could clearly show which real person was liable. It is, however, difficult to accept this contention of the learned advocate, because the universal rule in so far as the negotiable instrument is concerned is that a man who puts his name on the promissory note makes himself personally liable, unless he excludes in a way which shows that the principal is liable. This promissory note does not show that the principal was liable. This promissory note, on the other hand, shows that the defendant No. 1 was liable. The word "Vahiwatdar", as held in several other cases, is merely a descriptive or decorative word. Unless he has, therefore, unequivocally and clearly disclaimed in some portion of the document his own responsibility and mentioned the name of the person really liable, he cannot escape the liability. 6. The learned advocate for the applicant also relies on Yeluri Satyanarayana v. Yeluri Mallayya8 This is a Full Bench case of the Madras High Court. A promissory note was executed by the mother of the minor defendants. 6. The learned advocate for the applicant also relies on Yeluri Satyanarayana v. Yeluri Mallayya8 This is a Full Bench case of the Madras High Court. A promissory note was executed by the mother of the minor defendants. In the body of the note the minor defendants were discribed as the makers with the words "represented by their mother and guardian V", but the note was signed by the mother V without any such description attached to her name. The pro-note itself was executed in renewal of an earlier promissory note executed by the defendants father. It was held by that Court in a suit upon the note that it was binding on the estate of the minor defendants. It was observed that in inferring the intention of the parties in such a case one must look at all the surrounding circumstances and the liability of the minor in such cases under the Hindu Law is not affected by the fact that the promissory note was made by the guardian. The case of a guardian stands on a somewhat different footing from the case of an executor or a trustee and this Full Bench case is the case of a guardian and a minor. But the learned advocate for the applicant relies more on the observation of the Court that we should, in a case, look at all the surrounding circumstances and then come to the conclusion regarding the liability. It is, therefore, his contention that when defendant No. 1 has described the executor in the promissory note as "Harihar Ramchandra Sansthan Akola, Vahiwatdar Radhakisan Narayandas Agarwal", it means that Radhakisan Narayandas Agarwal was not executing the promissory note, but the trust was executing the promissory note. It is, however, difficult to accept this contention, because the settled law is that the promissory note is an unconditional undertaking to pay the money by the executor. The description does not show that he has excluded himself from the personal liability. These words cannot be appropriate to exclude himself from personal liability. 7. It is, however, difficult to accept this contention, because the settled law is that the promissory note is an unconditional undertaking to pay the money by the executor. The description does not show that he has excluded himself from the personal liability. These words cannot be appropriate to exclude himself from personal liability. 7. The learned advocate for the applicant has also invited my attention to T. S. Venkatabalagurumurthi Chettiar v. T. A. Balakrishna Odavar and others9 This was not a case of a negotiable instrument; but it was a case of a liability on account of a sum which represented the balance of money owing to the creditor by the temple for the supply of groceries to the temple, those groceries having been supplied for the purpose of the puja. It was in that context that it was held that the person who supplied the goods was entitled to recover their value from out of the temple funds, notwithstanding the fact that at the time when credit was taken the trustee had some cash on hand. 8. Therefore, it appears to me that the decree passed by the trial Court is quite legal and proper. The applicant has borrowed the money under a promissory note and has incurred a personal liability. This revision, therefore, should fail. I, therefore, confirm the decree of the trial Court and dismiss this application with costs. Application dismissed.