GOPIVALLABHA IYENGAB, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER filed Election Petition Ele. Misc. No. 212 of 1969 before the addl. Second Munsiff, Bangalore, challenging the election of the second respondent as a Taluk Development Board Member of the Anekal Taluk development Board from thte Jigani Constituency. The election petition was allowed and the election oi the second respondent was set aside by the addl. "second Munsiff, Bangalore. He made a further declaration that the petitioner is elected a member of the Anekal Taluk Development Board from the Jigani Constituency. As against this decision, the second respondent filed Misc. App. No. 22 of 1970 before the I Addl. District Judge, bangalore, under the provisions of S. 106 (7) of the Mysore Village panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act ). The second respondent also made an application (IA. No. 1) to stay the operation of the order dated 20th Jan. 1970 passed by the Addl. Second Munsiff, bangalore, in Elc. Misc. App. No. 212 of 1968, pending disposal of the above appeal. This application (IA. No. 1) was allowed and the operation of the order of the Addl. Second Munsiff, Bangalore, was stayed pending disposal of the appeal. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has preferred the above writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india, praying that the impugned order of the first respondent-1 Addl. District Judge, Bangalore (Ext. F) be quashed. ( 2 ) SRI S. K. Venkataranga lyengar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has advanced arguments which are mainly two fold. The first is that the First Addl. District Judge, as an appellate authority, has no power to grant an order of stay of operation of the order passed by the addl. Second Munsiff on an election petition filed under S. 106 (7) of the act. The second contention is that even if it is held that the First Addl. District Judge, as an appellate authority, has power to grant an order of stay, his decision granting stay in this case is patently erroneous and liable to be set aside. The petitioner also made an application on 24-2-70 after this petition had become part-heard, seeking permission to raise an additional contention that the First Addl. District Judge, as an appellate authority, has power to grant an order of stay, his decision granting stay in this case is patently erroneous and liable to be set aside. The petitioner also made an application on 24-2-70 after this petition had become part-heard, seeking permission to raise an additional contention that the First Addl. District Judge who had passed the impugned order had no jurisdiction to hear the Election Appeal under s. 106 (7) of the Act as the District Jndge is only a persona designata who alone had to hear the appeal and it could not be transferred to the Addl. District Judge. This application was however not pressed and therefore we are not called upon to consider that application and it is rejected. ( 3 ) THE petitioner's learned Counsel submitted that the powers of the munsiff as an Election Tribunal is entirely circumscribed by the provisions of s. 106 of the Act. Under the provisions of 3. 106 (2) of the Act, the munsiff is invested with powers of a Civil Court only for the purpose of the enquiry. He is not invested with all the powers that a Civil Court has under the provisions of the CPC. Our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in WP. No. 50 of 1960 (1) and to the observation that the word 'court' in S. 231 includes a Munsiff hearing an election petition as persona designate. Though this decision was under S. 13 (1), it applies to the provisions of S. 106 of the Act so far as the Munsiff is concerned. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Nagireddy v. Khandappa, 1961 Mys. L. J. Jr. 24. in support of the submission that the Munsiff acting as an Election Tribunal under the Act, is a persora designata. It was further submitted that the District Judge, as an appellate authority under S. 106 (7) of the act is also a persona designata and the word 'court' in S. 231 includes the district Judge also. It was therefore contended that the prohibition under sec. 231 of the Act applies to the District Judge also. S. 231 of the Act reads -as follows:"231. It was therefore contended that the prohibition under sec. 231 of the Act applies to the District Judge also. S. 231 of the Act reads -as follows:"231. Injunctions not to be granted in election proceedings.- notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court shall grant any permanent or temporary injunction or make any interim order restraining any proceeding which is being or about to be taken under this Act for the conduct of any election under this Act. " ( 4 ) IT was submitted that the impugned order is in effect an injunction restraining a proceeding which is to be taken under the Act for the conduct of the election under the Act. The petitioner's Counsel invited our attention to the fact that subsequent to the order made by the Munsiff setting aside the election, the Divisional Commissioner has issued a notification (Ext. B) on 30th January 1970, declaring the petitioner as having been elected as a member to the Taluk Development Board, Anekal from jigani Constituency. Further it was stated that the Deputy Commissioner, bangalore District, issued a communication (Ext. C) to the President of the Taluk Development Board, Anekal, requesting him to issue notices of meeting of Taluk Development Board to the petitioner. These are consequential on the result of the Election Petition. In this connection, Sri k. Ramasubbiah, the learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent submitted that the election ends by the publication of nomination of elected members. The proceedings under S. 106 of the Act do no relate to the conduct of any election under the Act. S. 106 of the Act only deals with a judicial process. We think that there is much force in this contention. It is not the case of the petitioner that the election proceedings continue even during the pendency of the election petition before the munsiff. If all acts conneced wih the conduct of he election are over, S. 231 of the Act "cannot operate. It is stated that the object of S. 231 of the act is to prevent interference with the conduct of elections under the act, by any order of the Court. It appears to be so in view of the other provisions of the Act providing remedies in connection with the result of the election. It is stated that the object of S. 231 of the act is to prevent interference with the conduct of elections under the act, by any order of the Court. It appears to be so in view of the other provisions of the Act providing remedies in connection with the result of the election. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the District judge is precluded as a Court from making the order of stay cannot be accepted. ( 5 ) IT is pointed out by the petitioner's learned Counsel that in the absence of provisions analogous to those in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, viz. , S. 116b, it must be presumed that the Legislature has deliberately refrained from investing similar powers in the Munsiff, or the District Judge. S. 116b of the Representation cf People Act, 1951, invests the high Court with power to direct stay of operation of an order made by it under S. 98 or 99 before the expiry of the time allowed for perferring appeal therefrom and clause (2) of the said section invests the Supreme court with power to direct stay of the order appealed from. In answer to this submission, the second respondent's Counsel states that the provisions of S. 116b of the R. P. Act do not take awav the inherent power which the appellate Court has to grant an order of stay of operation of the order against which the appeal is filed. Provisions of S. 116b clause (2) of the R. P. Act incorporate specifically the power of the appellate court, which otherwise would have to be inferred. Sri K. Ramasubbiah, the learned Counsel for the second respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Courtt in Income Tax Officer, cannanore v. AT. K. Mohammed Kunni, AIR 1969 SC. 430 . ( 6 ) THE learned District Judge has also followed the said decision. The petitioner's Counsel submitted that this decision is of no help as it is rendered keeping in view the provisions of the Income- tax Act. He points out that under S. 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act, the income-tax Officer has power to grant stay by treating the assessee as not being in default during the pendency of an appeal before the Appellate assistant Commissioner. He points out that under S. 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act, the income-tax Officer has power to grant stay by treating the assessee as not being in default during the pendency of an appeal before the Appellate assistant Commissioner. The assessee has no right to make an application for stay when the appeal is pending before the appellate tribunal. It is to be noticed that it is only at the earlier appellate stage before the appellate Assistant Commissioner that the statute provides for such matter being dealt with by the Income-tax Officer. In the decision of the supreme Court the assessee preferred an appeal to the Income-tax appellate Tribunal and made an interim prayer for stay of collection of the penalties imposed. The Tribunal declined to stay the order holding that it had no power to grant such a prayer. The assessee then moved the high Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court held that the Tribunal had the power to direct stay of the proceedings and also collection of penalties pending the appeal since that power was incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal was dirtcted to dispose of the stay application in accordance with law. This order of the high Court was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court. ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court has observed that: " There can be no manner of doubt that by the provisions of the Act or the Income-tax Act Appellate Tribunal rules 1963 powers have not been expressly conferred upon the Appellate tribunal to stay proceedings relating to the recovery of penalty or tax due from an assessee". The argument advanced was that in the absence of any express provision in the sections relating to stay of recovery during the pendency of an appeal it must be held that no such power can be exercised by the Tribunal. In this connection, the Supreme Court further lays down as follows:"the right of appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to review by the appellate tribunal. Indeed the Tribunal has been given very wide powers under s. 254 (1) for it may pass such orders as it thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties to the appeal. Indeed the Tribunal has been given very wide powers under s. 254 (1) for it may pass such orders as it thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties to the appeal. If the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner have made assessments or imposed penalties raising very large demands and if the appellate tribunal is entirely helpless in the matter of stay of recovery the entire purpose of the appeal can be defeated if ultimately the orders of the departmental authorities are set aside. . . . . . . . " ( 8 ) FURTHER the Supreme Court observed as follows:"it is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Arts. 5401 and 5402) - the powers which have been conferred by S. 254 on the Appellate tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes/ Eleventh Edition contains a statement at p. 350 that " where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. " ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court ultimately laid down the law in the following terms:"in our opinion the Appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. This is particularly so when Sec. 220 (6) deals expressly with a situation when an appeal is pending before the Appellate assistant Commissioner but the Act is silent in that behalf when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal. It could well be said that when S. 254 confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution and that the statutory power carries With it the duty in proper case to make such orders for staying proceeding as will prevent the appeal if successful from being rendered nugatory. " ( 10 ) IN view of this decision, it appears to us that the existence of S. 116b in the R. P. Act does not take away the incidental and ancillary power of the appellate Court. The District Judge whether he acts as a Court or as a persona designata has been under S. 106 of the Act invested with all appellate powers which includes the power to grant stay of operation of the order appealed against. ( 11 ) THE petitioner's Counsel also cited the decision in Rameshwar Dayal v. Sub-divisional Officer, Ghatampur, AIR. 1963 All. 518. in support of his contention that the order of stay should not have been granted by the District Judge. The said decision cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. The facts of that case were that the petitioner therein filed election petition in the court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Ghatampur, challenging the election of the second respondent-Pradhan. He made a prayer for an injunction restraining the transfer of the charge of the office of Pradhan from him to the second respondent pending disposal of the election petition. It was held by the High Court that the Sub-divisional Officer has not an implied power to grant the interim relief. The High Court has not dealt with the powers of an appellate Court. In fact, while dealing with the provisions of Or. 41, R. 5, CPC. it was observed that it does not apply in the present case because an election tribunal is not an Appellate Court, there is no decree to be reversed by it the execution of which may be suspended during the hearing before it and the rule does not relate to a trial of a suit. It is not possible to infer what view the Allahabad High Court would have taken if it was dealing with the powers of an appellate Court to grant stay. We may, however, state that in view of the decision of the supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M. K. Mohammed kunni, it is no longer open to contend that the appellate Court has no power to direct stay. ( 12 ) THE next question that arises is whether the discretion exercised by the learned Additional District Judge warrants interference. ( 12 ) THE next question that arises is whether the discretion exercised by the learned Additional District Judge warrants interference. The petitioner's Counsel submitted that the learned District Judge has failed to take into consideration relevant material and facts, which, if taken into consideration, would render the impugned order patently erroneous calling for interference. The learned Judge has not taken note of the fact that the Divl. Commissioner has notified the election of the petitioner as a member on 30-1-1970 and the Deputy Commissioner has followed it up by his communication dated 6-2-1970. Further, the petitioner has also been invited to the meetings of the Taluk Development Board proposed to be held on 26-2-1970. The second respondent's Counsel submits that the absence of reference to these facts does not vitiate the discretion exercised by the District Judge. Those acts are merely steps incidental to the order passed by the Munsiff which is now in appeal. These steps do not constitute any legal bar for the exercise of the appellate powers by the district Judge. In the course of his order, the learned District Judge on a perusal of the grounds of the appeal and the contentions involved in the appeal, comes to the conclusion that the appellant before him has made out a prima facie case and if he were to succeed in the appeal he would certainly suffer an irreparable injury and loss if an order of stay of the operation of the order of the Munsiff is not granted. The position of the second respondent would continue to be the same as it was before the trial Court if an order of stay is made. If the second respondent succeeds in the appeal, then the consequence would be that he would be deprived of his right to continue as a member. It cannot be said that these are not relevant considerations. The petitioner's Counsel further submitted that the second respondent is not entitled to any relief on account of the delay on his part in seeking relief by way of stay. He placed reliance on Note no. 414 of the Supreme Court Notes (Vol. 10-1968 ). The case referred to therein is distinguishable. In the said case, the High Court had declared respondent No. 1 as elected after setting aside the election of the petitioner. He placed reliance on Note no. 414 of the Supreme Court Notes (Vol. 10-1968 ). The case referred to therein is distinguishable. In the said case, the High Court had declared respondent No. 1 as elected after setting aside the election of the petitioner. The High Court had power to direct stay of operation of the judgment. ( 13 ) THE petitioner therein did not take immediate steps before the High Court for grant of stay. But, in the present case, it is not open to the Munsiff to grant stay of his own order. It is only after filing the appeal that the second respondent could seek relief by way of stay. The petition was allowed on 20th January 1970; the appeal was filed on 8th February 1970 after obtaining the certified copies of the order of the trial Court. The order of stay was passed on 10th February 1970 after hearing both the parties. These circumstances indicate that there has been no such delay on the part of the second respondent in seeking the relief by way of stay, so as to disentitle him from getting the relief. Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Punjab High Court in Ear Govind v. Pahoo Ram, AIR. 1965 Pun. 22. wherein, the general principles which should be borne in mind by the court in granting an order of stay has been enunciated. They are as here under:" (1) That stay should not be granted as a matter of course because the matter has been admitted for examination by this Court. (2) The right to get elected is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is a special right created by the statute. To put it in other words, it is not a constitutional right, but is merely a legal right. (See in this connection, the decision of the Supreme court in Jamuna Prasad v. Lacchi Ram (10 Elelr 120: AIR 1954 SC 686 ). Therefore, it is not a right to or in property which is protected by Art. 19 of the Constitution. Therefore, the consideration that status quo should not be disturbed during appeal or in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution should not form the basis for the purpose of determining the question of stay. Therefore, it is not a right to or in property which is protected by Art. 19 of the Constitution. Therefore, the consideration that status quo should not be disturbed during appeal or in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution should not form the basis for the purpose of determining the question of stay. (3) The Court must take into account whether there is a prime facie case made out for the grant of stay, for it is elementary that the party asking for stay has to make out a strong case for stay. It is axiomatic that while determining whether there is a prime facie case, the Court must always take into account as to in whose favour the balance of convenience lies and also, as to what benefit or harm willaccrue in the even of its being granted or refused. "we are in respectful agreement with the above observations and the appellate Court should bear those principles in mind. It cannot be said that in the present case the learned District Judge has overlooked the aforesaid principles. Further, we may observe that though it may be possible in the circumstances of the present case to take two views and the view that the District Judge has taken is one of the possible views in the exercise of his discretion, it is not appropriate for this Court to interfere -with that view while exercising powers under Art. 226 of the constitution. It cannot be said that in this case the learned District Judge has exercised his discretion capriciously or without regard to relevant facts. ( 14 ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that no interference is called for. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct each party to bear his own costs. --- *** --- .