Judgement ORDER :- Petitioner L. P. Narayanan sole proprietor of L. P. K. Murthy and Bros., filed S. C. S. No. 729 of 1964 to recover a sum of Rs. 1583.42, made up of Rs. 250 deposited by him as earnest money in connection with the tender for the supply of livestock etc., Rs. 1294-67 being the cost of goats supplied by him, and Rs. 38-75 as interest. 2. The facts of this case were not disputed even in the trial court and the parties did not adduce any oral evidence, but merely marked their respective documents. The petitioner submitted a tender for a supply of livestock, cattle food, etc., for a period of one year from 1st April 1961 and this was accepted by the Director of Animal Husbandry on 12th April 1961 and communicated to the petitioner on the next day. But even before its acceptance, the petitioner supplied goats of the value of Rs. 1294-67 on the terms of the tender made by him. Subsequent to his receiving the intimation of acceptance, the petitioner withdrew his offer to supply goats on the ground of some domestic calamity, but the responddent insisted on the petitioner executing the necessary agreement and furnishing security deposit and fulfilling the terms of the contract to supply goats. The petitioner's plea was that there was no concluded valid contract and that therefore he was entitled to get refund of the security deposit and recover the value of the goats supplied by him. But the respondent claimed that the petitioner had forfeited the security deposit, that he was bound to pay damages for breach of contract and that therefore he was not entitled to recover any amount. 3. The trial court accepted the case of the respondent, but decreed the suit for damages on the ground that no court-fee was paid for the set off claimed by the respondent. But on the new trial application preferred by both the parties, the respondent was given an opportunity to pay the court-fee for the set off claimed by it in the written statement. But on the new trial application preferred by both the parties, the respondent was given an opportunity to pay the court-fee for the set off claimed by it in the written statement. Sri K. S. Palaniswamy, the then Chief Judge of the court of Small Causes, found that there was a valid concluded contract and in view of his finding that the damages claimed by the respondent as set off was equal to the value of the goats supplied by the petitioner, he dismissed the suit with costs and it was affirmed in the new trial application preferred by the petitioner. The petitioner now seeks to revise the judgment passed on his new trial application. 4. The main question for consideration in this civil revision petition is whether there is a valid concluded contract between the parties. The petitioner has not executed a regular agreement as contemplated in clause 10 of the tender and he has also failed to furnish the security deposit. But it is clear from the tender made by the petitioner and the agreement Ex. D-2 signed by him that it is not the intention of the parties that a valid contract should come into existence only on the petitioner executing a formal agreement. Hence if there is otherwise a valid concluded contract between the parties, the mere absence of a formal agreement preceded by the furnishing of security by the petitioner would not in any way affect it. 5. Article 299 (1) of the Constitution of India provides that all contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of a State shall be expressed to be made by the Governor of the State and all such contracts shall be executed on behalf of the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise. The Manual of Institute off Veterinary Preventive Medicine, Ranipet, has been approved in G. O. Mis. No. 1510, Agriculture, dated 13-6-1956. Paragraph 66 of the Manual provides that the Director of Animal Husbandry, Madras, is empowered to enter, on behalf of the Government, into all contracts, agreements and leases relating to this department. The subsequent paragraph in that Manual deals with the purchase of stores and acceptance of tenders and agreements. No. 1510, Agriculture, dated 13-6-1956. Paragraph 66 of the Manual provides that the Director of Animal Husbandry, Madras, is empowered to enter, on behalf of the Government, into all contracts, agreements and leases relating to this department. The subsequent paragraph in that Manual deals with the purchase of stores and acceptance of tenders and agreements. It is clear from the Manual that the Superintendent should call for sealed tenders, open and scrutinise them, and submit his proposals and recommendations to the Director of Animal Husbandry for acceptance of the tenders. But, by the subsequent G. O. Ms. 1886 Food and Agriculture Department dated 20-6-1957, the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry was authorised in supersession of all the previous orders on the subject, to execute contracts and other instruments relating to the Animal Husbandry Department. In fact, the agreement Ex. D-2 relating to supply of light wood planks by the petitioner has been executed by the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry. Till this Government Order was passed, the Director of Animal Husbandry alone was entitled to enter into a formal contract. But by reason of the later Government Order Ms deputy has been authorised to enter into such contracts, evidently in order to give him some relief. It is a moot question whether the authorisation of a subordinate officer to execute a contract ipso facto gives a right to the superior officers to do the same act. But the courts below were justified in finding that the Government Order did not take away the provisions of the Manual regarding the purchase of stores and acceptance of tenders and agreements. Even if G. O. No. 1886 Food and Agriculture Department dated 20-6-1957 superseded the earlier G. O. No. 1510, Agriculture, dated 13-6-1956, it would only be in respect of the formal execution of the document, and not in regard to the prior negotiations and conclusion of the contract, for which no provision was made in the latter Government Order. If the petitioner had entered into a formal agreement for the supply of goats, it might have been executed by the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry, as in the case of Ex. D-2. I do not want to express a definite opinion whether the Director of Animal Husbandry himself could not validly execute a formal agreement, when his deputy is empowered to do so. D-2. I do not want to express a definite opinion whether the Director of Animal Husbandry himself could not validly execute a formal agreement, when his deputy is empowered to do so. It should be noted that under the Manual, which has been approved by G. O. Ms. 1510 dated 13-6-1956, the Director of Animal Husbandry alone should enter into contracts like the one in this suit and execute formal agreements. The subsequent G. O. 1886 dated 20-6-1957 passed in supersession of all previous orders on the subject empowered the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry to enter into such contracts. It could not be said that the courts below erred in finding that the rights of the Director of Animal Husbandry to enter into contracts under the prior Government Order had not been taken away. 6. Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution of India, like Section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, does not in terms require that a formal document executed on behalf of the Government and the other contracting party alone is effective. In Union of India v. Rallia Ram, 1964-3 SCR 164 at p. 173 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1685 ), it has been held that in the absence of any direction by the Governor General under Section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, prescribing the manner of entering into a contract, a valid contract may result from correspondence if the requisite conditions are fulfilled. The courts below have rightly pointed out that the object of Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution of India is that the State should not be burdened with liability based on unauthorised contracts. It is true that even in the absence of a formal agreement, the contract concluded between the parties must be one satisfying the requirements of Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution. But, as already pointed out, the power of the Director of Animal Husbandry to negotiate and enter into such contracts by virtue of the prior Government Order has not been taken away. It is clear in this case that the tender made by the petitioner was accepted by the Director of Animal Husbandry and his acceptance was communicated to the petitioner. Hence it could not be said that the requirements of Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution of India has not been complied with. 7. It is clear in this case that the tender made by the petitioner was accepted by the Director of Animal Husbandry and his acceptance was communicated to the petitioner. Hence it could not be said that the requirements of Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution of India has not been complied with. 7. The contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that, by virtue of his tender being accepted, there was no concluded contract, but merely a standing offer, which could mature into a contract as and when orders were placed, and that the said offer had been withdrawn before any such order was passed. 8. The law on the subject is fairly well settled. The following passage from .Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Volume 8, p. 70, is relevant for the present discussion : "An advertisement inviting tenders for the supply of goods extending over a period of time is not an offer, but an invitation for offers. A tender for the supply of such goods as may be required, no quantity being specified, is not an offer which may be accepted generally so as to form a binding contract, but is a continuing offer, which is accepted from time to time whenever an order is given for any of the goods specified in the tender. An acceptance of such a tender merely amounts to an intimation that the offer will be considered to remain open during the period specified, and that it will be accepted from time to time by orders for specific quantities, and does not bind either party unless and until such orders are given. But a tender may be so worded as to impose an obligation on the person who accepts it to order all the goods that he requires for a particular business or purpose during the period specified from the person whose tender has been accepted, provided it is sufficiently specified what the terms of the contract are." 9. Cheshire and Fifoot in the "Law of Contract" 7th Edn. at p. 37, have pointed out the difficulty experienced in deciding whether an offer has been accepted by referring to a series of illustrative cases where tender is invited for the periodical supply of goods. Cheshire and Fifoot in the "Law of Contract" 7th Edn. at p. 37, have pointed out the difficulty experienced in deciding whether an offer has been accepted by referring to a series of illustrative cases where tender is invited for the periodical supply of goods. The following passage in the same page of that book clearly explains the law on the subject :- "Suppose that a corporation invites tenders for the supply of certain specified goods to be delivered over a given period. A trader puts in a tender intimating that he is prepared to supply the goods at a certain price. The corporation, to use the language of the business world, 'accepts' the tender. What is the legal result of this 'acceptance'? There is no doubt, of course, that the tender is an offer. The question, however, is whether its 'acceptance' by the corporation is an acceptance in the legal sense so as to produce a binding contract. This can be answered only by examining the language of the original invitation to tender. There are at least two possible cases. First, the corporation may have stated that it will definitely require a specified quantity of goods, no more and no less, as for instance, where it advertises for 1000 tons of coal to be supplied during the period January 1st to December 31st. Here the 'acceptance' of the tender is an acceptance in the legal sense and it creates an obligation. The trader is bound to deliver, the corporation is bound to accept, 1000 tons, and the fact that delivery is to be by instalments as and when demanded does not disturb the existence of the obligation. Secondly, if the corporation advertises that it may require articles of a specified description upto a maximum amount, as for instance, where it invites tenders for the supply during the coming year of coal not exceeding 1000 tons altogether, deliveries to be made if and when demanded, the effect of the so called 'acceptance' of the tender is very different. The trader has made what is called a standing offer. Until revocation he stands ready and willing to deliver coal upto 1000 tons at the agreed price when the corporation from time to time demands a precise quantity. The trader has made what is called a standing offer. Until revocation he stands ready and willing to deliver coal upto 1000 tons at the agreed price when the corporation from time to time demands a precise quantity. The 'accepttance' of the tender, however, does not convert the offer into a binding contract, for a contract of sale implies that the buyer has agreed to accept the goods. In the present case the Corporation has not agreed to take 1000 tons, or indeed any quantity of coal. It has merely stated that it may require supplies upto a maximum limit. In this latter case the standing offer may be revoked at any time provided that it has not been accepted in the legal sense; and acceptance in the legal sense is complete as soon as a requisition for a definite quantity of goods is made." 10. In Chitty on Contracts, 23rd Edn. at p. 53, it is pointed out that the effect of acceptance of a tender is a question of construction in each case. The author refers to the difficulty in construing a tender to supply, for example, "such quantities" (not exceeding a specified amount) as you may order and gives the following opinion : "The person to whom such a tender is submitted does not incur any liability merely by 'accepting' it; he only becomes liable when he places an order for goods, and he would not, in the absence of a stipulation to that effect, be bound to place any order at all. The party submitting the tender can also wihdraw before a definite order is placed if the tender means: 'I will supply such quantities as you may order'. But he will not be entitled to withdraw if the tender means 'I hereby bind myself to execute any orders which you may place, and if this promise is supported by some consideration." 11. In Anson's 'Law of Contract' 21st Edn.. p. 56, it is pointed out that in this class of cases, relating to acceptance of a tender, much turns on the forms of invitations, tender and acceptance actually adopted by the parties and for that reason the decisions of the courts upon them appear sometimes somewhat difficult to reconcile. In Anson's 'Law of Contract' 21st Edn.. p. 56, it is pointed out that in this class of cases, relating to acceptance of a tender, much turns on the forms of invitations, tender and acceptance actually adopted by the parties and for that reason the decisions of the courts upon them appear sometimes somewhat difficult to reconcile. He has referred to the following passage in the judgment of Atkin J. in Percival Ltd. v. London County Council Asylums and Mental Deficiency Committee, 1918-87, LJKB 677 at p. 678 in which the legal relations which may result from the acceptance of a tender, are classified :- "It is quite common for large bodies that require supplies over a year to ask for tenders and to obtain them, and it sometimes happens that the effect of the form of the tender with an acceptance is to make a firm contract by which the purchasing body undertakes to buy all the specified materials from the contractor. On the other hand, one knows that these tenders are very often in a form under which the purchasing body is not bound to give the tender any order at all; in other words, the contractor offers-to supply goods at a price, and if the purchasing body chooses to give him an order for goods during the stipulated time, then he is under an obligation to supply the goods in accordance with the order; but apart from that nobody is bound. There is also an intermediate contract that can be made in which, although the parties are not bound to any specified quantity, yet they bind themselves to buy and to pay for all the goods that are in fact needed by them. Of course, if there is a contract such as that, then there is binding contract which will be broken if the purchasing body in fact do need some of the articles the subject of the tender, and do not take them from the tenderer." 12. The author has pointed out that whatever may be precise form of the obligation, once a contract has been concluded by the acceptance of an offer it is no longer open to the offeror to revoke and withdraw from the transaction. He has referred to the difficulty experienced in the case of unilateral contracts. The author has pointed out that whatever may be precise form of the obligation, once a contract has been concluded by the acceptance of an offer it is no longer open to the offeror to revoke and withdraw from the transaction. He has referred to the difficulty experienced in the case of unilateral contracts. He has referred to a judicial example of one man offering another £ 100 if he will go to York and questions whether he can revoke it when the other is half-way there. In order to avoid such an iniquitous result Sir Frederick Pollock suggests that a distinction should be drawn between the acceptance of an offer and the consideration therefor; the acceptance is complete once the offeree has begun to execute the contract; but the consideration is not furnished until the act has been performed. In Friedman's 'Contract Law in America' it is pointed out (at p. 87) that the concept of mutuality was central to the classifical law of contracts that an agreement must be two-sided; otherwise it is not bargain, and that it is often said that there must be mutuality of obligation to a contract; both parties must be bound or neither is bound. At page 89, the learned author has observed as follows : "Taken at their word, the classic doctrines of mutuality and definiteness would render unenforceable whole classes of contract familiar to twentieth century businessman e.g., output contracts, longterm buying and selling arrangements, which must leave the price term open. Recognition of this fact, and perhaps also the public's increasing sensitivity to the perils of inflation, explains why nudges tended to relax the older views of mutuality and definiteness in later contract law. By the 1950's, most jurisdictions would freely enforce requirement and open-price contracts." 13. A reading of the agreement which should be executed by the contractor in favour of the department will leave the impression that it is one sided in favour of the department. In fact, clause 17 of the agreement gives liberty to the department to terminate the agreement either wholly or in part, on one month's notice and thereupon the agreement shall cease and be void and the contractor shall not be entitled to any compensation in respect of such termination. In fact, clause 17 of the agreement gives liberty to the department to terminate the agreement either wholly or in part, on one month's notice and thereupon the agreement shall cease and be void and the contractor shall not be entitled to any compensation in respect of such termination. But the following observation of Atkin J. in the judgment in 1918-87 LJ KB 677 at p. 679 furnishes an answer to persons, who enter into one sided contracts with open eyes : "I have no doubt that in a case of this kind where a man is asked to tender in advance for large quantities, he must in the ordinary course expose himself to certain liabilities in advance and it may seem very one-sided that the contractor should be bound on the one side, but that the purchasing body should not be bound on the other; but the answer is that that is the contract the parties chose to make and certainly it is not in my experience an unusual contract, because Great Northern Railway v. Whitham, 1873-43 LJ CP 1 : LR 9 CP 16, and other cases afford instances for the last forty years of this kind of contract being entered into by business people. No doubt they rely on the matter going through in the ordinary course very much in the terms of the contract. Sometimes it happens they are disappointed. That is a business risk, which, as it seems to me, a person who signs a contract in express language must put up with." 14. I shall proceed to refer to some of the leading decisions on this question to find out the principles on which the courts have proceeded to decide whether on the facts of a particular case there was only a standing offer, or a concluded contract for supply of goods. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Witham, (1873) LR 9 CP 16 the plaintiffs advertised for tenders for the supply of stores for a period of twelve months. The defendant sent a tender to supply the stores required for the period, at certain fixed prices, in such quantities as the company's store-keeper might order from time to time and plaintiffs accepted his tender. The defendant refused to deliver the goods ordered by the plaintiffs and the objection to the plaintiffs' claim was that the contract was unilateral. The defendant sent a tender to supply the stores required for the period, at certain fixed prices, in such quantities as the company's store-keeper might order from time to time and plaintiffs accepted his tender. The defendant refused to deliver the goods ordered by the plaintiffs and the objection to the plaintiffs' claim was that the contract was unilateral. This contention was rejected and it was pointed out that it would be wrong to countenance the notion that a man who tenders for the supply of goods in this way is not bound to deliver them when an order is given. The judgment did not decide the question whether the defendant might have absolved himself from the further performance of the contract giving notice. This question, however, arose in Gloucester Municipal Election Petition, Ford v. Newth, 1901-1 KB 683. The respondent Newth in that case, in answer to an advertisement, had offered to supply to the Municipal Council for twelve months certain goods at specified prices and the offer was accepted. Afterwards he applied to a committee of the council to be released from the date. He was then nominated for standing as a candidate for the Municipal Council. After his nomination the council approved the resolution of the committee relating him. His election was challenged on the ground that on the date of his nomination he had an interest in the contract with the council. If respondent Newth had a contract with the council, there could be no doubt that he was disqualified. But it was argued that there was no contract, but only a promise to supply goods at certain prices when he was called upon to do so and that the council was not under any obligation. It was held in that case that there was an obligation to order from the respondent such of the goods included in his tender as the council might require during the period of twelve months and the council would not be justified in treating the respondent's tender as a mere price list and ordering the goods which they required from any one whom they might choose. It was therefore held that there was a subsisting contract on the date of nomination of the respondent and not a mere standing offer. 15. In Thathian v. M. and S. M. Railway, 1956-2 Mad LJ 584 : ( AIR 1957 Mad 82 ),. It was therefore held that there was a subsisting contract on the date of nomination of the respondent and not a mere standing offer. 15. In Thathian v. M. and S. M. Railway, 1956-2 Mad LJ 584 : ( AIR 1957 Mad 82 ),. the plaintiff submitted a tender in the prescribed form offering to supply 14000 imperial maunds of cane jaggery to the railway grainshops, during the months of February and March 1948, at the rate of Rs. 11-4-0 per maund, and this was accepted by the M. and S. M. Railway, which then placed an order for the supply of the entire quantity in four instalments. Subsequently, the Deputy General Manager purported to cancel the contract by virtue of a clause in the contract reserving such a right. Ramaswami Gounder J., who tried the suit on the original side, held that the clause in question was valid and enforceable and dismissed the suit. But a Bench of this court on appeal held that such a clause was to be rejected as unenforceable and remanded the suit for deciding the issue relating to damages. The Railway took up the matter to the Supreme Court in appeal and the judgment is reported in Union of India v. M. Thathiah, AIR 1966 SC 1724 . The Supreme Court did not go into the validity of the clause reserving a right to the railway to cancel the contract in view of the fact that the railway had placed a formal order on 18-2-1948 for the supply of goods. It was held by the Supreme Court that the contract in question fell under the second type referred to in the "Law of Contract", by Cheshire and Fifoot, 5th Edn. In this view, the tender and acceptance would amount only to a standing offer which would be revoked at any time before a formal order was placed for specified goods. But in paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed that the acceptance of the respondent's tender by the Deputy General Manager might even, amount to a contract in the strict sense of the term, but did not proceed to consider in that sense, in view of the provisions contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the tender requiring a deposit of security and the placing of the formal order. 16. In App. 16. In App. No. 149 of 1961 and O. S. A. 116 of 1966 (Mad) on the file of this court, a Bench had to consider a similar case like the present one, in which one Manickam Chettiar gave a tender for the supply of articles of diet required for the City Hospitals, but had failed to enter into a formal stamped agreement, as in this case. Manickam Chettiar filed a suit in the City Civil Court for the return of the earnest money and for the value of the goods supplied by him. The suit was resisted by the Government on the ground that there was a breach of contract. The suit was dismissed by the City Civil Judge. The Government filed a suit on the original side of this court for recovery of damages. Kunhamed Kutti J. dismissed the suit on the ground that it was a case of a standing offer where the contract could come into existence as and when the Government indented with the contractor for the supply of any particular item undertaken to be supplied by him. The appeal preferred by the contractor Manickam Chettiar against the decision of the City Civil Court and the appeal preferred by the State against the decision of Kunhamed Kutti J. on the original side, were heard together by a Bench of this court. The Bench held that it was not a case of a mere standing offer, as held by Kunhamed Kutti J. that, in spite of the non-execution of a regular stamped agreement, there was a concluded enforceable contract between the parties and that the contractor Manickam Chettiar had committed a breach of contract. 17. Mr. V. Thyagarajan distinguishing the above case on the ground that there was a clause in the tender in that case that the Government could not purchase any of the items from any one else during the period of the contract and that there was no such clause in the tender made by the petitioner in the present case. He referred to clause 11 of the tender of the petitioner, that the Department reserved to itself the right to dispense with the purchase of any or some of the items in the schedule if found necessary in the interest of the Government of Madras. He referred to clause 11 of the tender of the petitioner, that the Department reserved to itself the right to dispense with the purchase of any or some of the items in the schedule if found necessary in the interest of the Government of Madras. In cases of this kind, the department is not entitled to ignore the contract and place an order with a third party in violation of the contract. Even from the terms of the tender it is possible to infer an implied term that in respect of its requirements, the department should place the order for goods with the petitioner so long as the goods are mentioned in the tender. In K. P. Chowdry v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 203 it was held, that, in view of Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution, there can be no implied contract between the Government and any other person, the reason being that if such an implied contract were allowed, that would in effect make Art. 299 (1) useless, for then a person who had a contract with the Government which was not executed at all in the manner provided in Art. 299 (1) could get away by saying that an implied contract may be inferred by the facts and circumstances of a particular case. But this would not prevent a person from showing that in a conduded contract which is not hit by Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution, there is an implied term in respect of a particular matter. In Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 it was held that even though the case did not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, it was still open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. In Churchward v. Queen, 1865-1 QB 173 at p. 195, Cockburn, C. J., has stated the sound and safe rule of construction with regard to implied covenants and agreements which are not expressed in the contract. In Churchward v. Queen, 1865-1 QB 173 at p. 195, Cockburn, C. J., has stated the sound and safe rule of construction with regard to implied covenants and agreements which are not expressed in the contract. He has referred to several illustrations to show the occasions on which the Court may imply, although the contract may be silent corresponding and correlating obligations on the part of the other party in whose favour alone the contract may appear to be drawn up, but he has struck a note of caution that great care must be taken that the courts "do not make the contract speak where it was intentionally silent; and, above all, that they do not make it speak entirely contrary to what, as may be gathered from the whole terms and tenor of the contract, was the intention of the parties." 18. In Metropolitan Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Ginder, 1901-2 Ch D 799 the defendant had agreed to take the whole of the electric energy required for his premises from the plaintiff at a particular rate. But there was no covenant by the company to supply, nor by the defendant to take any energy. It is observed in that decision that the whole essence of the contract is that which is not expressed in words, but which by implication is really the only thing existing, a contract that he will not take from somebody else the electric energy required by him. In The Queen v. Demers, 1900 AC 103 the respondent contracted with the Government to execute for a term of years the printing and binding of certain public documents at stipulated prices, but the Government did not expressly contract to give to the respondent all or any of the said work. It was held that there was nothing in the contract binding the Government to give to the respondent all or any of the printing work referred to in the contract. There could be no objection to this part of the decision, but it proceeded to state that there was nothing in it to prevent the Government from giving the work to any other printer. Evidently this part of the decision proceeded on the terms on the contract in that case. There could be no objection to this part of the decision, but it proceeded to state that there was nothing in it to prevent the Government from giving the work to any other printer. Evidently this part of the decision proceeded on the terms on the contract in that case. There could be no difficulty to infer from the terms of the tender in the present case that there was an implied agreement between the parties that in respect of the goods to be supplied by the petitioner, the respondent should place an order with him for its requirements. 19. Clause 11 of the tender only refers to the right of the respondent not to place any order for goods which were not required. Even in the decision in 1918-87 LJ KB 677. it is pointed out that the London County Council Committees have asked for tenders, they have got tenders and they have made it plain that they are under an obligation to ordar any of the goods, and that the tenderer, on the other hand, is under an obligation to deliver the goods specified in his tender, as and when he gets orders for them. At page 679 of the decision. Atkin J. has pointed out thus :- "One has to remember that this is an important public body, managing these asylums in the interests of the patients and in the interests of the public at large, and the rate-payers in the district; and having regard to their most important and responsible duties, it appears to be plain that the only persons who can be judges as to whether particular provisions are or are not needed at the asylums must be the body itself; and therefore, if in fact they do not choose to order eggs for the patients or to order rabbits for the patients, or to order butter for the patients, and choose to substitute something else that is not butter, in the case of butter, or is not rabbit in the case of rabbits, or is not eggs in the case of eggs, then that shows that those articles are not needed for the asylums and therefore it appears to me that from that point of view there would be no breach of contract in this case." 20. Hence if clause 11 of the tender in the present case is interpreted in the light of the above observations of Atkin J.. there could be no difficulty in upholding that clause. Reading the tender as a whole, there can be no doubt that the respondent has agreed to indent all its requirements from the petitioner in respect of the goods agreed to be supplied by him. 21. Further it is clear from cl. 10 of the tender that the petitioner has agreed to execute a draft agreement. The draft agreement is similar to the one executed by him, viz.. Ex. D-2 in respect of the supply of Planks. Clause 3 of that agreement specifically provides that during the period of the contract, the purchaser, namely, the respondent herein, agrees not to buy any of the goods undertaken to be supplied by the contractor, or any part of the same, from any other person. In fact, there is the finding of the courts below that during the period of the contract the respondent was bound to place orders only with the petitioner in respect of all its needs in respect of the goods for which the petitioner's tender was accepted. It could not therefore be said that there was no mutuality on this ground. Thus the ground on which Sri V. Thyagarajan attempted to distinguish the Bench decision in App. No. 149 of 1961 and O. S. A. No. 116 of 1966 (Mad) on the file of this court, fails. 22. Sri G. Ramaswami referred to the terms on which the tender was called for and urged that there was a concluded contract even when the respondent made the tender and signed the agreement at the end of the tender. This contention was negatived by the trial court on the strength of the decision in Somasundara Pillai v. Provincial Govt. of Madras, 1947-1 Mad LJ 123 : (AIR 1947 Mad 366). But that decision proceeded on the terms of the sale notification and that documents in that case. In the present case, the petitioner has agreed in his tender to have his earnest money confiscated and make good the loss on account of his re-tender or local purchase, in case of his failure to undertake the contract. But that decision proceeded on the terms of the sale notification and that documents in that case. In the present case, the petitioner has agreed in his tender to have his earnest money confiscated and make good the loss on account of his re-tender or local purchase, in case of his failure to undertake the contract. In fact, clause 14 of the tender makes it obligatory on the part of every tenderer not to withdraw the tender before the expiry of 12 weeks. But, as pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, clause 15 reserves a right to the respondent to reject any or all the tenders without assigning any reasons. Hence the mere fact that the petitioner sent the tender cannot lead to the inference that there was any concluded contract at that stage. But once the tender has been accepted, there is clearly a concluded contract. 23. The decision of the courts below that there was a concluded valid contract between the parties is correct. It is clear from the judgments of the courts below that the parties agreed that the loss incurred by the respondent by reason of the breach of the contract was Rs. 1294-67, which is equivalent to the amount claimed by the petitioner for the supply of goods. Once it is found that the petitioner committed a breach of contract, he is not entitled to claim refund of the earnest money of Rs. 250. In fact, the petitioner has conceded in his letter, Ex. P-16, that the earnest money was liable to be forfeited and merely requested the Superintendent, Institute of Veterinary Preventive Medicines, to reconsider the position of his liability in respect of the purchase, which the Superintendent said he would make from other persons at the petitioner's risk. 24. The decree and judgment in N. T. A. No. 304 of 1965, on the file of the Small Cause Court, Madras, are correct. There is no ground to interfere in revision. The civil revision petition is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.