JUDGMENT Mathur, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Victoria High School Association, Agra, to challenge the order of the Deputy Director of Education, whereby the resolution of the Management of the petitioner-Association to terminate the services of the respondent, Ramcsh Chand Pathak, was not approved, and instead his three increments were stopped with cumulative effect. Other consequential orders were also passed by the Deputy Director of Education. 2. The material facts of the case are that the respondent was in the employment of the petitioner as a School teacher for about 14 years. During the, material period he was the class Teacher of XII Science, and it was his duty to collect fees from students and to deposit the amounts so collected in the office of the Institution. He collected fees from 62 students, but deposited the fees of only 60-the other two having not filled in their forms of the Intermediate Examination. This matter came to the notice of the authorities when the guardians of the two students asked for refund of the fees. The Management held. an inquiry and was of opinion that the amount of fees of the two students had been embezzled by the respondent. They adopted a resolution to terminate the services of the respondent and referred the matter to the Inspector of Schools for approval. The Inspector of Schools did not agree with the finding of the Management and did not accord his approval. The petitioner then went up in appeal before the Deputy Director of Education, who agreed with the finding of the Management, but in view of the fact that the respondent had put in 14 years of service in the Institution, took a lenient view and, instead of terminating his services, directed that his three increments shall be stopped with cumulative effect. 3. Section 16-G (a) of the intermediate Education Act, 1921 lays down that no teacher shall be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector, who has to communicate his decision within the period prescribed by regulations. Under Clause (b) thereof the Inspector has the power to approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination. of service proposed by the Management. Under Chapter III Part IIA, clause 44 of the Regulations, the Inspector has to communicate his decision to the Management within six weeks of the receipt of its proposal in complete form for action mentioned in sub-Sec. (3) (a) of Section 16-G of the Act. Any party aggrieved by the order of the Inspector of Schools can prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education under sub-Sec. 3 (c) of Section 16-6 of the Act, and the Regional Deputy Director of Education can confirm, set aside or modify the order of the Inspector. The order passed by the Regional Deputy Director in appeal is final. 4. Two points were raised on behalf of the petitioner : firstly, that when the Inspector of Schools did not communicate his decision within the prescribed period of six weeks, the punishment proposed to be awarded by the Management became final, and the Inspector had no power to later disapprove of the. punishment proposed by the Management. The second point contended is that the Regional Deputy Director could merely confirm, set aside or modify the order of the Inspector, but could not impose a punishment 'other than the one proposed by the Management. 5. For purposes of this writ petition it is not necessary to express any opinion on the first point. In case the disapproval of the Inspector of Schools had no legal value and automatically the action proposed to be taken by the Management came into effect, in the eye of law, the services of the respondent could be deemed to have been terminated. He could then prefer an. appeal before the Deputy Director of Education and the matters to be considered in that appeal by the Deputy Director would have been the same as were raised and considered in the present appeal. In those circumstances, this Court can refuse to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction for the reason that the order passed would have been the same. 6. appeal before the Deputy Director of Education and the matters to be considered in that appeal by the Deputy Director would have been the same as were raised and considered in the present appeal. In those circumstances, this Court can refuse to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction for the reason that the order passed would have been the same. 6. It is true that Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act has not been so clearly word- ed as clause (b) thereof, and on account o;i this drafting error it can be contended that the Deputy Director cannot pass any order as to the punishment where the Inspector of Schools had, disapproved of the action proposed by the Management. However, an enactment has to b construed to give effect to the intention of the legislature and with this aim in view can alter or acid words to make good any drafting mistake. 7. Where the Inspector of Schools, accords, his approval to the action proposed by the Management, he confirms not only the finding as to the charges levelled against the teacher, but also confirms the punishment proposed by the Management. In the appeal preferred by the teacher, the Deputy Director can either confirms, or set aside both the parts of the order, or can modify them, that is, the Deputy Director can confirm the finding on the charges but reduce the punishment. But if the Inspector of Schools does not give his approval and it finding is recorded in favour of the teacher, the Deputy Director of Education shall have no opportunity to consider the propriety of the punishment in case the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is accepted. It could not be the intention of the legislature that in one case the quantum of punishment can be looked into by the Regional Deputy Director, but not in the other. Both the appeals, whether by the teacher or by the Management, stand in the case category. Consequently, if the quantum of punishment can be challenged in an appeal by the teacher, there shall be no bar to such a question being raised in an appeal preferred by the Management. 8. The above controversy can be resolved if it is assumed that the order of the Inspector of Schools is always in two parts, one on the charges levelled against the teacher, and the other on the punishment. 8. The above controversy can be resolved if it is assumed that the order of the Inspector of Schools is always in two parts, one on the charges levelled against the teacher, and the other on the punishment. If the order of the Inspector of Schools is so divided in two parts, it shall be open to the Regional Deputy Director to confirm both the parts of the order, or to set aside both or to modify the order by upholding the finding on charges and at the same time was a lesser punishment to the teacher. 9. On consideration of the factors detailed above I am of opinion that in the appeal preferred by the Management the Regional Deputy Director of Education could record a finding of his own as to the punishment to be awarded to the teacher, and if the Deputy Director decides to reduce the punishment his order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. 10. In the present case the Regional Deputy Director of Education was, I may say, wrongly moved by the factor that the respondent had been in the service of the Institution for 14 years. It is often said that an older person deserves a more severe punishment than it juvenile offender. What has to be considered is whether the offender is feeling repentent and is likely to change his way of life. I1' the authority is satisfied that the offender would, in the future, lead a decent life and shows repentence of his wrong deeds not only to the appellate authority but also to the Management, a lenient view can be taken. 11. Though this Court is of opinion that the Regional Deputy Director of Education had shown too much leniency to the respondent, the punishment awarded cannot be interfered with in the present proceeding. In order that the respondent may not be adversely affected in the criminal proceeding pending against him, it is made clear that this Court has not gone into the merits of the case. Its jurisdiction under Art. 226 is a limited one and, ordinarily it has to act on a finding of fact recorded by the subordinate authorities. It is for this reason that this Court has proceeded with the assumption that the charges of embezzlement levelled against the respondent had been. established. 12. The writ petition is hereby dismissed. Costs easy. Stay order is vacated.