ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiffs over a house. The facts giving rise to this appeal lie within a short compass. 2. The house in dispute originally belonged to one Chheqi Lal who executed a sale-deed dated 13-12-1943 (Ex. 1) in favour of the Plaintiff Respondents. One Mst. Liaqun Nisa instituted a suit for possession and demolition against Chhedi Lal, being Suit No. 193 of 1945 which was decreed on 23-10-1945. The decree-holder proceeded with the execution of her decree but she was resisted by Mahabir Defendant-Appellant No. 1 who claimed the property as his own on the basis of a theka from the Zamindar. He filed objections (Ex. A10) presumably Under Order 21, Rule 99, CPC which were allowed by the order dated 14-12-1946 (Ex. All). Later Mahabir and Mst. Ram Jiyai executed a sale deed dated 18-10-1951 (Ex A1) in favour of the Defendants Nos. 3 to 5 (Appellants Nos. 2 to 4). In these circumstances the Plaintiffs who are the legal representatives of the judgment debtor filed a suit for injunction against the erstwhile objectors and transferees. Thus, the position is that the Plaintiffs of the present suit are the legal representatives as well as vendees of the original judgment debtor whereas the Defendants are the objectors in the execution proceedings and their transferees. The allegations of the Plaintiffs were that they had purchased the house from Chhedi Lal in 1943 and had been in possession over the same since then, that the Defendants threatened to interfere with their possession and hence the suit was filed for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession also. 3. The defence in the suit was that the house did not belong to Chhedi Lal, that it belonged to Defendant No. 1 namely Mahabir and Mst. Ram Jiyai, from whom it was purchased by Defendants Nos. 3 to 5 and since then they had been in possession. The trial court held that the house was originally constructed by Defendant No. 1 and Mst. Ram Jiyai, that the Plaintiffs did not get possession over the house in suit, that the Plaintiffs had not been wrongfully dispossessed by the Defendants and that the Plaintiffs had no title or interest in the same. The trial court held that the house was originally constructed by Defendant No. 1 and Mst. Ram Jiyai, that the Plaintiffs did not get possession over the house in suit, that the Plaintiffs had not been wrongfully dispossessed by the Defendants and that the Plaintiffs had no title or interest in the same. Hence, the learned Munsif dismissed the suit of the Plaintiffs. An appeal was filed against the decree of the trial court and the lower appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the Plaintiffs suit for possession over the house in dispute. Aggrieved by the same the Defendants have come in second appeal to this Court. 4. The learned Counsel for the Appellants pressed before me only one ground, namely, that the claim of Mahabir the purchaser in interest of the Appellants having been allowed by the order dated 14-12-1946 and Chhedi Lal (judgment-debtor) having not filed any suit for establishing his title Under Order 21, Rule 103 CPC the order dated 14-12-1946 was conclusive against the judgment-debtor, namely, Chhedi Lal and the Respondents claiming title through Chhedi Lal were also bound by the said order and the present suit was, therefore, not maintainable. 5. Therefore, the short question which falls for determination in the present appeal is as to the effect of the order dated 14-12-1946 passed Under Order 21, Rule 99 Code of Civil Procedure. I have perused the record and it appears that no notice of the objection, filed Under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC was served on Chhedi Lal, judgment debtor. There is nothing to indicate either that he was impleaded in that petition which was a distinct proceeding or that notice was given to him. The heading of the objection shows that only the number of the original suit was mentioned and the parties arrayed in the suit and the execution application were 'verbatim' reproduced. The recitals in Ex. A 10 also did not contain any allegation as such against the judgment debtor. They were directed solely against the decree holder and the record further reveals the oral evidence was adduced on behalf of the decree holder and the objector alone. Thus the judgment debtor was no where in the picture nor had he any notice of the objection and naturally he did not adduce evidence. They were directed solely against the decree holder and the record further reveals the oral evidence was adduced on behalf of the decree holder and the objector alone. Thus the judgment debtor was no where in the picture nor had he any notice of the objection and naturally he did not adduce evidence. In my opinion the proceeding commenced by filing an objection Under Order 21, Rule 99, CPC is a distinct proceeding and is not to be equated with the main execution case itself and when Order 21, Rule 103, CPC refers to "any party...against whom an order is made Under Rule...99" the word "party" refers to a party to the petition (objection) and not to a party to the decree under execution. See Veyiendramuthu v. Maya Nandan AIR 1920 Mad. 126. Unless the judgment debtor is actually a party to the proceedings of the objection Under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC i.e. he is made a party and notice is served on him, there is no triangular contest in such proceedings. The contest is confined between the decree holder and the objector who claims the right to be in possession of the property. It will be against the principle of natural justice that an order passed in any proceedings should bind a person who is not a party thereto. In my opinion a judgment debtor who is not in fact a party to the proceedings of the objection Under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC does not in the eye of law become such solely of his being a judgment debtor. He cannot be regarded as a necessary party to the enquiry in those proceedings and it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case whether he was in fact a party. In the objection proceedings the contest is really between the decree holder who asserts that he is entitled to take possession of the property and the objector who alleges that in his own right he is entitled to be in possession of the same property. The order passed in those proceedings, therefore, is conclusive only between the objector and the decree holder. 6. It may be noted that Rule 103 of Order 21 CPC uses the words "any party not being a judgment debtor" and thereby expressly excludes a judgment debtor from the operation of the rule. The order passed in those proceedings, therefore, is conclusive only between the objector and the decree holder. 6. It may be noted that Rule 103 of Order 21 CPC uses the words "any party not being a judgment debtor" and thereby expressly excludes a judgment debtor from the operation of the rule. Even Under Order 21, Rule 63 CPC which is in more general terms and refers to "a party against whom an order is made" has been judicially interpolated to mean that it would affect only the parties to the enquiry. Under Rule 58 of Order 21 CPC where the judgment debtor is not in fact a party to the claim enquiry, he is not affected by the provisions of that rule. It cannot be disputed that a person who is not a party to the claim proceedings and against whom there is no order, is not bound by the order although he may be interested in the property. It was held by Sulaiman, J. in Rati Ram Vs. Barhmajit and Others, AIR 1924 All 302 as follows: A judgment debtor who is not in fact a party to the claim proceedings does not in the eye of law become such by reason of solely of his being the judgment debtor. This proposition was laid down by this Court even in an earlier decision in Mannu Lal v. Harsukh Das ILR 3 All. 233 (235) (DB). The same rule applies with even greater force to Rule 103 of Order 21 CPC whereby the case of a judgment debtor has been advisedly excluded. Thus, it follows that Rule 103, Order 21, CPC does not apply to cases where the order in question is being challenged by the judgment debtor or his representative. 7. There is yet another way of looking at this question. One of the tests which can be applied is as to whether in such a case a suit could lie at the instance of a judgment debtor or not. If a suit is maintainable Under Rule 103 but the party effected by the order passed in those proceedings fails to institute a suit to establish his right, the order shall be conclusive against him. If a suit is maintainable Under Rule 103 but the party effected by the order passed in those proceedings fails to institute a suit to establish his right, the order shall be conclusive against him. On the contrary, if the party later bringing a regular suit to establish his right is not given a right to establish the same right by a suit Under Rule 103 of Order 21, any order passed in proceedings Under Order 21, Rule 99, cannot be deemed to be binding on him so as to bar an independent suit by him. A plain reading of the provisions of Rule 103 makes it clear that a judgment debtor is precluded from instituting a suit Under Order 21. Rule 103, CPC for establishing his right. In other words, he is denied the right to challenge the order passed in the objection proceedings by a suit Under Rule 103 and consequently the intention of law could not be that such order should bind him unless he was in fact a party thereto and the order was passed against him in those proceedings. This also therefore leads to the same conclusion that the present suit instituted by the representatives of the judgment-debtor was competent. 8. Another aspect of the matter which may be brone in mind is that in deciding an objection Under Order 21, Rule 99, CPC there is no adjudication of the title or the final rights of the objector. In order to succeed in defeating the attempt of the decree holders to get delivery of possession through the coercive process of the court it is not necessary that the objector must establish definitely his right to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtors. All that the court has to see in this connection is whether the resistance occasioned by the objector can he said to have been by a person who claims in good faith to have a right to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person Jather than the judgment debtor. See Deo Karan Agarwalla Vs. Satyendra Ghosaul and Others, AIR 1959 Cal 621 . See Deo Karan Agarwalla Vs. Satyendra Ghosaul and Others, AIR 1959 Cal 621 . In such circumstances it would be highly prejudicial to the interest of the judgment-debtor who is not a party to those proceedings if the order passed therein is allowed to defeat his right to bring a regular suit to prove his right. 9. The provisions of Order 21, Rule 103, CPC are of a restricted nature and strict compliance of its terms is necessary in the sense that the failure to bring a suit Under Rule 103 should affect the rights of only that person who is really a party to those proceedings. In the absence of a clear provision in the rule embracing within its ambit the judgment-debtor also, any restriction on his general right to bring a regular suit in order to vindicate his right cannot be spelt out. Rule 103 of Order 21 CPC implies that there is a clear exception so far as the judgment debtor is concerned and he had not been invested with a right to bring a suit under that provision and for failure to avail of which he may be visited with the consequence that the order passed in the objection proceedings may be treated as conclusive against him. 10. Thus, the Appellants cannot plead the bar of the order dated 14-12-1946 against the maintainability of the present suit. Once that hurdle is removed from the Plaintiffs' path, the findings recorded by the court below are that the house in suit was constructed by Chhedi Lal and inspite of the decree in suit No. 193 of 1945 the Plaintiffs continued to remain in possession over the property and the sale-deed executed by the objector Mahabir (Defendant No. 1) and Smt. Ram Jiyai in favour of the other Defendants was invalid to the extent it affected the rights of the Plaintiffs. The Defendants had made encroachments over the plot in dispute and made constructions and the Plaintiffs were admittedly dispossessed from the house in suit. On these findings the lower appellate court was justified in granting the relief of possession to the Plaintiffs and decreeing the suit. I find no illegality in the decree passed by the court below. 11. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.