JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - This is Plaintiff's second appeal. Plaintiff Lallan Misir filed a suit Under Sections 12 and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 in the court of Civil Judge, Basti for dissolution of his marriage with the Respondent Smt. Lalita Kunwar. He sought divorce on a number of grounds. But when the matter reached before the appellate court he pressed his case only on the ground that Respondent was living in adultery. 2. Plaintiff's case was that he was married to Smt. Lalita Kunwar on 13-6-1956 and the Gawana ceremony took place on 23rd April 1959. Smt. Lalita Kunwar gave birth to a daughter on 5-9-1959 i.e., in about five months' time after the Gawana. Since the Plaintiff has had no access to his wife, it was clear that the daughter born to Lalita Kunwar was as a result of adulterous relations which Lalita Kunwar had with some one else and that she was living in adultery. 3. The suit was contested on behalf of Lalita Kumar and it was alleged that her 'Donga' ceremony had taken place on 12-12-1958 after which she lived with Lallan Misir. The child born to her on 5-9-1959 was fathered by Plaintiff himself. It was denied that the Defendant either committed adultery or was living in adultery with some one else. 4. After considering the evidence produced in the case, the trial court came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff had access to his wife long before 23-4-1959 and the child born to the Defendent was his legitimate child. It came to the conclusion that the evidence produced in the case did not establish adultery on the part of the wife and accordingly the suit, seeking dissolution of marriage, was dismissed. 5. The Plaintiff went up in appeal. Lower Appellate Court, without going into the evidence produced in the case proceeded to decide the case on the assumption that Plaintiff's allegation that he had no access to his wife prior to 23-4-1959 was correct. According to it, in the circumstances, birth of a daughter on 5-9-1959 could at best mean that the Defendant committed adultery. From this fact no reference could be drawn that the wife was living in adultery. It was held that a single act of adultery or one lapse on the part of the wife would not mean that she was living in adultery. From this fact no reference could be drawn that the wife was living in adultery. It was held that a single act of adultery or one lapse on the part of the wife would not mean that she was living in adultery. There was no evidence on the record from which it could be inferred that the Respondent was living in adultery with anybody. 6. A request was made to the learned Judge to treat the suit filed u/s 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act as one u/s 10 (1)(f) of the Hindu Marriage Act and for granting a decree for judicial separation on the ground that the Defendant had committed adultery. The lower appellate court, however, refused to exercise its discretion as in its opinion the plaint as filed did not comply with various rules framed under the Hindu Marriage Act. In the result the lower appellate court upheld the decree of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's suit. 7. Main question that arises for consideration in this case is whether a single lapse of adultery committed by the wife would amount to her living in adultery within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. It has been held in the case of Rajani Prabhakar Lokur Vs. Prabhakar Raghavendra Lokur and Another, AIR 1958 Bom 264 that the expression 'living in adultery' means a continuous course of adulterous life as distinguished from one or two lapses from virtue. Similarly in the case of Mahalingam Pillai Vs. Amsavalli, (1956) 2 MLJ 289 , it has been been held that there is a distinction between "committing adultery" and "living in adultery". Living in adultery means, following a course of adultertos conduct more or less continuously; a single act of adultery cannot be considered as living in adultery. 8. Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, provides for circumstances in which a party to marriage may move the court for a decree for judicial separation. Clause (f) of Sub-section (1) provides that if after solemnisation of the marriage one party to the marriage has sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse, an application for judicial separation can be moved. It is to be noticed that under this section an application for judicial separation can be moved on the ground of a single act of departure from the path of virtue. It is to be noticed that under this section an application for judicial separation can be moved on the ground of a single act of departure from the path of virtue. u/s 13 of the Act, a single act of sexual intercourse with a person other than his or her spouse i.e. adultery, has not been made a ground for obtaining divorce. What has been made a ground for obtaining a divorce is 'living in adultery'. It is therefore clear that the Legislature intended dissolution of marriage on the ground that the guilty spouse has adopted a continuous course of adulterous life i.e. he or she is living in adultery and that isolated act of committing adultery may provide a ground for judicial separation it will not be sufficient for obtaining dissolution of marriage. In this view of the matter and following the decisions of the Bombay and Madras High Courts mentioned above, I am of opinion that the lower appellate court was right in holding that even if the evidence produced on behalf of the Plaintiff was accepted, he was not entitled to a decree for divorce. I however wish to make it clear that the finding of the trial court that the child born to Smt. Lalita Kunwar was legitimate daughter of Lallan Misir has neither been affirmed nor reversed either by lower appellate Court or by this Court. 9. So far as the question, whether the lower appellate court should have converted the present suit into a suit for judicial separation u/s 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, is concerned, I find that the lower appellate court exercised a discretion in refusing to permit the Plaintiff to convert the suit into an action for judicial separation. In the circumstances of this case it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the lower appellate Court was contrary to law. The discretion exercised by the lower appellate court, therefore, cannot be interfered with in a second appeal. It will be open to the Appellant to bring another action for judicial separation on the ground that Smt. Lalita Kunwar committed adultery after solemnisation of her marriage and he my be able to obtain a decree for judicial separation if he is able to substantiate his allegation to the satisfaction of the court concerned. 10. It will be open to the Appellant to bring another action for judicial separation on the ground that Smt. Lalita Kunwar committed adultery after solemnisation of her marriage and he my be able to obtain a decree for judicial separation if he is able to substantiate his allegation to the satisfaction of the court concerned. 10. In the circumstances mentioned above, the present appeal has no force and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.