Judgment :- 1. The several appellants in these writ appeals are wholesale distributors of rationed articles appointed under Clause.51 of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 promulgated by the Government of Kerala under S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, in pursuance of the authorisation by the Central Government under S.5 thereof. The State Government added Clause.51A to the original Rationing Order in September 1967, which clause authorised the Government that, if at any time the Government were of the opinion that in the interest of the general public it was necessary or expedient so to do, the Government might, by general or special order, cancel the appointment of any or all or any class of authorised wholesale distributors after giving an opportunity to such distributor or distributors of being heard. And when the appointment of any wholesale distributor or distributors was cancelled, Clause.51A provided further, the stocks of rationed articles available - with him or them at the time of such cancellation should be disposed of in accordance with the directions of the Government. The Government issued show-cause notices to some of the wholesale distributors; and some of them who received such notices filed writ petitions before this Court questioning the validity and constitutionality of Clause.51A. A Division Bench of this court disposed of those matters ultimately by judgment reported in M/s Appukutty v. State of Kerala (1969 Lab. & Ind. Cases 30). The Division Bench upheld Clause.51A; and one of the learned judges, Raman Nayar J. (as he then was), indicated that two views were possible on the question whether the Government could, under the Rationing Order as it then stood, legally and validly transfer the wholesale distribution to the Food Corporation of India. Subsequently, those show-cause notices were dropped and the matter was not pursued further; and the State Government added Clause.51B to the Rationing Order providing that it would be open to the Government, if, in its opinion, it was necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the general public, to enter into an agreement with the Food Corporation of India for the distribution and supply of rationed articles to retail dealers in the whole or any part or area of the State on such terms and conditions as might be agreed upon, etc. Clause.51B further provided that the Food Corporation would be subject to control by and supervision of the Government, and that nothing contained in Clause.51 would apply to the Food Corporation. After the promulgation of this clause, the Government issued show-cause notices under Clause.51A to the appellants, heard their representations and ultimately cancelled their appointments. And the Government also entered into an agreement with the Food Corporation of India as contemplated by Clause.51B. The appellants filed writ petitions questioning this action of the Government; and the writ petitions were dismissed in limine by a learned judge of this Court (Isaac J.). The appeals are against the said dismissals in limine of the writ petitions. 2. Mr. V. K. K. Menon, the counsel of the appellant in one of these appeals, argued the appeals in the main; and the counsel of the other appellants all adopted Mr. Menon's arguments and did not contribute anything more. Mr. Menon's arguments can be summarised as follows. What has been done by the State Government is in effect to create a monopoly in favour of the Food Corporation; that such creation of monopoly is beyond the scope of the Essential Commodities Act; that even if it is within the scope of the Act, it is beyond the scope of the delegation by the Central Government to the State Government under S.5 of the Act; that such creation of monopoly should only be by a statute and not by an executive order as the Rationing Order; and that the action of the State Government is violative of the fundamental right of the appellants under Art.19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution and not protected by sub-el. 6 (ii) of the said Article. The counsel also urged that in his appeal and in some of the other appeals the appellants were co-operative societies and therefore the action of the Government in preferring the Food Corporation to cooperative societies was discrimination hit by Art.14 of the Constitution. 3. The counsel drew our attention to the observation of the Supreme Court in Mannalal Jain v. State of Assam (A. I. R.1962 S.C. 386) that the Supreme Court left open the question whether the State could create a monopoly under the Essential Commodities Act. 3. The counsel drew our attention to the observation of the Supreme Court in Mannalal Jain v. State of Assam (A. I. R.1962 S.C. 386) that the Supreme Court left open the question whether the State could create a monopoly under the Essential Commodities Act. The counsel also requested us to decide that question in the negative in these appeals, viz ; that the State was not competent to create a monopoly under the Act. And the other contentions enumerated in the previous paragraph were also pressed. 4. If the facts of these cases are properly appreciated, we think, most of the questions raised will resolve themselves. The indisputable facts are that the State Government passed a series of Orders like the Kerala Foodgrains (Regulation of Distribution) Order, 1965, the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965, the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order, 1966, the Kerala Rice (Purchase by Levy) Order, 1966, the Kerala Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1966, the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967 and the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 taking power under the delegations from time to time by the Central Government to the State Government under the Essential Commodities Act. As a result of some of these Orders, the entire stock of foodgrains (rice and wheat) in the State was cornered. This stock came into the hands of authorised mills/importers/wholesalers; and the imported foodgrains imported by the Central Government, which constituted the major part of the foodgrains, came into the possession of the Food Corporation of India. Wholesale distributors were appointed under Clause.51 of the Rationing Order; and agreements were entered into with them by the Collector for the State authorising the wholesale distributors to purchase the foodgrains from the authorised mills/importers/wholesalers or a depot of the Food Corporation and to sell the same to the retail distributors. The purchase price and the sale price were fixed leaving a margin as profit for the wholesale distributors; and the agreements by the Collector with the wholesale distributors contained provisions for control of the wholesale distributors by the Government, the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, etc.; and there was also provision for the cancellation of the said agreements for certain reasons after giving show-cause notices to the wholesale distributors. It was in addition to this that Clause.51A provided an overall power to the Government to cancel, if it was found necessary or expedient in the interest of the general public, the appointment of any or all or any class of authorised wholesale distributors; and in such cases Clause.51B provided that the wholesale distribution might be handed over to the Food Corporation of India. What has been done now by the Government is to cancel the appointments of the appellants as wholesale distributors and authorise the Food Corporation to open sub-depots in several places within the State and do the wholesale distribution itself. In other words, one link in the chain of distribution of rationed articles is cut and the distribution of foodgrains is made more direct to that extent. Stating the position again differently, instead of having the Food Corporation, the wholesale distributor and the retail distributor in the chain of distribution to the consumer, there are now only the Food Corporation and the retail distributor to distribute the articles to the consumer. Thus, the effect of the impugned action of the Government is not to create a monopoly; and if no monopoly is created by the impugned action, all the arguments that the creation of a monopoly is outside the competence of the Act and outside, the authorisation under S.5 of the Act; that the creation of a monopoly cannot be effected by an executive order and that the creation of a monopoly is bit by Art.14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g) and not saved by Art.19 (6) (ii) must necessarily fall to the ground. We may add that the other argument that the monopoly created is in favour of the Food Corporation which is not an organisation created by the State Government has also no force, because the Constitution does not insist that, when a State creates a monopoly the monopoly must be in favour of the State which creates it or in favour of its agencies: it has only to be in favour of a State organisation and organisation controlled by the Central Government too. 5. One argument of Mr. V. K. K. Menon has, probably, to be specially noted. He argued that even if the action of the Government was not a creation of a monopoly, still it infringed the fundamental right of the appellants under Art.19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. 5. One argument of Mr. V. K. K. Menon has, probably, to be specially noted. He argued that even if the action of the Government was not a creation of a monopoly, still it infringed the fundamental right of the appellants under Art.19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. This argument was also adduced in Appukutty's case already referred to by us; and Raman Nayar J. has pointed out in his judgment that no one has a fundamental right to trade in a stock of goods held by another and it is entirely within the right of the person holding the stock to sell it to whomsoever he pleases or not sell it at all. The foodgrains in the State had already been cornered by the State and the imported foodgrains were in the possession of the Food Corporation of India. The State Government was thereafter within its right when it chose the appellants and other wholesale distributors to sell the Government's stock of foodgrains. The Government must equally be within its right when it cancelled that arrangement and directed the Food Corporation to sell the foodgrains to the retail distributors direct. Again, the appellants have no complaint that the cancellation of their contracts would, as such, prevent them from carrying on their trade or business: in fact the counter affidavit of the State states that the appellants are at liberty to apply for and obtain necessary licences under the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967 and are also free to obtain No Objection Certificates from the Government for importing rice from outside the State. What the appellants want is that their contracts with the Government should be kept intact, which they cannot claim as their fundamental right guaranteed by Art.19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution, The last argument that there is discrimination in some cases where the appellants are co-operative societies has equally no force. It is obvious that there cannot be any discrimination between a co-operative society, a private organisation of individuals, and the Food Corporation, an organisation owned and controlled by the State. Secondly, the question of discrimination can arise only if the co-operative societies have a right to claim that they are entitled to trade in the foodgrains belonging to the State. 6. Secondly, the question of discrimination can arise only if the co-operative societies have a right to claim that they are entitled to trade in the foodgrains belonging to the State. 6. We do not think we need refer to any decision other than the decision of Raman Nayar and Govindan Nair JJ. in Appukutty's case already referred to. (It is unfortunate that this decision has not been reported by any journal other than the Labour and Industrial Cases). As we have already indicated, what was impugned in that case was the constitutionality of Clause.51A of the Rationing Order. Almost all the arguments raised before us in these appeals were raised in that case too. And both the learned judges rejected the contentions; but on one question they disagreed. Raman Nayar J. pointed out that, if at all a monopoly was created, it was done not under the Rationing Order but when the State cornered all the foodgrains and brought them under the control of the Food Corporation or the authorised mills/importers/wholesalers. The learned judge also pointed out that, if the wholesale distributors wanted to dispute the creation of the monopoly and also claim their fundamental right under Art.19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution, they should have impugned the creation of the monopoly at the time when the foodgrains were cornered. Of course, if they succeeded in that, they would not have themselves obtained the exclusive right to distribute foodgrains wholesale to the retail distributors! We are in entire agreement with the reasoning of Raman Nayar J ; and what we have indicated in the earlier portion of this judgment is only the same reasoning, viz., that there is no creation of any monopoly by the impugned action of the State Government. We may also point out that the validity of Clause.51A was already upheld by the said decision; and if at all anything could be impugned in the cases before us, it is only Clause.5IB. And no argument, as such, was adduced against the legality or constitutionality of this provision. Govindan Nair J. stated in his judgment that an entirely different approach was possible. And no argument, as such, was adduced against the legality or constitutionality of this provision. Govindan Nair J. stated in his judgment that an entirely different approach was possible. According to him, S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act spoke of regulations and prohibitions; and the delegation to the State Government by virtue of which the several Orders mentioned at the beginning of this judgment were passed was only to regulate trade or commerce in order to maintaining or increasing supplies or to ensure an equitable distribution at fair prices of the commodities concerned. Consequently, the learned judge opined, all the Orders should be read as integral part of the Rationing Order and therefore, none of them could prohibit trade or commerce but could only regulate it. We do not think that this approach of Govindan Nair J. is justified, because the several Orders were passed on several dates and there is no question of all of them constituting one integral whole and there is also no question of all of them existing together to provide a scheme. In other words, each of them has a separate purpose and effect and the effect, of one cannot be questioned when action is taken under another. On the other hand, we endorse the view taken by Raman Nayar J.-that if at all a monopoly was created, that was done earlier by some of the earlier Orders and what was done under the Rationing Order had nothing to do wit6 the creation of any monopoly. But, we wish to point out one thing appearing in the judgment of Raman J. and also in the judgment of Isaac J. now appealed against. Raman Nayar J. says in considering the effect of Clause.51: "What has been done is (as the clause advisedly and very correctly puts it) to appoint the petitioners as distributors of the stocks held by or under the control of the State Government. The position occupied by the petitioners is that of an ordinary appointee or an agent, and the circumstance that the petitioners are remunerated by the difference in the buying and selling prices fixed by the Government, does not make what they are doing in exercise of their fundamental right to trade in rice or wheat. The position occupied by the petitioners is that of an ordinary appointee or an agent, and the circumstance that the petitioners are remunerated by the difference in the buying and selling prices fixed by the Government, does not make what they are doing in exercise of their fundamental right to trade in rice or wheat. It remains only an exercise of their statutory and contractual right, as appointees under the order who have entered into agreements with the State Government thereunder, to distribute such stocks of rice and wheat as may be handed over to them for the purpose under the directions of the State Government." And Isaac J. states: "In short, a wholesale distributor is only a statutory agent of the Government for distribution of rationed articles subject to very strict controls." If the learned judges meant, by these observations, that the wholesale distributors were mere agents of the Government and were not independent dealers, we are afraid that the position may not be so. As we have already indicated somewhere else in this judgment, the agreements between the State Government and the wholesale distributors authorised the latter to purchase from authorised mills/ improrters/wholesalers or a depot of the Food Corporation of India and to sell the articles to retail distributors. This means that the wholesale distributors are not mere agents of the State Government, but are dealers who purchase and sell or deal in rationed articles: the only restriction is that there are some controls on the purchase and sale prices, from whom the purchases have to be made, to whom the sales have to be made, etc. We have held so in R. P. Govindan & Co., Tellicherry. v. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum (TRC. No. 38 of 1968). The writ appeals are dismissed, however, without costs.