JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal in which a question of some importance relating to the interpretation and applicability of the amended Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been canvassed before me. The matter arose in the following circumstances. 2. A suit was filed by the respondent for declaration and joint possession against the appellant on the allegations that the respondent and the appellant were real brothers and formed a joint Hindu family of which the appellant being the elder brother was the Karta, that one Mahadeo mortgaged his share for a consideration of Rs. 500/- which was given out of the joint family funds and the mortgage deed was executed in the name of the defendant alone being the karta of the joint family, that thereafter Mahadeo executed a sale-deed in favour of the appellant but its consideration was paid out of the joint family funds, that the Plaintiff and the defendant were the khudkasht holders and in possession of the plots in suit and after the date of vesting became the bhumidhars of the same. On these facts the following reliefs were claimed which need be reproduced :- (1). That a declaration be given to the effect that the plaintiff is the bhumidhar of one half share of the land in suit. (2). That although the plaintiff is in possession over the land in dispute, yet if the defendant proved his exclusive possession during the pendency of the suit, in that event a decree for joint possession be passed in the plaintiff's favour. It was alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff asked the defendant to get the former's name entered in the revenue papers but the latter refused and, therefore, the suit had to be filed. 3. The appellant contested the suit with the allegations inter alia that he had separated from his father in the year 1921, that he had purchased the property out of his self earned money and was in exclusive possession thereof and had also acquired title by adverse possession for more than 12 years and that the plaintiff had no rights in or title to the property which was the exclusive property of the defendant. 4. The following issues were framed by the trial court :- (1) Whether the property in suit is the joint family property of the plaintiff. 4. The following issues were framed by the trial court :- (1) Whether the property in suit is the joint family property of the plaintiff. If so, what is his share ? (2) To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled ? The learned Munsif case to the conclusion that the property in suit was joint family property and the plaintiff was a co-bhumidhar. Hence he decreed the suit. 5. The defendant preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial court and on the date of the argument the learned counsel for the appellant moved an application that he be permitted to take the plea that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The application was allowed and the arguments of the appellant's counsel on the point of jurisdiction were heard but the point was not decided in the appellant's favour. It may be noted that the appellant's counsel did not argue the case on merits but confined his submissions to the plea of jurisdiction alone which was allowed to be raised by the lower appellate court. The result was that the appeal was dismissed on 24-9-1963 and hence, this second appeal in this Court. 6. It was vigorously debated in this Court as to whether the plea of jurisdiction could be legally allowed to be raised by the lower appellate court in view of the amendment effected in Section 331 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. 6. It was vigorously debated in this Court as to whether the plea of jurisdiction could be legally allowed to be raised by the lower appellate court in view of the amendment effected in Section 331 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Sec. 19 of the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969, reads as under :- "(1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-Sec. (1) an objection that a court mentioned in column 4 of schedule II, as the case may be, a civil court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." It was strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plea of jurisdiction sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant in the lower appellate court was entertained and decided by it and, consequently, that matter became final and was not hit by Section 19 of the amending Act and, therefore, could trot be re-opened in this Court. It was also submitted that the language of the amending Act made it clear that the bar enacted by Section 19 was intended to impinge on the exact point when the plea was first entertained and once that stage was passed, the prohibition contained therein could not be reinforced. The learned counsel for the appellant proceeded to submit that there was force in the plea of jurisdiction and that on a proper construction of the reliefs claimed in the plaint the suit would be exclusively cognizable by the revenue court. He also argued that in the instant case if the plea which had already been entertained by the courts below was over-ruled by this Court and shut out from consideration, there would be a failure of justice inasmuch the appellant had refrained from advancing any arguments on merits before the lower appellate court. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the provisions introduced by Section 19 of U.P. Act No. 4 of 1969 relate purely to procedure and determination of the forum and, therefore, must be given retrospective effect. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the provisions introduced by Section 19 of U.P. Act No. 4 of 1969 relate purely to procedure and determination of the forum and, therefore, must be given retrospective effect. Consequently, the objection with regard to jurisdiction should not have been entertained by the lower appellate court which exceeded its jurisdiction and acted illegally in permitting the same to be agitated and adjudicating upon it. On merits also it was submitted that the suit as framed would be maintainable in the Civil court and there was no substance in the technical plea of jurisdiction sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant. 8. The first question, therefore, which has to be decided is as to whether the amendment in Section 331 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 which prohibits the objection with regard to jurisdiction being entertained by any appellate or revisional court unless it "was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity .............. has a retrospective application. There is no doubt that it provision which relates to the forum where a suit or proceeding has to be instituted is one which is procedural and the general law is that a procedural law has a retrospective application. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that this doctrine of retrospectivity of the procedural law is not wholly without limitation and a good deal of misapprehension seems to have clustered round the doctrine of retrospective enforcement of procedural laws. Authorities on statutory construction have, therefore, sounded a note of caution and tried to define the limitations which may be imposed on this seemingly expending field. In substance the limit which has been drawn in this regard is that where a right has vested in a party or a person has secured a decree etc., that right vests in him and it is not the intention of law that he should be divested of that right or the decree be annulled and he be relegated to the position which obtained prior to the commencement of the proceedings or the action. Thus, an emphasis has been, laid on the stage to which the proceedings had reached. When were they instituted, how far they had proceeded and whether they had concluded or not are relevant considerations in this regard. Thus, an emphasis has been, laid on the stage to which the proceedings had reached. When were they instituted, how far they had proceeded and whether they had concluded or not are relevant considerations in this regard. If an Action or proceeding has totally concluded and culminated in an order or decree which embodies the rights of it party, then in my opinion it would neither be fair nor conducive to the spirit of law that it should be wiped out altogether. In such circumstances, therefore, the hands of the clock must not be put back. That, in substance, is the line which must be drawn regarding the extent to which the retrospective effect of procedural law can be pressed. A full Bench of the East Punjab High Court had occasion to consider the question of retrospective effect of the procedural law in Ram Singh v. The Crown, A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab 25, The following dictum was laid down :- "It is well settled that no one has any vested right in any procedural rule and that, therefore, any change in the procedural law has a retrospective effect in the sense of being applicable even to judicial proceedings initiated before the change, provided of course this can be done without affecting any substantive rights acquired by any of the parties to the proceedings before the change. It is, however, equally well settled that the validity or operation of any order validly passed or any act validly done by a judicial tribunal under the procedural law for the time being in force cannot be affected by any subsequent change in the said law." The above decision was followed by this Court in the full Bench case of Ram Bux v. Board of Revenue, 1967 Revenue Decisions 413, where the Bench had to consider the effect of the amendment of Section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on pending appeals. It was held that the amendment introduced by U.P. Act No. 21 of 1962 requiring impleadment of the State Government as a necessary party had no effect on pending appeals and that it was not obligatory on the appellate court after the said amendment to directly implead the State without going to the merits of the case. It was held that the amendment introduced by U.P. Act No. 21 of 1962 requiring impleadment of the State Government as a necessary party had no effect on pending appeals and that it was not obligatory on the appellate court after the said amendment to directly implead the State without going to the merits of the case. To the same effect was the decision in Indraj Singh v. Savitri, A.I.R. 1966 Allahabad 234, wherein it was observed : "Thus, it is clear that although the procedural law is generally retrospective but if enforcement of such an amendment affects the validity of a judicial order validly passed it cannot be retrospectively given effect to. In such cases we have also, to look to the stage at which the particular case has reached. If a suit is in its initial stages and pending before the trial Court and at that time there is a change in the procedure, the changed procedure should be followed for it would not affect the right of any person at that stage, but if a party has already obtained certain right under a decree it would be very unfair to disturb that right and direct the suitor to start afresh from the trial stage for no fault of his." The stage at which a particular case stood was enunciated as a material consideration and the proposition that vested rights should not be disturbed was endorsed. The learned judge relied on a passage in Marwell's Interpretation of Statutes 1962 Edition at page 219 which is as under:- "But a new procedure would be presumably inapplicable where its application would prejudice the rights established under the old law or would involve a breach of faith between the parties." Thus, the doctrine of retrospective operation of procedural law is not absolute or without exceptions. 9. Sri K.C. Agarwal appearing for the respondents emphasised that the mere fact that the appellant's objection with regard to the plea of jurisdiction was entertained and decided by the lower appellate court did not create any vested right in him so as to destroy the retrospective effect of the amended Sec. 331. In support of his submission he relied on an observation of Chagla, C. J. in Shiv Bhagwan v. Onkarmal, A.I.R. 1952 Bombay 365. In support of his submission he relied on an observation of Chagla, C. J. in Shiv Bhagwan v. Onkarmal, A.I.R. 1952 Bombay 365. It is as under :- "No party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum, and it is also well settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary. Therefore, procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when a suit or proceeding comes on for trial or disposal." I was also referred to A. Steel Rolling Mills v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 Punjab 55 (para 17), wherein it was remarked :- "In any case no person has a vested right to have his case heard and decided by a particular tribunal." I think there is force in the respondent's contention. It is really doubtful as to whether the appellant could justly claim a vested right on account of the fact that the plea of jurisdiction raised by him was entertained by the court below and adjudicated. The mere fact that a party is permitted to file an application or objection and he obtains an order thereon does not amount to the vesting of a right in him as such. Thus, I am not inclined to accept this submission made on behalf of the appellant, though the proposition argued by him may be on other grounds. 10. Another reason advanced by the appellant in justification of the lower court's order allowing the plea of jurisdiction to be raised was that on the date when the order was passed permitting such plea, there was no legal bar to it as the appeal was decided by the lower appellate court in the year 1963 whereas the amendment in Section 331 was introduced in the year 1969. He submitted that if an order was validly passed at the time when it was obtained by a party, who raised that plea, it could not be rendered illegal by virtue of a subsequent which barred the raising of such plea. I find sufficient force in this argument. It cannot be gain-said that but for the amendment in Section 331 the plea of want of jurisdiction could be raised for the first time even in second appeal. See Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 A.L.J. 991, and Jangi Misra v. Muneshar, 1969 A.L.J. 222. I find sufficient force in this argument. It cannot be gain-said that but for the amendment in Section 331 the plea of want of jurisdiction could be raised for the first time even in second appeal. See Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 A.L.J. 991, and Jangi Misra v. Muneshar, 1969 A.L.J. 222. Therefore, it does not appear to be the intention of law that any proceeding in a suit or appeal which has been initiated by means of an application or objection and has since concluded in favour of the applicant or the objector be annihilated on account of a later amendment which prohibits the entertaining of such a plea. The limits beyond which the retrospective operation of a procedural law should not be stretched were summed up by P. B. Mukerji, J. in Ajit Kumar v. State, AIR 1961 Calcutta 560 at p. 566, para 22, in the following words:- "The law therefore is not in doubt, that the amended law relating to procedure operates retrospectively, but it is a very misunderstood branch of the law. It is necessary therefore to emphasise that it only means that pending cases although instituted under the old Act, but still pending are governed by the new procedure under the amended law, but it does not mean that the part of the old procedure already applied and concluded before the amendment came into force, e.g. in this case cognizance taken in the manner permissible under the old Act, becomes bad or can be re-opened under the new procedure after the amendment. The amendment of the procedural law will apply from and after the 1st February, 1961, when the amendment came into force and is retrospective only in the sense that even pending cases will be governed for future stages of the procedure by the amended procedure under the amended law. But this doctrine of retrospective operation does not mean that whatever procedure was correctly adopted and concluded under the old law will be reopened again for the purpose of applying the new law of procedure. That will be not merely making it retrospective but going a step further to make ex-post facto the procedure, legal when applied and concluded, illegal by a subsequent law. No court will permit such a consequence unless of course the statute expressly or by compelling implication says so. The present amendment has neither express nor necessary implication. That will be not merely making it retrospective but going a step further to make ex-post facto the procedure, legal when applied and concluded, illegal by a subsequent law. No court will permit such a consequence unless of course the statute expressly or by compelling implication says so. The present amendment has neither express nor necessary implication. It is crucial to bear this distinction in mind. A substantive law when amended is ordinarily said to be prospective unless otherwise expressly or impliedly retrospective, and therefore even pending cases, even after amendment of substantive law, are governed by the old substantive law under which they were instituted, but here where the amendment is only of procedure even pending cases are governed by the amended law of procedure but only in respect of those stages of procedure that remain to be applied after the amendment came into force." It is thus clear that the matter which has already been entertained and decided cannot be reopened in second appeal and those proceedings cannot be held to be wiped out by law. It is this aspect of the case which makes the expression "entertain" occurring in the amending Section 19 pregnant with special significance. I find force in the contention of the appellant that the bar created by the aforesaid amendment converges precisely to the point when an objection is for the first time raised whether it is the trial court or the appellate or the revisional court, naturally at a time when the amendment has been already introduced in Section 331 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. Applying the aforesaid principle if the trial of a suit was pending and the amendment came into force it will have to be given effect to but where the suit has already been finally decided and the appellant has obtained a decree in his favour, it would be most unfair to enforce the amendment with retrospective effect so as to destroy that right. Sri K.C. Agarwal vehemently argued that the word "appellate" or revisional court were prefixed by the word "any" and therefore the bar operated even at the stage of second appeal when the appellant raised the plea of jurisdiction to be considered by this Court. Sri K.C. Agarwal vehemently argued that the word "appellate" or revisional court were prefixed by the word "any" and therefore the bar operated even at the stage of second appeal when the appellant raised the plea of jurisdiction to be considered by this Court. It is true that if the objection with regard to jurisdiction was raised for the first time in second appeal, the prohibition contained in Section 19 would apply with full force. But as the plea had already been `entertained' at the time when the amending Act was not in existence at all, retrospectively should not be carried to such limit as to reopen the proceedings which have already concluded. There is no denying the fact that the view expressed by the court below on the plea of jurisdiction on merits is open to scrutiny by this Court but that only means that I may agree or disagree with the opinion of the lower appellate court on the merits of the objection relating to jurisdiction but so far as the initial entertaining of the objection is concerned, that is a `fait accompli' and in view of the language of the amending section the matter is no longer at large in second appeal. 11. I am also inclined to accept the appellant's submission that the non-entertainment of the plea of jurisdiction in the instant case would occasion a failure of justice. If the objection relating to jurisdiction which was already entertained and decided by the lower appellate court was excluded from consideration by me, the result would be that the appellant's case would go virtually unheard. I have already adverted to the fact that in the court below the appellant's counsel did not argue the appeal on merits and confined himself to the question of jurisdiction. 12. Lastly, the counsel for the parties advanced their respective contentions on the merits of the plea of jurisdiction raised in this case. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that there was no force in the objection about the jurisdiction and the civil court had rightly entertained the suit and that court alone had jurisdiction to try the same. Lastly, the counsel for the parties advanced their respective contentions on the merits of the plea of jurisdiction raised in this case. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that there was no force in the objection about the jurisdiction and the civil court had rightly entertained the suit and that court alone had jurisdiction to try the same. Reliance was placed on the full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 A.L.J. 1108, wherein it was held that the jurisdiction of the court would depend on the answer to the question as to which court was competent to grant the main relief claimed in the suit. Sri K.C. Agarwal on behalf of the respondent submitted that in the instant case the relief of joint possession was the main relief. It was an effective relief in itself and the relief of declaration was ancillary to it and consequently the civil court was the only appropriate forum for the present suit. On the contrary, the appellant's contention was that the relief of declaration was the principal relief in the suit and since that relief could be granted by the revenue court alone, the suit ought to have been filed in the revenue court and the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the same. In the instant case it appears to me that the relief of declaration must be considered to be the main relief. Firstly, no court would pass a decree for joint possession without first adjudicating upon the rights of the parties. The relief of possession would be dependent on the adjudication of the title of the parties and, therefore, the prayer with regard to possession must be regarded as subsidiary to the main relief of declaration. Secondly, it must not be lost sight of that in the plaint also it is the relief of declaration which is claimed as the foremost relief and the second relief namely of joint possession is claimed only in the alternative, in case the defendant proved himself to be in exclusive possession of the property in suit. There was a definite averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was a co-bhumidhar with the defendant which was categorically denied in the written statement and the parties were, therefore, at issue on the question of title. There was a definite averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was a co-bhumidhar with the defendant which was categorically denied in the written statement and the parties were, therefore, at issue on the question of title. Without adjudication of title no other relief could be granted in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant had totally denied the plaintiff's right or interest over the land and had claimed exclusive title and possession. Consequently, it is the question of title which loomed large in the present litigation. Thirdly, it is only the symbolical possession which could be delivered to the plaintiff if a decree for joint possession was passed as contemplated by order 21, Rule 35, C.P.C. So far as the actual possession is concerned, it was not possible for the plaintiff dispossess the defendant physically as a result of the decree passed for joint possession. For achieving that object the plaintiff could be driven to sue for partition. Hence, it is really the decision of title which was the main object of filing the present suit and not the obtaining of actual possession. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to another aspect of the case in support of his contention that the suit was not triable by the civil court. He argued that the scheme of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act revealed that the intention of the legislature was that the title of a tenure holder must be decided in the presence of the land holder. That was the underlying idea of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 229-B of U.P. Act No. I of 1951 which enjoined the necessity of impeding the State as the land holder. It was the duty of the State to maintain correctly the record of rights and hence any litigation which involved declaration of the rights or title of a tenure holder must not be entertained and proceeded with without impleading the State. It would not be open to a clever litigant to so draft his plaint as to circumvent the provisions of Sec. 229-B and file a suit merely for joint possession. If in substance the suit involves the determination of the title the State must be impleaded as a party and title between the parties inter se should not be decided unless the State has been so joined as a party. If in substance the suit involves the determination of the title the State must be impleaded as a party and title between the parties inter se should not be decided unless the State has been so joined as a party. These reasonings would ultimately lead to the conclusion that a suit of this nature should, be treated as one which involves the principal relief of declaration of title and hence it would be exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue court. 14. Thus, I come to the conclusion that the plea of want of jurisdiction was legally entertained by the lower appellate court and what was done by it cannot be undone on account of the later amendment of Section 331 of U.P. Act No. I of 1951. The result, therefore, is that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the respondent's suit. In these circumstances the proper order to be passed in the second appeal is not to decide the same on merits but return the plaint for presentation to the appropriate court. See Athmanathaswami Devasthan v. K. Gopalaswami, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 338. 15. I, therefore, allow the above appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and order that the plaint be returned to the respondent for presentation to the appropriate court. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.