JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the orders of the Dy. Director of Consolidation and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and a prayer has been made for quashing the orders of these authorities. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties it is necessary to give the following pedigree: 3. The dispute in the present case is in respect of two khatas Nos. 77 and 78 of village Humayunpur, pargana Ferozabad, district Agra. These khatas were occupancy tenancy khatas. On 2nd November 1958 an agreement was executed between Pyare Lal and Sant Lal shown in the above pedigree as the first party and Bankey Lal and Salig Ram shown in the said pedigree as the second party. This agreement was to the effect that the second party had one-third share in the occupancy tenancy in Mohal Dhani Ram and Dharam Ram in khata No. 77 and that they had allowed the first party to cultivate the entire land including the undemarcated share of the second party and they had agreed to pay the second party Rs. 30/- per year for profits and in case of default of this payment the second party would be entitled to have possession over plot Nos. 131, 125 and 277 of that khata exclusively and thereafter the second party would be entitled either to cultivate those plots or let them out to others. 4. It appears that there was default in paying Rs. 30/- with the result that in the year 1945 Salig Ram and Bankey Lal instituted a Suit No. 130 of 1945 in the court of Munsif, Fatehabad against Pyare Lal and Sant Lal and having given the details of the agreement in the plaint asserted that since there was a breach of the agreement the Plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession over plots Nos. 125, 131 and 277 which were occupancy plots. 5. This suit was dismissed on 3lst January 1946 by the Munsif. An appeal was preferred against the decision which was allowed and the Plaintiffs' suit was decreed. A second appeal was filed in this Court. During the pendency of the second appeal the Respondents Bankey Lal and Salig Ram died. No application for bringing their legal representatives on the record was moved within 90 days. An appeal was preferred against the decision which was allowed and the Plaintiffs' suit was decreed. A second appeal was filed in this Court. During the pendency of the second appeal the Respondents Bankey Lal and Salig Ram died. No application for bringing their legal representatives on the record was moved within 90 days. After the expiry of these 90 days when the appeal automatically stood abated an application was moved by the Defendants Appellants of that case that they were legal representatives of the deceased, whereas the Petitioners Ram Swaroop and Gaya Prasad claimed to be the legal representatives of the deceased asserting themselves to be the brothers of the two deceased Respondents. No orders were passed and the appeal was consigned to the record room. The result was that the decree of the first appellate court became final. 6. When the suit of Bankey Lal and Salig Ram had been decreed in appeal they put in an application in execution for getting delivery of possession over the three plots which they were entitled to by virtue of the decree passed in their favour. Before they could get actual possession over the three plots the two decree holders died. The present Petitioners moved an application for execution and for being substituted as the legal representatives of the deceased decree holders. This application of the Petitioners WKS contested by the judgment debtors opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 who claimed themselves to be the heirs of the deceased decree holders. The objection of opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 was allowed and the execution application was dismissed. 7. The Petitioners preferred an appeal being appeal No. 8 of 1954 which was allowed on 29th July 1955 by the first appellate court and it was held that the Petitioners were the brothers of the decree holders as such were entitled to execute the decree and their prayer for recovery of possession was allowed. 8. A second appeal was filed by opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 being Second Appeal No. 1545 of 1955 in this Court. This second appeal was finally dismissed by this Court on 6th May 1960 with the result that the decision given by the first appellate court that the Petitioners were leg al heirs and sons of Mittho Lal became final. 9. 3 and 4 being Second Appeal No. 1545 of 1955 in this Court. This second appeal was finally dismissed by this Court on 6th May 1960 with the result that the decision given by the first appellate court that the Petitioners were leg al heirs and sons of Mittho Lal became final. 9. During the pendency of the execution application after the Petitioners had prayed for delivery of possession in the execution proceedings the Petitioners also filed a suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act being Suit No. 9 of 1952 for possession over the three plots mentioned above treating the contesting opposite parties as trespassers. This suit was decreed by the trial court on 7th December, 1953. The Defendants opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 preferred an appeal against this decree. The first appellate court, i.e. the court of Addl. Commissioner allowed the appeal on two grounds: firstly that the khata being joint suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was not maintainable. Secondly that the Petitioners were not the legitimate sons of Mitthoo Lal. A second appeal filed by the Petitioners to the Board of Revenue was dismissed summarily on 4th August 1954 and their application for review of the judgment was also dismissed on 10th September 1957. 10. In pursuance of the order passed by the first appellate court in execution proceeding the Petitioners got possession over the three plots after duly executing Dakhalnama on 27th April 1961. 11. Consolidation operation started in the village in the year 1963. In the basic year the Petitioners were recorded as tenureholders of these three plots Nos. 125, 131 and 277 and opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 were recorded to be tenure holders of the rest of the plots of khata No. 77. Name of Salig Ram as co tenant over one third share was mentioned over khata No. 78 along with opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4. 12. Opposite Parties Nos. 3 and 4 filed two objections against the basic year entries by which they claimed to be the exclusive tenure holders of the two khatas. These objections were resisted by the Petitioners. 3 and 4. 12. Opposite Parties Nos. 3 and 4 filed two objections against the basic year entries by which they claimed to be the exclusive tenure holders of the two khatas. These objections were resisted by the Petitioners. The Consolidation Officer having considered the claims of both the parties held that the decision given in execution proceeding u/s 47 of the CPC was binding between the parties and the decision given by the revenue court was a decision without jurisdiction as such the decision of the revenue court u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was not bar to the present proceedings. Accordingly the Consolidation Officer rejected the objections of opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 and held that the Petitioners had one-third share in the khata in dispute. 13. Aggrieved with the decision of the Consolidation Officer opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed the appeal and accepted the objections of the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4. The order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was upheld in revision by the Dy. Director of Consolidation. The Dy. Director of Consolidation in effect held that the decision given in revenue suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was binding between the parties and that the decision given in the execution proceedings was not binding between the parties. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) querrly enough considered proceedings before the civil court as one u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act thus he attached no binding effect to the orders by the civil court. According to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) the decision in the regular suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act superseded the decision u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Before the Dy. Director the Petitioners drew his attention to the fact that the decision given by the civil court was not in proceedings u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act. He opined that whether it was proceedings u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act or Section 9 of the CPC that would make no difference and according to him the decision given by revenue court u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was binding between the parties. 14. Aggrieved with the two decisions of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Dy. 14. Aggrieved with the two decisions of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Dy. Director of Consolidation the present writ petition has been filed and the orders of the two authorities have been challenged to be patently erroneous on the face of the record. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the decision given by the Civil Judge in execution proceedings was a decision u/s 47(3) of the CPC and a decision given u/s 47(3) of the CPC was binding between the parties and operated as res judicata. His contention is that the Civil Judge had accepted the Petitioners to be the legitimate sons of Mitthoo Lal thus entitled to succeed to their two brothers Bankey Lal and Salig Ram. It is contended that the decision about their being the sons of Mitthoo Lal would operate as res judicata between the parties. Learned Counsel contended that the decision given by the revenue court u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was a decision without jurisdiction and would not operate as res judicata between the parties. His contention is that the suit of Bankey Lal and Salig Ram for possession in respect of the three plots mentioned above having been decreed they legal representatives of Salig Ram and Bankey Lal were entitled to get possession over these three plots through execution, the regular suit instituted for the recovery of possession was barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus a decision given by a court in a case which was barred by Section 47 of the CPC was a nullity. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sadananda Saha and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1956 Cal 317 . His further submission is that the decision of the revenue court u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act would show that the suit was dismissed on two grounds: firstly that the suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was not maintainable and secondly that the Plaintiffs were not the legitimate sons of Mitthoo Lal. The contention of the learned Counsel is that since the suit was dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability any decision given by the revenue court about the Petitioners being not the sons of Mitthoo Lal was unnecessary and the finding on this point could not operate as res judicata. The contention of the learned Counsel is that since the suit was dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability any decision given by the revenue court about the Petitioners being not the sons of Mitthoo Lal was unnecessary and the finding on this point could not operate as res judicata. For this submission of his the learned Counsel placed reliance on Jiwa Bam v. Kalyan 8 ALJ 409 and Sri Sri Gopal Jew Thakur through Narendra Nath Mondal Vs. Radha Binode Mondal and Others, AIR 1925 Cal 996 . 15. As against these submissions it was contended on behalf of the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 that the dispute between the parties being in respect of tenancy holding the decision of the revenue court between the parties was binding. Learned Counsel submitted that the decision of the civil court u/s 47(3) of the CPC would not operate as res judicata. His contention is that Section 47(3) of the CPC is just like Order 22 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned Counsel the decisions given Under Order 22 Rule 5 and Section 47(3) of the CPC should be treated at a par and the decision given by the civil court in the instant case cannot be held to be operative as res judicata in consolidation proceeding?. 16. I have considered the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties but in my opinion this petition has force and should be allowed. The points for determination in this case are: (1) Whether the decision given by the Civil Court in proceedings u/s 47(3) of the CPC would operate as res judicata or not between the parties in consolidation proceedings? (2) Whether the decision given by the revenue court u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act holding that the Petitioners are not the sons of Mitthoo Lal would be binding between the parties? (3) In case both the decisions are binding between the parties which of the two will prevail? 17. Re: 1-In the present case on the death of Bankey Lal and Salig Ram the present Petitioners executed the decree and claimed possession over the disputed plots. The claim of recovery of possession was resisted by the judgment-debtors on the ground that they were the heirs of the deceased decree holders and Petitioners were no heirs. 17. Re: 1-In the present case on the death of Bankey Lal and Salig Ram the present Petitioners executed the decree and claimed possession over the disputed plots. The claim of recovery of possession was resisted by the judgment-debtors on the ground that they were the heirs of the deceased decree holders and Petitioners were no heirs. After an elaborate enquiry it was found that the Petitioners were the heirs of Bankey Lal and Salig Ram and were entitled to possession. This decision given by the civil court was in respect of execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree, thus was clearly covered by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A determination u/s 47 of the CPC is a decree and binding between the parties. The contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 that the decision u/s 47(3) of the CPC should be held to be at bar with the decision Under Order 22, Rule 5 CPC cannot be accepted. The determination Under Order 22, Rule 5 CPC is not a decree and is merely an interlocutory order for the purposes of that case. Such a determination cannot operate as res judicata. Suppose if certain persons are brought on record as legal representatives of the Plaintiffs de ceased and the question of their being entitled to get a decree in preference to the Defendants of the suit is raised and is made an issue in the suit the decision of that issue would operate as res judicata. Similarly in the present case the judgment debtors claimed to be the heirs of the deceased decree holders in preference to the Petitioners and they resisted the claim of the Petitioners to get possession over the disputed plots. In such a case when decision is given one way or the other in my opinion it will be binding between the parties for that decision finally determines the rights of the parties in respect of the disputed property. The opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 in my opinion went wrong when they considered that the decision given by the civil court was in proceedings u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act The suit in the civil court was a suit in the nature of a suit for specific performance of a contract on the breach of the contract. The opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 in my opinion went wrong when they considered that the decision given by the civil court was in proceedings u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act The suit in the civil court was a suit in the nature of a suit for specific performance of a contract on the breach of the contract. Such a suit was cognizable by the civil court and a decision rendered by the civil court was very much within its jurisdiction. A decision given in execution proceedings of that suit is binding between the parties. In Rama Maruti Chaugule Vs. Mallappa Krishna Chaugule, AIR 1942 Bom 309 it was held that Order 22, Rule 5 CPC does not apply to execution proceedings in view of the fact that Order 22, Rules 3 and 4 on which Rule 5 is dependent do not apply to execution proceedings. Where therefore the question arises in execution proceedings as to whether a particular person is the legal representative of the deceased party, the case is governed by Section 47, Sub-section (3) and not by Order 22, Rule 5. In this case in execution proceedings the Petitioner claimed to continue the execution as an adopted son of the deceased. He was held to be the adopted son In a subsequent suit the question arose, as to whether the decision given in execution proceedings in respect of another property would operate as res judicata or not. The answer given by the learned Judge was that such a decision would operate as res judicata. To the same effect is the case of Rangappa Kelavadeppa Vs. Rindawa and Vasangouda, AIR 1954 Bom 139 . It is well settled with principles of res judicata applies to execution and other proceedings also, vide Mohanlal Goenka Vs. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee and Others, AIR 1953 SC 65 and Gulabchand Chhotelal Parikh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1985 SC 1153. Thus in my opinion the Consolidation Officer was right in holding that the decision given by the civil court in execution proceedings operated as res judicata between the parties. The opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 committed a manifest, error in coming to a contrary conclusion. 18. Re: 2-The revenue suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy, Act had been filed by the Petitioners and it was in respect of tenancy plots. The opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 committed a manifest, error in coming to a contrary conclusion. 18. Re: 2-The revenue suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy, Act had been filed by the Petitioners and it was in respect of tenancy plots. The Petitioners themselves were responsible for getting a decision in respect of those plots from the revenue court. When the decision in suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act has gone against them they are estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction. They cannot be permitted to say that the suit which they had filed was barred by Section 47 of the CPC and the decision given in that case will not bind them. Reliance placed by be learned Counsel for the Petitioners on Sadananda Saha and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1956 Cal 317 cannot be of any assistance to the Petitioners. This case is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In this case what happened was that a decree had been obtained from a court which originally was in the dominion of India when India was not partitioned. Subsequently the court which passed the decree went in the territory of Pakistan. Thereafter the successful party instituted another suit and obtained a decree on the basis of the previous decree. This subsequent decree was held to be nullity as contravening Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that a decree passed in a suit filed in contravention of the provisions of Section 47 of the CPC would be a decree passed without jurisdiction and a nullity. 19. Such is not the case before me. Here the Plaintiffs instituted a suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act treating the Defendants opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 as trespassers. The question of bar of Section 47 of the CPC was not raised in that suit. It such circumstance it cannot be said that the court acted without jurisdiction. It cannot be disputed that a suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was within the cognizance of the revenue court and decision rendered by that court must be held to be binding between the parties. It such circumstance it cannot be said that the court acted without jurisdiction. It cannot be disputed that a suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was within the cognizance of the revenue court and decision rendered by that court must be held to be binding between the parties. In this view of the matter the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that decision given by the revenue court in contravention of Section 47 of the CPC is not binding between the parties cannot be accepted. 20. The next submission of the learned Counsel was that the decision of the revenue court would not operate as res judicata because the revenue court in that suit had held that the suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was not maintainable and having held the suit to be not maintainable in the revenue court it gave decision on another point. The decision on the other point would be in the nature of an obiter and would not operate as res judicata. This argument also cannot be accepted, in view of a decision of the Supreme Court in Vithal Yeshwant Jathar Vs. Shikandarkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai, AIR 1963 SC 385 . In this Supreme Court case it was held that where final decision in any matter on issue between the parties is based by a court on its decisions on more than one point, each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision, the decision on each of these points operates as res judicata between the parties. Applying the principle of law laid down in this authority we find that the revenue suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act could be dismissed by the revenue court on each of the two points decided by it. Once the revenue court held that the Petitioners were not the sons of Mitthoo Lal the suit could be dismissed on this point. The suit could also be dismissed as being non-maintainable. Thus each of the points decided by the revenue court was sufficient to dispose of the case and the decision on each one of the two points would operate as res judicata. After the decision of the Supreme Court on this point the authority cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners will be deemed to have been overruled. Thus each of the points decided by the revenue court was sufficient to dispose of the case and the decision on each one of the two points would operate as res judicata. After the decision of the Supreme Court on this point the authority cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners will be deemed to have been overruled. Thus I find that the decision given by the revenue court u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act which is between the parties was also binding on them. 21. Re: 3-In view of my decision on the first two points it is clear that the decision rendered by the civil court in execution proceedings as well as the decision given by the revenue court u/s 18D of the UP Tenancy Act were both binding between the parties. The question that arises for decision is as to which of the two decisions should beheld to prevail. It is a settled law that subsequent decision will operate as res judicata in preference to a previous decision. The facts stated above would show that the revenue suit was decided earlier than the decision finally given in execution proceedings. The decision of this Court in execution proceedings was given in the year 1960 whereas the revenue suit was finally decided by the Board on 4th August 1954 and then a review application against the decision of the Board was rejected on 10th September 1957. Thus the decision of the civil court in execution proceedings was subsequent decision. It was open to the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 to urge before the civil court that there was a decision of the revenue court which operated as res judicata between the parties. But for reason best known to them they did not rely on the decision of the revenue court as barring the claim of the Petitioners in the civil court. The decision given by the civil court which culminated with the order of this Court in the year 1960 was the final and subsequent decision. 22. In Raghunath and Others Vs. Ram Khelawan and Others, AIR 1970 All 26 a Full Bench of this Court held in paragraph 23 that "it is trite that in a case of res judicata it is the latter decision and not the former which creates the bar". 22. In Raghunath and Others Vs. Ram Khelawan and Others, AIR 1970 All 26 a Full Bench of this Court held in paragraph 23 that "it is trite that in a case of res judicata it is the latter decision and not the former which creates the bar". In this case also a decision had been given by the revenue court prior to the decision of the civil court and it was held that the subsequent decision of the civil court would operate as res judicata as against the decision given by the revenue court. This point is decided in favour of the Petitioners and against the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4. 23. In the result this petition is allowed. The orders dated 21st September 1965 and 22nd April 1964 of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 are hereby quashed. The Petitioners are entitled to the cost of this petition.