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1970 DIGILAW 33 (KAR)

ANGESHE KHA v. M. RAMADAS

1970-03-10

CHANDRASHEKHAR

body1970
( 1 ) THE petitioner who is common in these two petitions, is the decree- holder, while the respective respondents are the judgment-debtors. In execution of decrees against them, the petitioner sought to attach bonus and gratuity payable to them by the Mysore Sugar Company Ltd. They objected to such attachment on the ground that such bonus and gratuity are not liable for attachment. The additional Munsiff at Mandya considered and upheld that objection. ( 2 ) AGAINST the orders of the learned Munsiff the petitioner has presented these two petitions purporting to be under S. 115 C. P. C. The Office of this Court raised an objection as to the maintainability of petitions under s. 115 C. P. C. Hence, these petitions have been posted for hearing the petitioner's Counsel regarding their maintainability. Mr. A. B. Mariappa, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contended that the aforesaid orders of the learned Munsiff do not come within the ambit of S. 2 (2) read with S. 47 C. P. C. , and are not appealable and hence revision would lie from these orders. Sub-section (1) of Section 47 CPC. reads: 47 (1 ). All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit it does not admit of any doubt that the question whether such bonus is attachable, arose between the parties to the two suits (in which the decrees under execution were made ). However, Mr. Mariappa contended that the said question did not relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. I am unable to see why such question does not relate to execution. Mr. Mariappa next contended that even if the said question relates to execution of the decree, the order of the learned Munsiff cannot be regarded as a decree within the meaning of S. 2 (2) C. P. C. , unless such order finally disposes of the execution proceedings. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 2 C. P. C.-reads:"2. Mr. Mariappa next contended that even if the said question relates to execution of the decree, the order of the learned Munsiff cannot be regarded as a decree within the meaning of S. 2 (2) C. P. C. , unless such order finally disposes of the execution proceedings. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 2 C. P. C.-reads:"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- (2) 'decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within S. 47 or S. 144, but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default (The explanation is not material for purpose of these petitions ). ( 3 ) IT is nowhere stated in this sub-section that the determination of any question within S. 47, must finally dispose of the execution proceedings. However, Mr. Mariappa sought to derive support from two decisions. In desikachariar v. Ramachandra, AIR. 1951 Mad. 56. Subba Rao, J. , (as he then was) who spoke for the Full Bench, said that an appeal from an order in execution would lie only if the following three conditions are complied with: (1) the order must relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree between the parties to the suit; (2) it shall conclusively determine the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy; and (3) such conclusive determination of the rights is with reference to the Court in which such rights are decided. ( 4 ) AS stated earlier, the question whether such bonus is attachable, is a question which relates to execution of the decree between the parties to the suit. It was argued by Mr. Mariappa that the second of the aforesaid three requirements, is not satisfied in the present cases, because the orders of the learned Munsiff did not conclusively determine the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. I find it difficult to accept this contention. It was argued by Mr. Mariappa that the second of the aforesaid three requirements, is not satisfied in the present cases, because the orders of the learned Munsiff did not conclusively determine the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. I find it difficult to accept this contention. Whether such bonus is attachable in execution of decrees against recipients of bonus, is undoubtedly a question in controversy between the parties and the orders of the learned Munsiff conclusively determined such question. The said orders of the learned Munsiff, even if they did not terminate the execution proceedings, did determine conclusively the question of attachability of bonus. Thus, even the second of the aforesaid three requirements, has been satisfied by the said orders of the learned Munsiff. ( 5 ) MR. Mariappa sought to derive assistance from the decision of the calcutta High Court in Thacker's Press and Directories Ltd. v. Metropolitan Bank Ltd. , AIR. 1963 Cal. 515. There, G. K. Mitter, J. who spoke for the Bench, said:"to find out whether the order amounts to a decree, we have to consider the definition of 'decree' in S. 2 (2) of the Code as a whole, viz. , that it must be ' the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit'". ( 6 ) HIS Lordship also quoted the following observations of Banerjee, J. , in Jagadiswari Debya v. Kailash Chandra Lahiri, 1 CWN. 374 @ 382. "it is not every order made in execution of a decree that comes within S. 244 (corresponding to the present S. 47. . . . . . . . . . . . . . An order in execution proceedings can come under S. 244 only when it determines some question relating to the rights and liabilities of parties with reference to the relief granted by the decree; not when, as in this case, it determines merely an incidental question as to whether the proceedings are to be conducted in a certain way. . . An order in execution proceedings can come under S. 244 only when it determines some question relating to the rights and liabilities of parties with reference to the relief granted by the decree; not when, as in this case, it determines merely an incidental question as to whether the proceedings are to be conducted in a certain way. "even applying the criterion laid down by the Calcutta High Court, the orders of the learned Munsiff come within the ambit of S. 2 (2) C. P. C. because they determined the question relating to the rights and liabilities of the parties in regard to bonus and such determination was with reference to the relief granted by the decree, namely, recovery of money from the judgment-debtors. ( 7 ) IN my opinion, neither of the aforesaid two decisions lends any support to the contention of Mr. Mariappa that the orders of the learned Munsiff, do not come within the ambit of the term 'decree' as defined in S. 2 (2) c. P. C. , and hence are not appealable. ( 8 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I uphold the objection raised by the Office that these two petitions under S. 115 C. P. C. are not maintainable. The office is directed to return forthwith to the petitioner the papers presented by him. --- *** --- .