ORDER G.L. Oza, J. This appeal arises out of the order passed by the learned single Judge in Miscellaneous Second Appeal No. 81 of 1966 holding that the Rent Controlling Authority under the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, had no jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal of an application before that Authority in default. This appeal has been filed on leave being granted by the learned single Judge. The material facts that give rise to this appeal are that an application was filed by the appellant under section 10 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter called the Act), against the respondent. The application was fixed for hearing on 17th July 1964. On that date the appellant was absent but the respondent remained present. The Rent Controlling Authority, therefore, dismissed the appellant's application in default. Later on, the appellant filed an application for restoration of the application. The respondent contested the question of restoration. The Rent Controlling Authority dismissed the application for restoration on the ground that under the Act it had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside the dismissal. The appellant went up in appeal before the Additional District Judge, Mandsaur, who dismissed the appeal and a second appeal filed by the appellant in this Court also met with the same result. The only question for consideration in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether the Rent Controlling Authority has under the Act inherent powers of restoration of an application dismissed in default. Shri P.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the learned single Judge has taken the view on the basis of the decision in Ruplal v. Shiv Shankar 1952 NLJ 404 : AIR 1953 Nag. 191. He submitted that a later decision of this Court in Sunderlal v. Nandramdas 1958 MPLJ Note 1 : AIR 1958 MP 260 runs counter to the decision, in Ruplal's case (supra). He contended that the provisions of the Accommodation Control Act which were before their Lordships in the case of Ruplal (supra) could not be said to be identical with the present provisions. Learned counsel further submitted that the decision in Manohar Lal v. Mohanlal AIR 1957 P&H 72 is a decision under the Accommodation Control Act itself. He contended that the provisions of the Accommodation Control Act which were before their Lordships in the case of Ruplal (supra) could not be said to be identical with the present provisions. Learned counsel further submitted that the decision in Manohar Lal v. Mohanlal AIR 1957 P&H 72 is a decision under the Accommodation Control Act itself. Shri U.N. Bachawat, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the present Letters Patent appeal is not maintainable as it is not an appeal provided under the Act. He placed reliance for this proposition on the decision in S.A. Industries (P) v. Sarup Singh AIR 1965 SC 1442 . Learned counsel further contended that under section 29 of the Act the Rent Controlling Authority has been given powers under the Civil Procedure Code to the extent it was thought necessary by the Legislature, and that in the absence of any specific power being conferred on the Authority for restoring an application dismissed for default, it could not be held that the Authority has any power of that kind. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the decision in S.A. Industries (P) v. Sarup Singh is based on the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, especially section 43 thereof, and that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, does not contain a provision of that kind prohibiting an appeal except as provided under the Act. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that it could not be said that a Letters Patent appeal was not competent in the present case. He relied on M.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros AIR 1953 SC 357 where it was laid down that when an appeal comes to the High Court, a Letters Patent appeal is competent. As regards the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the appeal, it would be relevant to note that two appeals have been provided under the Act--a first appeal under section 31 and a second appeal under section 32. Section 36 of the Act provides about the finality of the order. The relevant portion of section 31 is as under: 31. (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Rent Controlling Authority made under this Act to the District Judge or an Additional District Judge having territorial jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the Judge) and the decision of the appellate Court shall be final. The relevant portion of section 31 is as under: 31. (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Rent Controlling Authority made under this Act to the District Judge or an Additional District Judge having territorial jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the Judge) and the decision of the appellate Court shall be final. * * * * * This provisions shows that an order of the first appellate Court is regarded as final. A second appeal has also been provided under section 32. Although a second appeal has been provided on restricted grounds, yet there is nothing in this section to show that the order passed in that appeal should be final. Section 32 of the Act is as follows: 32. A second appeal shall lie against any order passed in first appeal under section 31 on any of the following grounds and no other, namely: (i) that the decision is contrary to law or usage having the force of law; or (ii) that the decision has failed to determine some material issue of law; or (iii) that there has been a substantial error or defect in the procedure as prescribed by this Act, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits. Section 36 of the Act has to be considered in the context of this language. It lays down that: 36. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Rent Controlling Authority shall, subject to decision in appeal, be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. This section thus provides that the order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority shall be final, subject to the decision in appeal. Thus the finality of the order of the Authority is made subject to the derision in appeal. In this context, it would be pertinent to read section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the basis of which the decision in S.A. Industries (P) v. Sarup Singh took the view that a Letters Patent appeal would not be competent. In this context, it would be pertinent to read section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the basis of which the decision in S.A. Industries (P) v. Sarup Singh took the view that a Letters Patent appeal would not be competent. Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act is as under: Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. In section 43 of the Delhi Act the words used are "an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final". By the use of these words, it has been made clear that an appellate order, passed by the appellate Court hearing an appeal under that Act alone, is final. It was on the basis of this provision that the Supreme Court observed in S.A. Industries (P) v. Sarup Singh (supra) that: The following legal position emerges from the said discussion: A statute may give a right of appeal from an order of a tribunal or a Court to the High Court without any limitation thereon. The appeal to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in the High Court. Under the rules made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, an appeal under section 39 of the Act will be heard by a single Judge. Any judgment made by the single Judge in the said appeal will, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to that Court. If the order made by a single Judge is a judgment and if the appropriate Legislature has, expressly or by necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal, the conclusion is enevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a single Judge under clause 10 of the Letters Patent to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the single Judge to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the single Judge to the High Court. In this context, after examining section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act it was laid down by the Supreme Court that a Letters Patent appeal being specifically prohibited by the provisions of that Act could not be competent. In N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros., it was laid down that: Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of "practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well-settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. It would be significant to note that in the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, when the Legislature provided for a second appeal, it did not prescribe that the order of the second appellate Court shall be final although while prescribing a first appeal it was specifically so stated. This gives an indication that when a second appeal comes to the High Court, it will be governed by the rules of this Court and no finality attaches to the order given by this Court hearing an appeal under section 32 of the Act. In this view of the matter, it appears that the language of section 36 indicates that the order ultimately passed by this Court in appeal alone shall be final. In section 36 of the Act, the words used were not "an appeal under this Act" as were used in the Delhi-Rent Control Act, 1958. In the light of this, therefore, it cannot be doubted that the second appeal having been decided by a learned single Judge of this Court, the order passed in that appeal would be subject to a Letters Patent appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. In the light of this, therefore, it cannot be doubted that the second appeal having been decided by a learned single Judge of this Court, the order passed in that appeal would be subject to a Letters Patent appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. As regards the question of jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority to restore an application dismissed for default, it is significant to note that the provisions contained in the Act do not provide for dismissal of an application in default; nor do they provide for restoration of any such application. The question of inherent powers of a tribunal to restore a petition dismissed in default was considered in Sunderlal v. Nandromdas. While considering the powers of an election tribunal to restore an election petition dismissed in default, it was observed in the case that: No doubt, the Act does not lay down in so many words that a petition dismissed in these circumstances can be restored; but we take it that the inherent powers which every civil Court exercises are vested in the Tribunal. It is the inherent right of a Court to restore proceedings dismissed by it ex debito justitias when sufficient cause has been made out, not for the absence but for the slight delay. In Manohar Lal v. Mohan Lal, the question of the power of the Rent Controlling Authority to set aside an ex parte order came up for consideration. After considering a number of decisions, including the decision in Ruplal v. Shiv Shankar, it was observed in that case: For these reasons I entertain no doubt in my mind that the Rent Controller has inherent power to set aside an ex parte order passed by himself. In Ruplal v. Shiv Shankar (supra), on which the learned single Judge has placed reliance, it was held that the Rent Controller has no inherent power to set aside an ex parte order. In Ruplal v. Shiv Shankar (supra), on which the learned single Judge has placed reliance, it was held that the Rent Controller has no inherent power to set aside an ex parte order. In this decision, section 21 (3) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, was considered and it was held that clause 21 (3) of that Order specifically excluded the inherent power in the Rent Controller to set aside an ex parte order as that clause provided that the order of the Rent Controller shall be final subject only to the decision of the Deputy Commissioner in appeal and that it would not be open to review. In fact, it was on the basis of the phrase "not open to review" that it was held in that case that the Rent Controller had no inherent powers to set aside ex parte orders because in a sense it amounted to reviewing the previous order. In that decision, it was observed that: In our opinion, inherent power to set aside an 'ex parte' order is excluded by the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 21 which provides that an order of the Rent Controller shall be final subject only to the decision of the Deputy Commissioner in appeal and that it will not be open to review. To set aside an ex parte order is in a sense reviewing a previous order. We, therefore, hold that no application for setting aside the ex parte order lay. A perusal of section 36 of the present Act will indicate that the phrase "it will not be open to review" has not been enacted. In these circumstances, therefore, a comparision of the provisions contained in section 36 of the Act with clause 21 (3) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses an Rent Control Order, 1949, will clearly indicate that the decision in Ruplal v. Shiv Shankar (supra) cannot be used to interpret section 36 of the Act and to come to the conclusion that the Rent Controlling Authority under the Act has no power to restore an application dismissed in default. Section 29 of the Act provides the procedure which will be followed in proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority. Section 29 of the Act provides the procedure which will be followed in proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority. It is no doubt true that there is nothing in this provision which specifically confers on the Authority powers under Order 9, Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the dismissal of an application in default or for setting aside an ex parte order. But it is also significant that there is nothing in the provisions of the Act to show that the Rent Controlling Authority cannot exercise the inherent powers of dismissal and restoration as there is no provision taking away that inherent power in the Authority. In the light of the discussion above, therefore, the view taken by the learned single Judge does not appear to be justified. The Rent Controlling Authority under the Act has inherent powers to dismiss an application for default and also to restore it on sufficient cause being shown. In these circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Mandsaur, on 2nd August 1965 is set aside and it is directed that the Authority shall now examine on merits the application for restoration made by the appellant and dispose of it in accordance with law. The appellant shall be entitled to costs throughout. Counsel's fee for this appeal is fixed at Rs.50 if certified.