Judgment A.B.N. Sinha & B.D. Singh, JJ. This is a reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Sessions Judge of Purnea recommending that the orders passed by the learned Third Assistant Sessions Judge of Purnea dated the 16th of August 1967 upholding the order of conviction of Matlu Manjhi and three others under section 188 of the Indian Penal Cede and sentencing them each to undergo simple imprisonment for one month passed by the learned Munsif-Magistrate, Second Class, Purnea, and dismissing the appeal of the accused persons should be quashed as a whole. 2. The facts lie in a brief compass. One Baijnath Prasad, the Karpardaz of a lady named Zubaida Khatoon filed a petition before the Block Development Officer, East Block, Parnea, under Section 69 of the Bihar Tenancy Act against the aforesaid accused persons for division of the produce in respect of a holding for which rent was taken by division of the produce. The petition was registered as case no. 2 of 1964, having been filed on the 27th of October, 1964. On the 16th of November, 1964 the Block Development Officer, who was exercising the powers of the Collector, appointed the Mukhia of Kochaili Dagarua Gram Panchayat for getting the crops of the land concerned harvested and divided between the aforesaid Zubaida Khatoon and the accused persons and the case was directed to be put up on 1.12.1964 for further orders. Meanwhile the accused persons, however, appeared before the Block Development Officer and filed a petition that the crops were not ripe for harvesting and prayed for the stay of harvesting of the crops of the land in question. The Mukhia, however, meanwhile acting as an officer appointed under Section 69(1) of the Bihar Tenancy Act had issued a notice upon the accused persons prohibiting them from going and removing the crops grown upon the land in question. When in disobedience of the said notice the accused persons had cut a way and removed the crops standing on the land, the Mukhia submitted a report on the 23rd of December, 1964 informing the Block Development Officer about it, whereupon the Block Development Officer issued notice to the accused persons to show cause as to why they should not be prosecuted under Section 188 of the Penal Code. That notice was however returned unserved. That notice was however returned unserved. The Block Development Officer then filed a written complaint on the 25th of June, 1965 against the accused persons under Section 188 of the Penal Code in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Purnea, who took cognizance of the offence and the case was ultimately transferred for trial and disposal to the court of a Munsif-Magistrate at Purnea. The trial court found the prosecution case true and convicted the accused persons under Section 188 of the Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo simple imprisonment for one month as aforesaid. The accused persons, thereupon, preferred an appeal under, Section 408 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Sessions Court. The appeal was transferred for disposal to the court of the learned Third Assistant Sessions Judge, Purnea, who, as mentioned already, upheld the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their appeal, the accused persons, instead of coming to this Court directly under Section 439 of the Code, approached the learned Sessions Judge, Purnea, who called for the records of the proceedings in exercise of his powers under Section 435 of the Code from the court of the Assistant Sessions Judge and bas now submitted a report to this Court under Section 438 of the Code recommending to quash the appellate orders passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. 3. When this case was first listed for hearing before the learned Single Judge, he was of the opinion that beside the merits of the orders passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, two questions arose for decision in this case namely, (i) Whether the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge to whom an appeal is transferred by the Sessions Judge and disposed of is a court inferior within the meaning of Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and can, in such a case reference be made by the Sessions Judge and (ii) Whether on such a reference even if it is incompetent this Court should exercise its revisional powers under Section 439 of the Code. As the above two questions were in the opinion of the learned Single Judge of some importance this case has been placed before us for decision. 4. As the above two questions were in the opinion of the learned Single Judge of some importance this case has been placed before us for decision. 4. There can be no doubt that once an appeal is preferred under Section 408 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Sessions Court as was filed in the instant case, the appeal so filed can be transferred for disposal by the Sessions Judge under Sub-section (2) of Section 409 either to the Additional Sessions Judge or to the Assistant Sessions Judge. In the instant case the learned Sessions Judge of Purnea, acting under the powers conferred on him order Section 409 (2) of the Code had in fact transferred the appeal for disposal to the learned Third Assistant Sessions Judge. The question which arises for determination is whether once the Assistant Sessions Judge has disposed of the appeal after the same has been transferred to him by the Sessions Judge acting under Section 409 (2) of the Code, can the proceedings of that appeal be called for by the Sessions Judge order Section 435 of the Code, as if they were proceedings of the inferior Criminal Court? In our opinion the question must be answered in the affirmative. 5. Under Section 17(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure all the Assistant Sessions Judges are made subordinate to the Sessions Judge in whose court they exercise the jurisdiction and it is the Sessions Judge who may make rules consistent with the Code as to the distribution of business among such Assistant Sessions Judge. In our opinion being 'subordinate' necessarily means being 'inferior' though the vice versa may not be true. Now under Section 435(1) of the Code of Criminal' procedure any Sessions Judge, at his discretion, can call for, and examine the records of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court situate within the local limits of his jurisdiction for the purposes of satisfying himself under that sub-section of Section 435. Reading Section 17(3) with Section 435(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it appears to us that the Court of an Assistant Sessions Judge was an inferior Criminal Court so far as the Sessions Judge was concerned for the purposes of Section 435(1) of the Code. Reading Section 17(3) with Section 435(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it appears to us that the Court of an Assistant Sessions Judge was an inferior Criminal Court so far as the Sessions Judge was concerned for the purposes of Section 435(1) of the Code. It will be noticed that the Sessions Judge enjoys under Section 435(1) the power to call for and examine the record of any proceeding and it is plain that in the absence of any words of limitation the words 'any proceeding' must be held to include the appellate proceedings as well. It follows therefore, that the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge to whom an appeal is transferred by the Sessions Judge and disposed of was a court inferior within the meaning of Section 435 of the Code and in such a case the Sessions Judge could call for the records of the appeal under Section 435(1) and make a reference to this Court under Section 438 of the Code. Our attention was drawn to the language of the explanation of Sub-section (1) of Section 435 of the Code and it was urged that in the said explanation though the Magistrates exercising the original or appellate jurisdiction are mentioned no mention has been made of an Assistant Sessions Judge. There is no substance in the argument. It may, however, be pointed out that the reason why only the Magistrates whether exercising the original or appellate jurisdiction are mentioned in the explanation of Sub-section (1) of Section 435 is that under Sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 17 the Magistrates are made either subordinate to the District Magistrate or to the Sub-divisional Magistrate subject to the general control of the District Magistrate. It is because of that provision that the necessity for a deeming clause under the explanation of Sub-section (1) of Section 435 arose. So far as the Assistant Sessions Judges are concerned Sub-section (3) of Section 17 as pointed out above has already made them subordinate to the Sessions Judge and there was thus no use of duplicating the provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 17 by including the Assistant Sessions Judge with the Magistrates. So far as the Assistant Sessions Judges are concerned Sub-section (3) of Section 17 as pointed out above has already made them subordinate to the Sessions Judge and there was thus no use of duplicating the provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 17 by including the Assistant Sessions Judge with the Magistrates. The view expressed above in regard to the courts of Assistant Sessions Judges being inferior to that of the Sessions Judge finds support from the decisions in the cases of (1) Thakur Jaikrit Singh and others V. Sohan Raj (A.I.R. 1959 Rajasthan 63) and (2) the Municipal Board, Bijnore V. Bhim Singh (A.I.R. 1962 Allahabad 450). In the former case the learned Judge pointed out that in Section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code the word 'inferior' was substituted for the word subordinate which used to occur before the amendment, and it was obvious that the change was knowingly effected because the word 'inferior' is of much wider import than the word 'subordinate'. One court may be inferior to another court without being subordinate to it. In other words, there may be inferiority without subordination though there cannot be subordination without inferiority. The latter case is more or less similar to the instant case. There also the records of the proceeding of an appeal before the Assistant Sessions Judge had been called for by the Sessions Judge under Section 435 and had been referred to the High Court under Section 438. It was pointed cut by the learned Judge that the Assistant Sessions Judge was subordinate to the Sessions Judge and consequently the court of the Assistant Sessions Judge was an inferior criminal court and the Sessions Judge could entertain a revision application against an order of the Assistant Sessions Judge passed in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. 6. In regard to the second question there cannot be any doubt that whether reference is competent or incompetent, once the record of a particular criminal case has come to the notice of this Court there was nothing to prevent it from exercising its revisional powers under Section 439 of the Code. Indeed cases are not unknown when having come to know of the facts regarding the irregularities in a particular case either on its administrative side or otherwise this Court has exercised its revisional jurisdiction suo motu. Indeed cases are not unknown when having come to know of the facts regarding the irregularities in a particular case either on its administrative side or otherwise this Court has exercised its revisional jurisdiction suo motu. In the instant case the facts and the relevant materials are before us and therefore even if it could be successfully urged that the reference was incompetent there was no difficulty in disposing of the points which arose on the merits of this case in the exercise of this Court's revisional jurisdiction. 7. As to the merits, it is quite clear that the learned Sessions Judge has taken a correct view of the matter. An application under Section 69(1) of the Bihar Tenancy Act must be filed by the landlord. In the present case the application was not filed by Zubaida Khatoon herself but it was filed by her Karpardaz. Moreover the prohibitory order was issued not by the collector nor by the Block Development Officer but by the Mukhia who was an officer appointed within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 69 of B.T. Act. The Mukhia was appointed for the limited purpose of dividing the produce. It is only the Collector or an officer exercising the powers of a Collector who can under Sub-section (3) of the aforesaid section make the prohibitory order. In the circumstances, neither there was a valid proceeding under Section 69(1) of the Bihar Tenancy Act nor there was any lawful order prohibiting the accused persons from going upon the land and harvesting the crop. Therefore the prosecution and conviction of the accused persons under Section 188 of the Penal Code was wholly misconceived and must be set aside. The, reference is accordingly accepted. The conviction of Matlu Manjhi and three others under Section 188 of the Penal Code and the order of sentence passed thereunder must accordingly be set aside. Application allowed