ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - This is an application in revision questioning the validity of the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif dismissing a suit instituted by the Plaintiff Applicant Under Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter called the Act) for determination of the rent of a certain godown situate in Mohalla Nayaganj, Kanpur. 2. Admittedly the Plaintiff Applicant is the landlord of the godown in dispute and the Defendant opposite party Ram Sajiwan Tripathi is the tenant by virtue of an allotment order obtained by him on 21-3-1964. There is no dispute between the parties that the godown in dispute is a part of a big building belonging to the Plaintiff, constructed before 1st July 1946. There is further no dispute between the parties that immediately before the passing of the allotment order in favour of the Defendant one Siddhnath Sehgal kept the godown as tenant and was paying rent at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month. There arose a dispute between the Plaintiff landlord and the Defendant tenant on the rate of rent. The Defendant as tenant was not prepared to pay monthly rent-of Rs. 45/-, but the landlord demanded the rent at that rate. The Defendant then made an application before the District Magistrate u/s 3-A of the Act for determination of the annual reasonable rent of the godown. The Rent Control Officer who had the delegated powers of the District Magistrate, after hearing both the parties determined the annual reasonable rent at the monthly rental of Rs. 8.90 Paisa. The Plaintiff being aggrieved instituted a suit Under Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act in the court of the Munsif. It was pleaded by the Plaintiff that the annual reasonable rent fixed by the District Magistrate was inadequate. It was further pleaded that it was incorrectly fixed, as the building of which the godown was a part was never assessed to Municipal assessment. It was prayed that the court may determine the proper rent. 3. The suit was contested on the plea that the annual reasonable rent was determined in accordance with law and it was not inadequate. A further plea was raised that it was barred by principles of res judicata and estoppel. The learned Munsif on the pleadings of the parties framed four issues. 3. The suit was contested on the plea that the annual reasonable rent was determined in accordance with law and it was not inadequate. A further plea was raised that it was barred by principles of res judicata and estoppel. The learned Munsif on the pleadings of the parties framed four issues. They were: (1) What is the fair and reasonable rent of the disputed premises? (2) Whether the suit is barred by res judicata? (3) Whether the suit is barred by estoppel? (4) To what relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled? 4. On issue No. (1), which was the main issue, the learned Munsif found that the annual reasonable rent was correctly determined by the District Magistrate as the godown in dispute was a part of the building which had been assessed by the Municipal Board. On the measurement of the area covered by the godown the learned Munsif found that the proportional rent was Rs. 8.90 Paisa per month. But the learned Munsif refused to consider any further evidence on record in determining the fair and reasonable rent for the disputed godown as he thought that under the law he could not take those circumstances into consideration. On the other issues the learned Munsif found in favour of the Plaintiff. In view of the finding on issue No. 1 the suit of the Plaintiff was dismissed. Since the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif is unappealable, hence this revision u/s 115 of the CPC before the High Court. 5. Learned Counsel for the Applicant contended that thief learned Munsif in the exercise of his jurisdiction acted with material illegality in excluding out from consideration all that material furnished by the evidence adduced on behalf of the Plaintiff which established that for the godown in dispute the previous tenants had paid a much higher rent and that similar accommodation in the locality was fetching a higher rent. According to the learned Counsel the learned Munsif completely ignored the provisions of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act which lays down that in the case of accommodation constructed before July 1, 1946, the prevailing rent on the date of the suit for similar accommodation in the locality is one of the factors which has to be taken into consideration in determining the amount of annual or monthly rent, in any suit u/s 5 of the Act. It was submitted that the learned Munsif made a wrong approach to the law applicable to such suits and proceeded on the basis as if the only power he had was to find out whether the annual reasonable rent as determined by the District Magistrate was in accordance with law. There is no doubt if what the learned Counsel for the Applicant has contended is the correct position in law then the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif would be liable to be set aside there, being an error apparent on the face of the record amounting to error of jurisdiction vitiating the result arrived at. 6. In reply the learned Counsel for the Defendant opposite party contended that the learned Munsif has not made any erroneous approach in law and his finding on the question of annual reasonable rent for the accommodation in dispute being consistent with the provisions of law, no error of jurisdiction will arise and this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot interfere. 7. The question which arises for determination in this revision then is whether the learned Munsif fell into a legal error in taking the view that the evidence as to the rent of the godown in dispute paid by the previous tenant and other evidence relating to the rent of similar accommodation in the locality was excluded and could not be made the basis of determining the amount of annual or monthly rent. The learned Counsel for the Applicant has not challenged before me that the building of which the godown in dispute was a part had been assessed to Municipal assessment and the calculation of annual reasonable rent proportionately for the godown was in accordance with the provisions of Section 3A of the Act. The learned Counsel for the Applicant has not challenged before me that the building of which the godown in dispute was a part had been assessed to Municipal assessment and the calculation of annual reasonable rent proportionately for the godown was in accordance with the provisions of Section 3A of the Act. Learned Counsel put the case of the Plaintiff on the footing that the annual reasonable rent being inadequate the suit was filed for determination of the fair rent by the court below. 8. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the opposite party that the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act do not contemplate a suit by the landlord for fixation or determination of rent of an accommodation as under those provisions the landlord can only file a suit for declaration and the Plaintiff not having prayed for declaration but having prayed for determination or fixation, his suit was not maintainable. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on the case of Deo Datt Dwivedi v. Ajit Prased Dube 1963 ALJ 888. A learned Single Judge in that case held, where the landlord sued for fixation of rent and not for a declaration that the annual reasonable rent was inadequate, the Civil Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit and pass a decree for fixation of rent to be paid by the tenant to the landlord. This decision is no longer good law. It stands overruled by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Vidya Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal 1964 ALJ 858 wherein it has been held after review of the case law that u/s 5(4) of the Act a suit by a landlord for fixation of rent is maintainable. A subsidiary argument was then advanced by the learned "counsel for the Defendant opposite party that where the rent has been declared or determined u/s 3-A of the Act by the District Magistrate, the only remedy open to the tenant or the landlord u/s 5(4) of the Act will be by way of filing a suit for correction of the determination by the District Magistrate and not for fixation of or determination of rent independently of the annual reasonable rent. It is difficult to accept this argument. It is difficult to accept this argument. I do not find from the language of Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act that a landlord cannot have a declaration of rent or fixation of rent without first questioning the correctness of the determination of the annual reasonable rent by the District Magistrate u/s 3 A of the Act. As explained by the Division Bench in the case of Vidya Rani v. Kanhaiya Lal (supra) in its first part Sub-section (4) of Section 5 enumerates various circumstances under which a landlord or a tenant may approach the court for suitable relief. In its second part Sub-section (4) deals with the reliefs which can be obtained, that is, a relief for a declaration of rent, or relief for fixation of rent. It is not possible to predicate that a particular relief is meant for a particular situation mentioned in the first part of Sub-section (4). It is always open to a court to grant to a Plaintiff the appropriate relief according to the circumstances of the case. Moreover, I do not see any practical difference between a relief for declaration or fixation of rent. If a landlord feels that the annual reasonable rent is inadequate, that is, insufficient, he can approach the court for determination of the proper rent. Thus the inadequacy of annual reasonable rent is the cause which compels the landlord to institute the suit and then the appropriate relief would be given by the court. It is not necessary, therefore, for the landlord to seek a relief for declaration or fixation of rent. If a landlord feels that the annual reasonable rent is inadequate, that is, insufficient, he can approach the court for determination of the property rent. Thus the inadequacy of annual reasonable rent is the cause which compels the landlord to institute the suit and then the appropriate relief would be given by the court. It is not necessary, therefore, for the landlord to seek a relief for the correction of the annual reasonable rent if it has been determined u/s 3A. There may be a case that the annual reasonable rent though correctly fixed by the District Magistrate u/s 3-A of the Act yet may not satisfy the landlord as to its adequacy. Likewise, the rent correctly declared or fixed u/s 3-A may appear to be excessive to the tenant. There may be a case that the annual reasonable rent though correctly fixed by the District Magistrate u/s 3-A of the Act yet may not satisfy the landlord as to its adequacy. Likewise, the rent correctly declared or fixed u/s 3-A may appear to be excessive to the tenant. One wav to look at Sub-section (4) is that the words or that the reasonable annual rent declared by the District Magistrate u/s 3-A is not correct were introduced by amendment in 1954 to make it abundantly clear that the determination or declaration by the District Magistrate u/s 3-A of the Act of the annual reasonable rent was not final but could always be interfered with by the Civil Court if on other considerations mentioned u/s 6 of the Act the court came to the conclusion that it was not the fair rent. It cannot be doubted that the fair rent, monthly or annual, could even be determined by the Civil Court in those cases also where there was a prior declaration u/s 3-A of the Act. The legislature has used the words "reasonable annual rent declared by the District Magistrate u/s 3A is not correct." I think when a landlord approaches the Civil Court on the plea that the annual reasonable rent is inadequate, that is, far below than what it ought to be, or when the tenant approaches the Civil Court on the plea that the annual reasonable rent is far higher than what it ought to be, then both are saying that the annual reasonable rent as declared or determined by the District Magistrate u/s 3A is not correct. I do not think the amendment has in any way brought a change in the basic structure of the provisions of Sub-section (4). To remove all doubts and for clarity the legislature explicitly included what was implicit before the amendment that the incorrect declaration by a Magistrate u/s 3A will also be one of the occasions entitling the landlord or the tenant to approach the Civil Court. Further I do not find any restriction in the language of Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act that a landlord or a tenant cannot include more than one relief based on one or more circumstances mentioned in that section in the suit. Further I do not find any restriction in the language of Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act that a landlord or a tenant cannot include more than one relief based on one or more circumstances mentioned in that section in the suit. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the contention that Sub-section (4) of Section 5 does not contemplate a suit for declaration or fixation of the fair rent where the annual reasonable tent has been declared or determined u/s 3A and the only suit which can be filed in those circumstances will be one for correction of that determination of declaration. Assuming for a moment that this line of argument is tenable, even then the practical result will be the same, If the suit is by the landlord the Court will always consider on evidence before it whether the rent was fixed at a low rate and if the suit is by the tenant then the Court will consider whether it was fixed at a high rate and if so what is the correct rate? I think the terminology used in Sub-section (4) like declaration of rent, or fixation of rent and for the matter of that, 'determination of rent' in some other parts of the Act, have the same meaning and one would not be guilty of misinterpretation if one construes that all those terms are inter-changeable in practice. In my judgment nothing much turns on whether the court gives declaration of rent or fixes the rent or determines the rent By whatever language you may call the process, the practical result is pronouncing upon what is the amount of money which is payable by the tenant to the landlord for the occupation of the accommodation let out. I do not agree with the approach of the learned Counsel for the Defendant opposite party that where the rent has been declared u/s 3A the Act contemplates a declaration simpliciter by the Court that the annual reasonable rent is inadequate or excessive without fixing the rate. Such a declaration will serve no useful purpose and will afford no effective relief either to the landlord or to the tenant. I ought pot to attribute an intention to the legislature that the time spent by the Civil Court and the labour and expenses incurred by the parties is to be wasted for nothing. 9. Such a declaration will serve no useful purpose and will afford no effective relief either to the landlord or to the tenant. I ought pot to attribute an intention to the legislature that the time spent by the Civil Court and the labour and expenses incurred by the parties is to be wasted for nothing. 9. It was then suggested by the learned Counsel that a declaration is some thing different from the fixation and the fixation of rent was only contemplated when a tenant filed a suit in the Civil Court on the plea that the agreed rent was excessive. This argument militates against the view of the Division Bench in the case of Vidya Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal (supra) and therefore unacceptable. 10. Having disposed of the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the Defendant opposite party in regard to the competency of the proceedings and the reliefs which are obtainable by the landlord in the instant case, now I proceed to consider the main point raised, viz., whether the Munsif in determining the rent of the godown in dispute was s bound to take into consideration the prevailing rent on the date of the suit for similar accommodation in the locality and the rent paid by the previous tenant of the godown. I think there can only be one answer and one answer alone to this question. The language of Section 6 of the Act is clear. Sub-section (1) of that section says that in determining the amount of annual or monthly rent in any suit u/s 5 the Court shall take into account certain matters. Then Clause (a) deals with the case of accommodation constructed before July 1, 1946. One of the circumstances which is mentioned in Clause (a) is the prevailing rent on the date of the suit for similar accommodation in the locality. This the learned Munsif was bound to take into consideration. My reading of Section 6 does not show that what is provided in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) are the only circumstances which can be taken into consideration. It is open to the learned Munsif as a Civil Court to take into consideration other relevant circumstances also emerging from the admissible evidence on record. My reading of Section 6 does not show that what is provided in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) are the only circumstances which can be taken into consideration. It is open to the learned Munsif as a Civil Court to take into consideration other relevant circumstances also emerging from the admissible evidence on record. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 does not lay down that in determining the amount of annual or monthly rent in a suit u/s 5 the Court shall only take into account what is provided in Clause (a) or (b). But what it lays down is what is provided in Clauses (a) and (b) must always be taken into consideration. The language does not warrant an exclusion of other relevant circumstances from being taken into consideration. I think the learned Munsif ought to have also taken into consideration the evidence furnished by the Plaintiff of the payment of rent by previous tenants of the accommodation in question as that would be a relevant fact in determining the fair rent payable, besides the evidence on the prevailing rent of similar accommodation which the law makes obligatory to be taken into consideration. 11. An argument was made by the learned Counsel for the opposite party that u/s 5(4) the court determines or declares the annual reasonable rent. He referred to Sub-section (3) of Section 3A of the Act and submitted that if the annual reasonable rent as determined u/s 3A were not set a side first there would come into existence two different annual reasonable rents for the same accommodation calculated on two different basis, therefore the Civil Court cannot take into consideration the circumstances mentioned u/s 6 and will remain confined to the criterion provided by Section 3A of the Act for judging the correctness of the declaration by the District Magistrate. I think instead of supporting the learned Counsel, the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 3A militate against his proposition. Sub-section (3) of Section 3A makes it clear that the rent declared or determined by the District Magistrate as the annual reasonable rent would be the annual reasonable rent till such time as a decision is taken in a civil suit Under Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 3A makes it clear that the rent declared or determined by the District Magistrate as the annual reasonable rent would be the annual reasonable rent till such time as a decision is taken in a civil suit Under Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act. It clearly means that whatever is determined as rent by the Civil Court in a suit u/s 5(4) of the Act will be come the annual reasonable rent and what was declared or determined on the District Magistrate would automatically be wiped out. It is the declaration or determination or fixation of the Civil Court which will prevail and the annual reasonable rent then would be on the basis of the fair rent, annual or monthly, found by the Civil Court. I do not find any limitation on the power of the Civil Court in taking into consideration besides the obligatory circumstances mentioned in Section 6 of the Act other relevant circumstances also emerging from the admissible evidence on record for determining the rent. It is not correct to say that in a case where the annual reasonable rent has already been declared or determined by the District Magistrate u/s 3A of the Act the court's power becomes limited and it cannot take anything into consideration except the definition of "annual reasonable rent" in Section 2(f) of the Act and the principles for calculating the annual reasonable rent stated in Section 3A of the Act. Such a narrow construction will defeat the very object for which the power has been conferred on the Civil Court and will make the declaration by the District Magistrate sacrosanct and final thus depriving the landlord and the tenant of their right to approach the Civil Court which seems to have been made the final arbiter on the rate of rents under the scheme of the Act. 12. For the reasons given above, I hold that the learned Munsif made a wrong legal approach to the question before him and having misread the law or having not properly applied the law, omitted from consideration relevant material on record, thus recording a finding which is vitiated by that error which is apparent. 13. I, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and send the case back to the learned Munsif for re-hearing and decision in accordance with law. 13. I, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and send the case back to the learned Munsif for re-hearing and decision in accordance with law. The Applicant shall be entitled to his costs.