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1970 DIGILAW 339 (MAD)

C. Palaniswamy v. K. Palaniswamy

1970-10-23

P.S.KAILASAM, VENKATARAMAN

body1970
Per Verikataraman, J.- It is doubtful whether, notwithstanding the striking down of the hereditary principle in Madras Act (III of 1895), the appointment to the office of headman would be governed by the provisions of that Act. Even assuming that section 10 of the Act would still govern the appointment, the more important point is that the right of suit given in section 13 of the Act would seem inappropriate after the hereditary principle has vanished, since the right of suit is “ on the ground that he is entitled under sub-section (2) or (3) to hold such office.” The words “is entitled to hold office” mean that the person has a claim in law or right to be appointed to the post. [Para. 27] On the reasoning that section 13 conferring a right of suit is inapplicable after the hereditary principle has vanished, there can be no doubt whatever that the revisional power of the Collector of the district under section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 will continue unimpaired. The Collector of the district will have power to make the appointment under Regulation (II of 1803) and the Assistant Collector in charge of the division will have the power under section 3 of Regulation (VII of 1828) to exercise that power of the District Collector within his own jurisdiction, subject to the control of the Collector of the district. [Paras. 27 and 28] The view of Alagiriswami, J. in W.P. No. 2517 of 1968 (Sangameswara v. Rangaswami Goundar) that after the striking down of the hereditary principle, the office has become non-hereditary and will be governed by B.S.O. No. 156 referred and doubted. [Paras. 29 and 30] Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records connected with the order of the Joint Collector, Coimbatore, in D. Dis. 78716 of 1954, etc. S. Palaniswami, for the Petitioner. The Government Pleader, S. Ramalingam and P. Pandian, for Respondents. The Court delivered the following Judgments: Venkataraman, J.- This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by one C. Palaniswamy Gounder for a writ of certiorari. There was a vacancy in the office of the village headman of Ramapatnam village in Coimbatore District, consequent on the resignation of the previous office-holder. The Court delivered the following Judgments: Venkataraman, J.- This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by one C. Palaniswamy Gounder for a writ of certiorari. There was a vacancy in the office of the village headman of Ramapatnam village in Coimbatore District, consequent on the resignation of the previous office-holder. The Assistant Collector, Pollachi, invited applications and appointed the petitioner in his proceedings, dated 24th September, 1964. One of the unsuccessful candidates, K. Palaniswamy (the first respondent herein) filed a petition to the Joint Collector, Coimbatore (the second respondent). The Joint Collector by his proceedings, dated 26th April, 1965, set aside the order of the Assistant Collector and appointed K. Palaniswamy (first respondent). The petitioner filed an appeal to the Board of Revenue (the third respondent). The Board of Revenue by proceedings, dated 14th February, 1966, dismissed the appeal. This petition has been filed to quash the order of the Board of Revenue. 2. The only point urged before us is that the Joint Collector had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Assistant Collector. The argument runs thus. The post of the village headman was previously governed by the provisions of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act (Madras Act in of 1895). Under section 10 (2) of the Act the succession shall devolve on a single heir according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture. The Supreme Court held in Gazula Dasarctha-rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh1, that the hereditary principle would offend Article 16 (2) of the Constitution and would be void. Nevertheless, according to the petitioner, the remaining provisions of the Act would apply and under those provisions there was no right of appeal to the Joint Collector against the order passed by the Assistant Collector in this case. The Act was a self-contained one and, if no appeal was provided under that Act, there was no other provision by which the Joint Collector could act. 3. It is not disputed before us by the respondents that under the provisions of the Act no appeal lay to the Joint Collector against the order of the Assistant Collector in this case, but it is urged that the Joint Collector had power under Regulation (VII of 1828) to revise the order of the Assistant Collector. 3. It is not disputed before us by the respondents that under the provisions of the Act no appeal lay to the Joint Collector against the order of the Assistant Collector in this case, but it is urged that the Joint Collector had power under Regulation (VII of 1828) to revise the order of the Assistant Collector. It is further urged that that position has been settled by more than one decision of this Court, namely, by a Division Bench in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar2by another Division Bench (Rajamannar, C.J. and Venkata-rama Aiyar, J.) in Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras3, by the observations of the Full Bench (Rajagopalan, Bala-krishna Aiyar and Rajagopala Aiyengar, JJ.) in Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib4and by the recent decision of the Full Bench (Srinivasan, Ramakrishnan and Ramamurti, JJ.) in Sivasankarasubramania Pillai v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Tuti-corin5. 4. It seems to me that the contention urged by Sri Ramalingam, the learned Counsel for the first respondent, and by the learned Government Pleader for respondents 2 to 4, on the above lines is supported by the decisions and observations relied on by them and must, therefore, be accepted. 5. The first question which has to be decided is whether, even after the hereditary principle has been struck down, Act III of 1895 would still govern the appointment and appeals or revisions therefrom. The relevant provisions of the Act on this point are these: 6. Section 3 says that the Act shall apply to the classes of village offices mentioned therein and those offices are described as hereditary. Section 10 says that, when a vacancy occurs in any of the village offices forming class (1) in section 3, the Collector shall fill up the vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the sub-sections following. Sub-section (1) lists out the disqualifications. Sub-sections (2) and (3) read as follows: (2) The succession shall devolve on a single heir according to general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible zamindaries in Southern India. (3) Where the next heir is not qualified under sub-section (1), the Collector shall appoint the person next in order of succession who is so qualified, and, in the absence of any such person in the line of succession, may appoint any person duly qualified under sub-section (1). 7. (3) Where the next heir is not qualified under sub-section (1), the Collector shall appoint the person next in order of succession who is so qualified, and, in the absence of any such person in the line of succession, may appoint any person duly qualified under sub-section (1). 7. Section 13 gives a right of suit to the person aggrieved, and, so far as is relevant, it says: " Any person may sue before the Collector for any of the village offices specified in section 3 or for recovery of the emoluments of any such office on the ground that he is entitled..................under sub-section (2) or (3) of section 10." Section 23 (1) runs thus: " From every order passed by a Collector under section 6 or 7, and from every decree or order passed by a Collector in a suit preferred under section 13, an appeal shall lie, within one month, to the District Collector, or, if the said order or decree was passed by the District Collector, an appeal shall lie, within three months, to the Board of Revenue. The decision, on appeal, of the District Collector or the Board of Revenue as the case may be, shall be final." 8. A Division Bench of this Court (Veeraswami, C.J. and Somasundaram, J.) in Nataraja v. Revenue Divisional Officer1, has proceeded on the basis that, notwithstanding the striking down of the hereditary principle, the provisions of the Act relating to appointment and appeal would apply. With great respect, I doubt the correctness of this proposition ; but, to start with, I shall proceed on the basis that the provisions of the Act, excepting the hereditary principle, would apply to the appointment in this case. 9. The word ‘Collector’, it may be noted, has not been defined in the Act. It seems to me that that is because the Legislature intended to adopt the provisions of Madras Regulation (VII of 1828), and the Madras General Clauses Act (I of 1891). 9. The word ‘Collector’, it may be noted, has not been defined in the Act. It seems to me that that is because the Legislature intended to adopt the provisions of Madras Regulation (VII of 1828), and the Madras General Clauses Act (I of 1891). Madras Regulation (VII of 1828) so far as it is relevant says: "Section 3: First.- A Subordinate, Deputy or Assistant Collector in charge of a particular division of a district shall ex officio have authority to exercise within the division under his charge all the powers granted to Collectors by the Regulations now in force, or that may be hereafter enacted, unless the contrary shall be expressly declared in any Regulation............. Third: The proceedings of subordinate, Deputy and Assistant Collectors acting under the preceding clauses shall be subject, in all cases, and in the fullest manner, to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector, who shall have power either to direct generally, that the proceedings of any of his subordinates, deputies or assistants shall be regularly submitted to himself before the decision, order or sentence is carried into execution, and to confirm, modify or annul them, or issue any further orders in the cases, as he may see fit; or in any particular case to direct that the decision, order or sentence of any of his subordinates, deputies or assistants shall not be carried into execution, and to pass such further orders as he may see fit." 10. The Madras General Clauses Act defines ‘Collector’ and ‘District Collector’ thus: "Section 3(6): ‘Collector’ shall include every officer who, for the time being, is authorised to exercise the powers of a Collector. 8. ‘District Collector’ shall mean the Chief Local Officer-in-charge of the-revenue administration of a district." 11. By virtue of Madras Regulation (VII of 1828) and Act I of 1891, the word ‘Collector’ occurring in Madras Act (III of 1895) would refer to Subordinate, Deputy or Assistant Collector in charge of a division of a district, and, in this particular case, would apply to the Assistant Collector. The word’ District Collector ‘would similarly mean the Collector of the district. The word’ District Collector ‘would similarly mean the Collector of the district. It seems to me that unless Madras Regu-lation(VII of 1828) is invoked it would not be possible to hold, merely on the provisions of Madras Act (III of 1895), and, the definitions in the Madras General Clauses Act, that the Assistant Collector in charge of a division of a district will be a Collector for the purpose of Madras Act(III of 1895), entitled to make the appointment under section 10. It is true that section 23 of the Act (III of 1895) makes a distinction between a ‘Collector’ and ‘District Collector’. Similarly, section 15 of the Act also makes such a distinction. Section 15 runs: " The District Collector may transfer to his own file any suit on the file of any Revenue Officer in charge of a division of the district or from the file of one such officer to that of another, or to the file of an Assistant or Deputy Collector not in charge of a division for disposal." 12. If, for a moment, we do not have Regulation (VII of 1828) at all and have only the General Clauses Act and the provisions in Madras Act (III of 1895), it would not be possible to hold that the Assistant Collector in charge of a division would be a Collector for the purpose of making the appointment under section 10 of the Act. If we leave out of consideration the provisions of Madras Regulation (VII of 1828), the provisions in Act (III of 1895) and the General Clauses Act would at the most suggest that, besides the Collector of a district, there may be a Collector to exercise the functions under the Act, but would not be sufficient to clothe the Assistant Collector in charge of the division with the power of appointment under section 10 of the Act (III of 1895). For deriving such a power it will be necessary to invoke section 3 of Regulation (VII of 1828), and once we reach that stage it seems to me clear that, when the power is “conferred under Regulation (VII of 1828), on the Assistant Collector in charge of the division to exercise the powers of the Collector of the district subject to the powers of the full superintendence by the Collector of the district, the Assistant Collector can exercise the power only subject to the control by the Collector of the district in the fullest possible manner. If the foundation of the power of the Assistant Collector is section 3 of Regulation (VII of 1828), since that power itself has been granted to the Assistant Collector subject to the full superintendence by the Collector of the district it is not possible to pick out merely that power and discard the power of superintendence by the Collector of the district. 1 he power must be taken in the terms it has been conferred. It may be noted that the power under section 3 of Regulation VII is conferred in general terms and is not confined to the matter of appointment of a village headman, and, as has been pointed out in Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib1and Sivasankarasubramania Pillai v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Tuticorin2the power has been granted subject to the revisional power of the Collector of the district, because the Assistant Collector may be inexperienced and it would be necessary, in the public interest, for the Collector to revise his order. In fact, it seems to me clear that, but for the revisional power vested in the Collector, the initial power would not have been granted at all to the Assistant Collector. It may further be noted that the revisional power extends to all matters on which power has been conferred on the Assistant Collector and will, therefore, extend also to the matter of appointment of a village headman. On this reasoning it is quite clear that the power of appointment exercised by the Assistant Collector under Act (III of 1895), by virtue of Regulation (VII of 1828), is subject to control in the fullest possible manner by the Collector of the district. 13. On this reasoning it is quite clear that the power of appointment exercised by the Assistant Collector under Act (III of 1895), by virtue of Regulation (VII of 1828), is subject to control in the fullest possible manner by the Collector of the district. 13. It is, however, urged on behalf of the writ petitioner that since section 13 of Act III of 1895 provides for a suit by the aggrieved party and section 23 provides for an appeal and even a second appeal from the decree to be passed in the suit, it must be held that these provisions of Act III of 1895 have taken away the revisional power of the Collector of the District under Regulation (VII of 1828). A Division Bench of this Court (Bum and Lakshmana Rao, JJ.) has rejected such a contention in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar3 . There the question arose in second appeal in a suit. There was a vacancy in the post of the village munsif. The Revenue Divisional Officer at first registered the first defendant (then a minor) in the vacancy. This registration was cancelled as opposed to section 10(5) of Act III of 1895. Thereupon the Revenue Divisional Officer appointed the plaintiff-appellant permanently under section 10(3). The first defendant then filed before the District Collector what purported to be an appeal under section 23. The Collector’s office was apparently aware that there was no right of appeal and numbered the case as a revision case. The Collector, however, was under an erroneous impression that there was a right of appeal and reversed the Revenue Divisional Officer’s order of appointment and appointed the first defendant referring to turn as the appellant. The question was whether the said order, which was certainly ultra vires as an appellate order, could be treated as intra vires as an order in revision. Both the District Munsif and the District Judge held that the Collector had full power under Regulation VII of 1828, to revise and annul the subordinate’s orders. The plaintiff preferred the second appeal. The learned Judges delivered the following judgment: ” We agree with the learned District Judge that there is no conflict between Regulation VII of 1828, and Act III of 1895. The plaintiff preferred the second appeal. The learned Judges delivered the following judgment: ” We agree with the learned District Judge that there is no conflict between Regulation VII of 1828, and Act III of 1895. The right of suit which is given by section 13 of Act III of 1895, is not in any way inconsistent with the continuance of the power of ‘superinten dence, control and ‘revision ‘given to the District Collector by section 3, third of Regulation VII of 1828. Section 3 first of the Regulation expressly states that it applies to " all the powers granted to Collectors by the Regulation now in force or that may hereafter be enacted." It is only by virtue of this Regulation that a Revenue Divisional Officer gets authority to exercise the powers of ‘Collector’ under Act III of 1895. Consequently the District Collector’s power of revision created by the same Regulation, unless it is expressly taken away, must be held to continue. 1 his appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs." 14. The above decision is binding on us and further it has been referred to with approval by the Full Bench in Nagaratnam-mal v. Ibrahim Sahib1 . There Komara-velu Pillai, the permanent hereditary karnam, died on 24th March, 1950, leaving a widow Nagaratnammal and a minor son Vellaswami. The Sub-Collector, Dindigul, registered Vellaswami as the permanent karnam and appointed one Ibrahim Sahib to be his deputy during the period of his minority. Against this order Nagaratnammal preferred an appeal to the District Collector. The District Collector set aside the appointment of Ibrahim Sahib on the ground that it was undesirable to appoint a Muslim as a deputy of a Hindu minor and he directed the Sub-Collector to examine the qualification of the nominee of the widow. Ibrahim Sahib then filed a revision petition to the Board of Revenue. The Board overruling the objection of Nagaratnammal to its jurisdiction set aside the order of the Collector and confirmed the appointment of Ibrahim Sahib as deputy. Nagaratnammal preferred a revision to the Government. The Government declined to interfere on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. Thereupon a writ petition was filed in this Court, and the matter came up before the Full Bench. Nagaratnammal preferred a revision to the Government. The Government declined to interfere on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. Thereupon a writ petition was filed in this Court, and the matter came up before the Full Bench. Bala-krishna Iyer, J. delivering the judgment on behalf of Full Bench pointed out that under Regulation VII of 1828 the Board had no power in respect of the appointment of a deputy under section 10 (5) of the Act. He stated the principle thus: " Where a statute takes over and occupies a field previously not regulated by legislation, the rights and powers conferred and the obligations imposed by the statute must be worked out within the statutory framework. If a statute confers a particular right and prescribes a particular mode for its enforcement, the enforcement of the right must be sought in that mode. If it is to be enforced by a suit, then a suit must be filed, if it is to be vindicated by an appeal, then an appeal must be preferred to the specified authority. If no appeal is provided for, but only a right of revision, then that remedy must be sought in aid. Conversely, if no appeal or revision is provided for, then the order of the original authority cannot be interfered with and that order would be the first and final order. It has been noticed that under Act III of 1895 a right to sue is given to establish title to certain offices. A right of appeal and in some cases a right of second appeal are given in respect of certain punitive orders. Only a single right of appeal is given in respect of certain other punishments. In respect of an appointment made under section 10(5), neither a right of appeal nor a right of revision is provided for; the order of the District Collector cannot therefore be interfered with by any higher authority." Then follows what is relevant for us: " The question may be asked: Has the District Collector power to interfere with an order passed by the Divisional Officer, i.e., the Collector, under section 10(5)? The decision in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar1, helps, in answering this question." 15. The decision in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar1, helps, in answering this question." 15. After setting out the facts in the case and the reasoning therein, Balakrishna Aiyar, J. concludes thus: "They (Burn and Lakshmana Rao, JJ.) therefore held that the Collector had power to interfere." 16. Thiru Palaniswami, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has urged that the observations of the Full Bench referring to Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagarmatha Iyengar2 were obiter, because the question before the Full Bench was merely whether the Board had the power to revise the order of the District Collector and they were not directly concerned with the powers of the District Collector. The learned Counsel goes further and says that we cannot construe the observations of the Full Bench as approving of the reasoning in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar1 and that we must construe the observations merely as referring to the earlier decision without the Full Bench expressing any opinion of their own. I agree that the power of the Collector of the district to set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer did not directly arise before the Full Bench and that therefore the observations on that question are obiter. But, even so, they are entitled to weight. In any case, I cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel that the Full Bench did not approve of the reasoning in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar1 . They had earlier pointed out that the enforcement of the right of the aggrieved person must be sought in the mode prescribed by the statute and that, since in respect of the appointment of a deputy made under section 10 (5) neither a right of appeal nor a right of revision was provided for, the orders of the District Collector could not be interfered with by the higher authority. Having pointed out that, they raised the question whether the District Collector had himself power to interfere with the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. They posed the question, because Act III of 1895 did not by itself confer any power on the District Collector to interfere with the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer under section 10 (5) and they observed: “The decision in Srinivasa Iyengar v.Jagannatha Iyengar1, helps in answering this question.” 17. They posed the question, because Act III of 1895 did not by itself confer any power on the District Collector to interfere with the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer under section 10 (5) and they observed: “The decision in Srinivasa Iyengar v.Jagannatha Iyengar1, helps in answering this question.” 17. The use of the word ‘helps ‘shows that the Full Bench approved of the decision ; otherwise they would have stated clearly that they respectfully dissented from the decision in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar1.It may be noted that in respect of some other decisions the Full Bench expressed their dissent.191 18. The recent Full Bench decision in Sivasankarasubramania Pillai v Revenue Divisional Officer, Tuticorin1, has interpreted the observations of the Full Bench in Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib2as approving of the decision in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengr3, and have also emphatically expressed their opinion that in such a case the Assistant Collector in charge of a division derived his power only under section 3 of Regulation VII ot 1828 and that the exercise of that power was subject to revision in the fullest possible manner by the Collector of the district (which will include the Joint Collector). 19. The recent Full Bench had to deal with three writ petitions. W. P Nos 1097 of 1963, 1225 of 1963 and 424 of 1964 In W.P. 1027 of 1963, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tuticorin, had suspended a village headman for one year for not issuing printed receipts and for misappropriation. The village headman did not file any appeal, but the District Revenue Officer took up the matter suo motu and removed the village headman from service. The village headman filed a petition before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue held that the District Revenue Officer had undoubtedly jurisdiction to revise the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer by virtue of section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828, but set aside the order of the District Revenue Officer, because the charges were vague. The village headman filed a petition before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue held that the District Revenue Officer had undoubtedly jurisdiction to revise the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer by virtue of section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828, but set aside the order of the District Revenue Officer, because the charges were vague. The village headman filed a writ petition to quash the proceedings of the Board and the District Revenue Officer, his main contention being that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer had become final and the District Revenue Officer had no power to revise that order The contention was that Act III of 1895, did not confer any such power of appeal or revision on the District Collector. It was in that connection that the Full Bench had to examine the whole question. In the other two writ petitions-the question was whether the Collector of the district had power to set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer confirming a sale held under the provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act II of 1864. The Full Bench was constituted because there was a supposed conflict between two Full Bench decisions of this Court, namely, Chittayya v. Secretary of State for India1, and Nagarat-nammal v. Ibrahim Sahib2. Chittayya v. Secretary of State for India1, was itself formed to resolve a conflict between two earlier Bench decisions in Gnanasam-banda Pandara Sannadhi v. David Nadar3, and Brahmayya v. Pappusetti4. In Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. David Nadar3. it was held that the Revenue Divisional Officer in exercising the power of sale under Act II of 1864, derived his authority under Madras Regulation VII of 1828, and the corresponding later Regulation VII of 1857, that such power was subject to control by the Collector of the district in the fullest possible manner, and that consequently the Collector of the district had power to set aside the sale. This decision was not brought to the notice of the Bench which decided Brahmayya v. Pappusetti4, which took a contrary view. The Full Bench in Chittayya v. Secretary of State for India1 , affirmed the correctness of the decision in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. David Nadar3, and overruled the later Bench decision. This decision was not brought to the notice of the Bench which decided Brahmayya v. Pappusetti4, which took a contrary view. The Full Bench in Chittayya v. Secretary of State for India1 , affirmed the correctness of the decision in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. David Nadar3, and overruled the later Bench decision. The decision, however, was very brief and an attempt was made to convince the learned Judges of the Full Bench (Srinivasan, Rama-krishnan and Ramamurti, JJ.,) in Siva-sankarasubramania Pillai v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Tuticorin5that Chittayya v. Secretary of State for India1, had been wrongly decided and must be referred to a larger Bench. Hence it became necessary for the learned Judges (Srinivasan, Ramakrishnan and Rama-murthi, JJ.) to examine the matter afresh and they reiterated the reasoning adopted in the earlier decisions that the Revenue Divisional Officer became empowered to hold a sale under the Revenue Recovery Act, only by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828, that the Collector of the District had under the same Regulation the fullest power to revise the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and that such power could be exercised even after the sale had been confirmed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. The learned Judges, of course, indicated that the Collector of the district must act with circumspection before exercising that power. In that connection they pointed out that Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib1, though it did not refer to Chittayya v. Secretary of State for India2, reiterated the same principle by referring with approval to Srinivaa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar9, and Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras.4 20. Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras4, was also a case where the question of the power of the Collector of the district to revise the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer did not directly arise, and the question which directly arose was whether the Board and the Government had power to interfere with the order of the District Collector. Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras4, was also a case where the question of the power of the Collector of the district to revise the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer did not directly arise, and the question which directly arose was whether the Board and the Government had power to interfere with the order of the District Collector. The learned Judges (Rajamannar, C. J., and Venkatarama Aiyar, J.) held that the Government and the Board did not have any such power, and they observed: " We do not desire to say anything about the powers of the Government to interfere with the order of the Board of Revenue generally, because we are convinced that the Board of Revenue itself had no power to interfere with the order passed by the District Collector in a case like the present. Under section 10 (5) of the Act it is the Collector who has got the power to appoint a qualified person to discharge the duties of the office when a minor is registered as heir. Ordinarily this power is exercised by the Revenue Divisional Officer. This is because of the provisions of Regulation VII of 1828, viz., the Madras Subordinate Collectors Regulation. Under subclause (3) of clause 3 of that Regulation the proceedings subordinate and Assistant Collectors are made subject, in all cases and in the fullest manner, to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector, who shall have power either to direct generally that the proceedings of any of his subordinates or assistants shall be regularly submitted to himself before the decision, order or sentence is carried into execution, and to confirm, modify or annul them, or issue any further orders in the case, as he may see fit ; or in any particular case to direct that the decision, order or sentence of any of his subordinate or assistants shall not be carried into execution, and to pass such further orders as he may see fit. It is evidently under the provisions of this Regulation that the order passed by this Sub-Collectors and Revenue Divisional Officers are revisable by the District Collector. In this case the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer removing the petitioner and appointing another as the person to discharge the duties of the office during the minority of the registered heir was liable to be revised by the District Collector. In this case the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer removing the petitioner and appointing another as the person to discharge the duties of the office during the minority of the registered heir was liable to be revised by the District Collector. The District Collector in the exercise of this power set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and restored the petitioner to his original position. This order of the District Collector was not subject to any appeal or revision and we are unable to discover any statutory power under which either the Board of Revenue or the Government could interfere with his order.“ 21. We shall now refer to the following passages in the recent Full Bench decision in Sivasankarasubramania Pillai v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Tuticorin1, bearing on this point. Referring to Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib2, the Full Bench says (at page 335 of the M. L.J. Report)-: ” It was also held that the Board of Revenue has no general powers of supervision or revision as such a power is not conferred under Act III of 1895. The Full Bench pointed out that an appeal before the District Collector in respect of an order of appointment of a deputy under section 10(3) would not lie, the order of the District Collector could be treated as intra vires as an order in revision by virtue of section 3 (3) of Regulation VII of 1828. It is important to notice that in recognising the power of revision of the District Collector under Regulation VII of 1828 the Full Bench referred with approval to the two Bench decisions of this Court, Srinivasa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar2, and Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras3, in which the revisional power of the District Collector was upheld by virtue of Regulation VII of 1828. There is no conflict between Chittayya v. Secretary of State4, and Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib5. The two decisions dealt with two different enactments, though in both the scope of the powers of the District Collector under Regulation VII of 1828 came up for discussion. The important point to be noticed is that such observations as are made in the judgment of the Full Bench only support the ratio decidendi in the earlier Full Bench, Chittayya v. Secretary of State6, though there was no specific reference to that decision. The important point to be noticed is that such observations as are made in the judgment of the Full Bench only support the ratio decidendi in the earlier Full Bench, Chittayya v. Secretary of State6, though there was no specific reference to that decision. In other words, far from the later Full Bench revealing any divergent note, the trend of reasoning therein so far as the power of revision of the District Collector under Regulation VII of 1828 is concerned (it) is on the same lines as the earlier Full Bench.“ 22. Dealing specifically with W. P. No. 1027 of 1963, they observed (at page 343 of the M. L. J. Report): — ” It is urged that Madras Act III of 1895 is a self-contained exhaustive enactment, dealing with appointment of hereditary village officers, their emoluments, disciplinary jurisdiction over them and the punishments to be imposed with regard to their misconduct, that the powers of the Subordinate officers, the District Collector and the Board of Revenue, are all to be found only from the provisions of this Act and that the District Collector cannot exercise any power or jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Subordinate officer outside the provisions of this Act. There is no residuary power continuing to inhere in the District Collector after this Act came into force. It is therefore urged that if in respect of an order of suspension passed by the subordinate officer no appeal is preferred to the District Collector under section 23, that order becomes final and the District Collector has no revisional jurisdiction under Regulation VII of 1828. In support of this, reliance was placed upon some observations in the Full Bench case, Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib1. We see no warrant whatsoever for this extreme contention either in the scheme or in the provisions of the Act or the reasonings in the Full Bench decision. On the other hand, we notice that the Full Bench, while specifically dealing with this aspect has clearly laid down that despite the provisions for a right of appeal under section 23 the District Collector will continue to have his powers of revision under Regulation VII of 1928 and that there is no inconsistency between Act III of 1895 and Madras Regulation VII of 1828." 23. At page 345 they observed: "We are unable to agree that the machinery for the right of appeal in section 23 will have the effect of extinguishing the revisional power of the District Collector under Regulation VII of 1828. The provision for appeal is for an entirely different, purpose, namely, a statutory right of appeal to the aggrieved party. The power of revision and superintendence is a different power altogether, and that is vested in the District Collector with a view to ensure and maintain the efficiency, purity, morale and the discipline amongst the subordinate revenue officials. Both the powers can co-exist and there is nothing so inherently incompatible in the two powers so as to make one hold that the existence of the one necessarily means the supersession of the other. The result of accepting such an extreme contention is that in various matters concerning revenue officials the decision of the Sub-Collector would become final virtually making him the head of the district." 24. The Full Bench again referred to the decisions including the decisions in Srinivsa Iyengar v. Jagannatha Iyengar1, Seshagiri Sarma v. State of Madras2, and Nagaratnammal v. Ibrahim Sahib3, and the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, and finally concluded: " In view of this uniform course of decisions we have no hesitation in holding that section 23 of the Act cannot be so interpreted as to have the effect of extinguishing the power of revision of the District Collector under Madras Regulation VII of 1828." 25. No doubt the decision was with reference to the punishment of a village headman under section 7 of the Act, but the reasoning applies also to the appointment of a village headman. Consequently we have to hold in this case also that the Joint Collector had power under Regulation VII of 1828 to set aside the order of the Assistant Collector. 26. The above view has also been taken by Ismail, J., in N. Sivasankara Mudaliar v. District Revenue Officer, Chingleput5. Writ Appeal W.A. No. 60 of 1970, preferred against it was dismissed at the admission stage by Veeraswami, C.J., and Gokulakrish-nan, J., in a brief judgment. 27. The above discussion has proceeded on the footing that, notwithstanding the striking down of the hereditary principle in Act III of 1895, the appointment in this case was governed by the provisions of that Act. 27. The above discussion has proceeded on the footing that, notwithstanding the striking down of the hereditary principle in Act III of 1895, the appointment in this case was governed by the provisions of that Act. As I said earlier, 1 doubt the correctness of this view. Section 3 says that the Act applies only to the class of village offices mentioned therein, and they are described as here ditary village offices. Section 10 says "when a vacancy occurs in any of the village offices forming class (1) in section 3" that is to say, hereditary offices, and it is on that basis that sub-sections (2) and (3) have been enacted. That is the essence of section 10. No doubt, the concluding portion of sub-section (3) says that, in the absence of any such person in the line of succession, the Collector may appoint any person duly qualified under sub-section (1). But, in view of the fact that the Act itself is stated to be applicable only to hereditary village offices, that provision also cannot apply once, the hereditary principle goes. However, even assuming that section 10 would still govern the appointment, the more important point is that the right of suit given in section 13 would seem inappropriate after the hereditary principle has vanished. Section 13(1) says that any person may sue before the Collector for any of the village offices specified in section 3 on the ground that he is entitled under sub-section (2) or (3) of section 10 hold such office and enjoy such emoluments. In the first place, the village offices specified in section 3 were here-tary village offices. That description cannot apply after the hereditary principle has vanished. But the more important point is that the right of suit is "on the ground that he is entitled under sub-section (2) or (3) to hold such office." The words "is entitled to hold" mean that the person has a claim in law or right to be appointed to the post. One can certainly understand the use of that word on the hereditary principle enacted in subsection (2) or sub-section (3). But I doubt whether that word is appropriate when the hereditary principle goes and there are only several competitors before the appointing authority. One can certainly understand the use of that word on the hereditary principle enacted in subsection (2) or sub-section (3). But I doubt whether that word is appropriate when the hereditary principle goes and there are only several competitors before the appointing authority. In such a case nobody can say that he is entitled under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 10 to hold the office. He cannot even say that he is entitled even under the concluding portion of sub-section (3) of section 10. All that he can urge is that he is in person with better qualifications than the rest and should have been appointed. But the appointment vests in the discretion of the appointing authority and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. What I have said is what we understand by the term " is entitled ". In the Concise Oxford Dictionary the relevant meaning is given as, "give (person) a claim (to a thing, to do)" . The words "is entitled" normally mean that the claim made is definite and must be accepted as a matter of course, if the facts and law are properly determined. One thinks of a suit only in such a case and not in a case where the contention is that even as a matter of discretion, a person should have been preferred to others. On the reasoning that section 13 conferring a right of suit is inapplicable after the hereditary principle has vanished, there can be no doubt whatever that the revisional power of the Collector of the district under section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 will continue unimpaired, because the only argument throwing doubt on the existence of that power was the fact that there was a right of suit under section 13 with a further right of appeal and a second appeal from the decree passed in the suit. 28. It may be asked where at all is the provision for the appointment by the Assistant Collector, if section 10 of Act III of 1895 will no longer apply ? 28. It may be asked where at all is the provision for the appointment by the Assistant Collector, if section 10 of Act III of 1895 will no longer apply ? The answer is that the Collector of the district will have power to make the appointment under Regulation II of 1803 and the Assistant Collector in charge of the division will have the power under section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 to exercise that power of the District Collector within his own jurisdiction, subject, of course, to the control of the Collector of the district. This is the view which Alagiri-swami, J., has expressed in Sangameswara v. Rangaswami Gounder1 . 29. In the above writ petition, Alagiri-swami, J., has also expressed the view, that after the striking down of the hereditary principle, the office has become non-hereditary and will be governed by B.S.O. 156 and that a first appeal will lie to the Collector of the District against the order of appointment made by the Assistant Collector. B.S.O. No. 156 is entitled " Appointment punishment and removal of holders of village offices not governed by statute other non-hereditary artisans“. B.S.O.No.156 (3), so far as is material, runs thus: ”Claimants to these village offices being unable to obtain redress by the institution of suits under Act III of 1895, are allowed a single appeal against departmental orders of appointment. Where, however, the order of the Divisional Officer appointing particular person is set aside by the Collector and another person is appointed, an appeal to the Board by the person prejudicially affected by the Collector’s order will be allowed. Appeals should not be admitted in regard to claims to temporary vacancies. 30. It seems to me, however, that B.S.O. No. 156 in its original intendment was not meant to apply at all to a case like this. B.S.Os. 147 to 154 deal with hereditary village offices governed by statute and B.S.O. No. 156 deals with offices not governed by statute. That was the setting in which B.S.O. No. 156 was framed and that is why, in my opinion, B.S.O.156 (3) says: “Claimants to these village offices being unable to obtain redress by the institution of suits under Act III of 1895 are allowed a single appeal against departmental orders of appointment.” 31. That was the setting in which B.S.O. No. 156 was framed and that is why, in my opinion, B.S.O.156 (3) says: “Claimants to these village offices being unable to obtain redress by the institution of suits under Act III of 1895 are allowed a single appeal against departmental orders of appointment.” 31. It was because these offices were not governed by statute no redress could be obtained by the institution of suits under Act III of 1895 and that was why a departmental appeal was allowed. This view has been expressed by Veeraswami, C.J. and Somasundaram, J. in Nataraja v. Revenue Divisional Officer1, dissenting from the contrary view expressed by Ismail, J., in W. P. No. 2791 of 1967, dated 25th August, 1969. B.S.O. No. 156 was framed before the Constitution came into force and nobody ever thought then that the hereditary principle of the Act would be struck down. It would not be right to hold that the B. S. O. was intended even to deal with a situation which would arise after the Constitution came into force striking down the hereditary principle. It may be added that only recently, by Act XX of 1968, Madras Act III of 1895 was repealed and a rule was framed in G.O. Ms. No. 2298, Revenue, dated 1st December, 1968, that the Standing Order of the Board of Revenue applicable to non-hereditary village offices shall apply to every holder of a village office to which the Madras Act II of 1894 or Madras Act III of 1895 was applicable immediately before the 1st of December, 1968. This rule was not in force when the orders were passed in this case by the Assistant Collector and by the Joint Collector. 32. As pointed out, however, the Joint Collector had power under Madras Regulation VII of 1828 to revise the order of the Assistant Collector. It is unnecessary to enquire whether the appeal to the Board was competent, because, even if the Board has no jurisdiction and the order of the Board has to be set aside, that would not help the petitioner, so long as the order of the Joint Collector stands. 33. In this view the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Under the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs. 33. In this view the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Under the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs. In our opinion, this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution and we certify accordingly. 34.Kailasam, J.- I had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother, Venkataraman, J., I agree with the conclusion arrived at by him. I would base my conclusion entirely on the strength of the recent Full Bench decision of our Court in Sivasankarasubra-mania Pillai v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Tuticorin1, where it has been held that the power of the District Collector under Madras Regulation VII of 1828 had not been extinguished. As the Full Bench decision is binding on us, the only conclusion can be that the contention that an appeal against the order of the Deputy Collector lies to the District Collector will have to be accepted. In this view, I refrain from expressing any opinion on any of the questions raised except finding that an appeal from the order of the Deputy Collector lies to the District Collector under Madras Regulation VII. I agree that this is a fit case for certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. V.S. -------- Petition dismissed; Certified as a fit case to appeal to Supreme Court.