Judgment Bahadur, J. This is an appeal under Section 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (Act V of 1920) hereinafter , referred to as “the Act”, by a debtor whose application under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act to be adjudged as an insolvent, has been dismissed by the District Judge, Monghyr by his order dated 18.1.1968. 2. According to the appellant's case he had got debts amounting to over Rs. 30,000/- which he was unable to pay. He had taken loans on hand-notes from two persons, namely, Ajoy Kumar Agrawal and Bijoy Kumar Agrawal respectively, of Rs. 18,000/- and Rs. 6,000/- who were made opposite party nos. 1 and 2 in the said application. Further, his case was that he was liable to pay Rs. 2,500/- as income tax dues and another sum of Rs. 1,300/- which was also in respect of income tax dues, under certificate started by the Certificate Officer, Monghyr. In respect of the dues of Bijoy Kumar Agrawal, the appellant's case was that he had instituted a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge of Asansol in which his claim was for a sum of Rs. 24,480/-. As the appellant had got no landed properties and had only a few utensils and cloths which were mentioned in the list of properties appended to the application which he had valued at Rs. 118/- and was prepared to place those properties at the disposal of the Court, he prayed that he be adjudged insolvent. 3. The application was opposed by the Income Tax Officer who had also filed a petition stating that the Agarwals were in collusion with the applicant and in fact the applicant did not owe any money to them and the entire case set up by him that he had obtained loans from those two persons was not true. Further, it was stated that the applicant had got a house worth Rs. 50,000/- and some other properties which he had concealed. 4. The applicant had examined himself in court and supported his assertions about the loans from Bijoy Kumar Agrawal and Ajoy Kumar Agrawal and he also supported his claim of the income tax dues and the certificate dues. Further, it was stated that the applicant had got a house worth Rs. 50,000/- and some other properties which he had concealed. 4. The applicant had examined himself in court and supported his assertions about the loans from Bijoy Kumar Agrawal and Ajoy Kumar Agrawal and he also supported his claim of the income tax dues and the certificate dues. The learned Judge, on a consideration of the evidence and the other materials on the record, came to the following conclusions : (i) that there was no witness to corroborate the petitioner on the question of taking the two loans and there was no evidence that any suit had been filed against him at Asansol. As such, he had not established his case of having taken loans from the two creditors, (ii) he did not appear to have made a full and honest disclosure about his properties; in any case, he appears to have fraudulently concealed about his share in a house at Jamalpore, and lastly, the application was an abuse of processes of the court. Accordingly, the learned Judge dismissed the application as, in his opinion, he thought that the petitioner could not be adjudged insolvent. 5. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Devendra Narain Sinha has contended that the learned Judge was in error in not judging the true scope and the nature of the proceedings before him. He submitted that for the present purpose what the learned Judge had to investigate was as to whether the petitioner, namely, the appellant, had made out a prima facie case or not before him to be adjudged as insolvent. His contention is that the presentation of a petition by the debtor has in law, to be deemed as an act of insolvency within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act and on such petition the court has to make an order of adjudication. Learned counsel says that although the explanation to Section 7 of the Act says "may make an order of adjudication", in this case all the conditions have been satisfied by the appellant and on the evidence before him, the learned Judge had no discretion in the matter but to declare him as an insolvent and the stage will come later when the appellant makes an application before him for discharge then other matters will be considered. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance on two decisions, namely of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in (1) Chhatrapat Singh Dugar V. Kharag Singh Lachhmiram and others; A.I.R. 1916 Privy Council 64, and (2) a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (2) Satdeo Narain and others V. Union of India; A.I.R 1964 Patna 521. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have observed that the Provincial Insolvency Act presented a complete and exact delineation of a debtor's right to an order of adjudication on his own petition. It would be useful to quote their own words : "Subject to the conditions specified in the Act, if a debtor commits an act of insolvency an insolvency petition may be presented by the debtor, and the Court may on such petition make an order adjudging him an insolvent. The presentation by him of a petition is deemed an act of insolvency, and on that petition the Court may make an order of adjudication." They have further observed: "In clear and distinct terms the Act entitles a debtor to an order of adjudication when its conditions are satisfied. This does not depend on the Court's discretion but is a statutory right; and a debtor who brings himself properly within the terms of the Act is not to be deprived of that right on so treacherous a ground of decision as an "abuse of the process of the Court." This case illustrates the peril of this doctrine in India, for what has been treated by the courts below as such an abuse appears to their Lordships in no way to merit this censure. It may, perhaps, give rise to contest for priority between competing creditors, but that will be, if necessary, a matter for decision hereafter in the course of the insolvency. Be that, however, as it may, their Lordships are now concerned only with the debtor's position and as to that they are satisfied that he had complied with all the conditions specified in the Act, and is entitled as of right to an order adjudging him an insolvent. Be that, however, as it may, their Lordships are now concerned only with the debtor's position and as to that they are satisfied that he had complied with all the conditions specified in the Act, and is entitled as of right to an order adjudging him an insolvent. This conclusion, apart from the decision under appeal, is in agreement with the current of authority in India, where it has been rightly held that the stage at which to visit with its due consequences any misconduct of a debtor is when his application for discharge comes before the Court, and not on the initial proceeding." 6. In the case of Satdeo Narain and others, the judgment was delivered by Mr. Justice Misra (as he then was) who has dealt with a large number of authorities of this Court as also of other Courts and has observed, which may be usefully quoted here: "It is, no doubt true that this Court has expressed an opinion in the case of Narayan Mistri V. Ram Das ILR 7 Pat 771: (AIR 1928 Pat 477) as also in the case of ILR 12 Pat 107: AIR 1933 Pat 43 that the Court is not bound to accept the statement of the petitioner but is required to investigate the facts itself, but it is to be borne in mind, at the same time, that the investigation is only of a prima facie nature and not a conclusive enquiry. As I have said above, if it were not so, the fuller enquiry which is contemplated before an order of discharge is passed would be rendered wholly nugatory. Sections 4 and 53 of the Act have made ample provision to defeat any fraud practised by the person petitioning to be adjudged an insolvent. In the case of Firm Baijnath Rameshwar Lal V. Atal Prasad Kumar, 17 Pat. LT 857: AIR 1937 Pat 134, it has been held that whether the transfers alleged to have been made by the debtor were for inadequate consideration could arise only after the order of adjudication was made. The learned Additional District Judge was, therefore, clearly in error in dismissing the application of the appellants on the ground that certain properties were transferred by them and new ones acquired in a farzi name, when this question could be gone into at a subsequent stage before the order of discharge would be passed". The learned Additional District Judge was, therefore, clearly in error in dismissing the application of the appellants on the ground that certain properties were transferred by them and new ones acquired in a farzi name, when this question could be gone into at a subsequent stage before the order of discharge would be passed". It would, thus, appear that the contentions raised by Mr. Sinha are well founded and must be accepted as correct. 7. Mr. Tarkeshwar Prasad, appearing on behalf of the respondents however, urged that there is a difference between the present case and the one that was decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as that was under the old Act, Act III of 1907; and that certain changes have been brought about by the present Act V of 1920. Learned counsel's contention is that the decision of the Privy Council is an authority for the proposition for a case under the old Act; and it would not be reasonable to stretch it to apply to the facts of the present case which are governed by the present Act. It is true that under the Act of 1907 when the debt amounted to Rs.500/- or more, the debtor had a right to present a petition when he was arrested or his property attached, then, with regard to the amount of his debts, he had the right to present the petition and he was entitled to an order of adjudication. The Court had no discretion in the matter and could not refuse to adjudicate him on any ground. The present Act of 1920 had made a condition precedent to the maintainability of a petition by a debtor that he must be unable to pay his debts and must prove his inability before he can be adjudged an insolvent. It would, thus, appear that under the present Act, the debtor's right is something short of the unqualified right which he had under the old Act of 1907. It would, thus, appear that under the present Act, the debtor's right is something short of the unqualified right which he had under the old Act of 1907. Section 10(1) of the present Act which was Section 6(3) of the old Act, so far as material for the present purpose, is in the following terms:- “10(1) A debtor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition, unless he is unable to pay his debts and – (a) his debts amount to five hundred rupees ; or (b) he is under arrest or imprisonment; in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money; or (c) an order of attachment in execution of such a decree has been made, and is subsisting, against his property." It is clear, therefore, that the matter has now to be decided as to whether the debtor in the present case, namely, the appellant has been able to satisfy the learned District Judge that he was unable to pay his debts. Mr. Tarkeshwar Prasad, in this connection, relies on a Bench decision of this Court in (3) Gobind Prasad Gir V. Kishun Lall Dhokri and others, A.I.R. 1924 Patna 166. Undoubtedly, the contention of Mr. Tarkeshwar Prasad is supported by this decision but their Lordships considered the facts of that case and then they were satisfied that the learned District Judge had taken the correct view. With this approach we have ourselves examined the evidence in the present case and had asked Mr. Tarkeshwar Prasad to show as to how the findings arrived at by the learned District Judge could be sustained in the present case; especially when it has been contended for the appellant that the learned Judge was in error in the appreciation of evidence and has come to an erroneous conclusion, even on facts. We have, therefore, looked into the evidence of the appellant, Jagdish Sao, who was examined as witness no. 1. The contention of Mr. Tarkeshwar Prasad is that the appellant had not been able to show that he was unable to pay his debts and he also appears to have concealed his properties. It has been pointed out from his evidence that he had a truck which he used to drive and for which he had been charged income tax. The contention of Mr. Tarkeshwar Prasad is that the appellant had not been able to show that he was unable to pay his debts and he also appears to have concealed his properties. It has been pointed out from his evidence that he had a truck which he used to drive and for which he had been charged income tax. Learned counsel says that it is not known, and there is no denial, as to what happened of the truck. It is impossible to accept this submission because all that he has said in his evidence is that he used to drive a truck formerly and that he was charged to income tax in that connection. The witness was examined and there is no question put to him as to what happened to the truck or whether he still owns the same. Therefore, we cannot speculate that be still bas a truck. 8. Nextly, it has been urged for the respondents that the appellant has not come with clean hands in that he still has a share in a house at Jamalpore which has been noticed by the learned Judge. This submission again is without justification on the evidence on the record. All that he has been asked in cross-examination is whether his father had a house at Jamalpore to which be said that he did not know. He asserted that he was separate from his father and that there was a partition between him and his father. Our attention has been drawn to an answer given by this witness where he has said that the house was not partitioned and that the father would have got the house. On these statements, we are asked to hold that he has a house at Jamalpore in which he has a share. The difficulty in accepting this submission is that we do not know whether he really has a house and, if so, whether he has a share and even if he has a share, what the value of the house would be These were all matters which could have easily been brought on the record by the Income Tax Department who only had contested the application before the learned District Judge. In absence of these materials, it is not possible to bold that the learned Judge was right in coming to his conclusion that there was not a full and honest disclosure about his properties. Needless to say that in the above cases the appellant had satisfied the conditions required under Section 10 of the Act and the proper order that the court should have passed would have been under Section 27 of the Act. In my opinion, he cannot be deprived by the court simply on the ground that it was an abuse of the processes of the court, which indeed it is not, on the findings arrived at by me. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the learned District Judge is set aside and it is held that the appellant be adjudged as an insolvent and the subsequent enquiry as to the bonafide of the transactions entered into by him should be taken up when the appellant puts in necessary application for his discharge. The period fixed for making such an application would depend upon the discretion of the court which would take into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case. There will be, however, no order for costs. Appeal allowed