ORDER G.C. Mathur, J. - By this revision the Applicant has challenged the order of a Magistrate 1st Class, Kanpur, dated December 29, 1965, by which he granted pardon u/s 337 Code of Criminal Procedure to R.K. Mehra, one of the accused in the case. 2. On April 7, 1962 an FIR was lodged by the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, stating that a sum of Rs. 11,430/88 had been obtained from it on the basis of forged bills by Modern Scientific and Equipment Stores though no orders had been placed with this Firm nor any item received from it. The first information report alleged commission of offences Under Sections 420 and 409 IPC. The investigation by the police revealed that R.K. Mehra and some other persons, Ganesh Prasad, Badri Prasad and others, were involved in committing these offences. After the statements of R.K. Mehra were recorded by the police and by a Magistrate an application was made u/s 337 Code of Criminal Procedure for granting pardon to R.K. Mehra. The Magistrate, before whom the application was made, by order dated August 21, 1962, granted pardon to R.K. Mehra. This order was challenged before this Court in Cr. Rev. No. 1613 of 1962 on the ground that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to tender pardon in respect of an offence u/s 409 IPC as it was not one of the offences covered by Section 337 Code of Criminal Procedure. While this revision was pending the police filed a charge-sheet on March 28, 1963, alleging commission of offences Under Sections 420, 468, 420/511 and 120-B, IPC. R.K. Mehra, who had been granted pardon, was not cited as an accused in this charge-sheet but as a witness. The revision against the order granting pardon was allowed by this Court on January 16, 1964 (See 1964 AWR 279) and the order granting pardon was set aside. Thereupon, a supplementary charge-sheet was filed in which R.K. Mehra was also impleaded as an accused. On June 5, 1965 an application was made by the complainant, Indian Institute of Technology, praying that R.K. Mehra be tendered pardon u/s 337 Code of Criminal Procedure. Another application was made on September 27, 1965, by the State Counsel for the same purpose. The accused persons filed objections to these applications. By order dated December 29, 1965, the Magistrate overruled the objections and granted pardon to R.K. Mehra. Another application was made on September 27, 1965, by the State Counsel for the same purpose. The accused persons filed objections to these applications. By order dated December 29, 1965, the Magistrate overruled the objections and granted pardon to R.K. Mehra. Against this order the Applicants preferred a revision before the ADM (J), Kanpur. The revision was dismissed on December 31, 1966. Thereupon this revision was filed on April 4, 1967. 3. The main ground on which the order granting pardon is challenged is that one of the offences mentioned in the charge-sheet i.e. 420/511 IPC is not an offence covered by Section 337 and therefore, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant pardon u/s 337. In other words the contention is that when an accused person is accused of having committed an offence covered by Section 337 as well as with an offence not covered by this section then no pardon can be granted u/s 337 Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case the offences u/s 120-B (Conspiracy to cheat), 420 and 468 IPC are offences which are covered by Section 337, but the offence u/s 420/511 IPC, being punishable with imprisonment upto 3 1/2 years only, is not an offence covered by this section. 4. The first part of Sub-section (1) of Section 337 reads thus: In the case of any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or court of Sessions, or any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 7 years, or any offence under any of the following sections of the IPC, namely, Sections 161, 165, 165-A, 216-A, 369, 401, 435 and 477-A, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a SDM or any Magistrate of the 1st class may, at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of the offence, with a view to obtaining evidence of any person, supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor in the commission thereof. The opening words of Section 337(1) show that pardon can be tendered in respect of the following offences, namely: (i) any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or Court of Sessions; (ii) any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years; and (iii) any offence Under Sections 161, 165, 165A, 216A, 369, 401, 435 and 477A, IPC. The pardon can be granted either at the stage of investigation or inquiry or trial. In the present case we are concerned with the grant of pardon at the inquiry or trial stage and not with the grant of pardon at the investigation stage. Strong reliance has been placed by learned Counsel for the Applicant on the decision of the Supreme Court in The State Vs. Hiralal Girdharilal Kothari, D.P. Chadda and F.X. Jacobs, AIR 1960 SC 360 in support of his contention that a pardon can be granted only in respect of categories of offences mentioned in Section 337(1) and not in respect of any other offences. In this case one A.L. Mehra had been granted pardon u/s 337(1) during the investigation of a case registered u/s 165A IPC, 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B IPC. After investigation a complaint was filed against the accused u/s 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B IPC. The prosecution wanted to examine Mehra as an approver at the trial. The Supreme Court held that this could not be done and observed: What we have to decide is whether a pardon u/s 337(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be granted in the case of an offence u/s 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B of the IPC. To that there can be only one answer on the terms of Section 337(1), namely, that no pardon can be granted for an offence of this nature. Therefore, as the present proceedings before the Magistrate are only for an offence u/s 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B of the IPC, Mehra cannot be examined as approver in that Court. Therefore, as the present proceedings before the Magistrate are only for an offence u/s 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B of the IPC, Mehra cannot be examined as approver in that Court. It is to be noticed that in the case before the Supreme Court there was no allegation of the commission of any of the offences mentioned in Section 337 and the only offence with which the accused were charged at the trial was one which was not covered by Section 337(1). The decision of the Supreme Court is only to this effect that pardon can be granted only in respect of the offences mentioned in Section 337(1) and that an approver cannot be examined as a witness at a trial in respect of an offence not mentioned in Section 337(1). It does not deal directly with a question which has arisen before me. 5. The language of Section 337(l) indicates that a pardon can be granted in any case in which one or more of the offences mentioned in Section 337(1) is or are alleged to have been committed. The pardon can be granted only in respect of the offences mentioned in Section 337 and cannot be granted with respect to other offences. Even where the type of offences are joined at one inquiry or trial, the pardon can be granted only in respect of the offences which are covered by Section 337. If the grant of pardon in such a case in respect of those offences only which are covered by Section 337(1) does not prejudice either the approver or the co-accused then there can be no valid objection to the grant of the pardon. Two consequences flow from the grant of pardon, namely: (i) that the approver is protected from prosecution, and (ii) that the approver ceases to be an accused and becomes a competent witness against the other accused. There is no specific provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure laying down the extent of the protection from prosecution which will be available to the approver if he fulfils the condition of making a full and true disclosure. There is no specific provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure laying down the extent of the protection from prosecution which will be available to the approver if he fulfils the condition of making a full and true disclosure. On grounds of public policy to induce the approver to make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances relating to the offence or offences in respect of which pardon has been granted it has been laid down by the courts that the protection to the approver extends not only to the offences in respect of which pardon has bean granted but also to other offences connected with them. See Queen Empress v. Ganga Charan AIR 11 All. 79, Shiam Sunder v. Emperor AIR 1911 All. 234 and Nilmadhab Chowdhry and Others Vs. Emperor, AIR 1926 Patna 279 . Since the approver is protected in respect of both types of offences he will not be embraced in making a full and true disclosure in respect of both types of offences. It will make no difference to him whether the two types of offences are tried at one trial or at two separate trials. His duty to make true and full disclosure and the protection afforded to him remain the same. 6. But so far as the persons who were co-accused with the approver are concerned it makes a vital difference to them if pardon is granted in any injury or trial where both types of offences are charged. In such a Case if pardon is granted, then the testimony of the approver will become available against the co-accused in respect of both types of offences, though it could not be used if the accused were tried Separately of the offences not covered by Ss 337. In enacting Section 337 the Legislature intended that pardon should be granted only in respect of offences mentioned in Section 337 and the testimony of the approver should be available in respect of such offences only. The decision of the Supreme Court in State v. Hira Lal (supra) shows that where no pardon could be granted in respect of a particular offence the approver could not be examined as a witness at the trial of the accused for such offence. The decision of the Supreme Court in State v. Hira Lal (supra) shows that where no pardon could be granted in respect of a particular offence the approver could not be examined as a witness at the trial of the accused for such offence. Would it make any difference in principle if the accused were tried at one trial for the offences for which pardon could be and was granted as well as for the offences for which pardon could not be granted. I think not. Either the approver can or cannot be examined as a witness for the trial of offences not mentioned in Section 337(1). In either case it would make no difference whether such offences are tried separately or together with offences covered by Section 337(1). If the approver was not competent to depose in respect of the offence at a separate trial as held by the Supreme Court he could not be a competent witness in respect of the same offence at a joint trial with other offences. The intention of the Legislature is to make the evidence of the approver available only in respect of the offences mentioned in Section 337. If the pardon is granted in an inquiry or trial where both types of offences are charged the approver becomes a competent witness and he will be required to depose in respect of both types of offences. Since he is a competent witness it would not be pitiable for the court to utilise his testimony in respect of these offences which for covered by Section 337(1) and to ignore it in respect of the other offences. In such cases the testimony of the approver will become available against the accused in respect of both types of offences. It may even be that in a particular case the accused are acquitted of the offences mentioned in Section 337(1) but are convicted of the other offences not mentioned in Section 337(1) on the basis of the statement of the approver. This would be contrary to the intention of the Legislature. The only way to avoid this result is to hold that no pardon should be granted in an inquiry or trial where commission of both types of offences is alleged. 7. This would be contrary to the intention of the Legislature. The only way to avoid this result is to hold that no pardon should be granted in an inquiry or trial where commission of both types of offences is alleged. 7. My attention has been drawn to three cases where it has been held that all the Section 337(1) requires is that there should be an offence mentioned in Section 337(1) and the fact that there are other offences alleged or charged which are not mentioned in Section 337 will not invalidate the grant of pardon. These cases are Barumal Parmanand v. Emperor AIR 1915 Sind 43, Balmokand v. Emperor AIR 1915 Lah. 16 and Ismail v. Emperor AIR 1925 Nag. 409. It is not necessary to examine all these cases as I am also of the view that the language of Section 337(1) does not support the contention that a pardon can be tendered only where the offence or all the offences alleged to have been committed is or are of the categories mentioned in Section 337(1). 8. The case of Barumal Parmanand v. Emperor which is the leading case was decided at a time when Section 337 mentioned only offences exclusively triable by a Court of Session or the High Court. In this case the accused were charged with offences Under Sections 467 and 409 IPC when pardon was granted to one of them. The offence u/s 467 IPC was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions but the offence u/s 409 IPC was not. The argument was that the grant of pardon was illegal as pardon could only be granted when all the offences charged were such as were mentioned in Section 337(1) IPC. This contention was repelled by a Bench of the Sindh Judicial Commissioners Court. It gave two reasons for the decision. The first was that the grant of pardon extends not only to the particular offence in respect of which pardon was tendered to the approver but also to other offences of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter. In other words the grant of pardon in a case in which both types of offences are charged, does not adversely affect the approver. This is correct. In other words the grant of pardon in a case in which both types of offences are charged, does not adversely affect the approver. This is correct. The second reason given was that if the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted joinder of charges in respect of the two types of offences and made no exception for cases to which Section 337(1) was applicable then it could not be supposed that the legislature intended that such joinder should be prohibited in a case where pardon is tendered. Section 233 provides that for every distinct offence there shall be a separate charge and that every such charge shall be separately tried. Sections 234, 235 and 236 Code of Criminal Procedure are exceptions to this rule and permit joinder of charges at one trial. Section 239 permits joinder of accused persons and of charges at one trial. These provisions which permit joinder of charges and of persons are merely enabling provisions and do not compel the court to either try more than one offence or more than one accused at the same trial. Joinder may be made where it does not result in any prejudice to any of the accused persons. The question of granting pardon arises after the two types of offences are charged at one inquiry or trial. If on account of the joinder the accused are likely to be prejudiced by the grant of pardon then either the joinder should not be allowed or the pardon should not be granted. The Judicial Commissioners did not at all consider the consequences of granting pardon in such a case to the accused persons. As already stated above the granting of pardon in such a case will result in serious prejudice to the accused as the testimony of the approver will become avilable against them even with respect to those offences which are not covered by Section 337(1). 9. The correct position appears to me to be that though there is no legal bar to the granting of a pardon in a case where offences mentioned in Section 337(1) are joined with offences not so mentioned pardon in such cases should not be granted if it is likely to prejudice the accused. In an inquiry or trial in which both types of offences are charged the grant of pardon is likely to result in prejudice to the accused. In an inquiry or trial in which both types of offences are charged the grant of pardon is likely to result in prejudice to the accused. From what has been stated above it appears that the granting of pardon to Mehra in this case will result in Mehra's becoming a competent witness against the Applicant and the other accused and in his testimony becoming available not only in respect of offences Under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B IPC in respect of which alone the pardon could be granted u/s 337(1) Code of Criminal Procedure but also in respect of the offence u/s 420/511 IPC in respect of which pardon could not be granted. The offence u/s 420/511 IPC is an offence distinct from the other offence charged. The grant of pardon to Mehra is bound to result in prejudice to the accused persons. That being so the grant of pardon in the present case was improper. I accordingly allow the revision and set aside the order of the Magistrate dated December 29, 1965 granting pardon to R.K. Mehra.