ORDER J.S. Trivedi, J. - The Defendant Appellant is the tenant of house No. 55/77 Nayaganj, Kanpur. The property is Waqf property. A Waqf alal Aulad was created by Mohammad Ali. Wahid Ali was the Mutwalli of the Waqf. He applied to the District Judge for permission to sell the house. On 6-5-1961 permission was granted by the District judge. Wahid Ali died in the mean time and his son Hamid Ali thereafter became the Mutwalli and instead of selling the premises Hamid Ali applied for permission to leasS the house to the firm Kedarnath Baijnath, the Plaintiff Respondents, on a monthly rent of Rs. 250 for a period of fifty years. On 25-7-1964 the District Judge Kanpur granted permission to lease out the property to the Plaintiff Respondents. On 28-7-1964 an application was moved on behalf of the Defendant Appellant offering to pay Rs. 275 per month and requesting the District Judge to revoke his order dated 25-7-1964. This application was rejected by the District Judge on 19-9-1964 on the ground that the lease had already been executed and registered. The lease in favour of the Respondents was executed and registered on 29-7-1964 and the lease deed is Ext. 13 on record. On 18-8-64 Hamid Ali sent a notice to the Defendants that the rent be paid to the new lessee i.e. the Respondents. It was mentioned in the notice that the lease deed was duly executed and registered and that the Appellant was called upon to pay all rents due against him to Lala Kedarnath and Lala Baijnath and not to him. The notice was replied by the Appellant who contended that the Respondents had not derived any valid interest in the property in suit and the question of paying rent to them did not arise. The Appellant also demanded a copy of the lease deed. By letter dated 8-9-1964 Hamid Ali replied that the terms of the lease were known to the Appellant and that the Appellant had been unsuccessfully challenging the lease and obstructing the execution of the lease in favour of the Respondents. It was reiterated in the letter that during the subsistence of the lease Kedarnath Baijnath were to be treated as the landlord of the premises vis-a vis the Appellant. On 8-1-1965 the Appellant applied for the deposit of the rent u/s 7-C of the Rent Control Act. It was reiterated in the letter that during the subsistence of the lease Kedarnath Baijnath were to be treated as the landlord of the premises vis-a vis the Appellant. On 8-1-1965 the Appellant applied for the deposit of the rent u/s 7-C of the Rent Control Act. Hamid Ali alone was shown as the landlord entitled to receive the rent. On 9-2-1965 Hamid Ali filed his objection stating that he had leased out the property and that the rent was payable to the lessee i.e. the Respondents. On 12-2-1965 a combined notice of demand and determination of tenancy was sent by the Respondents. The notice was replied by letter dated 23-2-1965 in which the Appellant denied his liability to pay the rent to the Respondents. The suit out of which this appeal arises was then filed by the Plaintiff Respondents for arrears of rent, damages, ejectment and pendent lite and future damages. The Defendant Appellant contested the suit and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was also contended that the alleged lease in favour of the Plaintiff was illegal. The trial court decreed the Plaintiffs' suit for recovery of Rs. 2430 as arrears of rent for the period commencing from 1-8-64 up to 9-8-66 with proportionate costs and dismissed the suit with respect to other reliefs. The Plaintiff Respondents preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal in part and decreed the Plaintiffs' suit for ejectment as well as for recovery of pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 100 per month. This second appeal by the Defendant is directed against this decree. 2. The main contest in this appeal is against the decree of ejectment. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has contended that the title of the Plaintiffs was not proved and the Appellant was not liable to pay rent to the Plaintiffs, especially when the Plaintiffs refused to supply the Appellant with the copy of the title deed. He has also contended that the Appellant was in actual possession of the house and the second lease of the same house was not permissible in view of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act. He has also stated that the status of the Plaintiff in any event could not be that of a landlord. 3. He has also contended that the Appellant was in actual possession of the house and the second lease of the same house was not permissible in view of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act. He has also stated that the status of the Plaintiff in any event could not be that of a landlord. 3. Before entering into the question whether the Appellant was liable to pay rent to the Plaintiffs or not it would be desirable to examine whether the lease in favour of the Plaintiffs was a valid lease or not. A lease as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, is a transfer of the right to enjoy such property in consideration of the price paid or promised. In every case of a lease there must be reserved to the landlord a reversion upon the lease, for without reversion there can be no demise and the relationship of landlord and tenant does not come into existence. This reversion is an estate in the land and continues during the continuance of the lease. There is no bar in the Act forbidding the transfer of this reversion. A second lease validly granted by the lessor during the continuation of the prior lease vests a reversion on the first lease in the lessee under the second lease. The second lease is in the nature of a concurrent lease which is granted for the term which is to commence before the expiration or determination of the previous lease of the same premises to another person. The relationship of the subsequent lessee vis-a-vis the previous lessee will therefore be of a landlord and tenant, subject to the terms and conditions of the subsequent lease. The lease in favour of the Plaintiffs in this case was for fifty years with the right to construct any building. It is true that during the continuance of the prior lease the Plaintiff Respondents could not be entitled to exercise the rights exercisable under the lease by him, but that will not affect his right as an assignee of the reversion. Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act enumerates the rights of lessors transferees and under it a transfere of lessor's rights in the absence of a contract to the contrary possesses all the rights as the owner. A lease of reversion is different from a lease in reversion. Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act enumerates the rights of lessors transferees and under it a transfere of lessor's rights in the absence of a contract to the contrary possesses all the rights as the owner. A lease of reversion is different from a lease in reversion. A lease in reversion takes effect from a future date on the determination of the previous lease whereas a lease of reversion, which is a concurrent lease, takes effect during the continuance of the previous lease. The lease in the present case was a concurrent lease and the effect of the lease would be that the Plaintiffs became entitled to all the rights of the lessor including the rights to receive rent and eject the tenant. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that the lease deed does not expressly authorise the Plaintiffs to collect rent from the Defendant Appellant and therefore the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the Plaintiffs and the Appellant was not established. Clause (1) of the lease is as under: That the lessees are taking lease of the said house...on a rent of Rs. 250 per month for a period of fifty years from the date of the execution of this deed. Clause (4) of the deed is as under: That the lessees shall have a right to alter, make additions, construct, reconstruct, wholly or in part the said house No...in pursuance of any sanctioned plan wherever necessary which may be submitted by the lessees alone before the authorities concerned and the lessees shall have the right to give any part or the whole house on rent to any person or persons and to eject tenants who are at present occupying the premises in the name manner as the lessor could do or sublet the said house to anyone on such terms and conditions as lessees may choose. The lessees may also use and occupy the whole or any part of the house themselves. The lease was to take effect immediately from the date of execution which was 29-7-64. It was therefore a concurrent lease. Under Clause (4) the lessees were authorised to let out, eject a tenant or use the premises themselves. The lessees may also use and occupy the whole or any part of the house themselves. The lease was to take effect immediately from the date of execution which was 29-7-64. It was therefore a concurrent lease. Under Clause (4) the lessees were authorised to let out, eject a tenant or use the premises themselves. Manikkam Pillai v. Rathnaswami 43 IC 210 on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the Respondent lays down that a right to enjoy the property u/s 105 of the Transfer of Property Act is an interest in the property. It further lays down that: The rule of English law that a person entitled to immediate reversion of a demised premises is the proper person to give the notice to quit is applicable to India and the provision of the Transfer of Property Act is not inconsistent with this rule. Bhagat Ram v. Keshav Deo AIR 1965 Ass 55 lays down that "a lessor can execute a second lease of the same premises during the subsistence of the first lease. A lease is a transfer of the part of the interest of the lessor in the property. u/s 109 of the Transfer of Property Act also transfer of the part of a lessor's interest is permissible and on transfer the reversionary right vests in the transferee. After the creation of the second lease in favour of others the reversionary right of the lessor is transferred to the subsequent lessee who steps into the shoes of the lessor landlord for the purpose of ejecting the previous lessee." 4. Right to collect rent is implied by the execution of the lease itself and is also covered in the rights enumerated in Clause (4) of the lease. 5. The UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act also does not restrict the transfer. The Act only controls of letting of the premises. Merely because the lessee is unable to obtain actual possession or the occupation of the accommodation is subject to any allotment order passed under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the lease which is otherwise valid will not be invalidated. The provisions of this Act therefore do not in any way conflict with the right of the lessor to execute a concurrent lease. 6. The provisions of this Act therefore do not in any way conflict with the right of the lessor to execute a concurrent lease. 6. The next point for determination is whether the Appellant was liable to pay rent to the Plaintiffs and whether non payment of rent will entail the liability of ejectment. If the status of the subsequent lessee i.e. the lessee of the reversion became that of the landlord, the Appellant could nut deny his liability to pay the rent to the Plaintiffs. The liability however will be from the date of the transfer or from the date of the notice of transfer which ever is later. The original landlord i.e. Hamid Ali had not only intimated the fact of transfer but had directed the Appellant to pay rent to the Plaintiffs. If inspite of that the Appellant continued to ignore the Plaintiffs, the Appellant must suffer the consequences. It is also significant to note that in his application u/s 7-C the Appellant did not choose to implead the Plaintiffs as parties. The action of the Appellant could not be said to be bonafide and could not amount to putting the Plaintiffs to proof of their title. In Pulin Behari Shaw Vs. Miss Lila Dey, AIR 1956 Cal 106 while considering the rights of the tenant in similar circumstances, it was observed that where a tenant was duly made aware of the transfer of ownership of the premises occupied by him both by the transferor landlord and the transferee, he had no justification for his depositing the money with the Rent Controller in the name of the transferor. Under the proviso to Section 109 Transfer of Property Act, the tenant could only be absolved if he has reason to believe that the transfer has not been made and then pays to the lessor transferor. Reason to believe must be based on justifiable grounds and as remarked above, where can be no justification where both the transferor and the transferee intimated the tenant about the transfer. Tin lower appellate court was therefore right in holding that a default was committed in the payment of the rent and the Appellant had made himself liable to ejectment. 7. For the reasons given above, this appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed, with costs. Three months time is allowed to the Appellant to vacate the premises.