JUDGMENT D.D. Seth, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 2531/3/9 with pendentilite and future interest. 2. The plaintiffs' case was that Smt. Ram Dei the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had given a loan of Rs. 2,200/- to Mukundi Lal, defendant as karta and manager of the joint family firm Bhagwan Das Prayag Das on 5-3-1957 and that Mukundi Lal had executed a parcha for that amount in favour of Smt. Ram Dei. The plaintiffs' case was that they were the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased, Ram Dei, who had executed a will in favour of the plaintiffs on 15-5-1933. The plaintiffs alleged that they demanded the amount from the defendant and since the defendant did not pay the amount, the plaintiffs had to file the suit. 3. The suit was contested by Mukundi Lal who pleaded that he had not taken any loan from Smt. Ram Dei on 5-3-1957 and that one Ram Nath Dalal had approached the defendant after the death of Lala Pachkauri Mal, father of the defendant, and showed a parcha for Rs. 2,200/- which, Ram Nath Dalal said, had been executed by defendant's father in favour of Smt. Ram Dei. The `defendant's case was that Ram Nath Dalal asked him to renew the parcha for Rs. 2,200/- and believing the Dalal, the defendant renewed the parcha on 20.7.1956 and, thereafter, changed the parcha from time to time. It was pleaded by the defendant that the parcha said to have been executed by Lala Pachkauri Mal was not returned to the defendant and that the defendant had learnt that Smt. Ram Dei had never advanced any amount to his father and that Ram Nadi Dalal had falsely represented to the defendant that Lala Pachkauri Mal had executed the parcha in favour of Smt. Ram Dei for Rs. 2,200/-. In fact the defendant's case was that the parcha shown to him by the Dalal was a forged parcha. The defendant denied that the plaintiffs were the heirs of Smt. Ram Dei and it was pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. The plaintiffs filed a replication on 8-11-1960 (paper No. 33-C) after obtaining leave of the Court. On 4-11-1960 the plaintiffs filed an application for leave to file replication and served a copy of that application on the defendant. 4. The plaintiffs filed a replication on 8-11-1960 (paper No. 33-C) after obtaining leave of the Court. On 4-11-1960 the plaintiffs filed an application for leave to file replication and served a copy of that application on the defendant. The court allowed the application and permitted the plaintiffs to file a replication. Thereupon, on 10-7-1961 the defendant got his written statement amended but did not file any objection to the replication filed by the plaintiffs. Two additional issues were framed by the trial court on 14-9-1961 and the parties led evidence. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's father, Pachkauri Mal, had taken a loan from Smt. Ram Dei while the defendant denied that any such loan was taken. In the replication filed by the plaintiffs, it was made clear that Lala Pachkauri Mal was the karta of the joint family firm, Bhagwan Das Prayag Das, and that he took a loan of Rs. 2,200/- from the plaintiffs on 23-9-1955 through Ram Nath Dalal. It was further said in the replication that the contesting defendant, Mukundi Lal, had renewed the parcha for the first time on 20-7-1956 when he became karta of the joint family firm and that after renewal, all the old parchas were surrendered to the defendant. It was also urged that the parcha dated Bhando Sudi 7 filed by the defendant was forged one. It was also denied that the defendant had renewed the parcha on any false representation made by Ram Nath Dalal. 5. The trial court held that as there had been renovation by the defendant by execution of Ex. 6 in lieu of the old parchas, the suit was legally not maintainable. The trial court further held that old parcha had been renewed by the defendant. It also held that the plaintiffs were entitled to file the suit as a will had been executed in their favour by Smt. Ram Dei. It further held that Rs. 2,200/- had been taken on loan by the defendant's father with an agreement to pay interest to the plaintiffs but the plaintiffs were not entitled to any amount in view of the findings of the trial court regarding renovation of the parcha. On these findings the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 6. In appeal by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court framed following points for determination : "1. On these findings the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 6. In appeal by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court framed following points for determination : "1. Was the parcha relied on in the plaint renovated and the suit on its basis not maintainable ? 2. Was the suit barred by time ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue ? 7. The appellate court held that the defendant's plea that he had renovated the parcha alleged to have been executed by his father on a false representation by Ram Nath Dalal was not correct, as Ram Nath Dalal was admittedly a man of trust of both the parties and used to secure loan for the defendant's joint family firm, he used to manage borrowers for Smt. Ram Dei who carried on money lending business. The appellate court further held that circumstances of the case showed that the defendant had knowledge of the loan taken by his father, and that no false representation had been made to him by Ram Nath Dalal. According to the lower appellate court every parcha renewed by Mukundi Lal was a fresh transaction in itself and that parcha No. Ext. A-6 was void in view of the fact that it was written in favour of a dead person namely Smt. Ram Dei who had died on 17-7-1957. The lower appellate court held that unless the plaintiffs agreed to the renovation of the parchas, there could be no valid renovation. The lower appellate court was of the opinion that parcha in suit was never renovated, as alleged by the defendant, and that the suit on the basis of the parcha was maintainable as the parcha was not renovated. The lower appellate court further held that a perusal of the language of the parcha showed that a fresh contract was entered into at every time as it was written in the parcha that Rs. 2,200/- were taken on loan, and "the interest was paid every time", and therefore, the conclusion was that the old debt was paid and a fresh loan was taken. 2,200/- were taken on loan, and "the interest was paid every time", and therefore, the conclusion was that the old debt was paid and a fresh loan was taken. According to the lower appellate court, in view of the fact that every parcha was a new transaction, the limitation would run from the date of the parcha in suit and not from the date when the original loan was advanced to Pachkauri Mal in 1955 and hence the suit was within time. The lower appellate court held that the will executed by Smt. Ram Dei in favour of the plaintiffs had been proved and the plaintiffs were entitled to file the suit, and that the suit had rightly been filed against Mukundi Lal in his capacity as karta of the joint family firm on the basis of a loan taken by the joint family. 8. The lower appellate court, therefore, allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs and decreed the plaintiffs' suit for all the reliefs claimed by them. 9. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the defendant has come up in second appeal to this Court. 10. I have heard Sri J.D. Pradhan, learned counsel for the defendant appellant and Sri M. P. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents. 11. Sri J.D. Pradhan submitted that in fact no loan had been taken from the plaintiffs and even if it was taken it had not been taken for family necessity and hence the plaintiffs' suit could not be decreed by the lower appellate court. There is no force in this submission. No such ground has been taken in the memo of appeal and the question of family necessity was not even raised in the written statement by the defendant. Moreover, Mukundi Lal defendant appeared in the witness box and made the following statement : "Jab bhi is parvarik rozgar me paisey ki jarrut hoti thi to merey pita iske liye karj lelete the. Jiadatar yeh karj Ram Nath Dalal ke marfat liye jate the. 12. In view of the statement made by Mukundi Lal and in view of the fact that Ram Lal had appeared in the witness box and stated that Rs. 2,200/- had been taken by Mukundi Lal's father from the plaintiff I do not find any force in the contention raised by Sri J. D. Pradhan. 12. In view of the statement made by Mukundi Lal and in view of the fact that Ram Lal had appeared in the witness box and stated that Rs. 2,200/- had been taken by Mukundi Lal's father from the plaintiff I do not find any force in the contention raised by Sri J. D. Pradhan. Both the courts below have recorded a finding that the plaintiffs' predecessor Smt. Ram Dei had advanced a loan of Rs. 2,200/- to Pachkauri Mal and this is a finding of fact which is binding on this Court and in view of the finding recorded by the courts below it must be held that Pachkauri Mal had taken a loan of Rs. 2,200/- from Smt. Ram Dei and that the loan had been taken for family necessity. Apart from the finding recorded by the courts below Mukundi Lal, being the son of Pachkauri Mal it was his pious obligation to repay the loan taken by Pachkauri Mal from the predecessor of the plaintiffs. 13. Sri J.D. Pradhan next contended that the plaintiffs in their plaint had alleged that the loan had been taken by Mukundi Lal but they changed their case later on and in the replication they pleaded that the loan, in fact, had been taken by Mukundi Lal's father Pachkauri Mal and thus the learned counsel contended that the plaintiffs could not be allowed to deviate from the original pleadings and from the case originally set up by them in their plaint. In this connection Sri J. D. Pradhan submitted that Order VI, Rule 7, C.P.C. was a complete bar to the plaintiffs' suit inasmuch as the plaintiffs, after filing their replication, did not get their plaint amended. Order VI, Rule 7, C.P.C. reads as follows : "No pleading shall, except by way of amendment, raise any new ground of claim or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same." 14. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the proper course for the plaintiffs was to have their plaint amended after filing the replication and in the absence of the amendment of the plaint the plaintiffs' suit could not be decreed. 15. In support of his contention Sri J. D. Pradhan placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Trojan and Co. 15. In support of his contention Sri J. D. Pradhan placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Trojan and Co. v. Narappa, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 235, in which the Supreme Court held as follows :- "It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case." Sri J. D. Pradhan, therefore, submitted that without an amendment of the plaint the plaintiffs were not entitled to get any relief. 16. Sri J.D. Pradhan also placed reliance on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Viswapathi v. Venkata Krishna, A.I.R. 1963 Andhra Pradesh 9, in which a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held as follows :- "It is now well settled that a rejoinder cannot make a departure from the plea put forward in the plaint. The plaintiff cannot set up facts in the rejoinder which are inconsistent with those in the plaint. This result flows from Order 6, Rule 7, C.P.C." 17. Sri J.D. Pradhan also placed reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in M. K. Bapai v. John, A.I.R. 1965 Kerala 203, in which it was held that inconsistent allegations by the plaintiff cannot be accepted. 18. Sri J.D. Pradhan also relied upon a case of a learned single judge of Lahore High Court in Hardial Singh v. Jaswant Kaur, A.I.R. 1943 Lahore 159, in which it was held that: "No doubt a plaintiff is entitled to set up in his plaint an alternative and inconsistent case, e.g., a claim for ownership of a decree and in the alternative a charge over the decree but a plea which is inconsistent with the allegations in the plaint unless it can be legally allowed by way of amendment cannot be set up for the first time in a replication." 19. The case of Trojan and Co. was discussed by the Supreme Court in Bhagwati v. Chandramaul, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735 and in para. 8 of Bhagwati's case, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735 the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Mr. The case of Trojan and Co. was discussed by the Supreme Court in Bhagwati v. Chandramaul, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735 and in para. 8 of Bhagwati's case, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735 the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Mr. Setalvad for the defendant contends that in confirming the trial Court's decree for ejectment, the High Court has made a new case for the plaintiff, and that, according to him, is,not permissible in law. The plaintiff came to the Court with a clear and specific case of tenancy between him and the defendant and that case has been rejected by the High Court. As soon as the plaintiff's case of tenancy was rejected, his claim for ejectment should also have been negatived. In support of this argument Mr. Setalvad has referred us to the decision of this Court in Trojan and Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735. In that case this Court has observed that it is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. It is necessary to remember that these observations were made in regard to a claim made by the plaintiff for a certain sum of money on the ground that the defendant had sold certain shares belonging to him without his instructions, but he had failed to prove that the sale had not been authorised by him. The question which the Court had to consider in the case of Trojan and Co., was that in view of the plaintiff's failure to prove his case that the impugned sale was unauthorised, was it open to him to make a claim for the same amount on the ground of failure of consideration ? And this Court held that such a claim which was new and inconsistent with the original case could not be upheld." In paragraph 10 of Bhagwati's case, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735 the Supreme Court further observed as follows : "But in considering the application of this doctrine to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to bear in mind the other principle that considerations of form cannot over-ride the legitimate considerations of substance. If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched. though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formed and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is: did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it ? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence, and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another." 20. In the instant case, as has been mentioned above, the plaintiffs filed a replication on 8th November, 1960 after obtaining leave of the court under Order VIII, Rule 9, C.P.C. which reads as follows : "No pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to a set-off shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit, but the Court may at any time require a written statement or additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time for presenting the same." 21. On 4th November 1960 the plaintiffs filed an application before the trial court for leave to file a replication and served a copy of that application on the defendant. On 4th November 1960 the plaintiffs filed an application before the trial court for leave to file a replication and served a copy of that application on the defendant. No objection was filed to that application by the defendant and no objection was raised on behalf of the defendant after filing of the replication by the plaintiffs. Further the parties knew what the case involved in the trial was and led evidence and hence the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that since the plaint was not got amended the plaintiffs could not succeed is based on mere formal and technical plea and since no allegation has been made by the defendant either in the written statement or before the courts below that he was in any way prejudiced by non amendment of the plaint the plaintiffs could not be non suited merely because after filing the replication the plaintiffs did not get their plaint amended. It may be stated that after the plaintiffs had filed their replication the defendant had filed an additional written statement and no objection to the filing of the replication had been taken. 22. A Full Bench of this Court in Abdul Ghani v. Musammat Babni, I.L.R. 25 Allahabad 256, held as follows : "The plaintiff came into Court alleging that the defendant had, about eight years previously, hired a house from him at a monthly rent of one rupee, but latterly had failed to pay the rent, and that the plaintiff had given the defendant notice to quit the house. The plaintiff claimed possession and damages, but not arrears of rent." "The defendant denied the tenancy alleged by the plaintiff, and asserted that she had been in adverse possession for a period of seventeen years. She also asserted that she had purchased the land upon which the house stood, and had herself built the house. The findings in first appeal of the Court below, after remand of issues by the High Court, were, that the plaintiff was the owner of the house, and that the defendant occupied the house as a friend with the permission of the plaintiff; that the defendant had never before this asserted her title to the house, and that her possession was permissive. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled upon the facts found to a decree for possession notwithstanding that his case had been that the defendant was his tenant." It may be mentioned that the Full Bench case in Abdul Ghani has been approved by the Supreme Court in Bhagwati's case, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 735. 23. It was held by a learned single judge of this Court in Jugal Kishore v. Mt. Gomti Kuer, A.I.R. 1914 Allahabad 479 as follows : "In a plaint one of the reliefs was for possession. Both parties understood perfectly well the point in dispute and gave evidence accordingly. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to possession and the fact that the pleadings subsequent to the filing of the plaint, and the evidence in the case disclosed facts at variance with those mentioned in the plaint was immaterial." 24. A Division Bench of this Court in Hukam Singh v. Banwari Lal, A.I.R. 1965 Allahabad 552, observed thus: "It is well settled that if the parties go to trial despite the defects in the pleadings and evidence of the contesting parties is tendered on the issues raised by those pleadings, the petition thereafter cannot be dismissed for that defect because such defects will not relate to jurisdiction but may pertain to procedure only. The appellate court may be justified in setting aside the judgment of the Tribunal if it is satisfied that the defects in the pleading or the procedure adopted by the Tribunal had resulted in material prejudice and in considering whether material prejudice had resulted, any failure on the part of a party to raise and press the objections about those defects before going to trial must be given due weight." 25. In Kedar Lal v. Hari Lal, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 47. It was observed that : "The Court would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side however clumsily or in artistically the plaint may be worded. In any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what can be compensated for in costs." 26. In any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what can be compensated for in costs." 26. In Someshwar v. Tribhawan, A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 130, their Lordships of the Privy Council held as follows : "Their Lordships of the Privy Council will be disinclined to stress the structure of the pleadings in a suit too strictly, if fair notice of the case to be made by the plaintiff has been given, and issue has been joined on any enquiry but faintly adumbrated in the pleadings." 27. A learned single Judge of this Court in Abdul Sami v. Mohammad Noor, A.I.R. 1966 Allahabad 39, held that : "A party which without any objection allows an issue to be raised and leads evidence to rebut the opposite side's case will not ordinarily be allowed in appeal to challenge the finding on that issue, alleging that the issue itself should not have been permitted to be raised. Such a conduct would be very near abuse of the process of Court." 28. A Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Deeplal v. Gulabchand, A.I.R. 1956 Rajasthan 171, held that : "The pleadings in India and specially those in the mofussil should not be considered very strictly, and the Court must look to the essential justice of the case without considering whether matters of form have been strictly attended to." 29. In the instant case since no objection had been raised by the defendant to the filing of the replication by the plaintiff and since the defendant never alleged either in his written statement or before the courts below that any prejudice had been caused to him by filing the replication by the plaintiffs and it view of the fact that both the parties knew what the case of the parties was and since they led evidence it cannot be said that without amending the plaint the plaintiffs' suit could not be decreed. The plaintiffs filed the present suit on the basis of the Parcha Ex. 4 dated 5th March 1957. Ex. The plaintiffs filed the present suit on the basis of the Parcha Ex. 4 dated 5th March 1957. Ex. 4 is a relevant document and reads as follows :- "Shri Patri Bhai Musammat Ram Dei Bibi jauje Bal Mukand ko jog likhi Bhagvan Das Prag Das ki ram ram bachne. Asge rupia 2200 ankan bais sau marfat Ram Nath Dalal ke aap se udhar liye so apke khata jama kare. Miti Bhadon Sudi 7 Sambat 2013." 30. Parcha Ex. 4 bears the signatures of Mukundi Lal on behalf of the firm Bhagwan Das Prag Das. The contention of Sri J.D. Pradhan was that the plantiffs, not having filed the original Parcha said to have been executed by Mukandi Lal's father Pachkauri Mal, the suit of the plaintiffs' could not be decreed. It is evidence that the original Parcha said to have been executed by Pachkauri Mal in favour of Smt. Ram Dei was delivered back at the time of the execution of other Parchas to Mukandi Lal and hence it was not possible for the plaintiffs to produce the original Parcha said to have been executed by Pachkauri Mal in favour of Smt. Ram Dei. Sri J. D. Pradhan relied upon the decision of Chief Justice Malik in Lila Singh v. Chhajju Singh, 1952 A.L.J. 303, in which the learned Chief justice held that : "Where in a suit for recovery of money lent on a promissory note, the note itself is not produced as it was insufficiently stamped, and the defendant does not admit the receipt of the money. oral evidence may be admissible of the fact that payment was made. but the terms on which the payment was made, that is, the unconditional undertaking to repay, which a promissory note contains, can be, proved only by the production of the promissory note. In view of the provisions of Section 91, Evidence Act it is not possible to hold that even in the event of non-production of the promissory note the Court can either allow proof of the fact that there was an unconditional undertaking to repay or presume to the same effect, and the suit must be dismissed." 31. In Lila Singh's case, 1952 A.L.J. 303, mentioned above the promissory note was not produced by the plaintiff, as it was insufficiently stamped and the defendant did not admit the receipt of the money. In Lila Singh's case, 1952 A.L.J. 303, mentioned above the promissory note was not produced by the plaintiff, as it was insufficiently stamped and the defendant did not admit the receipt of the money. In the instant case the original Parcha executed by Pachkauri Mal in favour of Smt. Ram Dei had been delivered to Mukandi Lal at the time of the execution of the Parcha by him and the present suit was based on Parcha. Ex. 4, said to have been executed by Mukandi Lal himself and it cannot be said that Parcha, Ex. 4, was not based on consideration because it was executed in lieu of old Parcha which itself was good for consideration. Lila Singh's case, 1952 A.L.J. 303 relied upon by Sri J. D. Pradhan is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. 32. Sri J. D. Pradhan also placed reliance on Udit Upadhia v. Bhwanidin, 1904 A.L.J. Volume I 483, " the headnote of which reads as follows : "Defendants borrowed a certain sum of money from the plaintiff and executed a memorandum in these words' Account (lekha) of Bhawani Din Kalwar, Katwaru Kalwar and Bindeshri Kalwar, 8th February, 1901, interest 1 per cent per mensem, payable 3rd of May, 1901, Rs. 500/- borrowed from Udit Upadhia for a sugar factory.' A stamp of one anna was affixed to the memorandum. The lower Courts dismissed the suit holding the memorandum was not properly stamped, and that oral evidence of the loan could not be allowed. Held that the document was not a promissory "note, a bond, or an acknowledgement of debt, and that it was nothing more than a mere memorandum or note drawn up between the parties as to a transaction which had been settled between them. Held also that the lower Courts were wrong in excluding oral evidence." 33. It may be mentioned that the law has been well settled by the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Badkulal, A.I.R. 1935 S.C. 225, and it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows in paragraph 12 : "Mr. Bindra drew our attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ghulam Murtuza v. Mt. It may be mentioned that the law has been well settled by the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Badkulal, A.I.R. 1935 S.C. 225, and it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows in paragraph 12 : "Mr. Bindra drew our attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ghulam Murtuza v. Mt. Fasihunnisha Bibi, AIR 1935 Allahabad 129 (F), wherein it was held that even if an acknowledgment implies a promise to pay it cannot be made the basis of suit and treated as giving rise to a fresh cause of action. We have examined the decision and we are satisfied that it does not lay down good law." 34. Sri J.D. Pradhan lastly contended that since no proper issues were framed by the trial court whether the defendant's father Pachkauri Mal had taken loan from Smt. Ram Dei the suit should be remanded and the trial court be directed to frame proper issues and then to re-decide the case after hearing the parties and after allowing the parties to lead fresh evidence. I do not find any force in this contention. The suit giving rise to this appeal was filed in 1959. No useful purpose will be served by remanding the case to the trial court specially in view of the fact that the parties knew what the case of the plaintiffs was and they led evidence and it cannot be said that the defendant has been prejudiced in any way. I am supported in my view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 593, in which it was held as follows : "Evidence led in no issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue, which was not present to the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduce evidence relating thereto." 35. But that rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduce evidence relating thereto." 35. In Kameshwaramma v. Subba Rao, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 884, the Supreme Court observed thus : "Where the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support of their contention but in refutation of those of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatal to the case, or that there was that mis-trial which vitiates proceedings. The suit could not be dismissed on this narrow ground, and also there is no need for a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case is sufficient to reach the right conclusion and neither party claimed that it had any further evidence to offer." 36. In the instant case the parties knew what the case was and even if proper issues were not framed by the trial court the parties led evidence and the evidence was sufficient to reach the right conclusion and since neither party claimed that it had further evidence to offer and since the defendant had also not claimed that any prejudice had been caused to him no purpose would be served by remanding the case. 37. For the reasons mentioned above I do not find any force in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.