JUDGMENT B.D. Singh, J. This appeal has been preferred by the sole appellant Chandrika Prasad alias Chandrika Ram, who was Halka Karamchari in the Block Development Officer's office, Daltonganj Block, in the district of Palamau, against the judgment and order of Assistant Sessions Judge convicting him for the offences under Sections 409, 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). Under Section 409 of the Code he was sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300/-, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. Under Section 466 of the Code he was sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300/- in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. Under Section 471 of the Code he was sentenced to four year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two months. However, under Section 468 of the Code no separate sentence was passed. All the sentences imposed under various sections were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the appellant in the capacity of Halka Karamchari, had collected rent on behalf of the Government from various tenants and during the period between November, 1951 to April, 1962, he committed breach of trust in respect of Rs. 264/- and forged the various Govt. records. The misappropriation of the said amount was brought to light in the following circumstances, Bashir Ahmad (P.W. 11), the then Karamchari, who had taken charge from the appellant on his routine transfer, in December, 1963, went to collect rent from Secretary, Cooperative Bank, Daltonganj, but the original receipt (Ext. 2/1) which was in possession of the Secretary showed that the entire dues were paid. After returning to the office P.W.11 examined the counterfoil of that particular receipt (Ext. 2/5) which showed that only Rs. 5.88 paise was realised and Rs. 20/- was showed as arrears in the counterfoil. In Register III A also it was shown that Rs. 5.88 paise was realised. After returning to the office P.W.11 examined the counterfoil of that particular receipt (Ext. 2/5) which showed that only Rs. 5.88 paise was realised and Rs. 20/- was showed as arrears in the counterfoil. In Register III A also it was shown that Rs. 5.88 paise was realised. He reported about this matter to Bacha Tewari (P.W.1), the Circle Inspector, who started to investigate and examine the other cases of collections made by the appellant and by examining Register IIIA, counterfoil receipt book for the year 1961-62 and Register II (tenants ledger), came to the conclusion that the appellant had managed to misappropriate a total sum of Rs. 264/- from six tenants including the Cooperative Bank mentioned above, and submitted a report dated 31-8-64 (Ext. 1) to Shri C.M. Rai Dewakar (P.W.4), the Block Development Officer, who submitted a written report (Ext. 6) dated 18-9-1964 to the Officer incharge of Daltonganj Police Station, Ram Swarath Singh (P.W.15). On the basis of the said report, first information report (Ext. 15) was drawn by P.W.15, who handed over the case to Saligram Mahton (P.W.14) Senior District Prosecutor, who was under training in the Police Station, for investigation. After conducting investigation for a few days, P.W.14 handed over charge of the case again to Ram Swarath Singh (P.W.15) who, after examining some of the witnesses, sent the various documents to the Government Hand Writing Expert Shamsul Haque (P.W.10) for favour of examination and report. After the receipt of the report, he submitted charge sheet against the appellant under Sections 409, 466, 468 and 471 of the Code. The Sub-divisional Officer after taking cognizance of the case, transferred it to Shri Indu Bhushan Sahay, Munsif Magistrate for disposal, who after making the usual enquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, committed the appellant to the court of sessions to stand his trial under these sections. 3. On behalf of the prosecution as many as is witnesses were examined. A large number of documents, Exts. 1 to 17, including the Expert report (Ext. 13) entries in Register IIIA (Exts. 7 to 7/5), entries in Register II (Exts. 3. to 3/5) and the writings in counterfoil rent receipts. (Exts. 2 and 8 series) were exhibited. On the other hand, no witness was examined on behalf of the defence, but certain initial and signature were exhibited as Ext. Ka and Ext. 13) entries in Register IIIA (Exts. 7 to 7/5), entries in Register II (Exts. 3. to 3/5) and the writings in counterfoil rent receipts. (Exts. 2 and 8 series) were exhibited. On the other hand, no witness was examined on behalf of the defence, but certain initial and signature were exhibited as Ext. Ka and Ext. Ka-1 respectively, of Shri L. Swaiya, predecessor-in-interest of P.W.4. In defence, the appellant pleaded innocence. However, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge after considering the evidence on the record, relied on the prosecution story and convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. 4. Mr. J.N.P. Verma, appearing on behalf of the appellant, assailed the judgment and order of the Assistant Sessions Judge convicting the appellant under the various sections mainly on a preliminary point for consideration by this Court. He urged that in the instant case no sanction was obtained as required under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code for launching prosecution against the appellant. In the absence of the sanction no cognizance could have been taken against the appellant under the terms of said Section 197. He added that admittedly the alleged offence was committed by the appellant, while he was acting in discharge of his official duty as a Karmachari. Therefore it was mandatory on the part of the prosecution to have obtained the required sanction. On that score alone, he urged that all the convictions against the appellants have got to be quashed. In order to support his contention he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Amrik Singh V. State of Pepsu (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 309) wherein S.R. Das, Bhagwati and Venkatarama Ayyar, JJ. were considering the provisions contained under Section 197 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of an offence under Section 409 of the Code committed by a public servant. In that case, the accused was a S.D.O. in the Public Works Department, Pepsu, and was, at the material dates incharge of certain works at a place called Karbali. It was part of his duties to disburse the wages to the workmen employed in the works, and the procedure usually followed was that he drew the amount required from the treasury and paid the same to the employees against their signatures or thumb impressions in the monthly acquaintance roll. It was part of his duties to disburse the wages to the workmen employed in the works, and the procedure usually followed was that he drew the amount required from the treasury and paid the same to the employees against their signatures or thumb impressions in the monthly acquaintance roll. In the roll for April, 1951, one Parma was mentioned as a Khalasi (Menial servant), and a sum of Rs. 51/- shown as paid to him for his wages, the payment being vouched by thumb-impression. The case of the prosecution was that there was, in fact, no person of the name of Parma, that the thumb impression found in the acquaittance roll was that of the accused himself, that he had included a fictitious name in the acquittance roll, with intend to himself draw the amount, and that by this expedient he had received Rs. 51/- and misappropriated the same. It was held that the accused received the sum of Rs. 51/- alleged to have been misappropriated as Sub-divisional Officer, and he admitted receipt of the same. Then it was his duty to pay that amount to the Khalasi Parma, and take his signature or thumb impression in acknowledgment thereof. The accused did claim to have paid the amount to Parma, and the acquittance roll recorded the payment, and there was in acknowledgement thereof a thumb impression as against his name. If what appeared on the face of the roll was true and whether it was true or not was not a matter relevant at the stage of sanction then the acts with which the accused was charged fell within the scope of his duties, and could be justified by him as done by virtue of his office. Their Lordships further held that clearly, therefore, sanction was required under Section 197 (1), Criminal Procedure Code before the accused could be prosecuted u/s 409, and the absence of such sanction was fatal to the maintainability of the prosecution. He also referred to the observation of their Lordships in Paragraphs 9 and 12 wherein they observed that when the charge is one of misappropriation by a public servant, whether sanction is required under Section 197(1) will depend upon the facts of each case. He also referred to the observation of their Lordships in Paragraphs 9 and 12 wherein they observed that when the charge is one of misappropriation by a public servant, whether sanction is required under Section 197(1) will depend upon the facts of each case. If the facts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under Section 197 (1) would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. Learned counsel submitted that in the instant case also, the issuance of the receipt and the entries made on the various registers were a part of the duty of the appellant and the offences complained of were integrally connected with his duties attaching to the office of Karamchari, and those offences were inseparable from his duties as such. Therefore, it was mandatory for the prosecution to have obtained sanction without which no cognizance could have been taken against the appellant. The defect is so vital, he submitted, that it goes to the very root of it, as observed by their Lordships. Hence even if this point was not taken before the Assistant Sessions Judge, this Court is left with no option but to quash the conviction of the appellant. In my opinion, the submission of learned counsel cannot be accepted in view of the later decisions of the Supreme Court. In (2) Baijnath V. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 220). A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah (now Hon'ble C.J.) and V. Ramaswami, JJ. were dealing with the provisions contained under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code with respect to offences committed by a public servant under Sections 409 and 477A read with Section 109 of the Code. In that case the brief facts were that the appellants Gupta and Kale were respectively the Chief Accountant-cum-Office Superintendent and Assistant Cashier of the Madhya Bharat Electric Supply, an enterprise run by the Government of Madhya Bharat. It was alleged that both of them in conspiracy with each other bad embezzled large amount of money belonging to the Government and made false entries of receipts and expenditure in the concerned Government registers for concealment of the embezzlement. It was alleged that both of them in conspiracy with each other bad embezzled large amount of money belonging to the Government and made false entries of receipts and expenditure in the concerned Government registers for concealment of the embezzlement. Hence they were convicted under Sections 409 and 477A read with Section 109 of the Code. It was not disputed that Gupta was a public servant who was not removable from his office save by the sanction of Madhya Bharat Government. The point for consideration was whether in regard to the charge under Section 409 of the Code he was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty. If he was, then in view of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no court could have taken cognizance of the offence without the sanction of the Government of Madhya Bharat and his conviction under Section 409 of the Code could not have been upheld. It also fell for consideration whether previous sanction was necessary for the charge under Section 477A of the Code. It was held per majority, Sarkar, J. dissenting that the sanction of the State Government was not necessary for the prosecution of Gupta under Section 409 of the Code because the act of criminal misappropriation was not committed by him while he was acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties, and that offence had no direct connection with the duties of Gupta as a public servant and the official status of him only furnished him with an occasion or opportunity of committing the offence. His conviction under Section 409 of the Code by the lower courts without prior sanction was held as valid. However, it was held that this conviction under Section 477A read with Section 109 of the Code could not be sustained in the absence of sanction to start proceeding against him. Their Lordships while considering the ratio which emerged from the decision in A.I.R. 1955 Supreme Court 309 (Supra), observed at page 228:- “... However, it was held that this conviction under Section 477A read with Section 109 of the Code could not be sustained in the absence of sanction to start proceeding against him. Their Lordships while considering the ratio which emerged from the decision in A.I.R. 1955 Supreme Court 309 (Supra), observed at page 228:- “... We need not examine how far the decision in Amrik Singh's case, 1955-1 SCR 1302; (5) A.I.R. 1955 SC 309), stand in view of the earlier decisions of the Judicial Committee and the two subsequent decisions of a larger Bench of this Court in 1957 SCR 423 : (S) AIR 1957 SC 458 ), and in 1960-2 SCR 89: ( AIR 1960 SC 266 )...” A similar view was taken in (3) P. Arulswami V. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 776) where V. Ramaswami, V. Bhargava and Reghubar Dayal, JJ. while dealing with the question of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code with respect to an offence committed by a public servant under Section 409 of the Code observed at page 778:- “....It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable. The same principle has been expressed by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta V. State of U.P.- 1957 SCR 423 : ( AIR 1957 SC 458 ) in which it was pointed out that sanction to the prosecution of a public servant under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code is not necessary since the public servant is not acting in his official capacity in committing criminal breach of trust. In a later case Satwant Singh V. The State of Punjab, 1960-2 SCR 89 : ( AIR 1960 SC 266 ) it was held that if a public servant commits the offence of cheating or abets another so to cheat, the offence committed by him is not one while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The same view has been taken by this Court in a later decision-(2) Baijnath Gupta V. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1966-1 SCR 210 : ( AIR 1966 SC 220 ) and it was held that the sanction of the State Government was not necessary for the prosecution of the appellant under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code because the act of criminal misappropriation was not committed by the appellant while he was acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties and that offence and no direct connection with the duties of the appellant as a public servant, and the official status of the appellant only furnished the appellant with an occasion or an opportunity of committing the offence, Therefore, in view of the above observations, in my opinion, the conviction of the appellant under Section 409 of the Code cannot be challenged now on the ground of want of sanction required under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 5. The conviction of the appellant under Section 409 of the Code is based on solid materials. Learned Counsel for the appellant, therefore, fairly conceded that it was not possible for him to dispel the evidence led by the prosecution on this point. P.W.4, the informant, unfolding the prosecution story, stated that after examination of various documents and registers it revealed that the appellant while collecting rent on behalf of the Government had misappropriated Rs. 464/- from the six tenants, the details of which he had also given in his written report to the Officer Incharge (P.W. 15) which formed the basis of the first information report. Those details are as follows:- Sl. Name of tenants Holding R.R. No. Date of Amount Suspec- no. issue ted to be mis-appropriated. 1. Secretary, Co-operative 738 474627 12.3.62 Rs. 20/- Bank, Daltonganj 2. Shri Sheo Tahal Sao 1256 474408 18.12.61 Rs. 20/- 3. Shri Bal Krishna Lal, 175 474410 do Rs. 20/- Shri Baijnath Prasad etc, Daltonganj 4. Shrimati Shyamsundari 354 474417 do Rs. Name of tenants Holding R.R. No. Date of Amount Suspec- no. issue ted to be mis-appropriated. 1. Secretary, Co-operative 738 474627 12.3.62 Rs. 20/- Bank, Daltonganj 2. Shri Sheo Tahal Sao 1256 474408 18.12.61 Rs. 20/- 3. Shri Bal Krishna Lal, 175 474410 do Rs. 20/- Shri Baijnath Prasad etc, Daltonganj 4. Shrimati Shyamsundari 354 474417 do Rs. 100/- Devi c/o Ramautar Singh, Nawhatta, Daltonganj 5. Miss M.E. Dass, Head 244 716857 27.3.62 Rs. 100/- Mistress, Mission School, Daltonganj 6. Shri Ganesh Lal Sarawgi 815 474412 18.12.61 Rs. 4/- Total Rs. 264/- The evidence of P.W.4 also finds support from P.W.I, who in his report (Ext. 1) to P.W.4 gave identical details about the misappropriation by the appellant. Similar is the evidence of P.W.11 which need not be dilated further in view of the concession made by learned counsel for the appellant. For misappropriation of Rs. 20/- under item no. 1 the conviction is further based on the evidence of Ishwari Ram (P.W.3), the peon of the Co-operative Bank who brought the original outer-foil receipt. (Ext. 2/1) showing that the entire rent of Rs. 25.88 paise was paid on behalf of the Co-operative Bank and nothing was due whereas in the counterfoil of the said receipt the appellant had shown only Rs. 5.88 paise and had also made similar entries in the various registers. Thus, he misappropriated Rs. 20/-. Similarly, regarding item no. 2, for misappropriation of Rs. 20/-the original outer-foil rent receipt (Ext. 2) was proved by Ramautar Lal (P.W. 13). P.W. 13 is the son of the tenant Sheo Tahal Sao mentioned as tenant in the report, which clearly establishes that the appellant had misappropriated Rs. 20/-. With regard to the misappropriation of Rs. 100/- mentioned in item no. 5, it is also based on the evidence of Miss M.E. Dass (P.W.6) who proved the original outer-foil rent receipt (Ext. 2/9). After comparing the outer-foil with the counterfoil it was clearly established that the appellant had misappropriated Rs. 100/-. Regarding misappropriation of Rs. 4/-, under item no. 6, his conviction is further based on the evidence of Mulchand (P.W.9), the Munim of Ganesh Lal Sarwagi who brought the original outer-foil rent receipt (Ext. 2/2) showing full payment of the rent due. By comparison of the outer-foil with the counter foil it was clear that Rs. 4/- was misappropriated by the appellant. 4/-, under item no. 6, his conviction is further based on the evidence of Mulchand (P.W.9), the Munim of Ganesh Lal Sarwagi who brought the original outer-foil rent receipt (Ext. 2/2) showing full payment of the rent due. By comparison of the outer-foil with the counter foil it was clear that Rs. 4/- was misappropriated by the appellant. Learned counsel, however, submitted that with regard to misappropriation of Rs. 20/- in respect of item no. 3, none came on behalf of the tenant Bal Krishna Lal along with the original outer-foil receipts to establish the misappropriation of Rs. 20/-. Similarly, in respect of item no. 4 for misappropriation of Rs. 100/- none came on behalf of the tenant, Shyamsundari Devi, with the original outer-foil receipt to establish misappropriation of Rs. 100/- by the appellant. In that view of the matter, he urged that Rs. 120/- ought to be deducted from the total amount of Rs. 264/-. Thus, according to him, the prosecution could establish misappropriation of total sum of Rs. 144/- only. In my opinion, this submission of learned counsel cannot be accepted as apart from the witnesses who came on behalf of the tenant to support the prosecution story, there is other evidence on the record which establishes the misappropriation with regard to item nos. 3 and 4 as well, which have been dealt with, in detail, by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in Paragraphs 15 and 16 of his judgment. Besides, even if Rs. 120/- is deducted from the total amount of Rs. 264/- which was misappropriated by the appellant, that will not affect in any way his conviction under Section 409 of the Code what amount is defalcated is not of importance. Learned counsel, however, submitted that the sentence imposed by the Assistant Sessions Judge on the appellant under Sections 409 of the Code was excessive. He urged the following extenuating circumstances for the reduction of the sentence on the appellant. First, the amount misappropriated is a small one. Secondly, the appellant with all promptness deposited the entire amount of Rs. 264/-, which was found to be misappropriated, to the treasury. Thirdly, he lost the job, and fourthly, he was already in jail for about a month and a half before he was released on bail. First, the amount misappropriated is a small one. Secondly, the appellant with all promptness deposited the entire amount of Rs. 264/-, which was found to be misappropriated, to the treasury. Thirdly, he lost the job, and fourthly, he was already in jail for about a month and a half before he was released on bail. He pointed out that the judgment of the Assistant Sessions Judge was delivered on 8.4.67 and he was taken into custody, Thereafter he filed appeal in this Court on 4.5.67. The appeal was admitted on 5.5.67 and bail was also granted, but in fact the appellant was released from jail about one week thereafter. Even during commitment proceeding when the commitment order was passed on 9.8.65, the appellant was remanded to custody. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the ends of justice will be met if the sentence of imprisonment of five years imposed under Section 409 of the Code by the Assistant Sessions Judge is reduced to the period already undergone, and instead a further fine of Rs. 1000/- is imposed upon him. However, the sentence of fine of Rs. 300/- which was imposed by the Assistant Sessions Judge on the appellant shall remain intact. Thus, the appellant, under Section 409 of the Code shall pay a total sum of Rs. 1300/- as fine. In default of payment of the said amount he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. 6. The other point which Mr. Verma urged is that on the facts and on the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution, the conviction of appellant under Sections 466, 468 and 471 of the Code could not be sustained. He referred to the provisions of Section 466 of the Code which reads: "Whoever forges a document, purporting to be a record or proceeding of or in a Court of Justice, or a register of birth, baptism, marriage or burial, or a register kept by a public servant as such, or a certificate or document purporting to be made by a public servant in his official capacity, or an authority to institute or defend a suit, or to take any proceedings therein, or to confess judgment, or a power of attorney, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description fur a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. He submitted that reading the section it clearly indicates that it applies to cases where a certificate or other document is forged by some unauthorised person with a view to make it appear that it was duly issued by a public officer, as for instance, where a man forges a marriage certificate with a view to make it appear that it was duly issued by the officer who ought to have issued it. He contended that the section does not supply to cases where a public officer or a person acting for a public officer whose duty it is to make entries in a public book, knowingly makes a false entry as in the instant case. It was admittedly the appellant's duty to collect, issue receipts to the tenant maintain the counterfoil receipts and to make entries in the various registers. According to him, he was authorised person to do those works on behalf of the Government. That apart, the offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant does not come within the purview or making a false document as provided under Section 464 of the Code which has to be read along with the definition of 'forgery' under Section 463 of the Code. That apart, the offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant does not come within the purview or making a false document as provided under Section 464 of the Code which has to be read along with the definition of 'forgery' under Section 463 of the Code. Section 464 of the Code reads as:- “A person is said to make a false document- First.- Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed; or Secondly - Who, without lawful authority dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly - Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.” On the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution none of the three clauses of the section quoted above are applicable to the appellant. In my judgment, the contention of learned counsel is well founded. P.W. 4 in his evidence stated that it was the duty of the appellant to collect rent and to grant proper receipt and to write demand register (No. II), Register IIIA and Register IIIAA and to get them checked by Circle Officer and Block Development Officer and to deposit them with Nazir. He further stated that P.W.1 gave him a written report (Ext. 1). After teat report he examined demand register, counterfoil receipt, Register IIIA and Register IIIAA and found therein over-writings and cuttings which led to suspicion about the issuance of receipts. He further stated that P.W.1 gave him a written report (Ext. 1). After teat report he examined demand register, counterfoil receipt, Register IIIA and Register IIIAA and found therein over-writings and cuttings which led to suspicion about the issuance of receipts. Therefore, he called for only those outer-foil rent receipts about which he had suspicion from the tenants. He also deposed that after the realisation of the rent the appellant had written Register IIIA and the six entries (Exts. 7 to 7/5) in the register were made in the pen of the appellant which he recognised. He also found cuttings and over-writings on those entries. He stated that after examining the various papers including the outer foil receipt granted to the tenant, it transpired that the appellant had misappropriated Rs. 264/- after forging the various registers maintained by him. His evidence does not indicate that the appellant after he had granted receipts to the six tenants mentioned above, had written correctly in the various registers including the counterfoil and subsequently he made alteration or forgery in order to cover up the misappropriated amount of Rs. 264/-. The evidence of P.W.s 1 and 11 also is on the pattern of the evidence of P.W.4. It is true that their evidence regarding the cuttings and over-writings in the various registers is also corroborated by the evidence and the report of the Handwriting Expert (P.W. 10), but that does not indicate that the appellant had initially made correct entries and later on altered the same in the various registers including the counter foil to cover up his guilt. It may be recalled that it was admitted case of the parties that the then Block Development Officer Shri L. Sawaiya had checked the relevant register maintained by the appellant and had endorsed therein "Checked and found correct". Those entries were marked as Exts. Ka and Ka/1 in Register IIIA. It was contended on behalf of the prosecution that the said endorsement was made in token of the fact that the amounts mentioned therein were the amounts alleged to have been realised and shown in the counterfoils and the register and not in token of the fact that the amounts which were shown in the registers were the amounts actually collected by the appellant from the tenants. The original receipts granted to the tenants were not before the Block Development Officer making the endorsement. The original receipts granted to the tenants were not before the Block Development Officer making the endorsement. Hence he was not in a position to ascertain the amount actually collected by the appellant. That also clearly indicates that at the very first instance the appellant had mentioned higher amount in the original outer-foil rent receipts and less amount in the counter foil rent receipts as mentioned earlier, and made entries in the various registers corresponding to the figure mentioned in the counterfoil rent receipts. Therefore, the Block Development Officer could not detect on checking. Hence, it cannot be said that those registers were subsequently forged by the appellant. In (4) State V. Parasuram (A.I.R. 1965 Rajasthan 9) the provisions contained under Sections 464 and 466 of the Code came up for consideration and it was held that to bring the case within Clause (1) of Section 464 of the Code, it was necessary to establish that the accused intended to induce a belief that a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by the authority of a person who did not make, sign, seal or exercise it or that it was made, signed, sealed or executed at a time when it was not so done. Evidently Section 464 cannot be invoked to cases where a public officer knowingly makes false entries initially in the public in the public record on his own authority. Where the prosecution case is not one of subsequent alteration of the document but is essentially one of making initial incorrect and unauthorised entry in the revenue record, the making of such entry cannot be said to constitute the making of false document under Section 464 of the Code. A similar view was expressed in (5) re-Venkatasuryanarasimba Rao (A.I.R. 1955 Andhra 82). It was observed that under Section 464 of the Code, what is essential is that the accused person must make a document with the intention of making it to be believed that it was signed by or by the authority of some one else, while he knows that it was not so made or authorised by that person. It was observed that under Section 464 of the Code, what is essential is that the accused person must make a document with the intention of making it to be believed that it was signed by or by the authority of some one else, while he knows that it was not so made or authorised by that person. Where the accused did not make the bills purporting to be made by or authorised by some person although his intention in issuing the bills may be fraudulent and be may be punishable for some other offence, no offence under Section 465 can be said to have been committed. Therefore, in my judgment, the appellant's conviction and the sentence imposed u/s 466 of the Code can not he sustained, which have got to be quashed. On the evidence, the appellant could have, however, been convicted u/s 477 A of the Code for falsification of accounts. I would have convicted him under Section 477 A of the Code instead of u/s 466 of the Code as contended on behalf of the State, but in the absence of the sanction he could not have been convicted under Section 477 A of the Code as held in A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 220 (Supra). 7. Mr. Verma, as mentioned above, also contended that the conviction of appellant under Section 468 of the Code was also bad for the same reasons, namely, that no offence was made out according to the provisions contained under Section 464 read with Section 463 of the Code. Section 468 reads: “Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” Therefore he urged that even under this section the fact that the documents were forged, has to be established by the prosecution and since they have failed to do so the conviction of the appellant under this section also cannot be maintained. This submission also, of learned counsel in my opinion, is well grounded. Under this section, it may be recalled no separate sentence was imposed by the Assistant Sessions Judge. This submission also, of learned counsel in my opinion, is well grounded. Under this section, it may be recalled no separate sentence was imposed by the Assistant Sessions Judge. Hence, whether the appellant is convicted under Section 468 or not, may not be any material from the point of view of the appellant, but since on the facts and on the evidence led by the prosecution the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained under Section 468 of the Code, it has got to be quashed. 8. Learned counsel argued that the conviction of the appellant under Section 471 of the Code also cannot be upheld on the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution. Section 471 reads :- "Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document". 9. Mr. Verma submitted that according to the provisions of the section the prosecution has to establish user as well as that the documents so used were forged one and it was within the knowledge of the user. He contended that from the evidence of P.W.1 it is clear that the appellant soon after the issuance of the rent receipts to the various tenants referred to above, had deposited the same with the Nazir. Therefore, he had not used them according to the requirements mentioned in the section. This submission of learned counsel, in my judgment, cannot be accepted. The prosecution has further led evidence in this case and it is also the case of the appellant that the relevant registers along with the counterfoil rent receipts were placed before the then Block Development Officer, Shri L. Sawaiya, who made endorsement on the register showing "checked and found correct", which entries were marked as Exts. Ka and Ka-1. Therefore, evidently the appellant had used those documents. Hence, it cannot be said that they were not used. Besides, it is fairly settled that the meaning of the term "use" mentioned in the section is not restricted to the filling of such documents as evidence in a court. It is sufficient that it is used in order that it may ultimately appear in evidence or used dishonestly or fraudulently. The nature of user is not material. Hence, there is no merit in this contention. It is sufficient that it is used in order that it may ultimately appear in evidence or used dishonestly or fraudulently. The nature of user is not material. Hence, there is no merit in this contention. But for conviction under this section only user is not enough. Prosecution has also to establish, as contended by learned counsel, that the document so used was forged within the meaning of Section 464 of the Code. I have already held that the prosecution has failed to establish the same. In that view of the matter his conviction and the sentence imposed under Section 471 of the Code also cannot be upheld. 10. In the result, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant under Sections 466 and 471 of the Code as well as the conviction under Section 468 of the Code are set aside, whereas his conviction and the sentence of fine of Rs. 300/- under Section 409 of the Code are upheld. However, sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment under Section 409 of the Cede imposed by the Assistant Sessions Judge is reduced to the period already undergone and instead a fine of Rs. 1000/- is imposed. Thus, he would pay a total fine of Rs. 1300/- and in default, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. With the above modifications, the judgment and order of the trial court are upheld and the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed with modification.