JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, J. - This is a plaintiffs' second appeal arising out of a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the respondent, Municipal Board of Bijnor, from enforcing a bye-law under which an amount of Rs. 8/- was sought to be realised as licence fee from the plaintiffs. It appears that the Municipal Board had made certain bye-laws in 1927, under Section 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') , for the regulation of flour mills. These bye-laws have been amended from time to time. In 1937, an additional bye law was made imposing a licence fee at the rate of Re. 1/2- per H.P. per annum on each flour mill. This fees was said to have been raised in 1947 from Re. 1/2 to Rs. 10/-, and, thereafter, reduced to Rs. 8/- per annum by a subsequent amendment it as a result of objections by flour mill owners and interference by the State Government. The particulars of this amending bye-law and the date on which it came into force are not given in the plaint. The plaint does not state whether the particular bye-law fixing the licence fees at Rs. 8/- was void ab initio or became void in 1954 or earlier, and, if so, for what specific reasons. In the plaint, as originally framed, the plaintiffs prayed only "that through a prohibitory injunction the Municipal Board Bijnor (defendant) be restrained permanently from enforcing the present bye-laws for the regulation and control of flour mills in the Bijnor Municipalities levying a licensing fee of Rs. 8/- per horse power per annum against the flour mills of the plaintiffs, which is really a tax and has been imposed to raise the general revenue of the Board." 2. The Municipal Board took various objections, including one of the validity of the notice given under Section 326 of the Act. 8/- per horse power per annum against the flour mills of the plaintiffs, which is really a tax and has been imposed to raise the general revenue of the Board." 2. The Municipal Board took various objections, including one of the validity of the notice given under Section 326 of the Act. This section reads as follows :- 326 (1) No suit shall be instituted against a Board, or against a member, officer or servant of a Board, in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been in the case of a Board, left at its office, and, in the case of a member, officer or servant, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) If the Board, member, officer or servant shall, before action is commenced, have tendered, sufficient amends to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not recover any sum in excess of the amount so tendered, and shall also pay all costs incurred by the defendant after such tender. (3) No action such as is described in sub-sec. (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title there-of be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. (4) Provided that nothing in sub-sec. (1) shall be construed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding." 3. The trial court held that the notice was valid as the only defect in the notice, set out in the paragraph 9 of the written statement, was said to be that the matter had been "finally settled" so that the Plaintiffs had no right to question the payment. The trial court held that the notice was valid as the only defect in the notice, set out in the paragraph 9 of the written statement, was said to be that the matter had been "finally settled" so that the Plaintiffs had no right to question the payment. After looking at paragraph 9 of the written statement, I find that the objections to the plaintiffs' suit found there were : firstly, that the mill owners having made a representation the matter was "finally settled" by reduction from Rs. 10/- to Rs. 8/- so that they had no right to question the payment now; and, secondly, that the notice under Section 326 of the Act was defective and illegal. The defendant had clumsily put two separate objections in one paragraph so that the trial court got the impression that the first objection, mentioned in paragraph 9 of the written statement, was really a defect of the notice mentioned there. I do not think that this is a correct interpretation. The first objection in paragraph 9 was neither mentioned there as a ground on which the notice was defective nor did it have any bearing on a defect in the notice. It is related to the questions of acquiescence and estoppel which were the subject matter of issue No. 2 in the suit. The validity of the notice was the subject matter of issue No. 4. Thus, the issue on the defective notice was not properly considered by the trial court. The trial court had decreed the suit after examining the evidence relating to the expenses incurred by the Municipal Board over licensing of the flour mills. It had hardly examined evidence relating to expenses incurred over the enforcement of the bye-laws. 4. The lower appellate court did not enter into the merits of the validity of the imposition of Rs. 8/- per H.P. as licence fee. It allowed the appeal of the defendant Municipal Board on the preliminary ground that the notice under Section 326 of the Act was defective and held that it was unnecessary to decide other questions. It observed that no specific mention had been made of the impugned bye-law in the notice served. The lower appellate court also held that the relief for declaring the bye-law in question to be void had not been mentioned in the notice. It observed that no specific mention had been made of the impugned bye-law in the notice served. The lower appellate court also held that the relief for declaring the bye-law in question to be void had not been mentioned in the notice. It held that this defect in the notice was neither immaterial nor based on any pedantic interpretation of the notice. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on The State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1309, where the following passage was cited from D. S. S. Singh v. Union of India, 1958 S.C.R. 781 at pages 795 and 796 : A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 274 at page 281 :- "We are constrained to observe that the approach of the High Court to this question was not well founded. The Privy Council no doubt laid down in 54 Ind. App. 338: (A. I. R. 1927 P. C. 176) (supra) that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not, however, mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. As was stated by Pollock C.B. in Jones v. Nicholls, (1844) 153 E.R. 149 at p. 150, `we must import a little common sense into notices of this kind'. Beaument, C. J. also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Government of Bombay, I.L.R. (1943) Bom. 128 : A.I.R. 1943 Bombay 138, One must construe Section 80 with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it appears to have been passed.........." 6. Learned counsel for the appellants also pointed out that the lower appellate court had permitted an amendment of the plaint so that a relief for the declaration of "the present bye-laws" as invalid was added in the following terms :- "That it be declared that the present bye-laws for the regulation and control of flour mills in Municipality of Bijnor levying a licence fee of Rs. 8/- per horse power per annum which is really a tax in the garb of licence fee and which merely has been imposed to raise the general revenue of the Board be declared void." In the notice itself it was only mentioned that the reliefs claimed will be : "That the Municipal Board, Bijnor be restrained from realising the license fee at the present exhorbitant and arbitrary rates from my clients and be allowed to levy the License fee only for the purpose of meeting the probable expense incurred by the Board for the regulation of the trade or business of my clients and not for the purpose of augmenting the general revenue of the Board." In paragraph 4 of the notice, it was certainly mentioned that the raising of the licensing fee from Re. 1/2- to Rs. 8/- per horse power was contrary to the provisions of Section 298 (2) -F (d) of the Act and was illegal and ultra vires. Sec. 298 of the Act merely provides for framing of bye-laws in general. Sec. 294 of the act, which provides for imposition of the license fees, was not even mentioned in the notice. Furthermore, in paragraph 10 of the notice, it was mentioned that the cause of action arose on 28-3-1954, when the last demand was made by the Board for the realisation of the licence fee "at the present complained exhorbitant and arbitrary rates." It was also mentioned there that the cause of action is recurring. It is difficult to make out, either from the notice or the plaint, whether the case of a bye-law void ab initio is there. 7. In the course of arguments, learned counsel for the Board stated that the Municipal Board concerned has still further revised the license fee and reduced it to R. 5/- per annum per horse power so that the "present bye-law" was very different now. There is no evidence to this effect on record, but, as the bye-laws are published in the official gazette, judicial notice could certainly be taken of amendments made in them. This is only mentioned here in order to indicate that the bye-law has been changing. An injunction is unnecessary for restraining enforcement of a bye-law which was no longer being enforced. This is only mentioned here in order to indicate that the bye-law has been changing. An injunction is unnecessary for restraining enforcement of a bye-law which was no longer being enforced. Again, the imposition of a licence fee and is reasonableness have to be judged in relation to the time at which it was imposed and the expenses which were being incurred by the Municipal Board on the enforcement of particular bye-laws at that time. If the case, however, was that a bye-law had become invalid after it was made, this should have been clearly specified. I find that both in the notice and in the plaint the cause of action is stated to have arisen in 1954; the year in which the suit was filed. Although the notice and the plaint mention that the fixation of the fee at Rs. 8/- per annum was not legal, yet no indication is given in the notice as to when or how this became illegal. The plaint does mention the year 1947 in which the amount was raised to Rs. 10/- but not when it was reduced to Rs. 8/-. 8. There is, therefore, force in the argument that such a notice could not enable the Board to know the precise nature of the claim put forward so that it may properly decide either to accept it or contest it. Sec. 326 of the Act requires an explicit statement of the cause of action as well as a statement of the relief sought. I find that the notice not only does not mention the nature of the relief subsequently sought by an amendment but also fails to mention the cause of action explicitly and fully. The lower appellate court had come to the conclusion that it did not give sufficient indication that the impugned bye law, by which Rs. 8/- was fixed, would itself be challenged. It is well established that a cause of action embraces every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Although every piece of evidence need not be mentioned, the state. men must give the whole bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove before he can succeed. Although every piece of evidence need not be mentioned, the state. men must give the whole bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove before he can succeed. It must give a fair notice to the defendant, in a case like the present one, of the time at which the cause of action arose. If the cause of action is said to arise in 1954, it is difficult to hold that the defendant was not actually misled into thinking that the bye-law was not challenged as void ab initio. 9. I also find that no specific issue was framed on the invalidity of the impugned bye-law. Parties cannot be absolved entirely from responsibility for issues framed. Issue No. 5 could only be said to involve the question of validity of a bye-law very indirectly as it was framed as follows :- "Whether the defendant is not entitled to realise Rs. 8/- per H.P. as licence fee ? If so, its effect ?" 10. It was contended by Mr. Bashir Ahmad reply that the cause of action arose only when the demand was made so that it was correctly slated in the notice and in the plaint that it arose in 1954. He relied on L. M. Jahagirdar v. S. L. Nadgir, A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 217, where it was laid down:- "........ if the order was illegal. the plaintiff was not bound to file a suit to set it aside, but was entitled to what until it was enforced against him, and the attempt to enforce it against him gave a good cause of action which was admittedly within time." It is quite true that the plaintiffs need not have filed a suit until the demand was made on them. But, demands had been made and met since the bye-law fixing the amount of licence fee at Rs. 8/- was made. Plaintiffs had only refused to pay in 1954. It is quite possible that the ground that they had acquiesced and accepted the fixation at Rs. 8/- as fair may have carried some weight in deciding whether there was fair correspondence between the licence fees charged and total expenses incurred in enforcing them if the matter had been really investigated and tried by the lower appellate court. This could only be done if it was properly pleaded. 8/- as fair may have carried some weight in deciding whether there was fair correspondence between the licence fees charged and total expenses incurred in enforcing them if the matter had been really investigated and tried by the lower appellate court. This could only be done if it was properly pleaded. The question involved here was not whether the plaintiffs had to file a suit immediately on the first demand or could wait and then question the subsequent demand. The real question here was whether the whole cause of action could be said to have been stated in the notice and in the plaint so as to give a fair notice to the Municipal Board of the case it had to meet. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the question whether the Board had fair notice of the plaintiffs' case could be said to be one of fact is not without substance. I have, however, examined this question and have also come to the conclusion that the defendant did not have fair notice. With sufficient particulars, either from the notice under Section 326 of the Act or from the plaint, that the Board will have to meet the case that the bye-law imposing Rs. 8/- as licence fee was invalid at the time when it was made. 11. The clearest proof of this want of notice of what the defendant had to meet was that neither side had tried to prove actual expenses incurred by the Board on enforcing the bye-laws at the time when Rs. 8/- per horse power had been fixed as licence fees. The trial court had merely considered the question whether any additional staff was employed for flour mills in 1954 and whether there were any expenses earmarked for the enforcement of the bye-laws relating to flour mills in 1954. The expenses incurred have to bear only a reasonable relationship to the licence fees imposed. It may be that a licence fees imposed in a particular year may become, under altered circumstances, either excessive or insufficient in another year. A reasonable relationship between estimated expenses and income from licence fees does not mean that any thing more than a roughly fair correspondence between the two need be shown. It seems that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant realised what had to be proved in such a case. A reasonable relationship between estimated expenses and income from licence fees does not mean that any thing more than a roughly fair correspondence between the two need be shown. It seems that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant realised what had to be proved in such a case. For example, it was not even attempted to be proved how often flour mills were inspected and what additional expenses were inferred on inspections or prosecutions for enforcement of the whole set of bye-laws or on litigation over them. However, as the cause of action is recurring, another suit, after due notice and proper pleadings, with necessary particulars. will not be barred by this decision. 12. It was also contended that, as the cause of action is recurring and an injunction is sought against future realisation no notice under Section 326 of the Act was needed. Reliance was placed on the terms of Section 326 of the Act and on The State of Bihar v. Raghunandan Singh, A.I.R. 1960 Pat. 530, where it was held that Section 80 C.P.C. has no application to future or threatened acts. It is not necessary for me to consider the correctness or applicability of this decision on Section 80, C.P.C. Sec. 326 (4) of the Act specifically deals with suits for injunctions and make, a notice unnecessary only in those cases where the object of the injunction sought would be defeated by the giving of the notice or by the postponement of the commencement of suit or proceeding. It has not been shown to me that the instant suit falls within the exception provided by Section 326 (4) of the Act. This is a sufficient answer to the contention. 13. This second appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. The interim order is discharged. The Municipal Board may now withdraw the amount which has been deposited in court with regard to the licence fee during the pendency of this case.