JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - This criminal revision has been referred to this Bench for decision at the instance of K.B. Asthana, J. The Applicant in this case was convicted by a Magistrate I Class, Kanpur, u/s 7/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default or payment of fine, he was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of eight months. His appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the II Temp. Civil and Sessions Judge, Kanpur. He thereupon filed a revision in this Court which was admitted by Asthana, J. only on the question of sentence. Subsequently, an application was made by the Applicant, stating that the revision involved the interpretation of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, regarding which there were conflicting decisions of Single Judges in this Court and praying that the revision be heard on merits also. This application was allowed by Asthana, J. and after hearing learned Counsel for the Applicant he directed that the revision be referred to a Division Bench for decision. That is how the case has come before us. 2. On October 9, 1968, at about 11-45 a.m. the Applicant was found selling and exposing for sale ghee at his shop in Mohalla Ali Zaheea Market, P.S. Babupurwa, Kanpur. Food Inspector Gulshan Ambwani PW 1 purchased a sample of ghee from him in the presence of Jagdamba Prasad Safai Naik of the Ma-hapalika. The sample was got analysed and was found to be adulterated. At the trial, the prosecution examined Gulshan Ambwani Food Inspector (PW 1) and Jagdamba Prasad Safai Naik (PW 2) to prove the purchase of a sample of ghee from the Applicant. The Applicant admitted that the sample of ghee was taken from him but contended that it was taken forcibly, from him and that no price was paid therefor. He also contended that he had a cloth shop and the ghee was kept there not for sale but for poor in. The trial court held that the Applicant was selling and exposing ghee for sale and that a sample of ghee was purchased by the Food Inspector from him. In view of the report of the Public Analyst, the trial court convicted and sentenced the Applicant as stated above. The trial court held that the Applicant was selling and exposing ghee for sale and that a sample of ghee was purchased by the Food Inspector from him. In view of the report of the Public Analyst, the trial court convicted and sentenced the Applicant as stated above. In appeal, one of the questions raised by the Applicant was that the conviction of the Applicant was vitiated as no independent witness of the public was examined in support of the prosecution case. The appellate court, relying upon a decision of M.N. Shukla, J. in Rama Kant v. State 1970 AWR 81 , rejected this contention. It further held that the Applicant's objection had no force, specially when he admitted the taking of the sample from him. The findings of fact recorded by the trial magistrate were all confirmed by the appellate Court. 3. The question, which has been raised in this revision, is that the conviction of the Applicant is vitiated on account of non-compliance with the provision of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. This section, as it stood at the material time, reads thus: 10 (7)--Where the Food Inspector takes any action Under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), Sub-section (2), Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (6), he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures. This section nowhere talks of "respectable witnesses of the locality." Section 10, Sub-section (7), as it stood before its amendment in 1964, was in the following terms: 10 (7)--Where the food inspector takes any action Under Clause () of Sub-section (1), Sub-section (2), Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (6), he shall, as far as possible, call not less than two persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take their signatures. It will be noticed that, by the amendment of 1964, the words "as far as possible" were deleted and for the words "not less than two persons" the words "one or more persons" were substituted. These provisions have come up for consideration before this Court on several occasions. It will be noticed that, by the amendment of 1964, the words "as far as possible" were deleted and for the words "not less than two persons" the words "one or more persons" were substituted. These provisions have come up for consideration before this Court on several occasions. In Municipal Board, Saharanpur v. Dhian Singh 1966 AWR 662 M.H. Beg, J. held: The object of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is to ensure that an actual and genuine transaction of sale of the sample and its formalities are proved by evidence which is above board and satisfactory. The sale cannot be vitiated simply because no witness was available Each cass has no be decided on its own facts and circumstances. In Ram Dass Vs. The State, AIR 1969 All 109 S.D. Singh, J. has held that any irregularity in the taking of sample cannot vitiate the taking of the sample from the accused. He has further held that there is no requirement u/s 10(7) that the witnesses should be respectable parsons of the locality as is required u/s 103 Code of Criminal Procedure. In Rama Kant v. State (supra) M.N. Shukla, J. has held: The terms of Section 10(7) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act clearly indicate that it is not necessary for the Food Inspector to take an 'independent' witness in the sense that he must be a public witness or a respectable witness of the locality. There is nothing inherently wrong in a Government Official or a public servant which may disqualify him for being taken as a witness as required by Sub-section (7) of Section 10. Rajeshwari Prasad, J. has in A.K. Chakravarty v. The State 1968 AWR 262 held that the requirement of Section 10(7) as to the presence of two witnesses is mandatory in those cases where it is possible to comply with the same. With respect, this appears to be self contradictory. In this case, no witness other than the Food Inspector was examined and since there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the other witness or witnesses were not present at the search, the learned Judge held that no reliance could be placed on the sole testimony of the Food Inspector and allowed the revision. In this case, no witness other than the Food Inspector was examined and since there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the other witness or witnesses were not present at the search, the learned Judge held that no reliance could be placed on the sole testimony of the Food Inspector and allowed the revision. Our attention has also been invited to the decision of Tripathi, J. in Teja Ram v. State 1970 AWR (J) 9 : 1970 ACrR 122. In this case, the Food Inspector was accompanied by the sanitary overseer when he took the sample. Tripathi, J. was of the view that the sanitary overseer was a member of the raiding party and was not a person who could be called to witness the taking of the sample. He accordingly held that there was non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7) and therefore, the prosecution was based on an action which was not in accordance with law stood vitiated. 4. It is now well settled that any irregularity or illegality in the investigation of a case does not, by itself, vitiate the trial or the conviction--see Niranjan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1957 AWR 258 SC. It is certainly desirable that, in every case, the provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act should be complied with fully. But a mere non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7) will not make the taking of the sample unlawful or make the prosecution or conviction based upon the taking of the sample illegal. There may be cases where it may not be possible to comply fully with the provisions of Section 10(7). If the provisions are contravened without proper justification, the taking of the sample may be viewed with suspicion. The only consequence of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7) is that it may affect the probative value of the evidence of the person taking the sample. 5. The provisions of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act may be compared with the provisions of Section 103(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. The only consequence of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7) is that it may affect the probative value of the evidence of the person taking the sample. 5. The provisions of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act may be compared with the provisions of Section 103(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 103(1) Code of Criminal Procedure reads thus: Section 103(1)--Before making a search under this Chapter, the officer or other person about to make it shall call upon two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do. The main difference between the two proviions is that whereas Section 103 (1) Code of Criminal Procedure requires the presence of "two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality", the provisions of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act only require the presence of "one or more persons." It thus appears that the provisions of Section 103(1) Code of Criminal Procedure are a little more stringent. With respect to Section 103 Code of Criminal Procedure the Supreme Court has held in Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2956 SC 411: In respect of the search of the room occupied by the Appellant and the recovery of the blood-stained shirt and bloodstained pants aforesaid, it was necessary to have at least two search witnesses as required by Section 103. Assuming that the two rickshaw-wallahs who actually witnessed the search as found by the courts below were not respectable inhabitants of the locality, that circumstance would not invalidate the search. It would only affect the weight of the evidence in support of the search and the recovery. Hence at the highest the regularity in the search and the recovery in so far as the terms of Section 103 had not been fully complied with, would not affect the legality of the proceedings. It only affected the weight of evidence which is a matter for Courts of fact and this Court would not ordinarily go behind the findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the courts below. It only affected the weight of evidence which is a matter for Courts of fact and this Court would not ordinarily go behind the findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the courts below. In this connection, we may also refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1963 AWR 304 SC: So far as the alleged illegality of the search is concerned, it is sufficient to say that even assuming that the search was illegal, the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. It may be that where the provisions of Sections 103 and 165, Code of Criminal Procedure, are contravened, the search could be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search the court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues. The High Court has chosen to accept the evidence of the prosecution with regard to the fact of seizure and that being a question to be decided only by the Court of fact, this Court would not re-examine the evidence for satisfying itself as to the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions reached by the High Court. We are, therefore, of opinion that, if, in taking the sample, the Food Inspector fails to comply with the provisions of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, then neither the taking of the sample is illegal, nor is the conviction based on the examination of this sample vitiated. The only result of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7) is that it may become necessary to examine the evidence with move than ordinary care. If, in the circumstance o a particular case and upon the examination of the evidence, the court comes to the conclusion that the sample was, in fact, taken from the accused, then the conviction can legally be founded upon the result of the analysis of that sample. It may be that, in a particular case, the court may come to the conclusion that, on account of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7) and the circumstances of the case, the taking of the sample itself becomes doubtful. In such cases, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal. 6. It may be that, in a particular case, the court may come to the conclusion that, on account of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7) and the circumstances of the case, the taking of the sample itself becomes doubtful. In such cases, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal. 6. Merely because there has been non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7), the evidence of the Food Inspector does not become inadmissible. He is a competent witness and the Court will have to decide, in the circumstances of each case, the value it would attach to his testimony. It is to be noticed that Section 10(7) does not prescribe any qualifications for a person who may be called to be present at the time of the taking of the sample. Therefore, prima facie, there can be no objection to calling the Sanitary Overseer or Safai Naik or any other such person for this purpose. Again, it is for the courts of fact to see what weight is to be attached to his testimony. 7. In the present case, the two courts below have recorded a finding of fact that the sample of ghee was taken from the Applicant and that he was paid the price thereof. In fact, the Applicant admitted the taking of the sample from him. Therefore, even if there is any non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7), it is immaterial and does not affect the conviction of the Applicant. We see no reason to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below concurrently. On these findings, the Applicant has rightly been convicted. The Applicant has been awarded the minimum sentence provided by law. There are no sufficient reasons for reducing that sentence. 8. The revision is accordingly dismissed. The Applicant is on bail. He will be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentence awarded to him.