JUDGMENT Pathak, J. - This is a defendant's revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order of the trial court allowing a plaint to be converted into an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act. 2. On March 18, 1952, suit No. 1 of 1952 was filed by the plaintiff-respondent alleging that a dispute had arisen between the parties in respect of money due on business transactions between them, that the dispute was referred to arbitration on the basis of an arbitration clause in the contracts and the arbitrators made an award on January 3, 1952 awarding a sum of Rs. 13,592[11[ - in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, that after adjustment of an amount due to the defendant-applicant he remained liable to pay Rs. 7,892 [11]]- which liability he duly acknowledged and promised to pay within 8 days thereafter, that the defendant-applicant did not pay the said amount within the period aforesaid in spite of demand made by the plaintiff-respondent and that. therefore, the said amount was due with interest. 3. In defence, the defendant-applicant denied any contract between the parties, alternatively pleaded that they were wagering contracts, challenged the validity of the award and denied that he had agreed to pay any amount. It was specifically contended that the suit. was barred by Section 32 of the Arbitration Act. 4. On May 6, 1952 the plaintiff-respondent made an application praying that the plaint be converted into an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the- Arbitration Act. On May 7, 1952, the application was rejected and on May 31, 1952 the trial court dismissed the suit as barred by Section 32 of the Act. There- after, on July 2, 1952 the plaintiff-respondent filed an application purporting to be under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, which was registered as suit No. 6 of 1952. The defendant applicant filed an objection under Section 33 of the Act, which in its turn was registered as suit No. 8 of 1952. Meanwhile, the plaintiff-respondent filed an appeal (First Appeal No. 164 of 1953) to this Court against the dismissal of suit No. 1 of 1952. The defendant applicant filed an objection under Section 33 of the Act, which in its turn was registered as suit No. 8 of 1952. Meanwhile, the plaintiff-respondent filed an appeal (First Appeal No. 164 of 1953) to this Court against the dismissal of suit No. 1 of 1952. That appeal was allowed by Bishambhar Dayal, J. on February 2, 1965 and the case was remanded to the trial court with the following observations : "The plaintiff may either proceed with the suit in its present form or apply to have it converted into an application under 'Sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act, and pray for the necessary amendments to be incorporated in the plaint." On September 3, 1965, an application was made for the review of the judgment of this Court in the First Appeal. The review application was rejected by the following order "By the main order disposing of the appeal this Court had held that the plaintiff had a choice either to proceed with the suit as it is or to have it converted into an application under the Arbitration Act. It has now been brought by this application to the notice of this Court that the plaintiff had already filed an application under the Arbitration Act. The contention is that he had no right thereafter to proceed with this appeal in this Court I am unable to agree with this contention. If the order of the court below dismissing the suit as incompetent was wrong he had a right of appeal and have it set aside. Now he has the same choice which was given to him in the judgment either to proceed with the suit after remand or to proceed with the application under the Arbitration Act and to let the suit be dismissed. I see no force in this application. It is accordingly dismissed. 3-9-65. Sd. B. Dayal." 5. The application and the objection, registered as suits Nos. 6 and 8 of 1952 were taken up by the trial court and dismissed on May 23, 1966. 6. Then on March 21, 1969, the plaintiff-respondent made a fresh application in suit No. 1 of 1952 praying that the plaint be converted into an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act. The defendant-applicant preferred an objection. On May 14, 1969, the trial court rejected the objection and allowed the application. 6. Then on March 21, 1969, the plaintiff-respondent made a fresh application in suit No. 1 of 1952 praying that the plaint be converted into an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act. The defendant-applicant preferred an objection. On May 14, 1969, the trial court rejected the objection and allowed the application. It is against that order that the defendant applicant has filed the present revision application. 7. The revision application came on for hearing before S. K. Verma, J., who by his order of July 8, 1970 referred the matter to a larger Bench. 8. The first contention of Shri K. C. Saksena, on behalf of the defendant- applicant is that having regard to the observations of Bishambhar Dayal, J. in the order dated September 3, 1965, the plaintiff-respondent could either proceed with the suit as it was or proceed with the application registered as suit No. 6 of 1952, and that it was not open to him to apply afresh for conversion of the plaint into an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act. Now, reading what was said by the learned judge while allowing the appeal with his observations in the order refusing review that conclusion does not appear possible to us. In the judgment allowing the appeal and remanding the case to the trial court the learned judge pointed out that it was open to the plaintiff- respondent to either proceed with the suit as it stood or to apply to have it amended into an application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act. It was subsequently brought to his notice by the review application that the plaintiff-respondent had already made an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act and it was contended that the appeal was liable to be dismissed. The learned judge did not agree and after noting what had been said by him when disposing of the appeal in respect of the course open to the plaintiff-respondent upon remand of the case he" pointed out that the plaintiff-respondent had the same choice which was given to him in the judgment, and that it was open to him either to proceed with the suit after remand or to proceed with the application under the Arbitration Act and to let the suit be dismissed. We read these observations to mean that it was open to the plaintiff-respondent either to proceed with the suit as it stood or to have it converted into an application under Sections 14 and 17, or to proceed with the application under Section 14 made on July 2, 1952 and in that event to let the suit be dismissed. It must be noted that the review application was rejected and the learned judge never intended to modify what was said by him in the judgment on the first appeal. 9. The next contention of learned counsel for the defendant-applicant is that the trial court committed an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction in making the impugned order because thereby a new cause of action has been introduced and the plea of limitation available to the defendant-applicant has been rendered nugatory. That is a serious question and will now be considered. 10. Perhaps the earliest enunciation of the principle relating to the amendment of pleadings was set out concisely by Branwoll, L. J. in Tildesley v. Harper, (1978) 10 Ch. D. 393. "My Practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that, by his blunder, he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by costs or otherwise." And in Cropper v. Smith, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 700 Cotton, L. J. observed : "Now it is true that under 15 and 16 Vict. C. 83, Section 41, you must give notice of an objection to the validity of the patent if you wish to raise the objection, but there is a power even in that statute for a judge at Chambers to amend, and to allow you at the last moment to cure any laches or error of judgment, and what a judge could do at Chambers, a Judge could do in Court, Moreover, every power of amendment given by the judicature Act seems to me to be applicable to this kind of suit as well as to any other. Now, I think it is a well established principle that the object of Courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. Now, I think it is a well established principle that the object of Courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. Speaking for myself, and in conformity with what I have heard laid down by the other division of the Court of Appeal and by myself as a member of it, I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or of grace. Order XXVIII, Rule 1 of the Rules of 1883, which follows previous legislation on the subject, says that, "All such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. "It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right. It was said by Mr. Barber in his very powerful speech to us, "You are taking away an advantage from the plaintiffs who have got judgment below, by making an amendment at last moment." In one sense we should be taking away an advantage from them, but only an advantage which they have obtained by a mistake of the other side, contrary to the true bearing of the law on the rights of the parties. The question seems to me to be this. Can .you by the imposition of any terms place the other side in as good a position for the purpose of having the question of right determined as they were in at the time when the mistake of judgment was committed ? It does not seem to me material to consider whether the mistake of judgment was accidental or not, if not intended to overreach. It does not seem to me material to consider whether the mistake of judgment was accidental or not, if not intended to overreach. There is no rule that only slips or accidental errors are to be corrected. The rule says, "All such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy. I have found in my experience that there is one panacea which heals every sore in litigation, and that is costs. I have very-seldom, if ever, been unfortunate enough to come across an instance, where it person has made a mistake in his pleadings which has put the other side to such a disadvantage as that it cannot be cured by the application of that healing medicine. Here I fail even to see that the Respondents want costs to remedy any grievance, because they have been put to none. The case has been fought exactly in the same way as it would have been fought if Mr. Hancock had delivered particulars of objection, and therefore, it seems to me-that he ought to be allowed to amend." 11. The rule considered by that learned Judge corresponds substantially to Rule 17 of Order 6 of our Code of Civil Procedure, and we are of opinion that the principles to which he has referred should also find favour with its. In India, leave to amend a plaint has been refused generally in those cases where the amendment would operate to defeat a right of the defendant which cannot be compensated for in costs. A frequent example is the case where the period of limitation for invoking the Court's jurisdiction for the grant of a relief has expired, and to allow the amendment would defeat it right in the defendant which has accrued by lapse of time. Yet, even there the Courts have affirmed their power to permit amendments. In Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Ind. Appl. Yet, even there the Courts have affirmed their power to permit amendments. In Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Ind. Appl. 255 : A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 59, the Privy Council pointed out : "That there was full power to make the amendment cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not as it rule be exercised where the effect is to take away from it defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, yet there are cases where such considerations are out-weighed by the special circumstances of the case." And in L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Messers Jardine Skineer and Co, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 357, the Supreme Court explained : "It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice." The point has engaged the consideration of the Supreme Court on several occasions since. It will be sufficient to refer to the recent decision in A. K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 96 in which the following observations appear to be most apposite to the present case : "The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred. Weldon v. Neale, (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 394. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation. The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistake, Cropper v. Smith, (1884) 26 Ch. The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistake, Cropper v. Smith, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 700, (710-711) and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended." Subsequent cases do not more than illustrate the principles embodied there. 12. Now, the question is whether the court below acted rightly in allowing the conversion of the plaint into an application under Section 14, Arbitration Act. It is urged that the cause of action now sought to be introduced arises upon the issue of notice of the making of the award while the original cause of action arose upon the breach of promise by the defendant-applicant in omitting to pay within eight days of the award. We are referred to what was said by Bishambhar Dayal, J. in the judgment disposing of the First Appeal. Assuming that position to be right in law, it cannot be said, we think, that an entirely new case has been set up. We must have regard to the fact that the plaint, though based on the circumstance that the defendant-applicant acknowledged the liability due under the award and promised to discharge it within eight days nevertheless proceeds essentially on the basis that an award was made between the parties and the liability sought to be enforced was declared originally by the award. The liability under the award generated the liability under the agreement. It is doubtful whether an entirely new cause of action has been substituted. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in A. K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. "The expression, 'cause of action' in the present context does not mean 'every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed' as was said in Cooke v. Gill, (1978) 8 C.P. 107 (116), in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. The expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corporation Ltd., (1962) 1 All. E.R0 24 and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words "new case" have been understood to mean "new set of ideas" : Dornan v. J. W. Ellis and Co. Ltd., 1962 1 All. E.R. 303. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time." 13. Can it be said that by converting the plaint into an application tinder Section 14 Arbitration Act a new set of ideas has been substituted for the original ? We think not. The structural context in which the original relief was claimed remains substantially the same even after amendment. It has merely been abridged in the sense that now a relief is claimed with reference to an earlier stage than that at which the original relief was founded. 14. It is immaterial whether the request for amendment made by the plaintiff-respondent proceeds from the application dated May 6, 1952 or the applications were admittedly made after the period of limitation for making an application under Section 14, Arbitration Act. The application dated May 6, 1952 was made immediately after the plaintiff-respondent came to know of the nature of the defence adopted by the defendant-applicant to his suit. The application dated March 21, 1969 way made after the observations of this Court in First Appeal No. 654 of 1963 and on the review application registered which followed, and the dismissal of the application registered as suit No. 6 of 1952. 15. Now, the award was made eighteen years ago, and for one reason or another, no adjudication has been possible for determining the rights of the plaintiff-respondent under it. It is time, we think, for the consumption of that proceeding. The law confers a discretion upon the court to permit an amendment of the pleadings so long as the discretion is exercised in accordance with sound judicial principles. It is time, we think, for the consumption of that proceeding. The law confers a discretion upon the court to permit an amendment of the pleadings so long as the discretion is exercised in accordance with sound judicial principles. The court below rightly exercised its discretion, and we do not see any cause for interference in the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction. 16. It is finally contended by Shri K. C. Saxena that the trial of the present suit after amendment is barred by the dismissal of suit No. 6 of 1952. Learned counsel pleads res judicata. That is a plea which can be raised before the trial court when it proceeds with the case before it. If learned counsel is taken to mean that the amendment application is barred by res judicata, we have only to point out that the question claiming the attention of the court there was entirely different from the question in suit No. 6 of 1952. 17. In our judgment, the revision application must fail. It is dismissed with costs.