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Allahabad High Court · body

1970 DIGILAW 384 (ALL)

Moin Uddin v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U. P

1970-09-24

S.N.SINGH

body1970
JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arises out of consolidation proceedings. Smt. Kulsum Bibi, the grand-mother of the petitioners, executed a Waqf-alal-aulad in the year 1930 in respect of her Zamindari property by a registered document. On the admitted case of the parties, she became ex-proprietory tenant of her Sir plots. It appears that Smt. Kulsum Bibi executed a Thekanama in favour of one Abdul Hasan in the year 1940 for a period of ten years. In this Thekanama she gave Abdul Hasan right to let out plots given to him. The plots in dispute were described as Sir and Khud Kasht of Smt. Kulsum Bibi. The period of the Thekanama expired in the year 1950. It appears that during the term of Thekanama Abdul Hasan admitted the contesting opposite parties to occupy the land in dispute. There are Qabuliats on the records which would show that the contesting opposite parties, who previously were cultivating the disputed land on Batai rent, agreed to pay cash rent to Abdul Hasan by executing Qabuliats in his favour in May 1949. 2. Consolidation started in the village in dispute. In the basic year the contesting opposite parties were recorded as Sirdars over their respective plots which are in dispute. The petitioners, who were successors-in-interest of Smt. Kulsum Bibi, objected to the entries in favour of the contesting opposite parties. They claimed to be Sirdars themselves and asserted that the contesting opposite parties, if at all, could be Asamis of the plots in dispute. 3. All the consolidation authorities have rejected the claim of the petitioners and have held that the contesting opposite parties have become Sirdars of the plots in dispute. 4. Aggrieved with the decision of the consolidation authorities, the present writ petition has been filed. 5. Mr. Sharafat Ali, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that on the execution of the Waqf deed, Smt. Kulsum Bibi became an ex-proprietary tenant of the plots in dispute. His contention is that on the execution of the lease in the year 1940, the status of Abdul Hasan was that of a sub-tenant. Abdul Hasan was permitted to let out land to others. As such under the authority granted to Abdul Hasan he let out the land in dispute to the various contesting opposite parties. The lease granted in favour of Abdul Hasan expired in 1950. Abdul Hasan was permitted to let out land to others. As such under the authority granted to Abdul Hasan he let out the land in dispute to the various contesting opposite parties. The lease granted in favour of Abdul Hasan expired in 1950. After the expiration of this period of lease, the right of Abdul Hasan as well as that of the contesting opposite parties came to an end and they were liable to ejectment under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. This happened in the year 1950 and Smt. Kulsum Bibi was competent to eject these various contestants upto July 1952, but on the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by virtue of their cultivatory possession, these contestants became Asamis and under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act there was no period of limitation prescribed for the ejectment of such Asamis, their status continued to be that of Asamis and of Smt. Kulsum Bibi as that of Sirdar. Thereafter the petitioners succeeded her as Sirdars. This argument has not been accepted by the consolidation authorities on different grounds. 6. On the facts as stated above, it is clear that so far as Sir plots are concerned, Smt. Kulsum Bibi would surely become an ex-proprietory tenant, but this cannot be true in respect of Khud Kasht plots unless it was established that these Khud Kasht plots were of such standing as to acquire the status of Sir under the tenancy law. This has not been proved in this case. So far as the Khud Kasht plots are concerned, on the execution of the lease in favour of Abdul Hasan, he would surely become a hereditary tenant and not a sub-tenant as contended to by the learned counsel for the petitioners. However, assuming for the purposes of this case that Smt. Kulsum Bibi became ex-proprietory tenant of the disputed plots, this has to be seen whether her right or the right of the petitioners as tenure holders subsisted at the date of the start of the consolidation proceedings. On the case set up by the petitioners, Smt. Kulsum Bibi was an ex-proprietory tenant in the year 1940. She sub-let the disputed plots to Abdul Hasan. The possession or the status of Abdul Hasan was that of a sub tenant. On the case set up by the petitioners, Smt. Kulsum Bibi was an ex-proprietory tenant in the year 1940. She sub-let the disputed plots to Abdul Hasan. The possession or the status of Abdul Hasan was that of a sub tenant. A sub-tenant under law could not let out to others in view of Section 39 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and if he let out the plots, the occupiers would have no better status than that of a trespasser qua the tenant and licensee qua the person allowing them to occupy the plots in dispute. After the expiry of the term of the lease, the occupiers of the disputed plots became trespassers and they had no lawful right to remain in occupation over the disputed plots. The term of the lease expired in 1950 equivalent to 1357 F. 1358 F. The possession of the occupiers on the disputed land was without lawful right. In such circumstances this has to be seen whether the contention of Mr. Sharafat Ali that on the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act they became Asamis is correct or not. In view of the Qabuliats executed by these contesting opposite parties, they were holding the disputed land from Abdul Hasan at least from May 1949. On the expiry of ten years' lease their possession became that of trespassers. 7. The question for determination is as to whether they became hereditary tenants on the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or not. According to Mr. Sharafat Ali the limitation for a suit under Sec 180 started in July 1950 and these persons as trespassers could be ejected upto 30th June 1952. Since Smt. Kulsum Bibi had a right to institute a suit till 1st July 1952, these persons could not become hereditary tenants by the time of the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and on the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, they became Asamis as such became immune from ejectment and no period of limitation having been provided for the ejectment of such Asamis, they continued to be Asamis. I do not think that Mr. Sharafat Ali is right in this contention of his. I do not think that Mr. Sharafat Ali is right in this contention of his. Assuming his argument to be correct that the limitation started for ejecting these persons in July 1950, Smt. Kulsum Bibi could institute suit under Section 180 upto 1st July 1952, but she not having filed any suit, her right came to an end and got extinguished. On facts of this case on the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act even accepting the argument of Sri Sharafat Ali, these contesting opposite parties got no right. If at all, if the contention is accepted, they got this right in November 1952 when the Supplementary Act XXXI of 1952 was passed. Before this Act was passed the right of Smt. Kulsum Bibi got extinguished by lapse of two years under Section 180 (2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act. In view of the first Governor's order when cause of action arose before the date of vesting, a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act could be filed in respect of a cause of action which arose before the date of vesting and Smt. Kulsum Bibi not having filed a suit within time, her right in the disputed property got extinguished. 8. This case can be looked at from another point as well. After the expiry of the period of lease in favour of Abdul Hasan, the possession of these contesting opposite parties, who were allowed to occupy the disputed plots by a sub-tenant, who had no authority to let out, was that of a trespasser and from July 1950 such trespassers had no lawful right to remain in occupation. If they remained in occupation during 1359-F., they cannot be said to have acquired Asami right by virtue of their cultivatory possession in 1359 F. In Smt. Sonawati v. Sri Ram, 1968 A.L.J. 313, the Supreme Court held that the expression "cultivatory possession" is not defined in the Act, but the explanation clearly implies that the claimant must have a lawful right to be in possession of the land, and must not belong to the classes specified in the explanation. "Cultivatory possession" to be recognised for the purpose of the Act must be lawful, and for the whole year 1359 F." Applying this principle of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we find that the possession of the contesting opposite parties was not in lawful right as such this possession could not entitle them to have become Adhivasis or Asamis under Section 3 of the Supplementary Act XXXI of 1952. Mr. Sharafat Ali tried to make distinction between legal right and a lawful right. He contended that the contesting opposite parties may not have a legal right, but they were in lawful occupation of the disputed plots, since Smt. Kulsum Bibi had authorised Abdul Hasan to let out to others. It is well settled that a party cannot contract against the statute. When the U.P. Tenancy Act prohibited sub-letting by it sub-tenant, no contract made by Smt. Kulsum Bibi could have given a right to Abdul Hasan to let out the disputed land against the provisions of statute. In my opinion the possession of the contesting opposite parties was without right from the time they were allowed to occupy. Their possession was that of trespassers. Since these persons had no lawful right to remain in occupation in 1359 F in view of the Supreme Court decision referred to above, they could not have become Asamis on the passing of the Supplementary Act No. XXXI of 1952. The possession of these contesting opposite parties can only be that of trespassers or of licensees. In either view of the matter, I am of the opinion that no Asami right can be held to have acrued to these contesting opposite parties. If these persons were trespassers, as I have already held above, they were not entitled to get Asami right in view of the Supreme Court decision referred to above. If they are held to be licencees, they will not be entitled to get right of Asamis in view of two decisions of this Court reported in Bhagwati Singh v. Suraj Deo Ram Tewari, 1964 A.L.J. 528, and Chhedi Ram Tiwari v. Mahngoo Tewari, 1969 A.W.R. 230. These two cases are authorities for the proposition that a licensee in occupation in 1359F cannot acquire right of an Asami on the passing of the Supplementary Act. Confronted with this legal position, Mr. These two cases are authorities for the proposition that a licensee in occupation in 1359F cannot acquire right of an Asami on the passing of the Supplementary Act. Confronted with this legal position, Mr. Sharafat Ali argued that the occupation of the contesting opposite parties was neither that of a trespasser nor that of a licensee, but it was of peculiar nature, but lawful. I am unable to accept this contention. No third status can be ascribed to the contesting opposite parties. They must be held either trespassers or licensees and in either view of the matter they did not become Asamis of the disputed plots. The claim of the petitioners in respect of the disputed plots was rightly rejected by all the consolidation authorities. 9. No case for interference has been made out. Accordingly this petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.