Order.- This is an application filed under section 561-A, Cr. P. Code, requesing this Court to quash all further proceedings in C.C. No. 842 of 1970 on the file of the Judicial Second Glass Magistrate, Guddapah in so far as it relates to A-2 and A-3. 2. The proceedings in C.C. No. 842 of 1970 were occasioned on account of a complaint filed by one Bole Chenchaiah, the complainant. The said complainant is a driver of Messrs. Kareem Aleem & Co. at Madras for the Three Aces Beedi van bearing M.S.Q. 7829. It is stated in the complaint that the accused company bore grudge against the complainant’s company in the matter of publicity of their business and that they attempted to use violence against the persons and property of the complainant’s company. Both these companies trade in beedies. After narrating the incidents taken place on 24th November, 1969 at Badvel and during Dasara at Proddatur, the complainant says that the accused were on a look-out for opportunities to cause harm and damage to the person and property of the complainant’s company. 3. On 22nd July, 1970 at about 6 P.M. while the complainant was driving his vehicle-Herald van from seven roads in Cuddapah town towards railway station, the driver of the 2nd accused obstructed the passing of the complainant’s vehicle along the road just in front of the Tahsildar Subbaiah’s house which is in their occupation as their sub-office. The 2nd and 3rd accused who were stated to have been standing there at the main gate of their office instigated the 1st accused to get into a car of theirs and drive it against the complainant’s vehicle, the 2nd accused saying “Legara Gadiko” and the 3rd accused saying “Ennappa Pakare Adi”. Immediately, the 1st accused started their Plymouth station-van MSY 3121 and dashed against the complainant’s car on its right rear side, thereby causing damage to the rear side of the complainant’s van. The complainant seeing the gravity of the situation, swerved to his left quickly and averted further damage by taking his van to a distance beyond the reach of the colliding vehicle. Having stopped the vehicle at some distance away, the complainant went and lodged a complaint in the I Town Police Station at Cuddapah immediately thereafter. The complainant estimated the damage to his Vehicle at Rs. 100. Having stopped the vehicle at some distance away, the complainant went and lodged a complaint in the I Town Police Station at Cuddapah immediately thereafter. The complainant estimated the damage to his Vehicle at Rs. 100. The police asked the complainant to prefer a private complaint saying that the offence reported to them is a non-cognizable one. Under those circumstances, the complainant filed the complaint. The accused, according to the complainant, rendered themselves thus liable to be tried and punished under section 427 read with sections 109 and 34, Indian Penal Code. 4. Seeking the quashing of the proceedings in the above C.C. No. 842 of 1970, accused 2 and 3 filed this petition before this Court. 5. Sri Harisesha Reddy, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioners contends that the complaint on the basis of which the said C.C.No. 842 of 1970 was instituted implicating the petitioners as accused Nos. 2 and 3 was ill-founded and untenable in law and facts, that no case can be said to have been made out under S. 427, Indian Penal Code, that the utterances attributed to A-2 and A-3 are innocuous and in no way incriminate the accused in the offence alleged against them and in any case it is accused No. 1 who was alleged to have caused damage to the car of the complainant to the tune of Rs. 100 and that the petitioners have been falsely implicated out of sheer enmity. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court, Chikkarange Gowda v. Mysore State1, for the purpose of showing the distinction between section 34 and section 149, Indian Penal Code, to the effect that the leading feature of section 34 is the element of participation in action whereas membership of the assembly at the time of committing of the offence is the important element in section 149 and that the two sections have a certain resemblance and may to a certain extent overlap but it cannot be said that both have the same meaning and that in the present case the ingredients of section 34, Indian Penal Code, cannot be said to have been present on account of the words attributed to the petitioners. 7. He drew my attention to the decision of Dapti v. Puri Lal1, for the position that the High Court under section 561-A, Cr. 7. He drew my attention to the decision of Dapti v. Puri Lal1, for the position that the High Court under section 561-A, Cr. P. Code, has got inherent power to interfere with the proceedings of a subordinate Court at any stage of a proceeding if it finds that there is an abuse of the process of law. 8. The next case referred to by the learned Counsel was Nandram v. Emperor2, to the effect that where the High Court felt satisfied that on the admitted facts there is no case against the accused and where the High Court is clearly of the opinion that a further prolongation of the prosecution would amount to harassment and abuse of the process of the Court, it is the duty of the High Court to interfere under section 561-A-Criminal Procedure Code and put an end to this abuse. 9. To the same effect another decision of Abdul Wali v. Emperor3, was relied upon. 10. The propositions propounded in the aforesaid decisions and relied upon by the learned Counsel are all unexceptionable but those are all cases where the High Court was satisfied that on the admitted facts there was no case against the accused and certainly, under those circumstances, prolongation of the prosecution would amount to harassment and abuse of the process of the Court as decided in Nandram v. Emperor2. 11. The question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the expressions attributed to the petitioners herein by the complainant are such as to make out a case of an offence under section 109, Indian Penal Code and section 34, Indian Penal Code, read with section 427, Indian Penal Code, I feel that this is eminently a fit case where the Court below can conveniently go into the allegations made by the parties concerned and arrive at a conclusion and as Sri Balaiah submits placing reliance upon the decision of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab4, that ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage and that it is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. 12. 12. The decision of K.C. Sonrexa v. State of U.P.5, is also relied upon by Sri Balaiah with regard to the nature, scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was stated therein that the inherent powers are wide but on account of this very reason they are to be applied in a very careful manner and should be used only in extraordinary cases. Section 561-A is not an instrument handed over to an accused person to short circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death, whenever the Counsel feels, that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case whose picture is extremely incomplete and hazy, as the evidence has not been produced and the issues involved whether factual or legal cannot be seen in their true perspective. 13. The position can then be summed up thus: The inherent powers preserved to this High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, can be exercised only in extraordinary cases and with respect to matters not specifically provided for by the Code. They cannot be exercised for the purpose of short circuiting the case and this Court normally refrains from giving a premature decision by interfering at an interlocutory stage of a case. The Court below is in a better position to appreciate the significance of the utterances as sought to be attributed to the petitioners by the complainant and a much clearer picture of the case may emerge after the evidence is taken. 14. Under these circumstances, I feel that no case warranting the interference of this Court is made out and the petition is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. A.B.K.----- Petition dismissed.