JUDGMENT A.B.N. Sinha, J. The petitioners in all these applications along with nine persons, who have been allowed to intervene in C.W.J.C. 272 of 1969 in support of the petition, have prayed for an appropriate writ or direction restraining the respondents, in particular respondents 4 and 5, from proceeding further in the process of demarcation and fixation of boundary between the State of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in any manner which might transfer part or whole of their lands or entire villages which were hitherto within the territory of Bihar to the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners in C.W.J.C. no. 272 of 1969 and the intervenor-respondents are tenant residents of villages Gangauli and Rajapur respectively, both situate within Simri Police-station in the district of Shahabad. Their case, in brief, is that respondents 4 and 5 were illegally fixing the boundary line between the two States right across the villages of Dubha-Toufir, Gangauli Tofir and Kharah-Tanr-Toufir, which besides being in contravention of the provisions of the Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was inconsistent with several judgments and orders of civil courts or Revenue authorities determining that lands comprised in those villages appertained to the district of Shahabad in Bihar and not to Mauzas Sheopur Diar-Gangbarar and Sheopur Diar which lay completely in Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners in C.W.J.C. no. 375 of 1969, are tenant residents of Mauzas Pratappur, Jagdishpur and Parsanpah, police-station Simri, district Shahabad, and their case, in brief, is that respondents 4 and 5 were attempting to fix boundary pillars in that sector in such a way that large chunka of their lands comprised in the aforesaid villages were being cut out and formed into new villages under the names of Mauzas Sobhapur, Sahpur-Dighwar, Turk Ballia, Bijaipur, Bheekhanpura and Kassimpur for inclusion in the State of Uttar Pradesh. According to them, respondents 4 and 5 were preparing maps and fixing boundaries on the basis of the Revenue records of the State of Uttar Pradesh ignoring altogether the Revenue records of the State of Bihar and objection of the petitioners with the result that a large area of their tenancy lands comprised in their villages would stand transferred to the State of Uttar Pradesh in the name of such villages of which the petitioners and other residents concerned do not claim and have not claimed to be tenants at any time. The petitioners in C.W.J.C. no. 1064 of 1969 are tenant residents of villages Chakki Nauranga, Mosame Ojhwalia and Ishwarpura, Police-station Shahpur, district Shahabad, and their case, in short, is that though it must be taken as settled by several judgments of civil courts including that of the Privy Council and of the Revenue authorities that different blocks of lands identifiable at the spot formed part of Mauzas Ishwarpura, Sonbarsa and Ojhwalia and not part of villages Nauranga and Rampur etc., and though both in the report of the arbitrator which formed the basis of the Act as also under the Act itself it was clear that the whole of the villages Ishwarpura, Ojhwalia and Sonbarsa were to remain in the territory of the State of Bihar, respondents 4 and 5 were fixing boundary pillars in such a way that a large portion of the areas of those Mauzas was being transferred to the State of Uttar Pradesh and encouraged by the aforesaid action of respondents 4 and 5, the people of the Ballia district were giving threats to the petitioners and other tenants of their villages to dispossess them immediately after the fixation of the boundary, and in any case, by reason of the proposed transfer, the allegation is, that the petitioners and other tenants of villages Ishwarpura, Ojhwalia and Sonbarsa would be deprived of their valuable rights, such as, the occupancy rights and other incidents of tenancy attached to their lands which they had acquired under the tenancy law obtaining in Bihar, In the circumstances it has been claimed that steps being taken by respondents 4 and 5 and their staff for fixing the boundary line in the manner aforesaid was quite arbitrary and was against the decisions of several competent courts. 2. 2. From the above summary of the respective cases, it was clear that the grievance of the petitioners in all these three applications under Article 226 of the Constitution was more or less similar. The attack on the constitutional validity of the Act as also on the validity of the steps being taken by respondents 4 and 5 has also been on identical grounds. Accordingly, with the consent of the parties, the three applications have been heard together and this judgment will govern all of them. 3. In response to rule nisi calling upon the respondents to show cause why the writ or directions prayed for by the petitioners be not granted, cause has been shown by the Union of India (respondent no. 1) in all the three cases. Cause has also been shown on behalf of the Director General, Survey of India (respondent no. 4) and by the Superintending Surveyor Incharge of Demarcation (respondent no. 5) in at least C.W.J.C. nos. 272 and 375 of 1969, and their case is the same so far as C.W.J.C. no. 1064 of 1969 is concerned) though no separate show cause has been filed in that case on their behalf. It may be mentioned that respondents 4 and 5 have generally adopted the case of the Union of India and have supported the same. Though show cause petitions or affidavits have been filed in all the three cases on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh supporting the case of the Union of India and those of respondents. 4 and 5 and also on behalf of some of the tenant respondents of Sheopur Diar who figure as such in C.W.J.C. no. 272 of 1969, the real contest has been by the Union of India and respondents 4 and 5. So far as the State of Bihar (respondent no. 2) is concerned, it has satisfied itself by filing certain affidavits in C.W.J.C. no. 375 of 1969 alone wherein it has supported the case of the petitioners in that case by stating that though Diara Jagdishpur, Diara Pratappur and Diara Parsanpah as per large scale survey map of 1881-83 conducted by the Survey of India have been completely allotted to the State of Bihar under the Act, yet respondent no. 375 of 1969 alone wherein it has supported the case of the petitioners in that case by stating that though Diara Jagdishpur, Diara Pratappur and Diara Parsanpah as per large scale survey map of 1881-83 conducted by the Survey of India have been completely allotted to the State of Bihar under the Act, yet respondent no. 5 was drawing the boundary between the States of Bihu and Uttar Pradesh in such a way that portions out of the aforesaid villages were being carved out in the name of some villages which in fact did not exist in the year 1881-83 and as such have not been shown in the large scale survey map of 1881-83 conducted by the Survey of India. It has further stated that though by shifting of the course of the river Ganga between 1959 to 1968, large areas of the portions of Diara Pratappur, Diara Jagdishpur and Parasanpah had gone north to the deep stream; yet whole of those villages remained under the revenue control of the State of Bihar. Its case, in short, is that when it was found that in the map being prepared under Section 3 (4)(b) of the Act by the Survey of India, portions of the aforesaid villages which had oxtended beyond the present deep stream were not being shown as part of those villages as they should have been, the matter was brought to the notice of the Central Government at a meeting held on the 23rd of March 1969, in New Delhi, which was attended by the representatives of the two States, namely, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, but the claim of the Bihar Government for inclusion of the left out portions as part and parcel of the villages to which it belonged, was not accepted. The State of Bihar has also supported the case of the petitioners in C.W.J.C. 375 of 1969 in regard to village Kassimpur by stating that the Survey authorities, respondents 4 and 5, had illegally added to the original area of village Kassimpur by taking out lands appertaining to villages. Pratappur and Jagdishpur. The State of Bihar has also supported the case of the petitioners in C.W.J.C. 375 of 1969 in regard to village Kassimpur by stating that the Survey authorities, respondents 4 and 5, had illegally added to the original area of village Kassimpur by taking out lands appertaining to villages. Pratappur and Jagdishpur. In regard to village Shahpur Dighwar, the complaint of the State of Bihar appears to be that it may be that the Act allotted that village to the territory of the State of Uttar Pradesh, but as the State of Bihar had been exercising revenue control over the said village and had the relevant rent roll in its possession, and indeed had supplied the map of this village to respondent no. 5, it was incumbent on the authority appointed under Section 3 (2) of the Act to determine as to what constituted the relevant record within the meaning of the explanatory note to the schedule appended to the Act describing the village boundary etc. before fixing the boundary pillars showing that village with enlarged area in Uttar Pradesh. 4. Before referring to the grounds on which these applications have been resisted by the main contesting respondents, namely, the Union of India and respondents 4 and 5, it will be convenient to dispose of the controversy which appeared to arise from the stand taken up by the State of Bihar in these cases. It was submitted that whatever grievance the State of Bihar might be nursing in regard to the demarcation of the boundary between the two States in one sector or another. it could not be allowed to ventilate the same in the present applications and all that it could as a respondent do was to either support or oppose the petitioners as a whole or in part. In my opinion, this submission takes a rather technical view of the contents of the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Bihar. All that it has done is to place certain materials in support of the petitioners case in C.W.J.C. no. 375 of 1969, and it is quite clear that in the present applications no relief can be granted to the State of Bihar. The materials furnished through the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Bihar may or may not help the petitioners, but that is a different matter. 375 of 1969, and it is quite clear that in the present applications no relief can be granted to the State of Bihar. The materials furnished through the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Bihar may or may not help the petitioners, but that is a different matter. It may be that in view of the inherent weakness of the petitioners case, the State of Bihar was espousing a lost cause, but once it was impleaded as a respondent, it was open to it to support the case of the petitioners according to its own light. It may, however, be observed that if its grievances to which it has made reference in its affidavit and supplementary affidavit, were genuine and well founded, one would have expected the State of Bihar to have adopted appropriate means to get the same remedied in accordance with law. Be that as it may, there is no merit in the submission that the State of Bihar by putting in affidavit and supplementary affidavit has in any manner either transformed itself into a petitioner or was in any way claiming any relief against either the Union of India or the State of Uttar Pradesh. 5. Though the Union of India and the survey authorities, namely, respondents 1, 4 and 5 who, as mentioned already, are the main contesting respondents, have each outlined their own interpretation of boundary alignments and its delineations in those sectors with which the petitioners of these cases are concerned and have in substance supported the manner in which the boundary delineation and fixation was being done as warranted under the Act, the main ground on which these applications have been resisted by them is that no rights whatsoever, fundamental or otherwise, of the petitioners having been shown to have been infringed or threatened, the applications themselves were wholly misconceived and not maintainable. According to them, the constitutional validity of the Act in question admitted of no doubts. It merely provided for transfer of certain areas from one State to another and made consequential provisions as sanctioned under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution. These provisions in no manner affect the rights of owners or tenants of the lands so transferred. The petitioners, it was urged, in the circumstances had no locus standi to maintain these applications. 6. These provisions in no manner affect the rights of owners or tenants of the lands so transferred. The petitioners, it was urged, in the circumstances had no locus standi to maintain these applications. 6. The first question which falls to be considered is whether the petitioners have the locus standi to file the present applications under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is firmly established that as an application under Article 226 of the Constitution provides a remedy for enforcing fundamental and or other ordinary legal rights the existence of some such right in the applicant was the very foundation for the exercise of the court's jurisdiction. Though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified, there can be no doubt that before a writ of mandamus or an order or direction in the nature of mandamus as has been prayed for in these cases can be issued or made; the applicant must show that he has either alone or in common with others a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought. The applicant should be able to predicate to himself certain interest recognised and protected by law which was being or was likely to be jeopardised by the respondent unless the direction prayed for was issued, [Vide (1) Charanjit Lal Chowdhury V. the Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 46 (52); (2) State of Orissa V. Madan Gopal, 1952 S.C.R. 28; (3) Calcutta Gas Co. V. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1044, and (4) Kalyan Singh V. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1183 (1183)]. Indeed the necessity of satisfying the above test before any writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus can be issued, was not seriously disputed. V. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1044, and (4) Kalyan Singh V. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1183 (1183)]. Indeed the necessity of satisfying the above test before any writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus can be issued, was not seriously disputed. The question, therefore, is whether the petitioners in the present applications have succeeded in showing the existence of any legal right in them so as to be able to complain against the transfer of their tenancy lands from the State of Bihar to the State of Uttar Pradesh, in other words can it be said that the transfer involved in the fixation of a fixed boundary between the two States under the Act in any manner affects or abridges any of the civil rights enjoyed by the petitioners in their lands. It has been argued on behalf of the Union of India that it may be that the demarcation of the fixed boundary as required under the Act cuts through the present villages of Dabha Taufir, Gangauli Taufir and Kharhatanr Taufir (subject matter of C.W.J.C. 272 of 1969) and the portions so cut would with effect from the "appointed day" cease to be part of the territory of the State of Bihar and form part of the territory of Uttar Pradesh, or large chaunks of lands which have, since 1881-83, formed parts of Bihar villages called Diara Pratappur, Diara Jagdishpur and Parasanpah (subject matter of C.W.J.C. no. 375 of 1969) would be cut off and constituted into villages under the names of Bhikhanpura, Turk Ballia, Sahpur Dighwar, Sobhapur and Bhrigu Ashram, and form part of Uttar Pradesh as from the said date and from like date portions of Mauzas Ishwarpura, Sonbarsa and Ojhwalia (subject matter of C.W.J.C. 1064 of 1969) get added to certain villages like Nauranga and Rampur of Uttar Pradesh but that, as has been provided for in Section 26 of the Act, would not in any way affect the rights of the petitioners as tenants or owners of those lands and the Bihar laws to which they were subject at present would continue to govern them even after the transfer of the territories until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. It was thus submitted that the operation of the Act and its implementation by the survey authorities in no manner affected, infringed or abridged any of the petitioner's rights and/or interests recognised and protected by law. The learned Solicitor General of India who appeared for the Union of India for respondents 4 and 5 further submitted that in so far as the Act did not provide for any compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of the petitioners property or even a deprivation of the same the question of the said Act complying with the provisions of Article 31(1) or 31(2) did not arise, arid further, that even if it were conceded that the provisions of the Act in so far as it require the boundary pillars to be fixed on the boundary line for demarcating the "fixed boundary" between the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, it must be held that whatever small or almost negligible detriment which the petitioners might be said to have suffered on that account, was amply saved as reasonable restriction on the exercise of the petitioner's right to hold property under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. It was accordingly urged that the Act or its operation did not infringe any of the fundamental or even ordinary civil rights of the petitioners and, therefore, the present applications under Article 226 were wholly misconceived and not maintainable. In my opinion, the submissions made on behalf of the Union of India and respondents 4 and 5 are well founded and must be accepted. 7. In the case of (5) State of West Bengal V. the Union of India (1964) S.C.R. 371 (405), the Supreme Court pointed out that the federal structure was not an essential part of our Constitution and that there was no compact (?) between the States and there was no duel citizenship in India. It was also pointed out that there was no constitutional guarantee against the alteration of boundaries of States. It was also pointed out that there was no constitutional guarantee against the alteration of boundaries of States. By Article 3 of the Constitution, the Parliament is by law authorised to form a new State by redistribution of a territory of a State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State, to increase the area of any State, to diminish the area of any State, to alter the boundary of any State, and to alter the name of any State. In short, Article 3 deals with the internal adjustment inter se of the territories of the constituent states and our Constitution, it may be said, embodies in unequivocal terms the idea of "mobile" State frontiers. Indeed, the plenary powers conferred on the Parliament under Article 3 is so large and sweeping that it can go to the length of altering State boundaries even without the express consent of the Legislature of the State concerned because though by virtue of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act 1955, the President in the case of a Bill containing a proposal which affected the area, boundaries or name of any of the States has to refer the Bill to the Legislature of the State concerned for expressing its views thereon and has been given the power to specify the period at the time of making the reference and also the power to extend the period so specified, but if within the period so specified or extended any State does not express its views, the Bill may be introduced even though the views of that State have not been ascertained. It will be noticed that Article 3 does not provide for any referendum or plebiscite in the area sought to be transferred. In this context it must be held that no citizen of India enjoys any constitutional guarantee in the matter of a particular territory remaining part of one State or another. The main grievance of the petitioners, therefore, that what was their lands and in which they had acquired tenancy and other rights were being transferred to another State and that without consulting them must be held to have arisen out of a complete misapprehension of the true constitutional position. 8. The main grievance of the petitioners, therefore, that what was their lands and in which they had acquired tenancy and other rights were being transferred to another State and that without consulting them must be held to have arisen out of a complete misapprehension of the true constitutional position. 8. For the purposes of appreciating the contention raised on behalf of the contesting respondents that the transfer of the territories from the State of Bihar to the State of Uttar Pradesh or vice versa did not in any manner affect the private civil rights of the tenants or owners concerned and that the provisions of the Act were not violative of any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners, it may be convenient to read the relevant provisions of the Act after setting out briefly the background and the circumstances in which the Act came to be passed by the Parliament. 9. It appears from the affidavits filed on behalf of respondents 1, 4 and 5 that in accordance with the relevant notifications of the Government of India dated the 11th January 1867 and the 27th September 1871 and the subsequent notification dated the 27th September 1888) the deep-stream of the rivers Ganga and Ghaghra has been accepted as the boundary between the district of Shahabad (Bihar) and Ballia (U.P.) and between the districts of Saran (Bihar) and Ballia (U.P.). Due to the vagaries of nature the course of both the rivers have been fluctuating periodically with the result that the deep-stream line has been changing constantly requiring a joint verification by the authorities of the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh every year in accordance with rules framed for the purpose; Uttar Pradesh villages coming wholly or partly on the Bihar side of the deep-stream became the territory of Bihar and Bihar village going wholly or partly on the Uttar Pradesh side of the deep-stream became the territory of the State of Uttar Pradesh with consequential changes in civil, revenue and police jurisdictions. It is on record that during 1884 to 1950 as many as 192 villages bad passed either partly or completely from one State to another. It is on record that during 1884 to 1950 as many as 192 villages bad passed either partly or completely from one State to another. The result was that the shifting of the deep-stream broke up the solidarity of the villages involved and quite often it was found that the Abadi site of a village remained in one State while its culture-able area passed to another State. To make matters worse, with each change in jurisdiction, the applicability of the laws to the areas passing from one State to another except in relation to vested rights in lands, necessarily underwent a change. It was not surprising that the above state of affairs was found unsatisfactory for both the States. When after a prolonged discussion and correspondence between the Central and the State Governments, no suitable course of action could be agreed upon, it was resolved to refer the matter to the then Prime Minister of India, and it was agreed between the two States that the Prime Minister should appoint an Arbitrator who will, after giving full opportunity to the two Governments to place their points of view, report his recommendations to the Prime Minister. The two Governments further agreed to abide by the decision of the Prime Minister which he might give on a consideration of the recommendations of the Arbitrator. In this context on the 31st of May 1962, late Prime Minister, Sri Jawaharlal Nehru, appointed Sri G.M. Trivedi as an "Arbitrator", who after carefully studying and examining the relevant data and factors including holding spot verifications, submitted his report on the 28th of August 1964, to the then Prime Minister of India. The recommendations, amongst others, which were finally accepted by the Prime Minister were :- (1) There should be a fixed boundary between the districts of Shahabad and Ballia and the districts of Saran and Ballia. (2) The alignment of this fixed boundary should be as described in the annexure to the Report entitled "Description of the Boundary" and as delineated on the Map appended to the Report. (3) Detailed interpretation and demarcation of the boundary alignment on the spot will be carried out by the Survey of India in conformity with Paragraph (d) of the Preamble in the annexure to the Report entitled "Description of the boundary". (3) Detailed interpretation and demarcation of the boundary alignment on the spot will be carried out by the Survey of India in conformity with Paragraph (d) of the Preamble in the annexure to the Report entitled "Description of the boundary". (4) Responsibility for location of the positions of the boundary pillars at the spot should rest with the Survey of India. (5) The boundary pillars will be constructed and maintained by the Governments of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in accordance with Paragraphs (f) and (g) of the Preamble referred to above. Ultimately legislative sanction was given to the above recommendations by the Parliament by passing the Act in question as envisaged under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution of India. 10. The object, scope or purpose of the Act is clear from its long title and the Preamble which is "for the alteration of boundaries of the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and for matters connected therewith". Section 2 is the definition section which inter alia defines the following expressions-(1) "appointed day", (2) "deep stream", (3) "fixed boundary", (4) "law” and (5) "transferred territories". “Appointed day" has been defined to mean-the day which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint, and, "deep stream" in relation to the river Ganga or the river Ghaghra means the deep stream thereof as verified and agreed upon by the State Governments of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh after the 30th day of September of the year preceding the year in which the appointed day falls and before the 1st day of January of the year in which the appointed day falls and in default of agreement between the State Government as determined by such authority as may be specified by the Central Government. "Fixed boundary" as envisaged under the Act means the boundary line demarcated under the provisions of Sub -section (2) of Section 3 in relation to the river Ganga or the river Ghaghra, as the case may be, and, "law" has been given an inclusive definition and has been defined to include any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order, bye law, rule, scheme, notification or other instrument having the force of law in the whole or in part of the State of Bihar or Uttar Pradesh. "Transferred territories" means- (i) in relation to the State of Bihar, the territories transferred by this Act from that State to the State of Uttar Pradesh, and (ii) in relation to the State of Uttar Pradesh, the territories transferred by this Act from that State to the State of Bihar. While Sections 4 to 25 and 27 to 31 and 33 to 36 provide for the necessary supplemental, incidental and other previsions consequential on the transfer of the territories, or for the purposes of either giving effect to the provisions of the Act or for facilitating the application of any law that may be applicable to the two States in question at the relevant time, and, are not quite relevant for our present purpose, Sections 3 and 26 and the Explanatory Note to the Schedule of the Act may be set out in extenso as they have been referred to at the hearing as having some relevance on the point in issue. Sections 3 and 26 read as under :- "3. (1) As from the appointed day, (a) there shall be added to the State of Bihar- (i) All the territories of Ballia district of the State of Uttar Pradesh lying between the fixed boundary and the deep stream of the river Ghaghra, and (ii) all the territories of that district lying between the fixed boundary and the deep stream of the river Ganga, and the said territories shall thereupon cease to form part of the State of Uttar Pradesh; and (b) there shall be added to the State of Uttar Pradesh- (i) All the territories of Saran district of the State of Bihar lying between the fixed boundary and the deep stream of the river Ghaghra, and (ii) all the territories of Shahabad district of the State of Bihar lying between the fixed boundary of the deep stream of the river Ganga, and the said territories shall thereupon cease to form part of the State of Bihar. (2) The fixed boundary in relation to each of the rivers Ganga and Ghaghra shall be demarcated by an authority appointed in this behalf by the Central Government so as to be generally in conformity with the boundary line described in the Schedule in relation to that river : Provided that in the process of such demarcation, the said authority shall have power to rationalise to the extent considered necessary by him, the boundary alignment between -the high banks of the river Ganga or the river Ghaghra, as the case may be, and in particular shall try- (a) to ensure, as far as possible, the stability of the boundary pillars and the recognition of the boundary alignment both during the dry and flood seasons; and (b) to avoid, as far as possible, the splitting up of the existing Abadis. (3) For the purposes of such demarcation,- (a) the decision of the said authority on any matter relating to the interpretation of any part of the description of the boundary given in the Schedule (including the determination of the relevant record referred to in the Explanatory Note to the Schedule) shall be final ; (b) the said authority shall have power to determine the location of the points at which the boundary pillars shall be constructed and to specify the State Government which shall be responsible for the construction and maintenance of the boundary pillars at such points according to such specifications as that authority may indicate (the pillars of the same specifications being apportioned, as far as practicable equally between the two State Governn1ents), the decision of the said authority in regard to these matters being final; (c) it shall be lawful for the said authority and for any person specified by such authority to enter upon and survey any area in the vicinity of the boundary line and to do all other acts as may be necessary. (4) The authority referred to in Sub-section (2) shall also prepare a map of the transferred territories showing- (a) the deep stream of the river Ghaghra or the river Ganga, as the case may be, and the fixed boundary in relation to that river; (b) the names and boundaries of the villages in the transferred territories, as indicated by the State Government hewing jurisdiction over the territories before their transfer, with reference to the revenue records of that Government in force immediately before the preparation of such map, and forward such map to the Central Government who shall cause it to be published in the transferred territories in such manner as it thinks fit. (5) As from the appointed day, the State Government of Bihar or Uttar Pradesh shall, by order in the Official Gazette, provide for the administration of the territories transferred to that State under Sub-section (1) by including them or any part of them in such district, sub-division, police-station or other administrative unit as may be specified in the order." "26. The provisions of Section 3 shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to the State of Bihar or Uttar Pradesh shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day." The Explanatory Note to the Schedule appended to the Act describing and laying down the alignment of the fixed boundary between the two States, whether in the Ganga sector or in the Ghaghra sector reads as under :- "The village boundaries and names mentioned in this Schedule have reference to boundaries and names as shown in the sheets of large scale surveys covering relevant areas of Saran and Shahabad districts of the State of Bihar and Ballia district of the State of Uttar Pradesh, conducted by the Survey of India during the period 1881-83, and where such sheets are not available as shown in any other record which the State Governments of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh agree to be relevant within one month from the commencement of this Act, or in default of such agreement, which the authority referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 may determine to be the relevant record. The Ganga and Ghaghra rivers and their high banks where-ever mentioned in this Schedule have reference to the geographical river of high bank positions, as the case may be, as shown in the survey records mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs." 11. Mr. Willis in his book Constitutional Law of the United States (page 472) has pointed out that "there are three main methods whereby disputes between the States as such may be settled. The first method is by direct legislation by Congress. This method is applicable only where Congress has a jurisdiction to act,...... The second method is by means of litigation in the Courts. The United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over cases in which a State is a party.... The third method is that of inter-State compacts. 'This method is available both for justice-able and non-justiciable disputes, and both when the Federal Government has no power and when the Federal Government has a concurrent power." As is clear from the report on the boundary dispute between Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Volume 1) by the Arbitrator Sri C.M. Trivedi when the State Governments concerned Could not agree upon a suitable course for replacing the deep stream boundary by a fixed boundary, they ultimately agreed to refer the matter to the then Prime Minister of India and they further agreed to abide by the decision of the Prime Minister which he might give on a consideration of the recommendations of an arbitrator to be appointed by him. On the then Prime Minister accepting the recommendations summarised in Paragraph 9 above, the Parliament stepped in and gave legislative shape to those recommendations under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution of India. We thus find that though the boundary dispute between Uttar Pradesh and Bihar can be said to have been settled ay the first method spoken by Will is in the passage quoted above, namely, by direct legislation within the competence of the Parliament, its genesis is essentially rooted in some sort of a compact between the two States. The disputants thus were the two States and not individual citizens of either State and the Act embodies a settlement of the said dispute. Under such circumstances, it will be curious if the provisions of the Act were to affect any of the rights of the individual citizens residing in one State or another. The disputants thus were the two States and not individual citizens of either State and the Act embodies a settlement of the said dispute. Under such circumstances, it will be curious if the provisions of the Act were to affect any of the rights of the individual citizens residing in one State or another. Indeed, there are provisions in the Act which show quite clearly that the private rights of the citizens whether residing in the districts of Saran and Shahabad in Bihar or in the district of Ballia in Uttar Pradesh are not at all affected by the alteration of the boundaries of the two States with effect from "the appointed day" as provided for in the Act. The entire objective behind the Act is to have a "fixed boundary" between the two States in both the Ganga and the Ghaghra sectors and thereby replace the deep stream boundary rule which has been in force since 1867 or 1888. This objective has been sought to be achieved by (1) providing for the demarcation of deep stream in relation to the river Ganga or the river Ghaghra in the manner laid down in Section 2(c) which defines "deep stream", and (ii) by providing for the demarcation of the "fixed boundary" as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act on the basis and in the manner laid down in Sub-sections 2, 3 and 4 of Section 3 of the Act. Once the "deep stream" and the "fixed boundary" are demarcated as required under the Act, Sub-section (1) of Section 3 comes into play and all territories of Ballia district of the State of Uttar Pradesh lying between the fixed boundary and the deep stream of the river Ghaghra or the river Ganga, as the case may be, stand added to the State of Bihar and ceased to form part of the State of Uttar Pradesh, and, likewise, all territories of Saran and Shahabad districts of the State of Bihar lying between the fixed boundary and the deep stream of the river Ghaghra and of the river Ganga respectively stand added to the State of Uttar Pradesh and ceased to form part of the State of Bihar. It is, however, clear from the provisions of Section 26 of the Act quoted above that the transfer of territories from one State to another of diminution of the area of one State and corresponding increment in the area of another will not be deemed to affect any change whatsoever in the law which might be governing the transferred territories, and, thus so far the rights of the petitioners in their lands which may cease to be part of the State of Bihar are concerned, they will continue to be governed by the same laws as are governing them at present; and "law" as it appears from its definition in Section 2(e) has been given a very comprehensive connotation. It follows that the provisions of the Act far from taking away or altering the rights of the petitioners in their lands saves them in express terms subject always to the powers of the competent legislature or any other competent authority to alter or amend the said law. It may, however, be taken as well settled that except under a valid law passed by a competent legislature, none of the vested and substantive rights of the petitioners in their lands such as they exist today can be taken away, but that eventuality may occur whether the lands of the petitioners remain part of the territories of Bihar or stand transferred to Uttar Pradesh. That private rights of the petitioners in their lands which might get transferred to the State of Uttar Pradesh by and under the scheme of the Act will remain un-effected is further made clear by that is provided in Section 3(4) of the Act. That subsection requires the demarcating authority to prepare a map of the transferred territories and Cause (b) thereof as quoted above states that the names and boundaries of the villages in the transferred territories will be shown in that map on the basis of the revenue records of that Government which had jurisdiction over these territories before their transfer. This provision should allay the fears of the petitioners that in respect of their villages their names and boundaries such as they are in the revenue records of Bihar will be continued. This provision should allay the fears of the petitioners that in respect of their villages their names and boundaries such as they are in the revenue records of Bihar will be continued. Under the Act, therefore, not only the private rights of the petitioners in their lands are, saved, even the names of their villages and their boundaries will be such which are borne out by the revenue records maintained by the State of Bihar. 12. On behalf of the petitioners, it was, however, argued that when under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3, the demarcating authority had powers to rationalise the boundary alignment to the extent considered necessary by him, it must be held that it was clearly intended that the said power to rationalise was to be exercised with reference to objective factors, and maintaining the integrity of the petitioners villages was one such objective factor, and thus the demarcating authority should be directed to draw the boundary demarcation in such a way that the lands which formed part of one village be not cut off to form part of another village and vice versa. In my opinion, this submission is wholly untenable. In the first place, there is nothing in the Act to warrant that merely because in the process of demarcation of the fixed boundary, a portion of one village is cut off and stands transferred to a State to which it did not formerly belong, the portions so cut off will either be merged with another village or be given a different description or nomenclature. In the second place, it is obvious that the power to rationalise conferred on the demarcating authority is necessarily related to the nature of the work entrusted to the said authority. This is clear from the particular objects for which the power to rationalise the boundary alignment will be exercised by the demarcating authority, namely, to ensure, as far as possible, the stability of the boundary pillars and recognition of the boundary alignment in all seasons and to avoid again, as far as possible, the splitting up of the existing Abadis of the villages. It is clear that while splitting up of Abadis has to be avoided by the demarcating authority as far as possible, the Legislature has advisedly omitted to mention splitting up of the arable or waste lands that might appertain to a particular village. It is clear that while splitting up of Abadis has to be avoided by the demarcating authority as far as possible, the Legislature has advisedly omitted to mention splitting up of the arable or waste lands that might appertain to a particular village. Indeed, it appears to me that apart from the two cases where the demarcating authority will exercise its power of rationalising the boundary alignment, it has very little choice in the matter. One of the recommendations of the Arbitrator appointed by the Prime Minister in pursuance of a compact between the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh as has been referred to in Paragraph 9 above, and which has been incorporated into the Act in the shape of the Schedule to the same, was that the alignment of the fixed boundary should be as described in the Annexure to the Arbitrator's report under the heading "Description of the Boundary", and as delineated on the map appended to the said report. A cursory glance through the Schedule to the Act is sufficient to show that whether in the Ganga sector or in the Ghaghra sector, the boundary line to be drawn has been specified with minutest details and precision. Under the several paragraphs of the Schedule, the boundary line is required to be drawn in straight lines connecting successive points having specified latitude and longitude, and as required by Sub-section (2) of Section 3, the demarcating authority has to demarcate the boundary in such a way as was generally in conformity with the boundary line described in the Schedule in relation to one river or another. In the very nature of things, however, the demarcating authority making the demarcation at the spot had to be invested with the power to rationalise the boundary alignment either because of the requirements of the terrain or in favour of any of the two purposes mentioned in the proviso and referred to above. 13. Another alleged grievance of the petitioners on which considerable stress was given at the hearing was that the demarcating authority, namely, respondents 4 and 5, did not appear to be inclined to accept and take into consideration several inter parties civil court judgments and decisions of the survey authorities rendered from time to time determining in effect the boundaries and extent of some of the villages with which the petitioners were concerned. It was urged that those civil court judgments and decisions of the survey authorities constituted relevant records within the meaning from the Explanatory Note to the Schedule quoted above in extenso in Paragraph 10 the village boundaries and names mentioned in the Schedule have reference to boundaries and names as shown in the sheets of large scale surveys covering relevant areas of Saran and Shahabad districts of the State of Bihar and Ballia district of the State of Uttar Pradesh, conducted by the survey of India during the period 1881-83. It, however, provides that in cases of those villages whose boundaries and names do not find mentioned in such sheets of large scale surveys conducted during 1881-83, reference will be made to such other records which the State Governments of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh might agree within one month from the commencement of the Act as being relevant for the purpose, in default of such an agreement, the demarcating authority has to determine for himself as to what constituted the relevant records. Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act lays down that the decision of the demarcating authority on any matter relating to the interpretation of any part of the description of the boundary given in the Schedule (including the determination of the relevant record referred to in the Explanatory Note to the Schedule) shall be final. It is obvious that the occasion for the demarcating authority to decide for himself as to what constituted the relevant record for the purposes of interpreting or elucidating any part of the description of the boundary given in the Schedule, or for determining the names or boundaries of certain villages which find mentioned in the Schedule, but do not find mentioned in the sheets of large scale surveys of 1881-83, will only arise in absence of an agreement between the State Governments of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in that regard as envisaged in the Explanatory Note. No materials whatsoever have been placed in these cases to show that any such occasion ever arose or the demarcating authority exercised the power vested under Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 3, as mentioned above, on irrelevant or extraneous grounds. No materials whatsoever have been placed in these cases to show that any such occasion ever arose or the demarcating authority exercised the power vested under Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 3, as mentioned above, on irrelevant or extraneous grounds. In the circumstances, it will be wholly academic to determine whether the civil court judgments or decisions of the survey authorities referred to on behalf of the petitioners did or did not constitute the relevant records within the meaning of the Explanatory Note. In this connection certain averments made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India which have remained un-rebutted may be conveniently referred to. It has been stated in Paragraph 6 of the said affidavit that "the boundary line as described in the Schedule to the Act which provides the general guideline to the demarcating authority under Section 3(2) has been described in terms of the villages abutting on the line on either side" thereof with reference to the approximate latitude and longitude of the successive points on the line. It has been further stated that "the boundary in certain places follows the bed of the river as it existed during the survey of the area in 1881-83, but in certain places it departs from that bed so as to place in one or other State certain villages from the other side of the river bed as it existed in 1881-83". These villages were, however, of two categories; (i) those which are shown in the 1881-83 survey sheets and (ii) those which had existed earlier than 1881-83, but did not exist as separate villages during those years, because "due to reverine action, the latter villages had been thrown up on the other side of the river or had gone into the river bed by the time the 1881-83 surveys took place. The villages thrown up on the other side were included in the adjoining villages of the other State and had not been surveyed as separate village in 1881-83. The villages thrown up on the other side were included in the adjoining villages of the other State and had not been surveyed as separate village in 1881-83. The boundaries of such villages are, therefore, not available in the 1881-83 survey sheets." Nonetheless for the purposes of demarcating the boundary line, it must have" been felt that it was necessary to locate the boundary and names of those villages as well, and presumably it was on account of this factor that in absence of any agreement between the State Governments of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh as to with reference to which records the names and boundaries of these villages had to be identified the demarcating authority was invested with the power under Clause (a) of Section 3(3 read with the Explanatory Note to the Schedule of the Act to determine for himself as to what should constitute the relevant record for that purpose. Prima facie it follows that only such records which indicated or helped to indicate the boundaries or names of the second category of the villages referred to above, that may be reasonally described. as relevant records for the purposes envisaged under the Explanatory Note to the Schedule, and in the circumstances, it appears to me that the judgments of civil courts and/or of survey authorities, inter parties or otherwise, and, necessarily dealing with the rights of the parties to those litigations can hardly be described as relevant records to be taken into consideration for the purposes identifying or determining the boundaries and names of villages which did not exist during the period of the survey operations in 1881-83. Be that as it may in the instant cases, the petitioners having no locus standi to maintain these applications as found above and no specific decision purported to have been arrived at by the demarcating authority on the question as to what constituted the relevant records with the meaning of the Explanatory " Note to the Schedule having been placed therefore us, the point as raised on behalf of the petitioners that the various civil court judgments and decisions of survey authorities constituted the relevant record for the purposes of ascertaining the names and boundaries of such villages which did not exist during the survey operation in 1881-83, need not be pursued any further. Suffice it to mention that in view of the object, scope and true nature of the Act; as discussed above, or of the power vested in the demarcating authority to determine as to what would constitute the relevant record for the purposes of identifying the boundaries and names of such villages which did not find mention in the sheets of large scale surveys of the period 1881-83, the civil court judgments or decisions of the survey authorities as have been referred to on behalf of the petitioners, prima facie, can not be said to constitute such relevant record as is contemplated under the Explanatory note to its schedule of the Act. 14. Lastly, on behalf of the petitioners, though the legislative competence of the Parliament to pass the enactment in question under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution was not and could not be challenged, it was strenuously urged that the provisions of the Act infringed the petitioners fundamental right to property as enshrined in Article 31(2) of the Constitution, and on that ground alone the Act was fit to be struck down. Apart from the fact that there is no merit at all in this submission, it may be pointed cut at the very outset that none except those whose rights are directly affected by law can raise the question of constitutionality of that law [vide (i) Charanjit Lal's case, A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court 41(44)]. The following observation of Hughes] in (6) McCabe V. Atchison, [(1941) 235 U.S. 151] was quoted by the Supreme Court with approval: “It is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are persons of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established of injury to the complainant not to others which justifies judicial interference”. In view of my finding that the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain these applications, therefore, it is not open to the petitioners to canvass the question of the constitutionality of the Act. It is the fact, clearly established of injury to the complainant not to others which justifies judicial interference”. In view of my finding that the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain these applications, therefore, it is not open to the petitioners to canvass the question of the constitutionality of the Act. Moreover, it is equally settled that the Court will not enter upon the question of constitutionality of a law, if it is possible to dispose of the case and determine the rights of the parties before it, on other grounds. This principle, it may be mentioned has been more or less strictly applied so much so that even in cases which may lead to multiplicity of proceedings, it has been strictly adhered to [Vide (7) State of Bihar V. Hardat Mills (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 378); (8) Shagir Ahmad V State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 728); (9) Sheshdhari V. D.M. (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 747)]. Nonetheless, as the question that Article 31 (2) of the Constitution had been infringed by the provisions of this Act was debated at length at the hearing, it may be shortly disposed of. It was urged that in so far as the Act neither provides for compensation nor specifies any principle on which and the manner in which compensation for that portion of the petitioners land over which the boundary pillars in the process of demarcating the boundary between the two States had been or were going to be fixed, it must be held that Article 31 (2) of the Constitution was clearly violated. This submission assumes that there is something in the Act which provides for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of any portion of the petitioner's property. This in my opinion, is wholly an erroneous assumption. Under Clause (b) of Section 3 (3) of the Act; power has been conferred on the demarcating authority to determine the location of the points at which boundary pillars shall be constructed and also to specify the State Government which shall be responsible for the construction and maintenance of the boundary pillars so constructed, and Section 32 (1) of the Act, inter alia, provides that it shall be lawful for that State Government which has been made responsible for the construction of any boundary pillar under Sub-section (3), of Section 3, referred to above, to cause such pillar to be constructed and maintained. Sub-section (2) of Section 32 provides for joint inspection of the boundary pillars by the State Government of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and Sub-section (3) makes any wilful removal or injury to the boundary pillar so constructed punishable with imprisonment etc. There is no doubt, therefore, that in the process of the demarcation of the boundary, the Act provides for the fixation of boundary pillars, but that by itself does not amount to any taking of the petitioners property either by acquisition or by requisitioning by the State, and unless as laid down in Clause 2A of Article 31, a law provided for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the Stale or to a corporation owned or Controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of the property, even though the previsions of law might in some respect amount to deprivation of a property of any person. It was held in (10) Jennie A. Willink V. United States [60 Layers' Edition U.S. Supreme Court Reports (572)] that:- “1. Something more than the location of a harbour line across the land of a riparian owner on a navigable and tidal stream is essential in order to amount to a taking of his property and its appropriation to a public use." Apart from this, in my opinion, there are provisions in the Act itself which clearly show that under the Act there is no transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State, or to any corporation owned or controlled by the State. Reference may be made in this connection to Clause (c) of Section 3(3) and to Section 32(1) itself. Clause (c) of Section 3(3) provides that it shall be lawful for the demarcating authority or for any person specified by such authority to enter upon and survey any area in the vicinity of the boundary line and to do all other acts as may be necessary. In like terms Section 32(1) provides as already mentioned that it shall be lawful for the State Government which is made responsible for the construction of any boundary pillar to cause such pillar to be constructed and maintained. In like terms Section 32(1) provides as already mentioned that it shall be lawful for the State Government which is made responsible for the construction of any boundary pillar to cause such pillar to be constructed and maintained. In my opinion, these provisions leave no doubt that the ownership of possession of the property over which the boundary pillars are to be fixed continues with the persons to whom the property belongs. Indeed, but for the provisions of Clause (c) of Section 3(3), it would have been unlawful for the demarcating authority or for any person specified by such authority to enter upon and survey an area in the vicinity of the boundary line or to do any other act as may be necessary in that connection. This clause is clearly intended to save the demarcating authority from being guilty of trespass. Likewise, but for the provisions of Section 32(1) it would have been unlawful for the State Government to undertake the task of construction of any boundary pillar because that would have amounted to a trespass upon another's land. Granting, however, that the petitioner can be said to have been deprived of that little bit of his property over which the boundary pillars have been fixed or are going to be fixed, the said deprivation must be held to be fully in consonance with Article 31 (1) read with Article 19 (5) of the Constitution, there being no doubt that the fixation of the boundary pillars, on the facts and circumstances of the cases was in the interest of the general public where is yet another aspect from which this question can be disposed of. It is true that neither the body of the Act nor the Schedule anywhere give the size or the dimension of the pillars to be fixed, but judicial notice can be taken of the general practice that boundary pillars occupy a very small bit of area only, and there is no reason to suppose that in the present case the demarcating authority will depart from the general practice. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the well known maxim "de minimis non curat lex", the law does concern itself with trifles, must be held applicable to this case, and on that ground alone this part of the submissions of the petitioners should be repelled. 15. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the well known maxim "de minimis non curat lex", the law does concern itself with trifles, must be held applicable to this case, and on that ground alone this part of the submissions of the petitioners should be repelled. 15. To conclude, it must be held that under our Constitution there being no guarantee to the territorial integrity of the constituent states, and the Parliament being fully competent to alter the boundaries of one state or another, as it pleases, and none of the rights of the petitioners in the lands which are to be transferred from the district of Shahabad in Bihar to the district of Ballia in Uttar Pradesh having been in any manner affected by the provisions of the Act which were in no manner violative of any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners, these applications are wholly misconceived and must, therefore, be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 1.500/- payable equally by the three sets of the petitioners in these three applications. MISRA, C.J. I agree Application dismissed.