JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - These are two connected writ petitions arising out of assessment proceedings under the U.P. Sales Tax Act (hereafter referred to as the Act). Faqir Chand is the petitioner in both the cases. 2. On 10-1-1957 the Sales Tax Officer, Agra issued a notice to the petitioner under Section 21 read with Rule 41 (5) for the assessment year 1955-56. It was stated in the notice that it had come to the notice of the officer that, Faqir Chand had remitted huge sums of money to his Calcutta firm. There was reason to believe that the said money was paid by Faqir Chand towards purchases of leather purchased from outside U.P. and sold by him at Agra. Faqir Chand was, therefore, directed to appear before the officer with his accounts, failing which assessment would be made for the assessment year 1955-56. A similar notice was sent to Faqir Chand on 13-2-1957 with reference to the assessment year 1954-55. The petitioner protested against these notices. The Sales Tax Officer, Agra, however, made best judgment assessments on 31-1-1959 for the two assessment years. For each year tax amounting to Rs. 21,875/- was assessed on a turnover of Rs. 14,00,000/-. These assessments were upheld in appeal and in revision by the judge (Appeals), Sales Tax, Agra and the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, Agra respectively. Faqir Chand has, therefore, filed the two writ petitions challenging these orders of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 3. The first contention of Mr. Brijlal Gupta appearing for the petitioner is that respondent No. 1 was wrong in basing assessment for each year on the turnover of the assessment year itself. The relevant turnover was that of the previous year, and not of the assessment year. 4. A dealer is liable to tax under Section 3 of the Act. According to Section 3 as it stands at present, the liability for each assessment year is with reference to the turnover of the assessment year. But formerly the plan of Section 3 was different. According to Section 3 as it stood before 1956, a dealer was liable to tax for each assessment year on the turnover of the previous year. Sec. 3 was amended with effect from 1-4-1956. In the present cases we are concerned with assessment years 1954-55 and 1955-56. But formerly the plan of Section 3 was different. According to Section 3 as it stood before 1956, a dealer was liable to tax for each assessment year on the turnover of the previous year. Sec. 3 was amended with effect from 1-4-1956. In the present cases we are concerned with assessment years 1954-55 and 1955-56. Both the assessment years were governed by Section 3 of the Act, as it stood before the amendment. Mr. Brijlal Gupta is, therefore, right in his contention that for these assessment years liability ought to have been fixed on the turnover of the previous year. 5. In Writ No. 1748 of 1967, Annexure C is a copy of the notice dated 13-2-1957. It was mentioned in the notice that it related to assessment year 1954-55. In paragraph 2 of the notice the petitioner was directed to bring his books of account for 1954-55. Annexure D is a copy of the assessment order dated 31-1-1959. In paragraph 4 of the assessment order it was stated that the dealer had remitted Rs. 13 lakhs and odd during the year-1954-55 to his firm at Calcutta. Ultimately, the turnover was fixed at Rs. 14,00,000/- for purposes of best judgment assessment. It is thus clear that assessment for the year 1954-55 was made on the basis of the turnover for the assessment year itself. Similarly, assessment for the year. 1955-56 was based on the turnover for that assessment year. This procedure was not in accordance with the plan of Section 3, as it stood at the material time. 6. Mr. R.M. Sahai appearing for the respondents relied upon Rule 39. This rule appears in Chapter VIII dealing with submission of returns and calculation of turnovers and assessment of tax. Rule 39 deals with election of assessment year. Subrule (1) of Rule 39 states :- "Any dealer, may elect to submit returns of his turnover of the assessment year in lieu of the returns of the turnover of the previous year. and shall signify such election in the return filed by him in Form IV : Provided that a dealer who did not carry on business during the whole of the previous year shall elect to submit his returns of the assessment year." 7. and shall signify such election in the return filed by him in Form IV : Provided that a dealer who did not carry on business during the whole of the previous year shall elect to submit his returns of the assessment year." 7. According to Rule 39, a dealer may choose to submit a return of the turnover of the assessment year itself instead of turnover of the previous year as required by Sec. 3. In that case the turnover of the assessment year is to be deemed to be the turnover of the previous year for purposes of Sec. 3. Mr. R. M. Sahai suggested that the petitioner might have exercised his option under Rule 39. That was why assessment was based on the turnover of the assessment year itself. 7A. Orders of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the point under discussion was not raised by the petitioner before those authorities. Had the petitioner raised the point, respondent No. 1 would have met the point by appropriate action. The petitioner could be invited to exercise his option. Or the proceedings could be amended by calling upon the petitioner to submit accounts for the previous year. These assessment proceedings commenced in the year 1957. The present writ petitions were filed in this Court in the year 1967. The petitioner cannot be allowed to raise this point before the Court after this lapse of time. 8. Another contention of Mr. Brijlal Gupta was that the authorities were not clear whether the petitioner was the proprietor or a partner of the assessee firm. The notice dated 13-2-1957 was addressed to Faqir Chand personally. In the assessment order Messrs. India Leather House, Agra was described as the dealer. Mr. Brijlal Gupta pointed out that, although notice was issued against an individual, tax was assessed against a firm. The Sales Tax Officer appears to have made assessment on the footing that Faqir Chand is the sole proprietor of the firm India Leather House. Annexure F in Writ No. 1748 is a copy of the order of respondent No. 3 dismissing the two connected revisions. On page 6 of the judgment respondent No. 3 observed that the assessee had a tendency to change names without apparent rhyme or reason. Annexure F in Writ No. 1748 is a copy of the order of respondent No. 3 dismissing the two connected revisions. On page 6 of the judgment respondent No. 3 observed that the assessee had a tendency to change names without apparent rhyme or reason. On page 7 of the judgment respondent No. 3 observed that Faqir Chand and his son created confusion by frequent changes in the name of the firm. On page 11 of the judgment respondent No. 3 observed :- "Sri Faqir Chand, as proprietor or partner of India Leather House, Hing Ki Mandi, Agra took delivery of those goods and sold them for cash to customers. . . " Mr. Brijlal Gupta, therefore, contended that respondent No. 3 was not sure whether Faqir Chand was proprietor or partner of India Leather House, Agra. 9. In paragraph 1 of the writ petitions it is stated that the petitioner was a partner in the firm called India Leather House, Calcutta up to March 31, 1956. This statement of the petitioner involves two admissions. Firstly, the firm India Leather House was in existence throughout the assessment years 1954-55 and 1955-56. Secondly, the petitioner was at least a partner of the firm. This is not a case where a petitioner complains that he had nothing to do with the firm, which has been assessed to sales tax. If the petitioner was the sole proprietor of the firm, the notice under Section 21 had to be sent to the petitioner. If the petitioner was merely a partner, the notice could be sent to the petitioner as a representative of the firm. On any view of the matter, no illegality was committed by respondent No. 1 by passing an assessment order against the firm after serving a notice upon Faqir Chand. 10. Order 21, rule 50, C.P.C. states :- "(1) Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted- (a) ........... (b) against any person .... who has admitted on the pleadings that he ......a partner ........" According to this provision, a decree against a firm can be executed against a person, who was admitted to be a partner of the firm. (b) against any person .... who has admitted on the pleadings that he ......a partner ........" According to this provision, a decree against a firm can be executed against a person, who was admitted to be a partner of the firm. In the present case the petitioner was admitted to be a partner of the firm `India Leather House, Agra.' It, therefore, appears that on the principle of Order 21, rule 50, C.P.C., recovery proceedings against the petitioner would be permissible. 11. Thirdly, Mr. Brijlal Gupta contended that in the circumstances of the case no action could be taken under Section 21 of the Act. If no return has been filed by a dealer, the situation is governed by sub-Sec. (3) of Section 7 of the Act, and not by Section 21 of the Act. 12. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to quote Secs. 7 (3) and 21 of the Act. Sec. 7 provides for determination of turnover and assessment of tax. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 7 lays down that a dealer has to submit returns of his turnover at fixed intervals. Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 7 states :- "If no return is submitted by the dealer under sub-Sec. (1) within the period prescribed in that behalf or, if the return submitted by him appears to the assessing authority to be incorrect or incomplete, the assessing authority shall, after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, determine the turnover of the dealer to the best of his judgment and assess the tax on the basis thereof : Provided that before taking action under this sub-section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of any return submitted by him." 13. Sec. 21 deals with assessment of tax on the turnover not assessed during the year. Sec. 21 states :- (1) If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer has, for any reason, escaped assessment to tax for any year, the assessing authority may, after issuing a notice to the dealer, and making such enquiry as may be necessary, assess or re-assess him to tax; .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. (2) No order of assessment under sub-Sec. (1) or. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. (2) No order of assessment under sub-Sec. (1) or. under any other provision of this Act shall be made for any assessment year after the expiry of four years from the end of such year : Provided that where the notice under sub-Sec. (1) has been served within such four years the assessment or re-assessment to be made in pursuance of such notice may be made within one year of the date of the service of the notice even if the period of four years is thereby exceeded ......" 14. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Sugan Chand Shyam Lal, 1970 A.L.J. 895. A Full Bench of this Court observed on page 899:- "...... on the failure of the assessee to furnish his return, the turnover 'escaped' assessment and it was open to the Sales Tax Officer to proceed either under Section 7 (3) or under Section 21 ........" On the authority of the Full Bench decision, it must be held that in the present case it was open to respondent No. 1 to take action either under Section 7 (3) or under Sec. 21. 15. For both the assessment years in question respondent No. 1 issued notices under Section 21 of the Act. The notice for the assessment year 1955-56 was under Section 21 read with rule 41 (5) . It is, therefore, necessary to examine the plan of rule 41. 16. Rule 41 deals with submission of returns and assessment. Sub-rule (3) of rule 41 runs thus :- "If no return is submitted in respect of any quarter or month, as the case may be, within the period .... the Sales Tax Officer shall, after making such enquiries as he considers necessary, determine the turnover to the best of his judgment, provisionally assess the tax payable for the quarter or month, as the case may be........" The plan of rule 41 (3) resembles the provision of Section 7 (3) . Sub-rule (5) of rule 41 states :- "Upon the expiry of the assessment year the Sales Tax Officer shall, after such enquiry as he may deem necessary, determine the turnover of the assessment year and shall assess tax thereon." Annexure E in Writ No. 1749 is a copy of the assessment order for 1955-56. Sub-rule (5) of rule 41 states :- "Upon the expiry of the assessment year the Sales Tax Officer shall, after such enquiry as he may deem necessary, determine the turnover of the assessment year and shall assess tax thereon." Annexure E in Writ No. 1749 is a copy of the assessment order for 1955-56. That order opened thus :- "The dealer carried on business in tanned leather. He did not file any returns. He was therefore assessed under rule 41 (3) to a tax of Rs. 12,812/8/- on a net turnover of Rs. 8,20,000/- vide assessment order dated 24-3-1956 passed by my predecessor-in-office. .... Upon the expiry of the assessment year, his case is being taken up for final assessment under rule 41 (5) .......... The language of this order suggests that action had been taken under Section 7 (3) of the Act. 17. According to the Full Bench decision, action is permissible either under Sec. 7(3) or under Sec. 21. Mr. Brij Lal Gupta pointed out that there are certain differences between the provisions of the two sections. He, therefore, urged that these provisions are discriminatory and are, therefore, void. Reliance was placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Anandji Haridas and Co. v. S. P. Kasture, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 565. In that case the Supreme Court examined the provisions of C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act (No. 21 of 1947). The Court noticed that the Act permitted action both under Section 11 (4) (a) and under Sec. 11-A (1) . Although Sec. 11-A of that Act contained a provision about limitation, there was no limitation for action under Section 11 (4) (a) . It was, therefore, held that Section 11 (4) (a) of that Act was discriminatory, and consequently liable to be struck down under Art. 14. 18. Sec. 21 lays down that assessment proceedings may be initiated after issuing a notice to the dealer. Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 7 does not prescribe any such notice in a case where no return has been submitted by a dealer. Mr. R.M. Sahai pointed out that, although Section 7 (3) does not refer to any notice in a case where no return has been.submitted, action can be taken after making such enquiry as the Sales Tax Officer considers necessary. Mr. R.M. Sahai pointed out that, although Section 7 (3) does not refer to any notice in a case where no return has been.submitted, action can be taken after making such enquiry as the Sales Tax Officer considers necessary. Similarly, under subrule (3) of rule 41 the Sales Tax Officer determines turnover after making such enquiry as he considers necessary. According to Mr. R.M. Sahai, the requirement about holding an enquiry involves the issue of a notice to the dealer as expressly mentioned in Section 21 of the Act. 19. Sec. 7 (3) and Section 21 are parts of the same statute. Sec.. 7 (3) does not indicate the scope of the enquiry mentioned in it Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, the Court should adopt that interpretation which will upheld constitutionality of the statute. In order to avoid a grievance about discrimination, the enquiry contemplated by Section 7 (3) and by rule 41 (3) may be said to involve a notice to the dealer before passing an assessment order. 20. No limitation has been prescribed in Section 7 (3) itself. But it is clear from sub-Sec. (2) of Section 21 that the prescribed period of limitation of four, years governs assessment under sub-Sec. (1) of Section 21 as well as assessment under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 7. There is no difference in the two provisions as regards the normal period of limitation of four years. 21. It was however, pointed out for the petitioner that the proviso to sub-Sec. (2) of Section 21 introduces a difference. If notice under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 21. has been served within four years, assessment may be completed within one year of the date of the service of the notice even if the period of four years is thereby exceeded. Thus in certain cases -falling under Section 21 the period of limitation may in practice extend up to five years. 22. Mr. R.M. Sahai pointed out that in the present cases assessment orders were passed by respondent No. 1 on 31-1-59. That was within four years of the close of the assessment year 1954-55 and the close of the assessment year 1955-56. In the present cases the question of the extended period. of limitation under the first proviso to sub-Sec. (2) of Section 21 does not directly arise. 23. That was within four years of the close of the assessment year 1954-55 and the close of the assessment year 1955-56. In the present cases the question of the extended period. of limitation under the first proviso to sub-Sec. (2) of Section 21 does not directly arise. 23. It is true that there is some difference in the procedures indicated in Section 7 (3) and Sec. 21. But every difference in procedure is not necessarily discriminatory for purposes of Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 21 makes an express provision for a show cause notice to the dealer. Sec. 7 (3) does not contain an express provision for notice in cases where no return has been filed. But by implication a requirement about notice in Section 7 (3) also may be assumed. The normal period of limitation is the same (four years) under both the provisions. Neither of these two provisions can be said to be discriminatory. Sec. 7 (3) and Section 21 are both valid. 24. Upon this view, it makes little difference whether we treat the assessment proceedings in question as proceedings under Section 7 (3) or proceedings under Sec. 21. Upon either view, the proceedings were valid. 25. Thus, all the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner fail. In my opinion, the two writ petitions should be dismissed with costs. H. N. Seth, J. - I agree. 26. By the Court-Both the writ petitions are dismissed with costs.